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Abstract
If freedom is thought of as an opportunity concept, what value does it have for 
individuals who are unable to take advantage of their opportunities because of 
ignorance or poverty? If one concedes that individuals ought to be granted certain 
basic liberties, then there must also be a corresponding effort to empower individuals 
in their pursuit of the good; for to be free without all-purpose means such as wealth 
and income is to have the worth of (^ e ’s freedom eroded. This simple theme, I argue, 
inspires egalitarian liberalism, whereby the state plays an active role in empowering 
individuals to pursue their self-chosen ends. Although this argument is advocated by 
the likes of Rawls and Berlin, the current literature pays insufficient attention to its 
force. In this thesis, I make amends for that omission. I infer certain social obligations 
from a commitment to negative liberty; I consider this mbric in the context of four 
variants of egalitarian liberalism; and I propose an array of social policies that flow 
from broader considerations on the worth of liberty.
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Freedom and the Pursuit of the Good
Exercising an Opportunity Concept
“No-one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of 
others, for each may seek happiness m whatever way he thinlcs fit, so long as he does not 
infringe upon the freedom of others t%,pursue a similar end which can be reconciled with the 
freedom of everyone else.” - Immanuel Kant ’
' Kant, I., ‘On the Relationship of Theory to Practice in Political Right’, Kant’s Political Writings, 
Reiss, H., (ed.), Nisbet, H.B., (trans.), Cambridge University Press, 1970, p.74.
Introduction - The Analysis of ^Liberty’
“Only that which is without histoiy can be defined.” -  Friedrich Nietzsche^
‘Freedom’ and ‘liberty’ have roughly the same meaning in the English language. A
brief examination of the etymology of each word explains this synonymy. The porous
nature of the English language has resulted in the absorption of vocabulary with
Germanic, Nordic, Celtic, and French roots. Whereas ‘free’ derives from the Anglo%Saxon ‘freo’ (explaining the existence of ‘frei’ in German), ‘liberty’ derives from the 
Old French ‘liberté’, and originally from the Latin ‘liber’. There may have been subtle 
differences in the root meaning of these terms. In all likelihood, the term ‘liber’ 
originally referred to the status of a group or tribe, as in the citizens of a Republic, 
who were at liberty to generate and live by a system of laws designed to reflect their 
primary interests. By contrast, the Anglo Saxon term more explicitly alludes to the 
absence of bonds or chains on the individual (for example, the Icelandic term ‘frjals’, 
which also derives from a Germanic root, literally means ‘having a free neck’).  ^ Yet, 
it would obfuscate matters if we were to insist on any current literal distinction 
between ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ -  as the English language has evolved, the two 
expressions have come to be used interchangeably. I shall not attempt to alter this 
convention.
The analysis of language is perhaps the most appropriate starting point for an 
investigation into the idea of freedom. This approach became prominent during the 
middle of the 20^ '^  Century, following the lead of J.L. Austin. It was argued that the 
core meaning of a term could be discerned by considering how it is employed in 
everyday language. Flowever, as I will ultimately demonstrate, the analysis of 
language can take our understanding of freedom only so far, for it is incapable of 
resolving problems of incoherent or divergent usage.
Let us try to build up a basic picture of what liberty means by testing our intuitions 
against an array of hypothetical situations in which the term ‘free’ is employed:
Nietzsche, P., On The Genealogy o f Morals, Smith, D., (trans.), Oxford University Press, 1996.
 ^ Kjistjansson, K., Social Freedom, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p .9
® The prisoner had been locked in the dungeon and was no longer free.
© In the modern liberal state, atheists are free from legal persecution.
* I was a new person, free from the drugs that had shackled my existence.
Is it possible to discern a common root among these divergent uses of the term ‘free’? 
We might say (by way of an opening remark) that the term ‘free’ refers to the absence 
of some repressive or constraining force or obstacle, and hence that it is characterised 
by ‘a genuine negativeness’ As Alan Ryan points out,
“[Freedom] takes its meaning from the absence of something which might have been 
present but isn’t. The negativeness involved is that we can always ask the question 
‘what might we have had to free him from?’ or ‘what might have stopped him being 
free to do it?” ^
Returning to the above examples, the prisoner in the dungeon is constrained by the 
walls that limit his oppoitunities; for the prisoner, freedom is the absence of 
imprisoning walls. Or again, an atheist living in a liberal democracy is not oppressed 
by heresy laws -  his freedom is defined in terms of the absence of censure. Finally, 
the freedom of the reformed drug addict is manifest as the absence of insatiable 
cravings. Thus, the absence of a constraining force or obstacle is arguably the essence 
of liberty.
In addition to the ‘negativeness’ of the concept of freedom outlined above, ordinary 
language analysis seems to reveal a positive component. Thus, a man is free from 
drug addiction in order to live according to his ‘real will’. Or again, being free from a 
social obligation to worship God allows us to be open about oui' secular beliefs. Now, 
if fr eedom refers not only to the holding off of some oppressive force, but also to the 
capacity ‘to do’, does this not mean that freedom is composed of a triadic relationship 
involving both a negative and positive component? Perhaps at root liberty is a triadic 
concept; X seeks to be free from Y in order to do Z. This is the contention of Gerald 
MacCallimi.*^ For MacCallmn, a concept of liberty cannot simply be articulated 
around the XY or XZ axis (i.e. as ‘freedom from’ or ‘freedom to’) since such a
Ryan, A. ‘Freedom’, Philosophy, 1965, p. 110 
 ^ Ryan, A. ‘Freedom’, Philosophy, 1965, p .llO
 ^ MacCallum, G. C., ‘Negative and Positive Freedom,’ Philosophical Review, vol. 76, 1967
characterisation serves only to “emphasise one or the other of two features of every 
case of the freedom of agents.”  ^ Consequently, anyone who argues that ‘freedom 
from ' or that ‘freedom to' is the only ‘true’ definition of liberty, is misguided:
“It would be far better to insist that the same concept of freedom is operating 
throughout, and that the differences, rather than being about suhat freedom is, 
are for example about what persons are, and about what can count as an 
obstacle to or interference with the freedom of persons so conceived.”^
%MacCallum believes his triadic formulation will generate considerable conceptual 
clarity amidst the ideological disputes that plague discussion on liberty. He wants to 
rid competing concepts o f liberty of their flesh, leaving only an uncontested skeletal 
structure; at least this way, he suggests, ideologues can be sure they are arguing about 
the same thing.
Yet, MacCallum’s efforts are ultimately unsuccessful. Whilst his analysis indicates 
certain structural features about the way in which we use the term ‘free’ in our 
language, he does not provide us with an adequate concept or definition of liberty. 
The triadic structure of ‘freedom’ as it is used in our language actually says very little 
about a given concept of freedom; it does not establish (as MacCallum contends) that 
there is only a single concept of liberty. Indeed, MacCallum’s search for conceptual 
clarity serves only to purge different formulations of liberty of their substantive 
content and hence of their distinctive meaning. Concepts of liberty are identified by 
their particular take on human beings and their interests, as we will see when Berlin’s 
historical approach is discussed.
MacCallum’s under-developed analysis is exposed when we come to consider the 
value of freedom. As Berlin argues: “A man struggling against his chains or a people 
against enslavement need not consciously aim at any definite further state. A man 
need not know how he will use his freedom; he just wants to remove the yoke.”  ^ In 
other words, freedom is valued inasmuch as it permits choice in a general sense. The 
slave who seeks liberation values liberty as a means to many possible ends, that is, as
H bid .,p .318  
® Ibid., p.320
 ^ Berlin, I ,  ‘Two Concepts o f  Liberty,’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.xliii
a general oppoitunity to act, not as a means to some specific end (as MacCallum 
implies when he claims that one is free to do Z). Consequently, for the slave, the plea 
for freedom is adequately expressed in terms of X being free (or unfree) from Y.'® 
MacCallum’s framework therefore fails to appreciate the value that we plaee on being 
free to choose. Whilst we must distinguish between freedom and choice, and whilst 
choice is not a sufficient condition for the existence of freedom (for I may be forced 
to choose), the value o f freedom derives from our desire to choose uncoerced and 
unthreatened.
Yet, it is not only MacCallum who finds error in the analysis of ordinary language. 
Other commentators such as Alan Ryan maintain that our linguistic practices reveal a 
distinctly evaluative dimension to a given understanding of liberty. For instance, it is 
clahned that the term ‘free’ always renders a positive appraisal; in using it, I will be 
endorsing something, not merely conveying a factual point. As Ryan points out, 
whilst I might claim that my savings are ‘tax-fi’ee’ I would not seriously claim that 
they are ‘profit-free’; whereas tax is viewed as a burden to be avoided, profit is 
actively sought. Or, as Berm and Weinstein argue, “we congratulate ourselves on 
being free from care, poverty, and fatigue; but cannot correspondingly complain that 
we are free from nourishment, riches, or rest.”^^  However, the evaluative use of the 
term ‘free’ does not always hold. For instance, when 1 state that ‘I’m free to meet you 
tomorrow’ I am primarily making a factual statement pertaining to my availability. 
The statement conveys neither that 1 am pleased nor displeased - the evaluative 
dimension is absent. It may well be that the meeting is necessary but entirely 
loathsome, meaning 1 will meet grudgingly. Ordinary language does not demonstrate, 
then, that a positive evaluation is always implicit in our use of the term ‘free’.
The inadequacy of linguistic analysis becomes even more exposed when we come to 
examine the nature of constraint. For instance, some would argue that if I am 
prevented from leaving my office by a locked door I am clearly unfree, irrespective of 
how that door came to be locked. This position largely accords to the argument 
advocated by Hobbes, for whom any physical obstacle is potentially freedom denying
We should note, by contrast, that it is insufficient only to express the XZ axis; whenever X is free to do Z, he is 
also ïxc&from Y. Freedom must always involve the absence o f some constraining factor.
Ryan, A. ‘Freedom’, Philosophy, 1965, p. 103
Benn, S.I., and Weinstein, W.L., ‘Being Free to act, and Being a Free Man’, Mind, 1980, p. 19512
(at least insofar as it can cause some kind of blockage). A man is unfree when an 
avalanche blocks his exit from a cave, just as he is unfree when imprisoned by the 
state. Notwithstanding Hobbes’s peculiar idea that inanimate objects can be the 
possessors of liberty,^^ this understanding of freedom is supported (or at least not 
disqualified) by ordinary language. If I am trapped in a cave by an avalanche then it 
seems 1 am not free to leave. Yet, others would prefer to say that in this instance 1 am 
merely unable to leave. There seems to be no means of settling this argument by 
reference to ordinary language alone, since there are examples of both uses of the 
term ‘free’ in our' language. To thi# extent, linguistic analysis is uninformative. Even 
Austin, the great advocate of ordinary language analysis accepts that ‘sometimes we 
do ultimately disagree’ over the meaning of words and that other factors must be 
considered ‘if  our interests are more intellectual than the o r d i n a r y T h e  impotence 
of ordinary language analysis to settle such disputes is its greatest weakness. In short, 
it has no way of resolving problems of incoherent or divergent usage.
The comprehensive conceptual properties of freedom are difficult to derive from 
ordinary language analysis because of the term’s diverse application and its 
metaphorical extension. When we consider that the prefix ‘free’ can be applied to 
speech, action, merchandise, provisions, states, citizens, and choices, we might agree 
with S.Ï. Benn that; “No neat set of necessary and sufficient conditions could be either 
discovered or even plausibly stipulated for the proper use of ‘freedom’, which would 
embrace such diversity.” '^ As such, freedom as a political concept must admit of 
certain boundaries, which are not commonly respected by the varied and diverse ways 
in which the term ‘freedom’ is used in our language. Heidegger was surely right when 
he observed that ‘freedom is not merely what common sense is content to let pass 
under this name.’
For Flobbes, a flow o f  water blocked by an impediment could accurately be described as having its liberty taken 
away.
Austin, J.L. ‘A Plea for Excuses’ quoted in Kristjansson, K., “Social Freedom,” Cambridge University Press, 
1996, p. 175
Benn, S.I., A Theory o f  Freedom, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 123 
H eidegger, M ., The E ssen ce  o f  Truth, Continuum  International Publishing, 2 0 0 2 .
Divergent Concepts of Freedom
It would seem from the indeterminacies of linguistic analysis that ‘liberty’ cannot be 
pinned down as a single concept. We have already noticed that our use of this term in 
everyday language is diverse and often contrasting. As such, we should think about 
different concepts of liberty, which are located in different historical epochs, linguistic 
contexts and ideological traditions. These criteria serve to distinguish distinct 
understandings of fr eedom.
To give an example of an historical criterion, Benjamin Constant distinguished 
between the ‘liberty of tlie ancients’ and the ‘libeify of the modems’. Roughly 
speaking, the former involved the ‘active and constant participation in collective 
power’: deliberating in the public square over war and peace; legislating for the 
common good; calling fellow citizens to account for their actions. Yet, for Constant, 
this notion of liberty was potentially a danger to individual sovereignty, since it 
involved ‘the complete subjection of the individual to the authority of the 
community.’ By contiast, the liberty of the modems consists of ‘private enjoyment 
and private independence’; it exists in the pursuit of our particular interests. Yet, this 
liberty is not without its loss either, since the modems are ‘lost in the multitude’ -  
their political influence is imperceptible.'^
Theorists such as Quentin Skiimer and Philip Pettit have developed the idea of the 
‘libeify o f the ancients’ into a concept that is now commonly referred to as 
‘republican freedom’.'^ Briefly, republican freedom is held to be a property of both 
states and individuals. Historically, a state was said to be free in the sense that it was 
able to resist aggessive monarchical states and the tyiannous powers of the Church. 
As Machiavelli wiites, free states “are far from all external servitude, and are able to 
govern themselves according to their own wilL” '^ Within the republic, individuals are 
fr'ee inasmuch as they are entitled to mn for public office and contribute to the
Constant quoted in ‘The Liberty o f  the Ancients and the Liberty o f  the Moderns’, Political Thought, Rosen M., 
Wolff, J., (eds.) Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 122 
Pettit, P., Republicanism: A Theory o f  Freedom and Government, Clarendon Press, 1997; Skinner, Q, ‘The 
Republican Ideal o f  Political Liberty’ Political Thought, Rosen, M. and Wolff, J., (eds.), Oxford University,Rress, 
1999, p. 169
Machiavelli quoted in Skinner, Q., ‘The Republican Ideal o f  Political Liberty’, Political Thought, Rosen M., 
Wolff, .T., (eds.) Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 167
legislative process. Note that the freedom of the citizen is not dependent on active 
participation in democratic government (à la Constant), only the opportunity to 
participate in government, which is conferred by the legal status of citizenship.^^ At 
root, then, the republican idea of freedom is tied to a conception of citizenship in 
which all have an equal moral standing under law, to be contrasted with the morally 
subordinate subjects of an absolute ruler. This builds on the historical distinction 
made between Tiber’ and ‘servus’, or citizen and slave. Tins is the idea of liberty as it 
was understood in the city-states of the ancient world; it is contextualised by a 
specific linguistic heritage (Latin), Ideological tradition (republicanism) and historical 
timeline (Ancient Rome).
There is also evidence to suggest that Constant’s conception of Tiberty of the 
moderns’ is too broad to accurately represent the idea of freedom in the post- 
Enlightenment world. By the 19* Century, the period during which Constant wrote, 
two very different modern concepts of liberty had emerged, both of which were 
distinct from republican freedom. The first, which had its roots in the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition, conceived of liberty in terms of the opportunity to act; freedom was 
synonymous with license. The second, which had a continental origin, cast liberty as 
obedience to the moral law; individuals were said to be free when acting in 
accordance with their most fundamental purposes. This dichotomy has been 
conceptualised by Isaiah Berlin as negative freedom and positive freedom.
These two concepts are said to express fundamentally different, and often 
incompatible, views of human freedom. Positive liberty is a thesis on the importance 
of self-determination and responds to the question ‘By whom am 1 governed?’ 1 am 
free insofar as 1 am my own master, in charge of my own destiny, able to follow my 
most important plans and initiatives. Constraints on positive liberty might include 
fears, irrational desires, and immoral cravings. Negative freedom, by contrast, 
considers the question ‘To what extent am 1 governed?’ Here, a man is said to be free 
to the degree that he has the opportunity to act without the external interference of 
another person or group. Constraints on negative liberty take various forms: physical 
violence, restraint, compulsion, threat and legal prohibition.
For an expansion o f this idea, see Pettit, P., Republicanism: A Theory o f  Freedom and Government, Clarendon 
Press, 1997, p .52; Knowles, D., P olitical Philosophy, Routledge, 2001, p .85-86
Whilst Berlin is convinced that the distinction between positive and negative liberty 
‘is neither trivial nor confused,’ he also accepts that the two concepts ‘cannot be kept 
wholly distinct’? ' There are certain conceptual commonalities: “the essence of the 
notion of liberty, both in the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ senses, is the holding off of 
something or someone -  of others who trespass on my field or assert their authority 
over me, or of obsessions, fears, neuroses, irrational forces -  intruders and despots of 
one kind or a n o t h e r . T h i s  concession is crucial, for it implies there is a relationship 
between positive and negative freedom. Indeed, if  positive freedom is concerned with 
the question ‘By whom am 1 governed?’ and if, by implication, a man is not free who 
cannot govern himself, then we must establish what constraining factors limit this 
freedom. It may well be that 1 do not have the vrill power, or that 1 do not have the 
required intelligence, or that 1 am dominated by my passions. Yet, it may be that my 
inability to become my own master stems from the interference of others, in which 
case the denial of my positive freedom occurs as a result of the denial of my negative 
freedom. This point is implicitly recognised by Berlin:
“I wish to determine myself, and not be directed by others...my conduct 
derives an irreplaceable value from the sole fact that it is my own, and not 
imposed upon me. But 1 am not, and cannot expect to be, wholly self- 
sufficient...! cannot remove all the obstacles from my path that stem from the 
conduct of my fellows...if I am not to be dependent on others in every 
respect, 1 shall need some area within which I am not, and can count on not 
being, freely interfered with by them.”^^
In this passage, Berlin suggests that self-masteiy is contingent upon a degree of 
negative freedom, meaning the two concepts of liberty are linked. If 1 am to act in 
accordance with my self-determined goals (positive freedom), then I will require a 
minimum of (negative) freedom to realise this. To this extent, both positive and 
negative freedom are noble ideals. Yet, Berlin also saw a darker side to the liberation 
of human beings: the ethic of self-government, which underlies the concept of 
positive freedom, has often been transmuted into a doctrine of authority. Berlin argues
Berlin, L, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.xliii 
Ibid, p.xliii; p. 158
Berlin, I., ‘Introduction,’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.xliii
this has occurred historically because of the association between ‘self-mastery’, the 
‘bifurcated self and ‘monistic rationalism’. These terms will be explained shortly. 
Before proceeding, however, I should outline how my thesis will develop.
In Section I, I more or less uphold Berlin’s critique of self-mastery. 1 suggest that the 
notion of the bifurcated self is inimical to a liberal concept of freedom, which ought to 
deal solely with the revealed preferences of individuals; these preferences are 
sovereign in terms of the ends at which freedom is directed. To this extent, I make a 
case for negative freedom, which i%roughly defined as the opportunity to act without 
being coerced or compelled by other people. Though this concept of liberty is 
generally thought amenable to classical liberalism or libertarianism, 1 aim to show that 
it can be used to justify progressive social policy. Indeed, 1 argue that a concept of 
negative liberty promotes the type of egalitarian liberalism that has become 
increasingly influential over the last fifty years.
In Section II, 1 consider the broader relationship between egalitarian liberalism and 
the concept of negative liberty itself. Specifically, 1 assess the contribution of four 
liberal theorists -  Joseph Raz, Alan Gewirth, Isaiah Berlin, and John Rawls -  who 
each acknowledge the importance of supplementing liberty with all-purpose means 
such as wealth and income. Each author argues that personal freedom is worthless 
unless one has the capacity to advance one’s ends within a given social structure. 
However, though allied by this common belief, the four theorists I consider are 
importantly different in other ways: they disagree on the justification and value of 
liberty. These differences shall be filled out later.
Section III deals with the type of institutions that flow fiom the broader argument. It 
is suggested that certain social goods must support freedom if it is to be meaningfully 
exercised by individuals. Each of the authors discussed in Section II hints at how 
these social goods might be institutionalised in a modem liberal democracy, but none 
explore the substantive implications of their argument at any length; they deal largely 
with abstract justifications. The purpose of the last section, then, is to work out 
concrete social policies that are consistent with the view that liberty ought to be 
supported by a network of social goods. 1 vaiiously consider the role of health care, 
employment, and education in relation to a system of basic liberties. 1 touch upon the
10
type of support that is necessary to empower individual choice, and I .examine the 
reach of that choice.
11
Section I -  Concepts of Liberty
The analysis of language is a useful tool that can deepen our understanding of the idea 
of freedom. However, considered in isolation, it is unlikely to provide us with a fully 
developed concept of liberty; we must also locate an idea within a philosophical or 
political tradition. Hence, the history of ideas is an important source for our 
conceptual investigation; different ideological currents have placed diverse slants on 
the definition of liberty, not all of% hich have been coherent or indeed liberal. This 
point is made most eloquently by Isaiah Berlin, arguably the foremost historian of 
ideas in the 20* Century. His essay on negative and positive freedom is perhaps the 
most influential work on the subject since Mill wrote ‘On Libeity’. Nonetheless, 
critics argue that Berlin’s essay is bound by its historical context and that many of its 
central themes are no longer current or valid. My aim is to persuade the reader 
otherwise; while Berlin’s work is undoubtedly weakened by ambiguities and 
unwarranted generalisations, it makes four essential claims about liberty:
© Freedom ought not to be confused with other concepts such as power or equality.
® Freedom as self-mastery is potentially illiberal because it second-guesses the actual 
desires of human beings.
* The law always places restrictions on libeity.
© If personal freedom is to be worth anything at all, it must be accompanied by 
appropriate social conditions that enable individuals to advance their ends.
Each of these points requires significant explanation and development, wliich I will 
undertake in the first three chapters o f this thesis. Let it be said, however, that the 
development of a concept of liberty along these lines is a necessary first step in my 
general argument, which holds that a system of basic liberties ought to be 
complemented by an array of social goods if  individuals are to be empowered in their 
pur suit of a conception of the good. In other words, liberty by itself is not enough; 
individuals need additional capacities to take advantage of their freedom.
12
Chapter 1 -  The Corruption of the Liberal Ideal
“All we can know for certain is what men actually want.”
“ Berlin, ‘Tolstoy and Enlightenment’^ '^
Introduction - Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty
The broader aim of this chapter is to assess the validity of Berlin’s critique of positive 
liberty. Though 1 suggest that the*»4elationship between self-mastery and ‘monistic 
rationalism’ is more complicated than Berlin would care to admit, I broadly support 
his suspicion of positive freedom and the doctrine of the divided self. 1 aim to 
demonstrate that a liberal should not find meaning in a hierarchy of inner selves 
(higher or lower; true or false) or believe that there can ever be a political solution to 
the experience of inner conflict. Human beings are what they are, and liberalism deals 
only with what human beings say they want. Their preferences can be contested, 
doubted, even denied, but to use coercion in order to liberate them is always 
illegitimate. The revealed preferences o f ordinary men and women must be the limit 
and the arbiter of all practical politics. In short, liberalism must accept what people 
say they want. Positive freedom cannot inform a liberal agenda because it is either 
coercive or perfectionist.
Self-Mastery as a Doctrine of Authority
According to Berlin, self-masteiy is attained only when we act autonomously, in 
accordance with a rational plan for life:
“1 wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, conscious 
purposes, which are my own, not by causes which afreet me, as it were, from 
outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer...[capable] of conceiving 
goals and policies of my own and realising them...! wish, above all, to be 
conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for
24 Berlin, I., Russian Thin/cers, (London; Hogarth Press, 1978)
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my choices and able to explain them by reference to my own ideas and 
purposes.”^^
Yet, for Berlin, this altogether honourable notion of self-mastery is easily debased, 
and has historically been transmuted into a doctrine of authority. This transformation 
has not only been of academic importance; down the ages, seemingly benign ideas 
have been manifest as sinister political realities. Indeed, it was because of such a 
political reality that Berlin decided to write his famous polemic on freedom - it was 
the effrontery of the Soviet dictatorship’s claim to liberate its citizens that fuelled his 
opposition to the idea of positive fi eedom.^^ Berlin’s critique of self-mastery was thus 
delivered as a riposte to Marxist claims that only communism could deliver ‘true 
freedom’.
For the Marxist, freedom only comes with the classless society, a vision that exists 
just beyond the horizon; until then, apologists claim, we must accept that a socialist 
dictatorship will mle in the real interests of man. Berlin’s suspicion of this promise 
echoes that of the Russian critic Alexander Herzen. We cannot write off the current 
generation in the name of a glorious future. Life is characterised by the here and now, 
which is how we must live. Human life is fragile and should not be sacrificed to some 
far-off goal. What use is ‘the ironic promise that after your death life on earth will be 
splendid’? Will you toil in the fields, knee-deep in mud, all in the name of ‘Future 
Progress’? Such an unlikely pledge should malce people cautious: the aim, endlessly 
fai-, is but a snare. The goal must be nearer -  at the very least ‘the labourer’s wage’, or 
‘pleasure in work performed’.
Yet, Berlin’s most profound objection to the Marxist programme is not simply that 
coercion has often been justified in the name of some hazy, distant dream. Rather, he 
offers a critique of enlightened rationalism, a doctrine in which the ‘true’ purpose of 
humanity is deemed to be ascertainable by the insights of gifted men. Such indeed is 
the burden of Marxism, or perhaps its saboteur s, who attribute a scientific validity to
25 Berlin, I., ‘ Two Concepts of Liberty,’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 131 Berlin uses 
various expressions to convey the generic idea o f  self-mastery, namely: self-direction, self-control, rational self- 
direction, self-government and self-realisation. Me appears to use these terms interchangeabl}-.
Berlin first heard o f  this doctrine upon visiting the Soviet Union in 1945.
Herzen, A., ‘From the Other Shore’, Selected Philosophical MGrlcs, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956, 
p.363
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their argument and label those who refute its truth as ignorant or misguided or subject 
to false consciousness. From this dangerous premise, a paternalistic vision follows, 
where fools and the uninformed are ‘educated’ in order to ‘liberate’ them from their 
ideological prison; and if  they do not submit to this liberation willingly, then they 
must be forced to be free. However, as Berlin points out, once I take this view “I am 
in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, 
toiture...in the secuie knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man...must be 
identical with his freedom.”''^  The logic of the Marxist argument, then, is to espouse 
an Orwellian oxymoron - coercion liberates.
This type of argument is not only dangerous in the hands of materialists. Idealists 
have also justified coercion in the name o f liberty, and hence similarly debased the 
idea of positive freedom. Great names like Plato, Rousseau, and Hegel have all 
affirmed some sort of coercive vision. For the Idealist, freedom is attained when the 
higher ‘rational’ self controls the lower ‘sensual’ self. This doctrine becomes truly 
menacing when a conception o f rationality is employed that is loaded with ‘monistic’ 
assumptions about truth. Berlin describes these assumptions as follows:
“First, that all men have one tiue purpose, and one only, that of rational self- 
direction; second, that the ends of all rational beings must of necessity fit into a 
single universal, harmonious pattern, which some men may be able to discern 
more clearly than others; third, that all conflict, and consequently all tragedy, is 
due solely to the clash of reason with the irrational or the insufficiently rational -  
the immature and underdeveloped elements in life -  whether individual or 
communal, and that such clashes are, in principle, avoidable, and for wholly 
rational beings impossible; finally, that when all men have been made rational, 
they will obey the rational laws of their own natures, which are one and the same 
in them all, and so be at once wholly law-abiding and wholly free.”^^
For Berlin, when idealists combine the doctrine of the bifurcated self with a 
commitment to monistic rationalism, coercive prescriptions almost always follow. If 
the higher rational self can discern the one true goal of humanity, and yet if some men 
choose to ignore this goal (being subject to the oppression of false desires), then they
-® Ibid., p. 133
Berlin, I., ‘Two Concepts o f  Liberty,’ F'our Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p .154
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should be set free, liberated from their errant purposes. Coercion, therefore, increases 
the liberty o f such men, since they do not know what is good for them. It is in this 
sense that Berlin claims the ideal of positive freedom has been corrupted: freedom as 
self-mastery has been twisted to the extent that it has become a “specious disguise for 
brutal tyranny."^'' Thus, positive liberty, which began as a doctrine of freedom, 
ultimately becomes a doctrine o f oppression; it stipulates that the True’ interests of 
men must take priority over their actual interests.
Berlin is concerned that any re%pants of negative freedom may ultimately be 
consumed by the attempt to establish monistic trutlis of reason or morality, science or 
history. This danger does not merely lurk in the damp recesses of a philosopher’s 
study - all too often this doctrine has been manifest at a practical political level. The 
Soviet dictatorship is an obvious example, but European history is littered with the 
corruption of liberty. For instance, when Rousseau, writing in 18* Centuiy France, 
fused the idea of republicanism with his own naive idealism, he concluded that liberty 
and authority would coalesce, so long as the former is articulated in terms of the 
General Will. By this idea, the individual is assimilated into the social whole and 
subjected to the authority of the community. Soon enough, the works of Rousseau 
became, with Robespierre, the ‘blood stained weapon’ that destroyed the ancient 
regime, replacing it with a system of government that perpetrated persecution and 
cruelty - and all in the name of liberty.
For Berlin, Rousseau’s mistake was to confuse two distinct questions: whereas ‘By 
whom am 1 governed?’ considers the type of authority 1 am subject to, ‘How much am 
I governed?’ asks about the extent of that government’s authority. And whilst 
Rousseau’s heavily democratic answer to the first question might be admired, his 
argument does not, for all that, protect against the persecution of individuals. As a 
counterweight to this threat, Berlin argues for specific liberties to be upheld by law - 
there must be a bare minimum of personal freedom, an inviolable area of private life 
into which the state and other persons cannot be allowed to encroach. At the very least 
freedom of religion, opinion, expression, and property must be protected against 
arbitrary invasion. In this fashion, the individual is protected against oppressors,
Berlin, I., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.xlvii, p.l31
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in'espective of whether the oppressor is an absolute monarch or the enforcer of the 
General Will. It is indeed this concern, raised by liberals down the ages, that has given 
rise to the puisuit of certain safeguards, guarantees of private frontiers that no 
government can cross. It is exactly this freedom, wiitten-off by Marxists as bourgeois 
morality, which, for Berlin, ensures the virtue of liberalism.
A Rejoinder to Berlin
Despite the undeniable popular success of Berlin’s polemic, many critics remain 
unconvinced by its argument. For C.B. Macpherson, Berlin is inconsistent regarding 
the legitimacy of self-mastery. This inconsistency derives from the association made 
between monistic rationalism and positive liberty. As Berlin argues:
“Pluralism, with the measure of ‘negative’ liberty that it entails, seems to me a 
truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek in the great, 
disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of ‘positive’ self-masteiy by 
classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind. It is truer, because it does, at 
least, recognise the fact that human goals are many, not all of them 
commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another.”'^ '
This is Berlin’s classic view of value conflict, in which monism is denounced and 
pluralism celebrated. Yet, within this statement there are several contestable 
assertions, one of which is the problematic insinuation that positive freedom is 
inherently monistic. In his essay ‘Berlin’s Division of Liberty’, C.B. Macpherson 
maintains that Berlin’s take on enforceable rational freedom is a ‘brilliant analysis’ 
and accepts that there “is no doubt that the concept of positive liberty t e . . .  been used 
to deny the very freedom for human self-development that it began by invoking.”^^  
Nonetheless, he opposes Berlin’s deep suspicion of self-mastery, and, in particular, 
the attempt to categorise positive libeity as inherently monistic. The basic case 
assembled by Macpherson is that whilst enforceable rational freedom should be 
rightly rejected as both incoherent and immoral, the fundamental idea of freedom as
Berlin, L, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 171
Macpherson, C.B. ‘Berlin’s Division o f  Liberty,’ Dem ocratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, Clarendon Press, 
1973, p. 107 Many o f  the points made by Macpherson in his paper can be found in the arguments o f  other authors 
e.g. West, D., ‘Spinoza on Positive Freedom’ Political Studies, 1993, 284-96.
17
rational self-direction is entirely legitimate?^ The essence of rational self-direction “is 
the ability to live in accordance with one’s own conscious purposes, to act and decide 
for oneself rather than to be acted upon and decided for by others.” "^^ Portrayed in this 
light, self-mastery is as ‘humane’ as negative freedom. For Macpherson, there is no 
quality inherent in self-mastery that requires it to be articulated in a monistic fashion; 
there is no reason why rational self-direction must imply “conformity to a preordained 
cosmic order.”^^  Macpherson ar gues the idea of rational self-direction is open to the 
idiosyncrasies of individuals, and to the disparate, multifarious ends they pursue; 
rationality is here conceived instruri^^ntally, called upon only as a capacity to examine 
the means to our valued ends. For Macpherson, then, rational self-direction, or self- 
mastery, is not inconsistent with pluralism. Just because I am guided by rational 
thought does not mean my ends will be identical to yours.
In fairness, Berlin does not recommend a blanket dismissal of positive freedom; rather 
he points to the inherent flaws of monism, which propagates the false belief that the 
central truths of life cannot conflict.^^ Yet, tliis plea is undermined by his consistent 
efforts to link monism with the concept of self-mastery; indeed these efforts reveal a 
genuine inconsistency in his work. If positive freedom is, in Berlin’s own words, “a 
valid universal goal,”^^  then he must retract his insinuation that self-mastery is 
inherently monistic. Berlin insists the monistic doctrine is incoherent (insofar as it 
denies that conflict exists between values), which renders it a false, and presumably 
invalid, pursuit. Thus, a given species of positive freedom cannot be both monistic 
and ‘a valid universal goal’ at the same time. In the end one of these characteristics 
must give, and if, as Macpherson demonstrates, positive freedom can be constituted 
pluralistically, then we have to abandon Berlin’s ultimate thesis: positive liberty might 
often have been cast as a monistic doctrine, but this is not necessarily so.
Macpherson was not the first to articulate this view. Indeed, Maurice Cranston, writing before Berlin, 
differentiates between two types o f  self-mastery. The first, which is not necessar ily harmfirl, might be described as 
rational self-discipline. Here, freedom is attained by overcoming one’s weaknesses or mastering one’s base 
desires; it is to this extent a private ethic. The second, which Cranston tenns enforceable rational freedom , is more 
malevolent. This doctrine is manifestly political; it suggests that force and coercion are valid tactics in the 
promotion o f  rational Ireedom. It is this vision that we find in - among others - Spinoza, Rousseau, rmd Hegel. See 
Cranston, M., Freedom, Longmans, 1967 (orig. 1955}
Macpherson, C.B. ‘Berlin’s Division o f  Liberty,’ Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, Clarendon Press, 
1973, p.109 
Ibid. p .i n
Berlin, L, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.lviii, note 1 
Ibid, p.xlvii
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Yet, even if freedom as self-mastery is not inherently monistic, the concept is 
malleable and has the potential to become authoritarian. This is the less rigid and less 
dogmatic argument that Berlin pursues in ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’. Whilst the 
metamorphosis from liberty to authority could equally have occurred with negative 
fr eedom, the notion of self-mastery has been more amenable to this transformation, in 
both doctrine and practice.^^ The notion of rational self-mastery, which is based upon 
the idea of a man divided against himself, is conducive to the faulty reasoning that 
leads to enforceable rational freedom. This doctrine allows us to travel (more easily 
than with negative liberty) from the#eely  chosen ideals and policies of the individual 
to the coercive ideals and policies of a higher entity - the State, or the Party, or the 
Chui'ch, say. The image here is that of a Irigher rational authority ruling over a lower 
deviant will.
To make this point more strongly, the very notion of self-mastery would seem to 
imply a divided self: it expresses the idea of a self as both master and mastered. If one 
maintains that fr eedom is a matter of mastering some oppressive tendency within, 
perhaps a lower non-rational self or our reckless passions, one is already committed to 
a dualistic conception of the human being. If self-mastery is attained by obedience to 
the correct type of authority, we are already committed to a dichotomous view of the 
legislating self and the self that obeys. Thus, whilst there is no intrinsic connection 
between self-mastery and monism, there is certainly an authoritarian dimension to the 
doctrine of the bifurcated self.
On the Dangers of the Divided Self
In a famous paper, Charles Taylor attempts to establish the validity of freedom as self- 
mastery.^^ A man is free only insofar as he is the autonomous shaper of his own life, 
and is not motivated by alien desires of any kind. He is free to the extent that he can 
explain his action with reference to his own ideals, to the extent that he can control his 
own life. Freedom refers not only to the absence of external constraints that prevent 
me from pursuing my prefeired way of life, but also to the absence of internal barriers 
-  compulsions, phobias, obsessions, illusions, ignorance, and irrational frais. For
Berlin, I., ‘Two Concepts o f  Liberty,’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 134, p.xliv 
Taylor, C., ‘What’s wrong with Negative Liberty’, Liberty, Miller, D., (ed.) Oxford University Press, 1991
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instance, suppose I have an irrational fear, which is preventing me from doing 
something that I consider valuable, say, taking a flight to visit an old friend. Now, it 
seems likely that Î would experience this fear as a constraint, and hence I would be 
freer if I were not affected by it. This occurs because I do not associate the fear with 
my true self, and consider that I would not lose any important part of my personality if 
I were without it. That is to say, we experience our pui-poses and desires as 
qualitatively discriminated, as higher or lower, significant or trivial; and since some of 
our puiposes will be more important than others, our freedom is at stake when we find 
ourselves carried away by a less sigpifrcant goal (such as the avoidance of air travel) 
at the expense of a more important one (such as visiting a friend). In short, our 
freedom presupposes the ranking of our desires in terms of their overall importance in 
oiu lives.
Now, this is all well and good, but Taylor goes frulher and asks whether in ranking 
our desires we necessarily choose correctly; that is, whether we always favour our 
most important desire. According to Taylor, we cannot be content with a theoiy that 
allows for discrimination between purposes without introducing the notion of second- 
guessing, for we cannot accept that “there may be inner obstacles to freedom, and 
yet...not admit that the subject may be wrong or mistaken about these.”"*® Taylor 
claims that we can experience certain feelings and psychological processes 
mistakenly, perhaps as a result of misunderstanding the circumstances that gave rise 
to them.
Let us apply Taylor’s aigument to a real example. A woman suffering fi'om anorexia 
neiwosa believes that by limiting her food intake she is acting in accordance with her 
most significant purpose; she is exercising control over her life, and hence acting 
freely. Yet, psychologists tell us that the woman’s desires are a symptom of mental 
illness; by refusing to eat, she has mistaken her real interests. In other words, the 
anorexic woman would seem to be wrong in identifying her true desires and as such 
we must accept that she cannot be the fmal arbiter on whether or not she is free; in 
truth, she will be liberated only tluough forcible intervention. By this view, a 
definition of freedom must allow for phenomena such as false consciousness or
Taylor, C., ‘What’s wrong with Negative Liberty’, Liberty, Miller, D., (ed.) Oxford University Press, 1991, 
p.159
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repression or self-deception: “The fact that Tm doing what I want, in the sense of 
following my strongest desiie, isn’t sufficient to establish that I’m free.”"** This, 
however, is the argument Berlin warns against, for as soon as we argue that we cannot 
accept a person’s desires at face-value, or that a person does not know what their real 
freedom is, then there is no limit to the ways in which paternalism or coercion can 
take the guise of freedom. By doubting an individual’s knowledge of her true desires, 
it is but a short step to the sanctioning of an external authority to determine what she 
should want.
% '
In order to expand on this criticism, let us consider the notion of false consciousness 
and its various manifestations -  repression, self-deception, and ideological delusion. 
Whilst these generic ideas are neither synonymous nor easily defined, each implies 
that a person or gi'oup’s true interest may be different from their perceived interest, 
and thus each paves the way for paternalism or coercion. Now, my argument is not 
that none of these phenomena may be truly experienced. An abimdance of 
psychological research affirms the way in which human beings can bury unappetising 
thoughts in the depths of their mind or deceive themselves as to their real interests or 
act out of mistaken beliefs -  the anorexic woman is a case in point. My only point is 
that all of these notions are open to abuse and hence should not inform on the concept 
of liberty, since they all too easily dismiss the claims and desires of individuals. 
IiTcspective of whether I am ignorant or self-deceiving, my conscious intentions must 
be respected for what they are; whilst these intentions do not always have to be 
permitted, there should be no mistake that they are my intentions. Freedom is not the 
opportunity to act in my true interests but to act in my perceived interests.
Of course, it may be objected that I am denying a clear and necessary role for 
paternalism in society. Again, though, tliis is not my argument. To make a child attend 
school even though she might object to this idea every morning is an example of how 
we can force someone to do what we believe is in their best interests; indeed, it may 
even expand the value of their future liberty. Yet, as Berlin was keen to point out, 
paternalism is not freedom: the liberty of the child who resists school is greatly 
undermined by our actions, even if  we can justify our acts by recoiuse to their broader
Ibid., p. 154
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well-being. It is one thing to coerce a person and justify this in terms of what we think 
is in their interests; it is altogether different to say that if it is in their interests, then 
they are not being coerced."*^
In order to validate his thesis, Taylor deliberately recoils from authoritarian 
conclusions. He claims that even though the agent cannot always be the final arbiter 
regarding her own freedom, this does not mean we open the door to ‘totalitarian 
manipulation’ :
“Others, who know us intimately, and who surpass us in wisdom, are 
undoubtedly in a position to advise us, but no official body can possess a doctrine 
or technique whereby they could know how to put us on the rails, because such a 
doctrine or technique cannot in principle exist if human beings really differ in 
their self-realisation.”'*^
In other words, Taylor repudiates the view that his theory leads to authoritaiian 
conclusions; instead, he rests his hope on the liberal View that whilst self-realisation 
might fail for internal reasons, “no valid guidance can be provided in principle by 
social authority.”"*"* This conclusion seems unwarranted however. If we return once 
more to the woman who suffers from anorexia, would Taylor argue that it is improper 
for medical authorities to forcibly intervene? These experts, having identified the 
patient’s false beliefs (and having knowledge of her tme interests) are presumably 
justified in invoking compulsoiy powers to liberate the woman. There is no reason to 
think that a doctrine of enforced rational freedom could not be institutionalised in this 
manner, whereby psychiatric experts determine the patient’s true interests and hence 
free her from an overbearing burden on her true self.
The same argument for liberty can take the form of any number of coercive practices. 
When I split the human personality in two, I affinn the existence of the “transcendent, 
dominant controller, and the empirical bundle of desires and passions to be disciplined
*" See Berlin, I., ‘Two Concepts o f  Liberty,’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 134 
Taylor, C., ‘What’s wrong with Negative Liberty’, Liberty, Miller, D., (ed.) Oxford University Press, 1991, 
p. 147
Taylor, C., ‘What’s wrong with Negative Liberty’, Liberty, Miller, D., (ed.) Oxford University Press, 1991, 
p.148
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and brought to heel.”"*^ And if I add to this notion the concept of false consciousness, 
then I pave the way for a paternalistic definition of freedom. If a human subject 
cannot be the final arbiter on whether she is fi'ee (since she cannot be the final 
authority on whether her desires are authentic) then by implication the final authority 
must lie elsewhere, perhaps in the more enlightened, or in the wisdom of experts, or in 
the Party vanguard or in the small number of religious clerics who alone have access 
to the truth. Given this, I might be told that I can only be free when acting in a certain 
way, or when certain conditions have been met. I might not realise this, but I would 
(I’m told) if  I did not suffer from#the ignorance, or psychological defect, or false 
consciousness, or pathological condition that is so obviously affecting me. 
Furthermore, it must be the moral responsibility of the expert, or the Party, or the 
Church to create the conditions of my true freedom. Of course, this will involve 
serious coercion, indeed, a few people are going to have to be shot, but there is no 
higher moral case than providing the conditions of freedom. Freedom, of course (as if 
you didn’t know) is the highest good.
Now, Taylor’s theory does not admit of these glaring assaults on freedom, but the 
authoritarian seed is certainly evident; his liberal intentions are engulfed by a dubious 
paternalism. This tacit menace becomes explicit when Taylor examines the 
authenticity of a serial killer’s desires. He reckons that we can say of such a man that 
he has “a highly distorted view of his fundamental purpose,” which is “shot through 
with confusion and error.”"*® Yet, this argument is less than persuasive - it turns on 
equating a person’s actual desires with that which a person would desire if he were 
something he is not; even more unlikely, it equates one’s true purposes with the moral 
good. This process is engendered by the doctrine of the two selves. Linking the higher 
human self to freedom, Taylor insists that only by encouraging the killer to act 
morally will we be liberating him."*^  The crucial philosophical difficulty of moving 
from subjectively determined constraints on freedom to an objectively defined good is 
accommodated by the familiar appeal to false consciousness. If we can establish that a 
person is subject to false desires, then we must decide what that person’s ‘true’ desires
Berlin, I., ‘Two Concepts o f  Liberty,’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p .l3 4  
Taylor, C., ‘What’s wrong with Negative Liberty’, Liberty, Miller, D,, (ed.) Oxford University Press, 1991, 
p.l61 and p .l60
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might be. Taylor fills this vacuum with conventional morality. Freedom is ultimately 
defined in terms of moral goodness; I am now unffee where I do not act in line with 
probity and decency.
Yet, this raises an important question: should our understanding of liberty be defined 
in terms of what is right, or just, or good? Consider Raskolnikov, the hero of 
Dostoevsky’s classic novel, ‘Crime and Punishment’."*^ Raskolnikov is an 
impoverished student who murders an old woman and her sister, and makes off with 
their savings. Yet, the reason for m #der is not simply financial; rather, it is an attempt 
to exert his supremacy over his victims and his dire social environment, an expression 
of Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’. In this light, ‘Crime and Punishment’ is a tragic 
parable, in which the terrible sufferings and pathological state of Raskolnikov 
engenders a diabolical expression of his base desires. Now, by Taylor’s account, 
Raskolnikov is not acting freely; irrespective of what Raskolnikov considers his true 
self, it is plain for Taylor that one’s true desires can only be informed by what is 
morally correct. Yet, I would like to offer a different interpretation, of a Nietzschean 
slant. The act of murder committed by Raskolnikov is an example of self-mastery, or 
of positive liberation: oppressed by the dire social conditions in which he lives, he 
looks for a means to express himself, in spite of his powerlessness; he overcomes the 
moral constraints that would otherwise have prevented him fi'om committing the 
mui’der, and hammers the old lady and her sister until they are dead. Thus, he 
exercises his power over others; he commits an act of self-creation and is liberated 
from his prison, from a pitiful herd morality. This is the self-masteiy of the 
Nietzschean Ubermensch, where one rises above the conditions in which one lives in 
order to exercise innate power; here, Raskolnikov’s truest or highest desire is the 
desire to kill. Of course, I use this example not because I want to defend the ethics of 
Raskolnikov’s action, but in order to demonstrate that the normative vacuum created 
by the bifurcated self can be filled with a morality far less honourable than that 
prescribed by Taylor. Would a Nietzschean not describe Taylor’s morality as weak 
and delusional? Would a Nietzschean not consider himself a liberator? The existence 
of a normative vacuum means liberty need not be tied to conventional moral 
goodness. If I associate my tme self with the Nietzschean will to power, and find
Dostoevsky, F. Crime and Punishment, Penguin Books, 1991
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myself constrained by moral feelings, then I will view such feelings as a limitation on 
my freedom; if liberty is infringed when one is prevented from doing something one 
truly desires, then the moral conscience of the murderer must be interpreted as a 
constraint.
To sum up my argument so far: Berlin is wrong to associate rational self-direction 
with the monistic belief that all of the great goods in life coalesce. The idea of self- 
mastery is not necessarily inconsistent with pluralism; it can be articulated in a 
manner that accommodates the various and divergent ends of individuals. However, 
Berlin’s concern about the doctrine of the two selves fr justified. Indeed, this doctrine 
allows one to travel from the honourable sense of self-mastery to a debased sense in 
which paternalistic interference and coercive practice are integral. In order to locate 
this danger in a modern context, let us examine the current debate between liberals 
and radical feminists in the US, as regards the freedom-denying effects of 
pornography.
Positive Freedom, Pornography and Censorship
“Nature has endowed women with a power of stimulating man’s passions in excess of man’s power of 
satisfying those passions, and thus made him dependent on her goodwill, and compelled him in his turn 
to endeavour to please her, so that she may be willing to yield to his superior strength.”
- J.J. Rousseau, ‘Emile’
Ever since Mary Wollstonecraft objected to Rousseau’s characterisation of women, 
there has been a strengtliening tide against the oppression of women. Most of the 
aiguments formulated in defence of women’s rights have been entirely just, a 
consequence of which has been greater economic, political and professional equality. 
Nonetheless, certain feminist literature relies on argument that is akin to the idea of 
positive self-masteiy, and in pailicular, to a variant of self-mastery which sanctions 
coercion. This is in spite of rather honourable and benign beginnings, in which male 
expectations of female form and behaviour were criticised as imperialistic and 
oppressive. Wollstonecraft, for instance, complained that women are taught, from an 
eaiiy age, that beauty is their ‘sceptre’. Consequently, “the mind shapes itself to the
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body, and roaming round its gilt cage only seeks to adore its prison.”"*® Yet, ever since 
this aigument was made, the feminist movement has been encumbered with a 
seemingly intractable problem -  the complicity of women in their alleged subjection. 
If a woman identifies herself as an object of beauty, and pursues a life in which that 
self-conception is paramount, in what sense can we argue that that woman has not 
identified with her true self?
This problem has been exacerbated in modem times through the widespread 
publication of pornogiaphy. Radic^fTeminists have attempted to portray pornography 
as a means of imprisonment, in the sense that pornography defines and limits what 
women can be. This argument is accompanied by claims that pornogiaphy should be 
banned, in light of the servitude it engenders. Indeed, this issue recently generated a 
heated public debate between two eminent American academics, Ronald Dworkin and 
Catherine MacKinnon. The former, an uncompromising liberal, offers a line of 
argument similar to that of Mill, in which individual freedom (to buy or produce 
pornography) should be protected, even though some would deem it immoral or 
distasteful. The latter, a radical feminist, suggests that pornography causes great harm 
to women: it can lead to sexual violence, it undeimines the standing of women and 
erodes equality of opportimity, and it encourages women to define themselves 
according to a sexual ideal constructed by men. MacKiimon therefore suggests that 
pornography should be prohibited.
Dming the mid-1980s, MacKimion, along with other feminists such as Andrea 
Dworkin, acted upon this principle and sponsored an anti-pornography ordinance in 
Indiana, USA. The group hoped that pornographic material would be censored (and 
hence the sexually explicit subordination of women prevented). The aim of the 
ordinance was not simply to regulate tire display of pornography, or to guard against 
its exposure to children, but to recommend wholesale censorship. Yet, the ordinance 
was unsuccessful; the American courts ultimately ruled that censorship could not be 
based simply on the offensiveness of material, citing the First Amendment of the US 
Constitution, which protects ‘freedom of speech’.^ ® This reading of the constitution is 
supported by Ronald Dworkin, who accepts that “pornography is often grotesquely
Wollstonecraft, M,, A Vindication o f  the Rights o f  Women, 1792
Although pornography is not ’speech’ as such, its publication was judged to be protected by this amendment.
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offensive,” but nonetheless maintains that this cannot be considered “a sufficient 
reason for banning it without destroying the principle that the speech we hate is as 
much entitled to protection as any other.”®*
Nonetheless, there is a subtler philosophical argument that might be brought against 
those who would allow the production, publication and use of pornography. This 
refers to the idea that pornography undermines women by portraying them as 
submissive victims and hence subverts their capacity for self-mastery. In other words, 
pornography imprisons, since it defines what women can be. Women cannot identify 
with their true desires, so long as pornography is freely available:
“[Pornography] institutionalises the sexuality of male supremacy, fusing the 
eroticization o f dominance and submission with the social construction of male and 
female... Men treat women as who they see women as being. Pornography constructs 
who that is. Men’s power over women means that the way men see women defines 
who women can be.’ 52
For MacKinnon, the subjection of women is currently propagated by the 
dissemination of pornography, in which “‘woman’ is defined by what male desire 
requires for arousal and satisfaction.”®^ In other words, in order for women to attain 
self-mastery, there must be a sweeping system of censorship and prohibition with 
respect to pornography; only then can the concept of ‘woman’ be reconstructed. As it 
is, pornography is indelibly linked with violence and domination. MacKinnon insists: 
“pornogiaphy is not harmless fantasy or a coirupt and confused misrepresentation of 
otherwise natural healthy sex.”®"* Rather, she concurs with Andrea Dworkin’s 
diagnosis that pornogiaphy “reveals that male pleasure is inextricably tied to
®* Dworkin, R., Freedom's Law, Oxford University Press, 1996, p.218 Admittedly, MacKinnon’s complaint is not 
simply that pornography is offensive; she also claims it is harmful. Here, MacKinnon formulates an empirical 
argument, namely, that pornography causes violence towards women. If this link were established, there would be 
good reason to ban pornography. Yet, evidence to date does not seem to verify this conclusion. See Dworkin, R., 
Freedom’s Law, Oxford University Press, 1996, p.230 and p.402. Note 4 
MacKinnon quoted by Dworkin, R,, F reedom ’s  Law, Oxford University Press, 1996, p.220 
MacKinnon, C., ‘Sexuality, Pornography, and Method: ‘Pleasure under Patriarchy’ Ethics, 1988-89, p.318 
MacKinnon, C., ‘Sexuality, Pornography, and Method: ‘Pleasure under Patriarchy’ Ethics, 1988-89, p.328 It 
should be pointed out that there is a difference between pornography revealing the victimising nature o f  male 
pleasure and actually causing such victimisation.
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victimising, hmting, exploiting.”®® This context disallov^s women from defining 
themselves in a way that is consistent with their true interests.
Yet, as Ronald Dworkin points out, this argument seems ‘strikingly implausible’. 
Whilst sadistic pornography is revolting,®® it is not in general circulation, and even 
milder forms of pornography, which are more readily available, cannot surely have as 
debasing an effect on women’s self-conception, as advertising, cinema and television, 
which often portray women in stereotypical and demeaning ways (should we ban 
these images too?). Quite simply, tW reach and influence of pornography is less than 
MacKiimon supposes.
Nonetheless, whilst the self-conception of women in general is not harmed by 
pornography (since most women are not exposed to it), it might be said that specific 
women are harmed insofai as they are involved in the production and/or 
dissemination of pornography. The argument for censorship could be formulated as 
follows. Women who are complicit in the production of pornography are not truly 
following their real desires. Their self-definition is constructed in accordance with the 
sexual desires of men, and hence they come to want what men want them to want - 
“Men’s power over women means that the way men see women defines who women 
can be.”®^ Consequently, women who are complicit in the production of pornography 
are not free. In order to liberate them, pornogiaphy must be banned.
Yet, this argument fails because it employs a technique for which feminists have quite 
rightly condemned misogynists, namely, the attribution of false consciousness. As 
MacKinnon asserts, “the assumption that, in matters sexual, women really want what 
men want from women makes male force against women in sex invisible.”®® hi other 
words, it is precarious to project one’s own sexual desires onto another, for then the 
principle of consent becomes redundant. MacKinnon, with great rhetorical force,
Andrea Dworkin quoted by MacKinnon, C., ‘Sexuality, Pornography, and Method: ‘Pleasure under Patriarchy’ 
Ethics, 1988-89, p.328 This is an argument MacKinnon herself promotes: “Each violation o f  women -  rape, 
batteiy', prostitution, child sexual abuse, sexual harassment -  is made sexuality, made sexy, fun, and liberating o f  
women’s true nature in the pornography.” Ibid., p.327 
Most people would agree on this point. Yet, neither is that to say sadistic pornography should be banned. Sadists 
and masochists should be allowed to pursue their own good in their own way so long as their sexual relationsjiips 
are consensual.
MacKinnon quoted by Dworkin, R., F reedom ’s Law, Oxford University Press, 1996, p.220 
MacKinnon, C., ‘Sexuality, Pornography, and Method: ‘Pleasure under Patriarchy’ Ethics, 1988-89, p.330
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identifies the harm that can arise from such projection. Victims of rape, or those 
forced to participate in pornography, are often powerless to object to their treatment: 
“When any one of them tries to tell what happened, she is told it did not happen, she 
imagined it, she wanted i t  Her no meant yes.”®® MacKinnon is clearly conect to argue 
against the idea that ‘no’ means ‘yes’. If a woman does not want to participate in a 
sexual act, then it is clearly wrong to doubt this intimation. We must take a woman’s 
choice at face value, rather than second guess it. We cannot doubt her sincerity: ‘No’ 
means ‘No’.
Yet, does this not also mean that the principle of consent can legitimise pornographic 
acts? MacKinnon has her doubts, for such voluntariness can only be explained in 
terms of an imprisoning social construction, characterised by what “male desire 
requires for arousal and satisfaction.”®® In other words, women love and choose their 
chains because of a male hegemony. Yet, why should we doubt that a woman who 
expressly consents to such paificipation is not acting in accordance with her real 
desires, even where this consent pertains to the production of pornography? Why in 
this instance does ‘yes’ mean ‘no’? It is dangerous for the feminist to attribute false 
consciousness to a woman who participates in pornography, for -  as MacKinnon 
admirably shows - this same metaphysical sleight of hand could justify any number of 
assaults on women. Should we not accept, then, that if  a woman volimtarily (without 
coercion or threat) participates in the production of pornography, even though we 
might think it is against her interests, she is acting freely? And if so, should we not 
accept that pornography should not be banned on the grounds that a woman who 
participates in it is not her own master?
A more convincing justification for the banning of pornography would be that women 
are often forced to participate in pornogiaphy against their will (that is, their actual 
will). MacKinnon may not be wrong in claiming that pornographic models are often 
coerced into participation.®* She has assembled a significant body of evidence that 
shows how men have sexually exploited their partners, vis-à-vis pornography.®^
MacKinnon, C., Only Words, Harvard University Press, 1993, p.5
MacKinnon, C., ‘Sexuality, Pornography, and Method: ‘Pleasure under Patriarchy’ Ethics, 1988-89, p.3I8 
MacKinnon, C., Only Words, Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 15
See MacKinnon, C., and Dworkin, A., In Harm's Way: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings, Harvard 
University Press, 1997
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Whether this is enough to justify prohibition is another matter. As Hayek points out, 
all intimate relationships “undoubtedly offer opportunities for coercion of a peculiar ly 
oppressive kind and are, in consequence, felt as restrictions on personal liberty... But 
here society can do little to protect the individual beyond making such associations 
with others truly voluntary. Any attempt to regulate these intimate associations further 
would clearly involve such far-reaching restrictions on choice and conduct as to 
produce even greater coercion.”®®
Conclusion *
This chapter has surveyed the notion of self-mastery. I found arguments in favour of 
the legitimacy of this concept to be wanting in several respects. Although no 
necessary relationship was discerned between self-mastery and monism, I suggested 
that the doctrine of the divided self could sanction paternalistic interference. This 
occurs where the individual is deemed to be too ignorant or deluded to malce a 
judgement as to her most important goals. Consequently, it is rather dangerous to 
make an association between self-mastery and liberating social conditions, for those 
conditions could merely serve to support coercive practices. So let us set aside the 
idea of positive freedom. Instead, the concept of negative liberty shall be examined, 
which has traditionally been identified as the essence of the liberal society.
Hayek, F.A. Von, The Constitution o f  Liberty, Routledge, 1960, p. 138
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Chapter 2 -  Law and Liberty
P a r t  I: D efining Negative L iberty
“The word freedom has no meaning.” — Diderot, ‘Letter to Landois’ 
Introduction
Let me begin my examination of the concept of negative liberty by offering a brief 
definition. It refers to the opportunity to act unconstrained by human interference. 
More specifically, a person’s freedom is restricted if, and only if:
© He or she is 1) compelled or restrained, or is 2) threatened with punisliment for non- 
compliance, by 3) the deliberate intervention of 4) another human agent.
These are the necessary and sufficient conditions that define the restriction of a 
person’s freedom. To this extent, a person is not to be judged unfree merely because:
0  He or she has 5) no desire to take advantage of an opportunity, or is 6) unable to take 
advantage of an opportunity, or is 7) not dissuaded by a threat.
Each criterion will be duly explained in the course of the chapter. My analysis shall 
di’aw upon certain linguistic intuitions (and offend against others); it will aspire to 
internal coherence; and it will consider the natme of our moral relationships. I will 
begin by discussing the relationship between freedom and ability.
Freedom and Ability
Obstacles to freedom ought not to be confused with simple inability; my libeity is not 
at stake if I am too weak or too ignorant to take advantage of an opportunity. As 
Berlin points out, if a person does not have the subtlety of mind to understand the 
darker pages of Hegel, he is not to this extent unfree; he merely lacks the mental 
capacity. Let us pin down this linguistic distinction. We would not normally refer to
Randall, J., (ed.) Bloomsbiity Anthology o f  Quotations, (London: Bloomsbury, 2002), p. 170
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our inability to climb a mountain or swim a sea as a restriction on our freedom; 
ordinaiy language requires that we discriminate between ‘being free’ and ‘being able’. 
As Cranston points out, the former refers to an oppoitunity, the latter to a capacity. If I 
were told ‘you are free to swim’, then I would be subject to a permissive declaration; 
by contrast, if  I were told ‘you are able to swim’ I would merely be instructed as to 
my abilities (irrespective of my freedom).®® Although this distinction leads to what 
some consider a counter-intuitive conclusion - that a person can do something they are 
unfree to do - I do not feel the force of this complaint (it merely derives fr om the 
difference between tire divergent criteria that define restrictions on liberty). Thus, I 
might be able to commit arson (if I have the knowledge and skill to get away with it) 
but that does not mean I am fi-ee to burn dovm buildings. Similarly, it is consistent to 
claim that I am fi'ee but unable to something: I am free to swim in the Atlantic but I 
am almost certainly unable to traverse it.
The reason that freedom and ability are wrongly conflated pertains to the emptiness of 
liberty without the capacity or power to take advantage of it. As Cranston points out: 
“Truly there is little point in ‘being free to’ unless we ‘have the power to’, but it 
certainly does not follow from this that one is identical with the other.”®® Failure to 
recognise this distinction has led to a genuine conceptual error - the equation of 
freedom with power. T.H. Green made this mistake in his campaign against the 
poverty and destitution of the 19**^  Century. He suggested that a lack of material 
means is no less an obstacle to fieedom than overt political persecution. Liberty 
should not refer to a mere opportunity, but to the capacity to take advantage of an 
oppoilunity: “the mere removal of compulsion...is in itself no contribution to true 
freedom...the ideal of true freedom is the maximum of power for all members of 
human society alike to make the best of themselves.”®^ Green therefore argued for 
more than the formal freedoms coveted by classical liberalism - true freedom requires 
the capacity to realise one’s ambitions. It is tiue, of coui'se, that the injustices of the 
time -  widespread poverty, disease, ignorance and squalor -  should be criticised as 
symptoms of capitalist exploitation and gi'eed. It is also ti"ue that people living in such
Cranston, M., Freedom, Longmans, 1967, p. 19 
“  Ibid.
Green quoted by Berlin, I., ‘Two Concepts o f  Liberty,’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, 
p.xiix. For a critique o f  Berlin’s view o f  Green, sec Simhony, A., ‘On Forcing Individuals to be Free: T.H. 
Green’s Liberal Theory o f  Positive Freedom’, Political Studies, 1991, p.303-20
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squalor may well have been powerless. Yet, the absence of power (or means or 
capacity or ability), and the absence of liberty are different things. As Berlin reminds 
us: “Notinng is gained by a confusion of terms.”®® So let us condemn the systematic 
reduction of human well-being through poverty and destitution; but let us not call it an 
assault on liberty.
Indeed, critics such as Hayek contend that freedom is fundamentally misconceived 
when it is associated with the capacity to realise our ends. Hayek is particularly 
critical of the idea that wealth soi#ehow brings freedom: “The penniless vagabond 
who lives precariously by constant improvisation is...freer than the conscripted 
soldier with all his security and comfort.”®® That is to say, the soldier’s existence is 
much more limited in terms of his opportunity to act unconstrained by others; the 
soldier knows that if he refuses military service he will be incarcerated. By contrast, 
the penniless vagabond has significant scope to act without being coerced. Of course, 
it is true that the vagabond must eat, and it is true that food costs money, and if he 
were to illegally acquire food without paying, then he. too would be incarcerated. Yet, 
there is no intention to coerce the vagabond before he steals; the same camiot be said 
of the conscripted soldier before he absconds. For Hayek, then, it is no contradiction 
to be both poor and free. If a poor man were suddenly to acquire wealth, he would not 
become freer (even if he would become more powerful and even if he could enjoy his 
freedoms to a gi'eater extent). More will be said on this point later.
Equating freedom and power has profounder difficulties still with regards to social 
policy. Hayek, speaking as a liberal, wants to ensure that everyone is entitled to the 
same legal freedoms; but if  freedom is equated with power, this becomes impossible: 
power by definition cannot be distributed equally. This is because power is a 
relational concept: if X has power over Y tlien there is an inequality in terms of what 
X and Y are able to do. Yet, this contradicts with the basic liberal enterprise, which 
aims to ensure that individuals are equal under the law. In this sense, it would be a 
serious conceptual ercor to mistake freedom for power: legal opportunities can be 
equalised; the power to realise our goals cannot. Indeed, freedom understood as ‘the 
power to achieve’ tends towards omnipotence. If a man is not free unless he has the
Berlin, 1., ‘Two Concepts o f  Liberty,’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 125 
Hayek, F.A. Von, The Constitution o f  Liberty, Routledge, 1960, p. 18
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capacity to achieve his goals, then freedom will normally elude him. No social 
conditions could plausibly support such a characterisation of liberty; irrespective of 
what society we live in, human beings will always periodically fail in their 
enterprises, not least because of the interference of others. The reality is that our quest 
to achieve our goals will always be met with what Sartre described as a ‘resisting 
world’?” irrespective of the fairness or progiessiveness o f the social conditions that 
support fr eedom.
Freedom and Desire '4.
In the introduction to Four Essays on Liberty, Berlin resolves to correct ‘a genuine 
error’ that had tainted his original lecture on negative freedom. He had initially 
suggested that liberty ought to be understood as “the absence of obstacles to the 
fulfilment of a man’s desires.” ’^ Yet, Berlin concedes that this definition is 
problematic: “If degrees of freedom were a function of the satisfaction of desires, I 
could increase fr'cedom as effectively by eliminating desires as by satisfying them.”^^  
This notion is tantamount to the Stoic sense of liberty, according to which a man is 
fi'ee when he is not dominated by desire. In other words, liberty is attained through 
self-denial - it exists where one abandons the urge to walk down a given path:
“This is the traditional s e lf  emancipation of ascetics and qiiietists, of stoics or 
Buddhist sages, men of various religion or none, who have fled the world, and 
escaped the yoke of society or public opinion, by some process of deliberate 
s e lf  transformation that enables them to care no longer for any of its values, to 
remain, isolated and independent, on its edges, no longer vulnerable to its 
weapons.” ®^
Berlin attacks this notion on two counts. First, the logical culmination of the process 
of destroying one’s desire to act is suicide; total liberation is therefore conferred only 
by death. Second, even though certain individuals would uphold this form of ascetic 
se lf denial since it makes them feel fi'ee, or since it nourishes them or gives them
Sartre, J.P. “Being And Nothingness,” Barnes, H.E., (trans.) Methuen and Co., 1957, p507 
Berlin, I., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.xxxviii 
Ibid, p.xxxviii 
Ibid, p. 135
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spiritual strength, it is not the same as negative freedom -  indeed, it is often the very 
antithesis of this. My prison walls do not disappear simply by wishing away my plans 
to ever walk outside them.
Negative freedom, then, is not simply the absence of frustration (for this may be 
attained by killing desires), but the absence of obstacles to possible choices and 
activities. The term ‘possible choices’ is important here -  it is this condition that 
informs us of the presence (or absence) of liberty. If, in a country of absolute religious 
homogeneity, the practice of an alterative religion is prohibited, no one will have his 
or her religious customs frustrated, yet this in itself does not generate religious 
freedom. For Berlin, liberty depends not on whether I wish to walk down a certain 
road but on whether I have the opportunity to do so.^ "* Ultimately, freedom refers to 
the relationship between an agent and an obstacle, not to an agent and his desires.
Nonetheless, critics such as G.W. Smith maintain that Berlin’s theory is inadequate. 
Smith considers the relationship between freedom and desire vis-à-vis the situation of 
a genuinely contented slave. If we define freedom by the range of options available to 
an agent (whether or not he wishes to pursue them), “it remains to be shown precisely 
how the range can be delimited in such a way as to guarantee that options are indeed 
relevantly foreclosed for the genuinely contented slave.” ®^ Smith first considers an 
argument in favour of Berlin’s view, which, he reckons, is based on a weak 
counterfactual claim. By this account, the contented slave is unfree because if 
(contrary to the slave’s present intentions) he were to choose what his master forbids, 
he would be fr ustrated. In other words, whilst the slave might be happy at present, he 
might change his mind in the future; and because certain potential choices are 
precluded by slaveiy, we can therefore speak of the contented slave’s mifreedom. Yet, 
wliilst this argument can be applied to a living slave, it loses its force when we 
consider a slave who lives and dies contented. According to Smith, here we can say 
with certainty that “the slave’s legal condition never presented a bar to doing 
whatever he wanted to do.” ®^ To suggest otherwise would involve making a strong
Ibid, p.xxxix
Smith, G.W., ‘Slavery, Contentment, and Social Freedom’, Philosophical Quarterly, 1977, p.236 
Ibid., p.237
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counterfactual claim: we would have to arbitrarily attiibute to the slave desires he 
does not have, has never had, and perhaps is incapable of ever having.
Importantly, however, we can accept the slave’s desires -  or lack of them - without 
having to doubt that he is unfree; we need not deny that ‘the slave’s legal condition 
never presented a bar to doing whatever he wanted to do’. The important point is that 
the slave has had the opportunity to exit from his captivity removed (inespective of 
his desire to remain); he is unfree in virtue of the fact that a possible opportunity has 
been restricted. Smith overlooks thi% point because he mistakes liberty with the value 
that we place on it. Freedom is only valued insofar as we wish to take advantage of 
the opportunity it provides. I am free to stand on my head for a time each day, even 
though I do not particularly want to do tliis. Yet, this freedom exists whether or not I 
choose to take advantage of it. Consequently, whilst the contented slave does not 
value freedom, such contentment does not thereby eliminate the very real constraints 
that bind his existence.
Moreover, the idea tliat fr eedom can be defined in terms of the absence of obstacles to 
the satisfaction of one’s purposes is vulnerable to the desire-shaping effects of 
institutions, indocti'hiation, ideological re-education and so on. By this argument, an 
inmate who dr eads the thought of returning to the outside world might find freedom 
by staying in his cell. It is with this in mind that Berlin writes, “there is a clear sense 
in which to teach a man that, if he cannot get what he wants, he must learn to want 
only what he can get may contribute to his happiness or Ins security; but it will not 
increase his civil or political f r e e d o m . I n  other words, it is potentially serious to 
associate the provision of liberty with the machinery ultimately designed to limit it. A 
person’s desires are irrelevant to the existence of an obstacle blocking a given path.
Constraints on Freedom: Restraint, Compulsion and Threat
In the introduction it was suggested that the term ‘free’ refers to the absence of some 
repressive or constraining force or obstacle, and hence that it is characterised by ‘a
Berlin, I., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.xxxix
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genuine negativeness’?® Berlin gives this initial suggestion more detail v^hen he 
asserts; “The fundamental sense of freedom is freedom from chains, from 
imprisonment, from enslavement by others. The rest is extension of this sense, or else 
metaphor.” ®^ Berlin’s examples of basic constraints on liberty concm with om* 
linguistic intuitions. He points out that the most fundamental assault on liberty 
employs physical force, which might be manifest either as physical compulsion or 
physical restraint. The latter merely prevents, like prison bars or dungeon walls. The 
former involves physically making someone do something, like the master who whips 
his chained slaves to work. These # #  the basic senses of unfreedom as described by 
Berlin.
Berlin also refers to the extension of these basic phenomena. Most fundamentally, this 
alludes to the fact that involuntary obedience can be attained by threat. For instance, 
imagine that slaves are marched to the fields by gun-wielding guards; they comply 
because disobedience will result in being shot. In this context, threat restricts libeity 
just as effectively as compulsion or restraint. Indeed, it is for tliis reason that we must 
disagree with Locke and stipulate that all manner of laws -  just and unjust alike - can 
be held to restrict freedom, for they operate on the principle that non-compliance will 
be punished. Of course, it might be said by existentialists such as Sarti’e that threat 
does not eliminate choice. Yet, we can still distinguish between free choice and forced 
choice. Berlin gives the example of a man living in a totalitarian state who chooses to 
betray a friend under threat of torture. For Berlin, this cannot be termed a free 
decision; this ultimatum is an example of coercion. Whilst the man could have chosen 
tortui’e over compliance, “the mere existence of alternatives is not...enough to make 
my action free (although it may be voluntaiy).”®® Threat, or coercion, is therefore a 
paradigm of unfreedom.
Now this is all well and good, but Hillel Steiner unsettles this view by considering the 
relationship between threat, desire and constraint.®* Like Berlin, Steiner argues that 
fr eedom ought to be defined independently of desire; liberty should not be thought of 
as our capacity to do as we please. Yet, this being the case, we must also accept that
Ryan, A. ‘Freedom’, Philosophy, 1965, p .llO
Berlin, I., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.lvi 
Ibid, p. 130
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threat cannot place limitations on freedom, since this phenomenon cannot be 
adequately defined without referring to desire. If I am confronted with an ultimatum 
(e.g. ‘Your money or your life!’) then the coercer looks to affect the desirability of a 
given cour se of action such that I choose his preferred option. A threat, then, can be 
thought of as a sort of ‘intervention’ in which the coercer manipulates my mind-set 
such that I move from wanting to keep my money to the desire to part with it. It 
seems, then, that conventional theories of negative liberty must accept that by altering 
the appeal o f a certain option, a man’s freedom can be diminished. Yet, more than 
this, Steiner reckons conventional t%ories of liberty must accept that offers as well as 
threats can impact upon freedom, since offers also look to affect the desirability of a 
given course of action (and hence manipulate a recipient’s behaviour, or compel a 
recipient to act in a certain way). Of course, this would seem to be counter-intuitive 
and hence Steiner settles on the view that neither threats nor offers can be said to 
diminish liberty. Since desire is irrelevant to freedom, we must accept that only 
humanly imposed obstacles that render action physically impossible can constrain in 
the required sense. The virtue of this view is that, it allows us to make a clear 
judgement as to a person’s freedom -  if  a person is physically able to do x  then they 
ar e free to do x; it also avoids what some consider an awkward notion, namely, that 
one can be unfree to do something one has, in fact, done.
Steiner makes two contestable assertions in his broader argument. First, he claims that 
offers, like threats, can diminish one’s freedom, inasmuch as they are designed to 
manipulate behaviour by altering the desirability of a given course of action. 
Admittedly, we often speak as if this were the case. For instance, if  I am offered an 
enormous sum of money for my house, even though it is my family home, then I 
might justify my acceptance of the offer by claiming that I could not refuse such an 
enticing bid. Yet, such allusions cannot be equated with a lack of freedom. As 
Kiistjansson points out, not eveiything that affects someone’s deliberations can be 
counted as a diminishment of freedom. Some sort of obstacle must exist, which 
impairs, narrows possibilities, or forecloses options.®® This is certainly the case when 
we examine the phenomenon of tlneat, which is expressly designed to limit our 
options. And whilst we might say that an irresistible offer does foreclose my options
Kristjansson, K., Social Freedom — The Responsibility View, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.52
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(insofar as 1 would be foolish to refuse), it seems that this way of speaking is 
employed purely for its illocutionary force rather than to convey the literal truth. After 
all, offers are meant to expand our options, and hence eniich our freedom. There is a 
qualitative difference between having a possible choice restricted and having an 
alternative added to my current range of opportunities.®® It is astounding that Steiner 
fails to acknowledge the force of this point.
The second point of contention that arises pertains to the premise of Steiner’s thesis, 
namely, that we cannot refer to cd%ircion without implicitly referring to the desires of 
the coerced. According to Steiner, if we accept that threat is a constraint on liberty, we 
are committed to the idea that freedom can be limited by making a given option 
undesirable. However, J.P, Day claims that this premise is wrong, and demonstrates 
this by considering the archetypal expression of coercion ‘Your money or your life!’®"* 
In this situation, the desire of the coerced does not change; it remains the same both 
before and after the threat (to keep both his money and his life). Only, now the 
coerced Icnows he cannot keep both and therefore sacrifices the least valuable.®  ^ In 
other words, threat is manifest as an infringement of liberty simply because the 
coerced has a possible choice restricted (e.g. he can no longer keep both his money 
and his life). In this instance, the liberty of the coerced would be diminished even if 
he did not wish to keep both his money and his life.
Ultimately, the ways in which human beings speak and act do not necessarily support 
Steiner’s argument. Freedom as a human value surely must include threat as a 
criterion of constraint. David Miller makes the example of a man who is imprisoned 
in a cage such that he is physically incapable of escaping -  this, he claims, is a 
paradigmatic case of unfreedom. Yet, another man is instructed to stand in a square 
marked out on the ground and told that if he tries to leave this area he will 
immediately be shot (the guards have their rifles fixed on the prisoner). Does this man
There are, ot'course, marginal cases in which it is unclear whether someone is pro\'ided with a threat or an ofler. 
A woman who lives in poverty and who cares for her sick child might be offered family medical insurance by her 
employer so long as she becomes his mistress. Is tliis a tlmeat or an offer? See Kristjansson, K., Social Freedom -  
The Responsibility View, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p .55
Day, J.P., 'Thr eats, Offers, Law, Opinion and L ihcity', American Philosophical Quarterly, 1977, p.258 
This would seem to imply that an agent must have an appropriate epistemic base i f  he is to be moved by the 
tlireat. hideed, it is exactly this knowledge base, composed o f linguistic understanding and rational foresight, 
which is required to make tlneat e lective .
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not also have his freedom infringed?®® The problem with limiting constraints on 
freedom to physical impossibility, then, is that it fails to comprehend the worth, 
broadly speaking, of the freedom to act unhindered by others. As Gray suggests, the 
physicalist language preferred by Steiner ignores the vital truth that the “subject 
matter of freedom is action rather than behaviour.”®® Human beings certainly resent 
being locked up in chains; yet, they are just as resentful of coercion, threat and other 
sinister manipulations.
The Dynamics of T hreat ■it
Having established that threat should be considered as a constraint on liberty, it 
follows that law is a restriction of freedom. Prohibition is little more than a 
generalised threat. If a citizen does not comply with the laws of his state, then he will 
be punished, perhaps by a custodial sentence, but increasingly by way of a financial 
penalty. In other words, law curtails a possible choice: I cannot break the speed limit 
and choose not to pay my fine if I am caught. Yet, what if  I break the speed limit 
without being caught? Are laws freedom-denying only insofar as they are effective?
By one view, the freedom-denying effects of law would seem to rely on an 
interpretation of human natuie. The curtailment of liberty asks how the average man 
would respond to the threat of punishment. This is the type of argument offered by 
Hayek, for whom a person is imfree when a given course of action is rendered 
unreasonable by threat or coercion. In a coercive situation, while it might be possible 
to pursue an unattractive option, nonetheless, the reasonable person would probably 
submit to the demands of the coercer. Therefore, even though a person of 
extraordinaiy resolve might choose the disagieeable option, tliis does mean the choice 
was free.
The problem with this argument is that it suffers from a moralised basis, insofar as 
constraint is contingent upon the acceptance of a contestable understanding of human
Miller, D., ‘Constraints on Freedom’, Ethics, 1983. Again, the reason that we can speak o f  this man’s 
unfreedom is that he knows he will be shot i f  he leaves the square.
Gray, J., ‘On Negative and Positive Liberty’, Political Studies, 1980, p.515
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nature or psychology. Consider the following extract from The Constitution o f 
Liberty:
“W hether or not attempts to coerce a particular person will be succèsshil 
depends in a large measure on that person’s iimer strength; the threat of 
assassination may have less power to turn one man from his aim than the 
threat o f some minor inconvenience hi the case of another. But wliile we may 
pity the weak or the very sensitive person whom a mere frown may ‘compel’ 
to do what he would not do otherwise, we are concerned with coercion that is 
likely to affect the normal, average person.” *^*
Now, the way in which the ‘normal, average person’ is conceived will determine 
whether a given act can be considered free. Yet, what characteristics typify the 
average person? Hayek goes so far as to say that minor annoyances that repeatedly 
wear a person down might be considered coercive. Hence, “it is not impossible for a 
hoard of cunning boys to drive an unpopular person out of town.”®^ Yet, another 
person might say it is too strong to label a hoard of cunning boys coercive, A 
reasonable individual should be able to deal with such disruption without succumbing 
to the boys’ mischief. ‘Reasonableness’ is therefore a difficult notion to pin down. 
Moreover, Hayek has difficulty in establishing when persuasion becomes coercion. 
For instance, would we judge the worker who has to cross a picket line as being 
coerced, or indeed the young teenager who is invited to smoke cigarettes against his 
better judgement with his friends? In both cases, a penalty might be incurred for non- 
compliance, namely, unhappy relations with a peer group. But how would the 
average, reasonable person act in this situation? Arguably, there is no answer to this in 
the abstract, meaning the standard of the average person cannot be meaninghilly 
invoked. Finally, Hayek’s argument cannot persuasively comprehend the problem of 
weak threats. Certain laws constitute a weak threat insofar as disobedience is a 
realistic or ‘live’ option.^® For instance, many people ignore the law that requires us to 
wear a seatbelt when driving. A reasonable person might therefore choose to ignore 
the command to wear a seatbelt. By implication, they would then be free to ignore the
88 Hayek, F.A. von. The Constitution o f  L iberty, Routledge & Kegan Paul, I960, p. 136
Ibid, p. 138
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law. The ultimate problem for Hayek is that his understanding of coercion contains an 
evaluative dimension that admits of different interpretations.^*
It would make more sense to eliminate all evaluative criteria from the analysis of 
constraints on freedom. This, indeed, is the ai'gument of Felix Oppenheim. He 
believes that judgements about liberty can be ailiculated without an evaluative 
dimension so long as we restrict the criteria of constraint to prevention and 
punishability. Hence, I am unfr ee if  I am physically prevented from doing something 
or threatened with punishment non-compliance. This accords to our most 
fundamental assumptions about liberty insofar’ as it allows us to judge the prisoner 
unfree and aceept that law impinges on liberty (insofar* as it is backed by threat). 
However, Oppenlieim’s commonsensical argument is undennined by his additional 
claim that a person must be dissuaded before a threat can be coimted as coercive. 
Maintaining that one cannot do what one is not free to do, Oppenheim argues that 
constraints on liberty are a matter of degree, depending on the likelihood of 
punishment. This notion is taken to an unlikely extreme when he translates his theor-y 
into quantitative form. Thus, if 40 percent of all speeding motorists are caught and 
fined, it follows that drivers ai’e unfree to speed to a degree of 0.4.^^ However, it is 
patently bizarre to think of liberty in these terms. Irrespective of Oppenheim’s strange 
and uninformative statistical a p p ro a ch ,h is  argument leads to the counter-intuitive 
conclusion that people who disobey the law are free (insofar as they are not deterred 
by the threat of punishment) whilst law-abiding citizens ar e unfree.
The most sensible judgement that can be rendered on this issue is that the 
effectiveness of a threat does not affect judgements about liberty. Where the threat is 
neither severe nor effective, I might say that I am more or less able to do X, but I 
remain unfree.^"* Admittedly, this ai’gument requires that we can often do what we are 
unfree to do. Yet, this is not altogether against convention -  as was asserted earlier,
Benn and Weinstein articulate a similar evaluative criterion, but suffer from the siune difficulties. Benn, S.I., and 
Weinstein, W.L., ‘Being Free to Act and Being a Free Man’, Mind, 1971, p.208
Oppenheim, F., Political Concepts: A Reconstruction, Basil Blackwell, 1981, p.72
What, after all, does Oppenheim’s statistics tell us about our freedom to speed? I could not be sure on any given 
occasion that I would not be caught speeding. And, how, in real life, could we ever generate such a statistic? We 
would need to know either how many speeders avoided detection (and how could we know this?) or else ground- 
our judgement upon how many drivers escape the pursuit o f  the traffic police.
This point is made by Kristjansson, K., Social Freedom  -  The Responsibility View, Cambridge University Press, 
1996, p.47
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the arsonist is not free to arbitrarily burn down property although he might have both 
the desire and ability to do this. I do not therefore feel the force of the objection that 
one cannot do what one is unfree to do.
The Agency and Intention of the Coercer
In the introduction, I suggested that the analysis of ordinary language is inconclusive 
regarding the source of a constraint on freedom: the Hobbesian argument, which holds 
that any natural impediment can rë'§trict freedom, is not any less valid than the view 
that constraint must be humanly imposed, if ordinary language is our only source of 
reference. Yet, I am interested not only in the conceptual question of what liberty is, 
but also in the distributive question of what liberties should be protected by the state. 
Importantly, only humanly created obstacles are relevant to my thesis. There is not 
much point after all, in asking whether it is just for a fallen tree to obstaict my path. 
As Berlin points out, the right to freedom cannot be violated by non-human 
interference - if I fall and find my freedom of movement frustrated, I cannot be said to 
have suffered any loss of basic human r i g h t s . T o  this extent, I am interested in 
constraints on freedom that emanate from human action.
In modern theory, three main schools of thought take their point of departure from 
these preliminaiy considerations. One of these, which I will refer to as the moral 
responsibility view, maintains that: “ ...an obstacle counts as a constraint on the 
freedom of an agent B if and only if another agent A can be held morally responsible 
for the creation or non-removal of the o b s t a c l e . T h i s  view derives from an 
important paper by Benn and Weinstein, in which it was argued that obstacles to 
freedom generate normative charges that require r ebut t a l . In other words, constraints 
on liberty must always be justified: if a human agent is constrained, he will require 
some kind of reason as to why he is constrained. Insofar as the issue of justification 
arises, we can sensibly talk about the restriction of liberty; this does not hold if the 
source of a constraint is amoral (e.g. caused by a natural event). Consequently, the 
appropriate criterion for the source of constraint on freedom is said to be moral
Berlin, 1., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.xlix
Quoted from ICiistjansson, K., “Social Freedom,” Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.2
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responsibility, since justificatory questions are meaningless unless they are directed at 
moral agents.
Proponents o f the moral responsibility view hold that their argument is not moralised: 
they do not define freedom in terms of what is right or good; they merely identify 
moral responsibility as the most appropriate criterion regarding the source of 
constraints on freedom. By the moral responsibility view, then, I am unfree if I am 
constrained by the actions or inactions of a morally responsible agent, even i f  those 
constraints are justified. This distinction enables advocates to claim immunity against 
the traditional criticism of a moralised view of liberty, since they concede that one can 
have one’s liberty taken by a just act. Thus, when the prison guard locks up a 
murderer, he is (contrary to the moralised account) taking the murderer’s liberty.
However, the moral responsibility view is problematic in other ways. Most 
fundamentally, the intioduction of evaluative criteria when making judgements about 
the source of constraints leads to a concept of libeity that is essentially contestable. 
For example, imagine that a small mountain community has been subjected to a har d 
and unusually long winter. A heavy snowfall has blocked the only road out of the 
town, though supplies are plentiful and communications are still intact. The 
government has little in the way of spare revenue and would rather not part with what 
money it has to clear the road -  this operation would be expensive, time consuming 
and possibly futile (if another snowfall occui’s). Yet, the mountain community, being 
politically astute, decide their plea to have the road cleared would carry more weight 
if they employ the language of freedom - whilst the government might not have 
caused the blocked road (the community accepts that governments cannot control the 
weather), nevertheless, it is responsible for the continued blockage, since this could be 
remedied through concerted effort. Importantly, by the criterion of moral 
responsibility, my freedom is not only at stake when a human agency deliberately 
imposes a constraint on me, but also when an agency negligently imposes such a 
constraint, or when an agent fails to remove such a constraint, despite having a duty to 
do so.^ ** Flence, the mountain community claim the government is imprisoning them 
by its inaction.
Miller, D., ‘Reply to Oppenheim’, Ethics, 95, 1985, p.3iO
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Yet, how would we establish whether the government is morally responsible for the 
blockage? We might say that since it cannot be held responsible for the heavy 
snovffall, it is not diminishing the liberty of the mountain community. However, by 
the moral responsibility view, we must consider whether the government has been 
negligent in failing to clear the snow, despite the fact that it did not impose the 
constraint. Now, it is certainly true that the government could clear the blockage 
through concerted effort, but how do we decide whether the government’s inaction 
constitutes a morally relevant omission? Will we not differ in our judgements as to 
whether the government has been negligent? Does the criterion of moral responsibility 
not bui'den our judgements on freedom with an ineliminable indeterminacy?
One solution to this problem, proposed by Miller, is to accept that the concept of 
freedom, being based upon conti’oversial judgements about moral responsibility, is 
essentially contestable.^^ Hence, disagreement about the freedom of the inhabitants of 
the mountain village is bound to occur. Whilst some might not judge the government 
morally responsible as regards the predicament of the mountain community (and 
hence deny that there is an infringement of liberty), others will proffer the opposite 
judgement. Yet, Miller’s argument will not do, since the moral responsibility view 
was originally cast as a means to settle disputes regarding the source of constraint on 
freedom.***** If the idea of essential contestability is invoked, a perpetual indeterminacy 
will be generated in relation to judgements on liberty. The indeterminacy arises 
because this view of liberty requires that we make a value (as opposed to a mere 
causal) judgment vis-à-vis the source of constraint. Such a value judgement is 
irrelevant to the application of liberty. For instance, if I am deliberately locked in a 
room by a kidnapper who proceeds to take my child, then it is unquestionable that I 
have had my freedom impaired. However, if the culprit is caught and found not to be 
morally responsible (perhaps he is a small child himself, or mentally deranged) my 
situation cannot simply be redefined as mere inability. Even in circumstances where 
diminished moral responsibility is more or less accepted (as is the case with the 
mentally ill) the issue of freedom can still arise. Thus, the moral responsibility view
Miller, D., “Constraints on Freedom,” Ethics (94), 1983, p.70 
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invokes an elusive and inappropriate criterion when it proposes die essential 
contestability of judgements on freedom.
In order to avoid the indeteiminacies of an evaluative criterion, Felix Oppenheim 
advocates the causal responsibility view. He maintains that “any obstacle for which 
human agents are in some way or other causally responsible should be regarded as a 
constraint on freedom.”**** Thus, if  I inadvertently or intentionally lock you in your 
office one night, you can claim to have had your libeity denied. This would not be the 
case however, if the wind had locked the door shut, or if you had fallen and were 
unable to open the door - physical and psychological inability, and natural obstacles to 
action should not be considered as constraints on freedom. In this regard, 
Oppenheim’s argument coalesces with our linguistic intuitions about political and 
social constraints on freedom: we would not normally say that a lack of intelligence, 
or physical inability, or a natural obstacle to action amounts to a restriction of liberty.
However, Oppenheim’s criterion generates rather broad conditions for the restriction 
of liberty. All manner of obstacles in our daily lives are humanly caused -  the erection 
of a new building; increasing number of cai's on oui’ roads; increased flooding caused 
by global warming; and so on. Now, all of these developments or trends can be traced 
to human action, yet it is smely misleading to suggest that they somehow limit oui* 
freedom. This is why Oppenheim adds that freedom cannot be restricted by 
“incapacities caused by anonymous demogiaphic or economic or institutional 
conditions.” ’**^ Unfortunately, this additional criterion is an appendage that bears no 
logical relation to the notion of human causation. Why should we exclude anonymous 
but humanly caused constraints as restrictions on liberty? And how do we determine 
what is to count as an anonymous act? Are political acts that result from a protracted 
and diffuse governmental process anonymous? And how do we determine human 
causation? Do humans cause global waiming? Are we causally responsible for the 
absence of work or is there a ‘natural’ level of unemployment? Like the moral 
responsibility view, the criterion of human causation raises more questions than it 
answers. As such, if we were to ai’gue that demographic, economic and institutional
Oppenheim, F., ‘ ‘Constraints on Freedom’ as a Descriptive Concept’ Ethics, 95, 1985, p.306 
Ibid, p.306
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conditions do not limit freedom, we would do better to invoke the criterion of 
intentionality.
There is indeed a respected tradition in liberal circles that identifies constraints on 
liberty only with deliberately imposed obstacles. The intentionaUty view maintains 
that a person is free to the extent that he or she has the opportunity to act without the 
deliberate interference of others. This is the view that Berlin proposes in ‘Two 
Concepts of Liberty’: the restriction of liberty “implies the deliberate interference of 
other human beings.”***^ Moreover^#e quotes Rousseau with obvious support - ‘the 
nature of things does not madden us, only ill will does’. Admittedly, Berlin’s position 
is ridden with well-known inconsistencies and contradictions: he elsewhere writes that 
obstacles to freedom might be imposed “directly or indirectly, with or vritliout the 
intention of doing so.”***'* Indeed, the intentionality criterion seems to have been 
dropped in Berlin’s later work on liberty, in preference for the broader criterion of 
alterability.***  ^ By this view, a man is unfree if the constraints he faces derive from an 
alterable human practice. Nonetheless, this latter view is inconsistent with tire thesis 
Berlin develops in ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, which calls for a clear distinction 
between coercion and other debilitating conditions. For instance, if the criterion of 
alterability is upheld, a phenomenon such as poverty potentially places limitations on 
freedom, inasmuch as it is an alterable human practice that debars oppoitunity. In 
order to rescue his initial (and more compelling) thesis, in which poverty is not 
counted as a constraint on liberty, Berlin must retreat to a position in which only 
intentionally imposed obstacles count as a constraint on liberty. The virtue of this 
account is that the notion of negative liberty becomes a tightly configured concept that 
is not conflated with other valuable goods, nor swollen to such an extent that 
constraints on freedom include any humanly derived object that delimits the 
opportunity to act.
Nonetheless, some critics maintain tlie intentionality criterion is fundamentally 
flawed. They claim that too many restrictions of freedom aie ignored if we count only 
deliberate acts of coercion and persecution. Miller, for example, suggests there is little
Berlin, I., ‘Two Concepts o f  Liberty,’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 122 
Berlin, L, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 123 
Ibid, p.xl
47
difference between, say, a law that expressly forbids me to travel oiitwith the borders 
of my country and a law that requires me to repay the costs of my professional 
training (which I cannot do without remaining in the country).***  ^ Yet, Miller’s 
example is under-developed. If the law that requires me to repay the costs of my 
professional training specifically stipulates that I must remain in the country to repay 
my fees, then I am clearly unfree to leave. However, if I am afforded the legal 
opportunity to repay my fees from abroad (the law stipulates that my fees can be 
repaid from another country) but nevertheless lack the means to travel, then I am too 
poor to take advantage of this opporifrpiity, but I am not unfr ee.
Other critics reject the intentionality view because it is insensitive to injustices that 
can arise from unintentionally restrictive practices. Yet, this complaint is unfounded -  
whilst there is always good reason to object to injustice, this does not have to be 
framed in tenns of the denial of liberty. For instance, imagine that a disabled man, 
whose mobility is dependent on Iris wheelchair, is prevented from accessing a train 
due to its narrow doorway and high step. The disabled man launches a complaint 
against the rail authorities on the grounds that they are denying him his liberty. What 
can be said of his case? Those who disagree with the intentionality view will ar gue 
that the disabled man is unfree inasmuch as the narrow doorway is a remediable 
obstruction tliat prevents him from using the train. Although the interference is of an 
unintentional nature, its ultimate effect is to prevent the disabled man fr om accessing 
the rail network. This problem could be remedied if the rail authorities were to adapt 
their trains to allow for disabled access. Only then would the disabled gentleman have 
Iris libei-ty restored. However, this argument is unsuccessful, for it confuses the unjust 
treatment of disability with the conceptual issue of constraint on liberty. Simply 
because it is wrong not to provide for disabled access does not mean that this injustice 
must be expressed in terms of the curtailment of freedom. In other words, there might 
be a strong moral case for the rail authorities to provide disabled access, but not 
because the disabled are otherwise unfree; rather, it would derive from some other 
value, for instance, equality (non-discrimination), social justice (compensation for 
natural disadvantage), or regard for human welfare (empathie awareness of others). 
Relating this to our hypothetical example, we could say that whilst our sympathies are
Miller, D., “Constraints on Freedom,” Ethics (94), 1983, p.73
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with the disabled man, he cannot be considered unfree: there is no individual 
interfering with him, and no evidence of coercion; in short, no-one is preventing him 
from entering the train, even if he is unable to do so.
Regarding the source of constraints on freedom, then, the intentionality view seems to 
be the least offensive to our linguistic intuitions and it also achieves the greatest 
degree of internal coherence. Paradigmatic instances of unfreedom pertain to the 
activities of over-zealous legislators, to despots, dictators, and oppressors. All of these 
phenomena are deliberate and shoiiki be highlighted as gmve restrictions on liberty; 
unintentional restrictions of action, though potentially immoral, should not be thought 
of as denying liberty.
Let us recap on the argument thus far. Ï am free to the extent that I am not compelled, 
restrained or threatened by the deliberate actions of other human beings. 
Furthermore, negative liberty is fundamentally concerned with the opportunity to act; 
it is not concerned with the satisfaction of desire, or with the ability to act, or with the 
capacity to resist threat. These criteria allow us to claim that prisoners are unfree 
(insofar* as escape is physically prevented), as well as uphold the notion that law 
restricts freedom (insofar as non-compliance is punished). Indeed, if  this latter truth is 
not upheld, the essence of liberty can easily be overlooked. This is an important issue, 
as we will see below.
P a r t H : Law and  the  Limitation of L iberty
“Liberty then is neither more nor less than the absence of coercion... It exists without Law, 
not by means of Law.” -  Jeremy Bentham
The central question I now want to consider is whether my liberty is restricted when I 
am prevented from doing wrong. In the history of ideas, only a few theorists have 
been willing to uphold this view. Isaiah Berlin is perhaps the best known. He accepts 
that the imposition of any law, irrespective of whether this is good or bad, involves 
some loss of liberty. Berlin traces this line of argument to Bentham, who asked
Attributed. See Randall, J., (ed.) Bloomsbtuy Anthology o f  Quotations, (London: Bloomsbury, 2002), p.255
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rhetorically; “Is not liberty to do evil, libeily? If not, what is it? Do we not say that it 
is necessary to take liberty from idiots and bad men, because they abuse it?”**** In 
short all laws restrict liberty and it is a great confusion to think otherwise. In order to 
demonstrate this point more forcefully, let us consider the conceptual ruminations of 
Hayek and Dworkin.
Hayek’s Non-Coercive Law
Hayek defines liberty as the absencgvof coercion. Coercion is by definition intentional, 
and occurs “when one man’s actions are made to serve another man’s will.”***^ I am 
thus coerced when “the alternatives before me have been so manipulated that the 
conduct that the coercer wants me to choose becomes for me the least painful one.”**** 
In this sense, although the fact that I am coerced still leaves me with a choice, this 
choice is not sufficient to make my action free. One of Hayek’s primaiy concerns is to 
understand the type of coercion employed by the state. Here he argues, “True coercion 
occui's when...the state threatens to inflict punishment and to employ physical force 
to make us obey its commands.”*** By this definition, it would seem that most state 
acts are either overtly or tacitly coercive, insofar as they are made effective by the 
threat of punishment. Of course, there are certain state acts that do not exhibit 
coercion. In the UK for instance, the state recommends to parents that their children 
are immunised against various diseases but this is not mandatory. However, in some 
instances the state is openly coercive. For example, Hayek considers taxation or 
forced conscription to be coercive, even if both of these state acts can be justified 
under certain circumstances. Thus we might differentiate between advice and law: the 
govermnent advises me not to go on holiday to Chechnya, but imposes no penalty if I 
choose to do so; by contrast, the government requires that I parf with a proportion of 
my earnings in taxation each month and threatens to punish me if I fail to comply.
Flowever, Hayek unsettles this view by arguing that ‘true laws’ are not coercive. This 
argument is initially giounded on a distinction between rules that command and rules
108 Bentham quoted in Berlin, I., 'Two Concepts o f  Liberty,’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 
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that prevent. The state coerces when a law makes us undertake certain activities, but 
does not when a law merely prevents us from doing something. For instance, forced 
conscription is undoubtedly coercive (insofar as it is manifest as a positive 
requirement), but laws that protect the private sphere are not since they only prevent 
certain actions (and hence only admit of a negative requirement). If I respect other 
people’s property and physical integrity, I need not be coerced (for I am left as a free 
agent), but as soon as I do not respect this, I am at the mercy of state coercion. In 
other words, if I Imow that by placing myself in a particular position I will be coerced, 
and if I can avoid putting myself in # c h  a position, I need never be coerced.
Now, Hayek is undoubtedly correct that a command is more directly coercive than a 
preventive law, insofar as the latter leaves us as free agents, capable of following our 
‘own predilections’. However, that is not to say preventive law cannot impinge on our 
liberty. For instance, consider the Jew living in a ghetto in Germany towards the end 
of the 1930s. The Jew knows that if he tries to leave the ghetto he will be punished; 
nevertlieless, he knows that he need not put himself in such a position since he can 
stay within its demarcation. The problem for Hayek is that he must decide whether 
this is an instance of coercion or prevention. If we were to consider the law as merely 
preventive (i.e. if we interpret the law as imposing only a negative requirement), then 
we are led to the puzzling conclusion that the laws of Nazi Germany in this respect 
did not diminish the freedom of the Jewish community. This, of course, does not sit 
easily with oui* intuitions -  laws that admit only of a negative requirement are not 
necessarily incompatible with an extensive system of prohibition that places clear 
restrictions on liberty. Of course, Hayek might object -  the preventive nature of non- 
coercive law is merely one characteristic of what he calls ‘rules of just conduct’, 
which involve thiee criteria. Hayek contends such rules are: “almost all negative in 
the sense that they prohibit rather than enjoin particular kinds of action,” that they 
“protect ascertainable domains within which each is free to act as he chooses,” and 
that they “can be ascertained by applying...a test of generalisation or 
universalisation.”**^  According to Flayek, then, insofar as we obey a preventive law 
that protects the private sphere, and which has a general and equal application, we 
cannot claim that our liberty is restricted.
Hayek, F.A. von. Law, legislation and Liberty, vol.2, Roulledge & Keegan Paul, 1973, p36
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Yet, it is not clear that this is the case - we have already witnessed in the ghetto 
example that a rule admitting only of a negative requirement does not guaiantee the 
absence of coercion. Neither does the universality of a law preclude the violation of 
freedom. According to Hayek, a true law must express a general rule that applies 
equally to everyone, thus admitting of abstractness.**^ However, such generality is 
entirely compatible with the extensive infraction of liberty. For instance, the 
prohibition laws in the US satisfied this criterion and yet significantly restricted the 
freedom of the individual.**'* Indeed^,this is a common and poweiful criticism brought 
against Flayek’s understanding of liberty, to the extent that he reconsiders his initial 
opinion in Law, Legislation and Liberty, “even rules which are perfectly general and 
abstract,” he writes “might still be serious and unnecessary restrictions of liberty.”**^  
Thus, even if universalisability might be an essential criterion for a just law, this 
criterion does not debar assaults on freedom.
Hayek’s third criterion, on which his entire defence must rest, is that a non-coercive 
law protects a private sphere in which an individual can act unhindered by otliers. hi 
this sense, we can discriminate between laws designed to uphold the freedom of the 
individual and those such as the prohibition laws in America, which were abstract, 
general and preventative and yet which still placed limitations on liberty. For Hayek, 
rules of just conduct, which necessarily include the protection of the private sphere, 
actually provide fr eedom. This, of course, is not a new idea. As long ago as Locke it 
was argued that ‘where there is no law there is no freedom’. Similarly, for Hayek, if a 
law is designed to protect freedom, it can hardly be said to constrain at the same time. 
He writes “in defining coercion we cannot take for granted the arrangements intended 
to prevent it.”*'  ^ Without the demarcation of a private sphere and the protection of 
personal property, an individual would be vulnerable to arbitrary coercion by 
others.**^
Hayek, F. A. von. The Constitution o f  Liberty, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, p. 153 
This example is provided by Miller, D., Liberty, Oxford University Press, p. 15
Hayek, F.A. von, Law, legislation and Liberty, v o l.l, Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1973, p. 101 Hayek, also 
admits as much in The Constitution o f  Liberty, though clearly with some reservation: “It is not to be denied that 
even general, abstract rules, equally applicable to all, may possibly constitute sever restrictions on liberty. But 
when we reflect on it, we see how very unlikely this is.” Hayek, F. A. von. The Constitution o f  Liberty, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1960, p .154
Hayek, F. A. von. The Constitution o f  Liberty, Routledge and Kegan Paul, I960, p. 139 
Ibid., p. 140
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Of course, this fits nicely with Hayek’s broader libertarian argument. If I want to 
uphold the sanctity of property, for instance, I will tell you that the laws in question 
do not coerce -  such laws uphold private life, the bastion of individual freedom; and if 
these laws aie good, they cannot be coercive at the same time, since coercion is 
inherently evil. Is there not some truth to this argument? How can laws designed to 
protect freedom contribute to an increase in the level o f coercion in a given society? 
The answer to this, of course, is that they probably do not. For instance, a law that 
prevents censorship would increas^ the total amount of liberty in a society, ceteris 
paribus, inasmuch as it protects the publisher against unwanted interference; yet, that 
is not to say a specific liberty (i.e. the freedom to censor) has not been infringed. In 
other words, every law seems to curtail some liberty, although it may be a means of 
increasing another.
Yet, this raises anotlier question -  what combination of laws provides the greatest 
amount o f fr eedom? This question is impossible to answer in the abstract. We might 
argue that Danish citizens are, all things considered, fr eer than the citizens of North 
Korea; we can cite numerous examples to give credence to this notion -  a freer press, 
a stronger tradition of civil liberties, fr'ce elections. Building on these considerations, 
we may well judge that Hayek’s rules of justice provide a matrix of laws imder which 
the freedom of the individual is maximised. If laws protect an extensive arena in 
which the individual can act unobstructed by others (both economically and socially), 
then no doubt the freedom of the individual would be extensive. Yet, whether the 
maximisation of liberty should be our only priority is another matter. As Berlin points 
out, individual freedom might be good, but it is not the only good. As it is, Flayek 
finds considerable problems in defining freedom in terms of justice. If the two 
concepts are not carefully delineated, limitations on freedom could easily be 
overlooked. The aiticulation of laws of just conduct must not conceal the fact that 
those laws will curb some fomi of liberty, even if they expand freedom in other 
directions. This is the vital truth that Hayek fails to appreciate -  no laws are without a 
loss to fr eedom. To this extent, his argument rests on a fatal conceptual confusion.
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Dworkin and tfee G errym andering of Liberty**^
Dworkin is another who provides a moralised conception of liberty, yet his argument 
is slightly different from that of Hayek. Whereas Hayek contends that just laws do not 
coerce (insofar as they leave the individual as a free agent), Dworkin suggests that 
only those laws that are morally wrong can be judged to impinge upon freedom. Yet, 
both ultimately understand liberty in terms of justice. Dworkin defines liberty as the 
opportunity “to do whatever you like so long as you respect the moral rights, properly 
understood, of others.” He continu#, “Youi" liberty doesn’t include freedom to take 
over the resources of someone else, or injure him in ways you have no right to tin.”**** 
Of course, Dworkin’s definition fits nicely with his broader philosophical position - 
by this account, the liberty of the wealthy is not compromised by taxation, since the 
“property taken from them in taxation is not rightfully theirs.” *^** That Dworkin can 
come to this conclusion is a derivative of what he considers the central issue to be 
addressed in a discussion on liberty, that is, whether a just law can be properly termed 
a denial of freedom. The basic intuition that informs Dworkin’s position is that a 
conception o f liberty is unsuccessful when it forces us to describe some event as an 
invasion of liberty when no wrong has occurred. He develops this point by arguing 
that we all want to claim liberty as good; but not only liberty: also equality, 
democracy, justice and the rest. Of course, all of these porous terms are contestable 
when in substantive form, but nonetheless we agree, says Dworkin, that to 
compromise on these values is bad. As such, and contrary to the likes of Isaiah Berlin, 
Dworkin looks to define the central teims of political philosophy in such a way that 
value-conflict is eradicated (injustice, he reckons, is imavoidable so long as we accept 
that conflict exists between values). For instance, if liberty and equality aie deemed to 
conflict, then the wealthy are wronged through taxation (insofar as their liberty is 
infringed). Yet, if  liberty is defined in terms of the rights of others, this need not be 
the case - we could satisfy the demands of equality without contravening the demands 
of liberty. In other words, Dworkin contends we should define liberty in such a way
’*** This neat expression (the gerrymandering o f liberty) was coined by Richard Wollheim in his contribution to 
The Legacy o f  Isaiah Berlin, Dworkin, R., Lilia, M., Silvers, R., (eds.) New York Review o f  Books, 2001, p. 135 
Dworkin, R., ‘Do Liberal Values Conflict?’ The Legacy o f  Isaiah Berlin, Dworkin, R., Lilia, M., Silvers, R., 
(eds.) New York Review o f  Books, 2001, p.84 Emphasis added,
™  Ibid., p85
This is in contrast to the likes o f  Berlin, who would argue that even though the liberty o f  the wealthy has been 
infringed, this does not amount to an injustice.
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that one suffers no loss of liberty when one is prevented from doing something that is 
wrong.
Dworkin looks to demonstrate the intuitive appeal of his argument by asking whether 
a law that prevents murder limits liberty. Surely, Dworkin asks, such a law wrongs no 
one, and if no one is wronged, how can we seriously speak of a denial o f liberty? This 
argument is unambiguously based on the idea that a just law cannot be deemed an 
infringement of liberty - coercion is inherently wr ong and therefore any law that is not 
wrong cannot be judged coercive. ;J'he idea that liberty can be legitimately removed 
when in the interests of the greater good certainly sits uneasily with Dworkin; he 
would sooner avoid situations in which the language of conflict, loss and curtailment 
is used. Thus, rather than describe the wealthy taxpayer as having his liberty lessened, 
Dworkin would re-define the boundaries of liberty such that this difficult truth is 
glazed over. The curtailment of liberty describes a situation in which one is prevented 
from acting within one’s rights; and the wealthy have no right to live in luxury while 
their brothers live in squalor. The question of what is just is therefore prior to the 
establishment of a definition of freedom; liberty can only be understood in terms of 
what is right.
T et, as Bernard Williams demonstrates, this is no solution at all; the taxpayer will still 
feel aggrieved at having his earnings forcibly taken, a frustration that will not be 
appeased simply by explaining to him that he has not truly understood the meaning of 
libeify.*^^ The term ‘liberty’ cannot simply be extracted from its moral roots and re­
applied using the concept of justice; it is firmly embedded in our moral sense, invoked 
when we want to protest against those who would prevent us from pursuing our goals, 
or, indeed, force us to pursue their goals. Thus, when people claim that their liberty is 
being denied, such a remark implicitly refers to the resentment they feel at being 
prevented by others from undertaking an act.
Indeed, it seems that Dworkin’s ar gument presupposes a basic concept of freedom 
that is amenable to the requirements of his theory of justice. Dworkin certainly does 
not contend that liberty and justice amount to the same thing. What, then, would be
Williams, B. ‘Liberalism and Loss’, The Legacy o f  Isaiah Berlin, Dworkin, R., Lilia, M., Silvers, R., (eds.) 
N ew York Review o f  Books, 2001, p. 101
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left if we distilled Dworkin’s alloyed definition of liberty such that all references to 
justice were removed? Would this not provide us with the essence of liberty? 
Consider the following example. A society decides that it is right that all women 
should be required to wear certain clothing in public, such that no bare skin is 
exposed; further the women aie not allowed to engage in the same leisure pursuits that 
men enjoy -  sport, gambling etc. Finally, women are forbidden to work.*^^ Now, we 
all know that such a society is not unimaginable. We also know that such a society 
could be described as following a substantive system of justice; it might not be our 
preferred system but it would neveitheless accord to the requirements of that generic 
concept (insofar as it details what it considers to be the right distribution of goods in 
society). Now, what if we were to complain about the status of women in such a 
society -  how would we phiase oui* objections? In the first instance, we might say that 
women are suffering injustice; the society’s formulation of justice is wrong and 
outmoded. Yet, this raises the question, ‘what injustice aie they suffering?’ Faced 
with this question we would surely be inclined to make reference to the denial of their 
libeify -  women aie not given the opportunity to dress, work, or socialise as they 
please; they are hombly oppressed. Yet, if we phrase oui* objections in this manner, 
does this not demonstrate that liberty is an independent value that we use when we 
wish to describe the opportunity a person has to act unobstructed by others?* '^* Does 
this not also demonstrate that we must have an idea of what liberty is before we talk 
about rights? And does this not demonstrate that any attempt to redefine libeity to 
meet the demands of justice is motivated by a puiely tactical or justificatoiy concern? 
If so, does it not follow that the same sleight of hand might be employed to make 
liberty amenable to a less desirable system of justice, one that forbids women to work, 
dress and socialise as they please?
Let us re-consider Dworkin’s argument in the light of these objections. We have 
witnessed that an intuitive, independent understanding of liberty must be established 
in order to fui*nish Dworkin’s moralised definition of liberty. Now, the only reason 
Dworkin provides for altering the initial definition is to make it fit with his broader
This example could be used in opposition to Hayek insofar as it demonstrates that a comprehensive system o f  
prohibition (based on a series o f  negative requirements) can be just as oppressive as a rule that is based on a 
positive requirement (such as conscription). To this extent, the situation o f  the woman living under such 
prohibitive laws is similar to the Jew living in a ghetto.
Frances Kamm raised a similar objection in a discussion o f  Dworkin’s understanding o f  liberty. See The 
Legacy o f  Isaiah Berlin, Dworkin, R., Lilia, M., Silvers, R., (eds.) N ew  York Review o f  Books, 2001, p. 132
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account of justice; but this being the case, Dworkin is actually forwarding a definition 
of justice, not liberty. It is certainly ju st that the liberty to kill is restricted, but that 
does not thereby mean no liberty is infringed. Furthermore, in the elaboration of this 
theoiy of justice, Dworkin begins to twist the essence of liberty to such a degree that it 
becomes deprived of its fundamental characteristic, that is, the opportunity to act 
unhindered by others; and if Dworkin can do this, then presumably the same option is 
available to those favouring a less enlightened system of justice. By this token, a 
commitment to liberty could soon be claimed by the most frightening regimes.
m--
The capacity to distinguish freedom from other social goods is the great legacy of 
Berlin’s argument on freedom. The virtue of his thesis is that the concept of negative 
liberty can be applied unproblematically without having to consider issues of justice 
or equality and so on. It is somewhat ironic, then, that Dworkin articulates a 
particularly succinct description of the strength of Berlin’s position:
“[The] conception o f liberty as license is neutral amongst the various 
activities a man might pursue, the various roads he might wish to walk. It 
diminishes a man’s liberty when we prevent him from talking or making love 
as he wishes, but it also diminishes his liberty when we prevent him from 
murdering or defaming others...
Dworkin continues,
“Liberals like Berlin are content with this neutral sense of liberty, because it 
seems to encourage clear thinking. It allows us to identify just what is lost, 
though perhaps unavoidably, when men accept constraints on their actions for 
some other goal or value. It would be an intolerable muddle, on this view, to 
use the concept o f liberty or freedom in such a way that we counted a loss of 
freedom only when men were prevented from doing something they ought to 
do. 125
So let us agree with Bentham and Berlin that all laws are restrictive of liberty, even if 
certain laws can be justified in terms of the greater good. Coercion is not a morally 
loaded term; coercion can exist for good or bad purposes. As soon as we adapt the
Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, 1977, p.267-8
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definition o f liberty to suit the demands of justice or morality, we find ourselves in a 
great muddle. As soon as liberty is imbued with what one ought to do, the essence of 
freedom is easily lost, over-looked, or denied.
Conclusion
This chapter began by constructing a definition of negative liberty. I am free to the 
extent that I am not compelled, restrained or threatened by the deliberate actions of 
other human beings. Furthemiore, ;^egative liberty is fundamentally concerned with 
the opportunity to act; it is not concerned with the satisfaction of desire, or with the 
ability to act, or with the capacity to resist threat. These criteria allow us to claim that 
prisoners are unfiee (insofar as escape is physically prevented), that slaves are unfree 
(insofar as they are compelled to labour), and that law restricts freedom (insofai- as 
non-compliance is punished). Indeed, if this latter truth is not upheld, the essence of 
liberty can easily be overlooked.
The central message of the second part of this chapter warned against moralised 
understandings of liberty, according to which certain types of laws do not restrict 
freedom. Hayek pursues this line of argument vis-à-vis his rules of just conduct, wliile 
Dworkin offers a rights-based account of liberty. Both of these arguments are 
dangerous because they can blind us to the veiy real constraints that an individual 
faces in a society governed by law. Such systems of law are upheld by the tlireat of 
punishment, and hence all dimuiish liberty to some extent. It is therefore misleading 
to suggest that just laws ar e not coercive.
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Chapter 3 -  Capitalism^ Poverty and Liberty
“The obligation to promote education, health, justice, to raise standards o f living, to 
provide opportunity for the growth of the arts and sciences, to prevent reactionary 
political or social or legal policies or arbitraiy inequalities, is not made less stringent 
because it is not necessarily directed to the promotion of liberty itself, but to 
conditions in which alone its possession is o f value.”
-  Berlin, T our Essays on Liberty^^*^
Introduction
In the last chapter, I concluded that all laws coerce and hence deny liberty, even if the 
effect of a law is to increase liberty in other directions. This chapter will be devoted to 
an exploration of capitalism, to ascertain whether and to what extent it coerces. I 
argue that capitalism is coercive and that it should be exposed as such (inasmuch as it 
functions upon coercive law). Yet, within a capitalist context, wealth and class do not 
affect one’s liberty. Although the poor and dispossessed may experience the coercive 
nature of capitalism more keenly than their bourgeois adversaries do, that is not to say 
they are less free. Rather, the worth or value of freedom is undermined by a lack of 
social goods such as wealth or income, education, and social opportunity. I thus 
pursue the argument that legal freedoms are meaningless unless they are 
supplemented with an array of primary goods. This idea will be defended agaiast the 
libertarian suggestion that the remit of the state should be limited to protection against 
force, theft, fraud, and enforcement of contract.
Cohen on Socialist Freedom
G.A. Cohen is adamant that the capitalist system of production, being upheld by 
restrictive law, is freedom-denying. For Cohen, this coercion is played out at the level 
of private property. He argues quite plainly that if the state places limitations on what 
I am allowed to do then my freedom is at stake. If I wish to acquire or use your* 
property witliout permission then the state will intervene on your* behalf. For instance,
Berlin, I., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.liii
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I cannot simply take your lawn mower from youi' garden hut without first acquiring 
your consent; and if you decide not to lend me your lawn mower then I have no legal 
right to object. Thus, whilst capitalism might afford private owners the freedom to do 
as they wish with their property, it also debars non-owners from acquiring or using 
property that does not belong to them. Consequently, and contrary to the likes of 
Hayek, “to think of capitalism as a realm of freedom is to overlook half of its 
nature.”
Cohen is undoubtedly on solid grou-pd here. As we pointed out in the last chapter, it is 
deceitful to claim that laws designed to uphold capitalism somehow embody freedom, 
for whilst such laws protect certain freedoms they also restrict or debai* others. At the 
same time, it is important to recognise that an alternative social arrangement would 
similai’ly reduce freedom. As John Gray remarks “rt/Z property institutions -  capitalist, 
socialist, feudal, or whatever -  impose constraints on the liberties of those who live 
under them.”*^ * If, in a socialist society o f communal ownership, I attempt to claim 
exclusive rights to something (perhaps a field that I wish to plough and sow), I will 
find my efforts frustrated. It is clearly set out in the laws of this society that 
individuals cannot claim property as their own; these rules give each person the right 
to fai*m common property, and the rewards will be reaped equally. Thus, I cannot farm 
the field as my own, nor acquire the fruits of my labour as my own, nor sell the finits 
of my labour for profit, frrespective of the justice or desirability of such a society, it is 
clear that it functions on coercion and hence restricts certain liberties.
Admittedly, there is the logical possibility that an anai’chical society might exist in 
which human beings live collectively but without law and hence without the legal 
restriction of liberty. Whilst all recognisable societies are formed on the acceptance of 
rules of justice, which are upheld by the threat of punishment and which therefore 
reduce freedom, an anarchical society would not be encumbered with such rules. Yet, 
even then, individual members of such a community might still experience instances 
of unfreedom. We do not need to affirm Hobbes’s sceptical conclusions about a war 
of all against all to accept that such a society might produce occasional conflict. For
™  Cohen, G.A., History, Labour and Freedom: Themes from  Marx, Clarendon Press, 1988, p.294
Gray, J., ‘Against Cohen on Proletarian Unfreedom’ Capitalism, Paul, E.F., Miller, P.O., Paul, J., and Ahrens, 
J., (eds.) Blackwell, 1989, p.79
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instance, if another person or gi'oup forcibly prevents me from reaping the rewards of 
my labour, my liberty is at stake; if  there are no rules that debar such activity, then it 
would seem my efforts could be in vain. To avoid the conelusion that anaichical 
societies potentially limit freedom, one must subscribe to an improbable view of 
human nature in which all conflict between individuals is eradicated; by this view all 
individuals are necessarily respectful of, and non-interfering with, the physical 
integrity and labour of others. For those of us who contest such a portrayal of the 
human being, the idea of complete social freedom is fanciful.
Let us return to the restriction of liberty that occurs under social rules, and to Cohen’s 
argument in favour of socialism. Cohen is an exceedingly honest thinker and hence 
accepts that socialism coerces. At the same time, he is convinced tiiat it coerces less 
than capitalism. In order to demonstrate this point, Cohen imagines a scenario in 
which two neighbours decide to share their tools. Each may use the other’s tools 
without permission assuming the other is not using them and so long as the tools are 
returned after use. For Cohen, such an agreement expands the fr eedom of both, even 
though “some freedoms are removed by the new rule.” Neither neighbour is “as 
assured of tire same easy access as before to the tools that were wholly his... Nor can 
either now charge the other for use of a tool he Irimself does not require.” It would 
seem, then, that whilst the new arrangement generates additional freedoms, this is at 
the expense of other freedoms previously held. Yet, how do we tell whether the 
domain of libeity has been expanded? For Cohen, it is a simple matter of quantity. 
The number of tools available to each individual under the new system exceeds the 
number of tools available under the old.
Yet, this argument will not do. The issue of comparative fr eedom is not a quantitative 
matter; it cannot be settled in a non-evaluative fashion. Consider an argument 
formulated by Charles Taylor: an apologist of the former Communist dictatorship in 
Albania claims that the citizens of Tirana were freer than those living in London 
because there were more traffic lights in London, even though Albanian citizens were 
not allowed to practice religion. The apologist rests his argument on the fact that the 
sheer quantity of restricted acts would have been far greater in London than in Tirana
Cohen, G.A., ‘Capitalism, Freedom, and the Proietai-iat’, Liberty, Miller, D. (ed.) Oxford University Press, 
1991, p. 173-4
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(since we practice religion relatively infrequently compared to the number of times 
we are stopped at traffic lights). Of course, every intuition that we have about freedom 
resists this type of aigument: we understand that the prohibitions enacted by the 
former Albanian government more seriously assaulted freedom than did the 
prohibitions in the UK. Hence, a purely quantitative analysis of comparative freedom 
can be misleading.*^**
Relating this to Cohen’s thought-experiment, the question is not whether the freedom 
of the two neighbours has expanded but whether the freedoms generated by their 
agreement are more important to them than the freedoms lost. Given that the two 
neighbours entered into the agreement willingly, we can assume both are happier with 
the new freedoms. Does this imply, as Cohen insinuates, that the freedoms protected 
by the socialist state are more valuable than those protected under capitalism? Perhaps 
not: Cohen’s thought-experiment only generates the outcomes he desires by rigging 
the issue to begin with; he looks to establish the superiority of the communal system 
by supposing the two neighbours are equally content with its framework. However, 
imagine that the relationship of the neighbours begins to sour, and that the agreement 
in place is non-revocable. Neighbour A is annoyed that Neighbour B constantly 
borrows his chainsaw since its rather expensive blade is beginning to blunt. Moreover, 
A has been unable to access his chainsaw as much as he would like (he did not 
suspect beforehand that B would make such a high demand of this tool). B has cleaiiy 
benefited from the arrangement in a way that A has not, meaning A regrets giving up 
liis previous freedom (from a pmely prudential point of view). This demonstrates that 
if the variables of Cohen’s thought-experiment are altered an alternative outcome may 
be generated; by the variables Î selected, it is better (at least for Neighbour A) to 
remain a private owner. Indeed, if a set of variables were selected such that both A 
and B benefited from remaining private owners, the new laws that enforce communal 
ownership would greatly diminish the freedom of the neighbours. Now, my point is 
not that this thereby demonstrates the superiority of capitalism. Rather, I suggest that 
this thought-experiment cannot proffer judgement on the relative worth of the 
different freedoms secured by socialism and capitalism in a neutral fashion.
Taylor, C., ‘What’s wrong with Negative Liberty’, Liberty, Miller, D., (ed.) Oxford University Press, 1991, 
p. 150
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Cohen on the Collective Unfreedom of the Proletariat
Even if Cohen does not succeed in his attempt to demonstrate the superiority of 
socialism in relation to the freedom of the individual, he nevertheless offers a 
searching and sustained critique of capitalism. In accordance with Marx, Cohen would 
like to argue that the poor under capitalism are forced to sell then labour. He begins in 
this quest by criticizing the moralised understanding of freedom proposed by Robert 
Nozick, where liberty is defined in terms of individual rights. According to Nozick: 
“Other people’s actions place limits, on one’s available opportunities. Whether this 
makes one’s resulting action non-voluntary depends on whether these others had the 
right to act as they did.” For Cohen, when one combines this rights definition of 
freedom with a moral endorsement of private propeity, it follows that the legitimate 
protection o f private property cannot be said to restrict freedom. However, for Cohen, 
this will not do, since “even justified interference reduces freedom.”*^  ^ This is an 
argument I made at length in the previous chapter.
Yet, even if  Cohen demonstrates the inadequacy of Nozick’s moralised understanding 
of liberty, and hence undermines the claim that capitalism does not coerce, what 
arguments does he offer in favour of the view that capitalism renders the worker 
unfr ee (in comparison to the capitalist)? He begins his case on an abstract plane, by 
stating that one can be free to do something and yet also be rmfree not to do it. For 
instance, Australians are free to vote in elections, although they are not free not to 
vote (voting is mandatory). Relating this to the coercive nature of capitalism, Cohen 
suggests that whilst workers are completely free to sell their labour (unlike, say, 
peasants under feudalism), they are not free not to sell it, meaning they are forced to 
sell it. This is in contrast to capitalists, who do not have to sell their labour. This 
argument attains significant force when considered in the context of the laissez-faire 
economy. Let us imagine a capitalist system of the type that existed in Victorian 
Britain, with all its injustices: workhouses, poverty and exploitation. Now, if a man is 
threatened with starvation and if  he subsequently accepts the conditions of a 
workhouse solely as a means to satisfy his hunger, can we not say that he was forced
Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Blackwell, 1974, p.262
Cohen, G.A., ‘Capitalism, Freedom, and the Proletariat’, Liberty, Miller, D. (ed.) Oxford University Press, 
1991, p. 171; Cohen, G.A., Self-ownership, Freedom and Equality, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p.59
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into the workhouse? After all, there are no acceptable alternatives. By contrast, the 
owner of the workhouse does not need to labour and yet lives in relative luxury; he 
does this by extracting the surplus value from his manufactured goods.
What can be said of Cohen’s argument? In the first instance, it would seem to rely 
upon a moralised account of freedom as acceptable opportunities. Whereas tlie 
workhouse owner has an array of enticing options from which to choose, the worker 
must choose between two undesirable alternatives; and because death by starvation is 
not a reasonable course of action ;%r any individual, it follows that the worker is 
forced to accept a position in the workhouse. Yet it is somewhat hypocritical that 
Cohen should criticise Nozick for colouring the definition of liberty with a moralised 
view of justice when he commits the same error. Cohen might object that his account 
of the poor man having to choose between starvation and the workhouse is much the 
same as the unfortunate traveller who has either to surrender his money or his life to 
the highway robber. However, the examples are different, for two reasons. First, the 
highway robber is coercive insofar as he restricts a possible choice for the tiaveller,
i.e. to retain both money and life. This is not quite the case for the poor man whose 
only restriction of choice is the opportunity not to enter the workhouse and not to 
starve; yet another person does not force this restriction upon him. That is to say, the 
restriction of this choice is not coercive because it is not manifest as a deliberate threat 
prosecuted by a human agent or institution. It is not coercive because there is no 
punisliment threatened for non-compliance. Even if the poor man’s choices are 
morally unacceptable, that is not to say he suffers from a curtailment of liberty.
By the non-evaluative account of liberty that I prefer, freedom is independent of the 
desirability of the opportunity it comprehends. The extent of one’s freedom is decided 
purely on the existence or non-existence of opportunity. That the oppoitunities 
available to me are undesirable is not sufficient to demonstrate my freedom is at 
stake; I have to show, in addition, that I am being prevented or threatened in some 
regard. Thus, contrary to Cohen’s honourable morality, the worker’s situation cannot 
be properly described as a denial of liberty. As Nozick points out, “A person’s choice 
among differing degrees of impalatable alternatives is not rendered nonvolmitary by 
the fact that others voluntarily chose and acted...in a way that did not provide him
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with more palatable alternatives.” *^  ^ Consequently, the worker’s freedom is not at 
stake, even though we can sympathise with his situation. Indeed, it is important to 
separate the question of justice from the question of freedom. The situation of the 
worker is clearly unjust: offered no prospect of decent employment, his vulnerability 
is exploited by the morally bankrupt owner of the workhouse. Yet, crucially, he is not 
coerced or threatened with punishment if  he does not agree to work under these 
conditions.
Perhaps a better ar gument of Cohere s is that members of the proletariat are prevented 
from escaping their class predicament. This argument identifies the existence of a 
constraint and hence conforms to the accepted structure of liberty. Yet, in what sense 
are workers prevented from acquiring bourgeois status? Historical evidence shows 
that proletarians have often climbed the class ladder and become bourgeois. So how 
can Cohen claim that members of the proletariat are condemned to servitude if there is 
fluidity between social classes? Cohen recognises this as a problem. He is aware that 
through hard work, skill and luck, it is possible for workers to transcend class barriers. 
In order to overcome this difficulty, Cohen maintains that whilst proletarians are 
individually free, they are collectively unfree. What exactly does this mean? For 
Cohen, the unfr eedom of the proletariat is due to the fact that they are individually 
free to become a member of the bourgeoisie “only on condition that the others do not 
exercise their similarly conditional freedom.”*^ '* In other words, although one might 
ascend the class ladder (and thus become a property owner through hard work, skill 
and luck), insofar as capitalism requires “a substantial hired labour force,” it follows 
that “the proletariat is collectively unfree, an imprisoned class.” *^ ^
In order to demonstrate this point, Cohen imagines a situation in which ten people are 
locked in a room. There is a single key, lying on the floor, which will open the door, 
but the door will stay open long enough only for a single person to escape. Thus, 
whilst one person can exit, nine are condemned to remain. The person who uses the 
key to escape becomes free only on the condition that the nine other people do not. 
Though all are free to leave as an individual, the members of the group are
Nozick, R., Anarchy, State and Utopia, Blackwell, 1974, p.263
Cohen, G.A., ‘Capitalism, Freedom, and the Proletariat’, Liberty, Miller, D. (ed.) Oxford University Press, 
19 9 I,p .l8 2  
Ibid, p. 181
65
collectively u n f r e e However, Cohen’s thought experiment does not easily translate 
into the real example of class barriers. In the thought experiment, one can easily 
comprehend the barrier faced by the unfree, namely, the prison door. Yet, what 
barriers do the poor face mider capitalism, and do these barriers translate as a 
restriction of liberty? Let us examine the obstacles Cohen identifies vis-à-vis the 
unfreedom of the proletariat. Asking why the proletariat are individually capable of 
escaping though many do not, Cohen settles on the following view:
1. It is possible to escape, but it not easy, and often people do not attempt what is 
possible but hard.
2. There is also the fact that long occupancy, for example from birth, of a subordinate 
class position nurtures the illusion, which is as important for the stability of the 
system as the myth o f easy escape, that one’s class position is natural and 
inescapable.
3. Finally, there is the fact that not all workers would like to be petty or trans-petty 
bourgeois... It is sometimes true of the worker that, in Brecht’s words, ‘He wants no 
servants under him, and no boss over his head’.’^  ^ ,
Yet, none of these barriers restricts liberty in a meaningful way. In the first instance, 
our freedom is unaffected by the likelihood of success. I have the opportunity to play 
the lottery each week, and though my remote chances of success may stop me from 
buying a ticket, this does not amomit to the curtailment of my liberty. To maintain 
otherwise would be to confuse unfreedom and inability. Similarly, I might be ignorant 
about my opportunities and be apathetic about the prospect of change, yet this does 
not render me unfree. I may in my apathy refrain from voting in the next general 
election, given the expected Labour victory; yet, that does not thereby cancel my 
freedom to vote. Freedom amounts to the opportunity to act, not to my aspiration to 
act. This truth also tells against Cohen’s final assertion. Simply because I do not 
desire to become bomgeois (because of my values) it does not follow I am thereby 
unfree. In other words, Cohen mistakes the psychologically and socially debilitating
Cohen is clear that the tteedom o f  which he talks is manifest in terms o f  an individual’s opportunities and he 
thus avoids the charge o f  reification. And an individual can cleai iy be rendered unfree in virtue o f  belonging to a 
group. Black people living in South Africa during the early 1980s were forced to cany an identity card, meaning 
their unfreedom was contingent upon their (racial) group status. In other words, the logic o f  Cohen’s argument 
seems to be intact.
Cohen, G.A., ‘Capitalism, Freedom, and the Proletariat’, Liberty, Miller, D. (ed.) Oxford University Press, 
1991 ,p .l81-2
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effects of poverty for the absence of opportunity. He attributes the proletariat’s 
imprisonment to a combination of apathy, learned helplessness, ignorance and moral 
indignation - yet none of these phenomena (regrettable though some of them are) can 
be said to restrict liberty.
Why Poverty does not reduce Liberty
In spite of Cohen’s best efforts, he has failed to demonstrate that the proletarian is less 
free than the capitalist. Nonetheless^ it remains true that the experience of capitalism 
is entirely different for those with money and those without. It is in this regard that 
Cohen launches a final argument; in a capitalist society, the absence of money 
amounts to a restriction of liberty. Cohen’s view is in contrast to the liberal argument 
which insists that to be poor is not to be unfree; simply because I do not have the 
money to dine at an expensive restaurant does not mean I am prohibited from doing 
so. I am free to dine, even though I do not have the resources to take advantage of 
this. My inability is attributable to a lack of means, not to a lack of freedom. Yet, for 
Cohen, this argument commits an error of reification. The absence of wealth cannot 
be seen as mere inability -  money is unlike intelligence or strength, which are 
properties of a human being and which do not impinge upon the extent of one’s 
freedom. In truth: “To have money is to have freedom, and the assimilation of money 
to mental and bodily resources is a piece of unthinking fetishism, in the good old 
Mai-xist sense that it misrepresents social relations o f  constraint as things that people 
lack.” ^^ ^
In order to demonstrate his point, Cohen imagines a society in which the courses of 
action available to people are written in law. As a means of regulating this, each 
person is issued with a set of tickets detailing what he or she is allowed to do. One 
ticket might permit us to go to the opera, another to walk on a given piece o f land. If I 
attempt to undertake a course of action without a ticket, the authorities will arrest me. 
In short, my freedom is contingent upon my having the requisite ticket. Cohen’s point 
is obvious -  money is just a highly generalised form of such a ticket, and as such, the 
absence of money amounts to the absence of freedom. Relating this argument to the
Cohen, G .A ., Self-ownership, Freedom and Equality, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p.58
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reality of capitalism, Cohen imagines a woman who is too poor to travel to see her 
sister in another town. Her lack of money debars her from taking the trip; if she 
attempts to board the train or bus without having the money to pay for her journey, 
she will be physically ejected and perhaps charged by the police. In this instance, the 
absence of money is manifest as a restriction of freedom.
Nonetheless, Cohen’s argument is unsuccessful inasmuch as he confuses an enabling 
condition (the ticket or money) for the restrictive law that requires its use (die 
prohibitive, or freedom-denying mechanism). It is the legal barriers designed to 
uphold the principles of capitalist exchange that constrain my freedom, not my lack of 
money. Poverty might be degrading and undermine the capacity of an individual to 
live autonomously, yet it does not in itself reduce freedom. As I pointed out earlier, 
freedom must involve the absence of some external constraint, if we are to distinguish 
it from mere capacity, hi social terms, my freedom is contingent upon the absence of 
law, not on the presence of an enabling condition (e.g. money). Laws designed to 
uphold capitalist exchange are prohibitive measures backed by the threat of 
punishment and hence necessarily impinge on freedom. Yet, this affects both the poor 
and the wealthy. A millionaire who is not sufficiently wealthy to buy a small 
Caribbean island faces the same obstacle as the poor man without the means to buy a 
new hat. Both men are unfree with respect to the law that prevents the acquisition of 
goods or land without payment. Indeed, if the millionaire were to take the hat without 
paying for it, even though he could easily afford it, he would nonetheless be 
prosecuted for theft.
As Bemi and Weinstein point out, the difference between exacting a monetary charge 
for the goods one is selling and exacting a monetary charge, say, for breaking a 
speeding law, is that the former is not designed to prevent people from acting in a 
certain way; indeed, the monetary exchange is actively encouraged. By contrast, a 
speeding fine takes the form of a penalty, which is intentionally designed to deter 
people from breaking the limit; it dictates the acceptable behaviour of the individual. 
In other words, we must discriminate between those instances in which a person or 
group compel the individual to act in a certain way by threatening punishment for
Rodger Beehler also argues that a lack o f  money in a capitalist environment amounts to a constraint on liberty. 
See Beehler, R., ‘For One Concept o f  Liberty’, Journal o f  Applied Philosophy, 1991
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non-compliance (for instance, we will ultimately be imprisoned if we fail to pay a 
speeding fine) and those instances in which the individual is simply missing an 
enabling condition (such as those who are too poor to make a desired purchase) 
The distinction between coercive law and the enabling conditions that enrich om* 
freedom is crucial in my mind.
This discrimination is not merely pedantic, and it works just as well in other areas of 
social consequence. If I claim that I am unfree to work, I mean some person or 
institution is preventing me from do#g so -  perhaps I do not have rights of citizenship 
and hence I am forbidden to work by the government. Yet, this is not the same as 
being unemployed due to a debilitating physical condition or an unattractive 
curriculum vitae; to use the term ‘unfree’ in the latter instance would surely be a 
misuse of the term.
It is important to make this distinction, lest we contuse liberty with those social 
conditions that make its exercise possible and fruitful. Property, education and wealth 
all affect the value of liberty to some degree - liberty has little meaning unless certain 
material and social resources accompany it. Yet, that is not to say an increase in those 
resources will liberate or that the absence o f these resources will coerce. As Berlin 
claims, “if a man is too poor or too ignorant or too feeble to make use of his legal 
rights, the liberty that these rights confer upon him is nothing to him, but it is not 
thereby annihilated.” "^^’ In fact, it is the peimissive/prohibitive dimension of state 
activity that pertains to liberty - the legal freedoms each individual has confened on 
them, the extent to which an individual can act without being interfered with by the 
state or other people.
Consider the distribution of freedom in Britain around the time that Mill wrote ‘On 
Liberty’ (1859). Important freedoms, such as the right to vote, remained a privilege of 
the minority. There was a clear bias in the political system in favour of the propertied 
classes; political freedom was solely an instrument of the wealthy. To tliis extent, the 
particular matrix of laws that existed at the time favoured those in power. Yet,
I think it is important to point out that my liberty is not only a stake when an individual intentionally makbs me 
do something, which is the line Hayek takes. More broadly, my liberty is infringed when I am threatened for non- 
compliance. It is in this regard that I claim a ll law restricts liberty.
Berlin, I., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.liii
69
political liberties aside, all citizens had the same civil liberties under the law: freedom 
of conscience and religion, freedom of speech, the freedom to buy and sell goods, 
freedom of association. This allowed citizens to manage their personal and economic 
affairs without state interference. As A.J.P. Taylor recounts:
"A sensible, law abiding Englishman could pass through life and hardly notice 
the existence o f the state, beyond the post-office and the policeman. He could 
live where he liked and as he liked. He had no official number or identity 
card. He could travel abroad or leave his country forever without a passport of 
any sort of official permission. He could exchange his money for any other 
currency without restriction or limit. He could buy goods from any country in 
the world on the same terms as he bought goods at home. For that matter, a 
foreigner could spend his life in this country without permit and without 
informing the police. Unlike the countries on the European continent, the state 
did not require its citizens to perform military service... It left the adult 
citizen alone.” ''*^
For some, such as Mill, these liberties allowed for the free expression of individual 
character; it allowed for diverse experiences. Mill himself spent half his time living in 
France, half in England. He experimented in his professional life, working variously 
as a critic and editor, civil servant, writer, campaigner, university governor, and 
Member o f Parliament. He was able to devote himself to his personal affections and 
nurture his higher faculties. Yet, for others, this freedom was meaningless, not 
because the opportunities did not exist, but because they lacked the requisite means to 
take advantage of their liberty. The value of freedom for many was eroded by miseiy 
and poverty; many were unemployed, others condemned to workhouses; most lived in 
dilapidated housing and were exposed to fatal diseases (Mill himself could not escape 
this scourge). In short, few people had the capacity to take advantage of their libeity 
and live in accordance with a conception o f the good.
I raise these truths not to satirise the emptiness of negative freedom. For as Berlin 
points out, to sacrifice a degree of freedom in the face of misery and destitution is 
right and proper, in order to generate a fairer society. Yet, we should not lose sight of
Taylor, A .J.P. quoted in Gray, J., Liberalism, Oxford University Press, 1995, p .26
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the fact that an absolute loss of liberty occurs: “it is a confusion of values to say that 
although my ‘liberal’ individual freedom may go by the board, some other kind of 
freedom -  ‘social’ or ‘economic’ is increased.” ’"’^  To be poor - as terrible and 
undesirable as it might be - is not to lack freedom. Poverty might debar me from 
pursuing my dreams, or it might rob me of my dignity and autonomy; but it should 
not be confused with a lack of freedom. And yet, it is true that poverty and freedom 
are not unconnected, for unless I have the capacity to take advantage of my freedom, 
then it is useless to me. To enjoy my freedom I need an income, a job, and state 
support when this is absent; I need education, a chance to gain qualifications of some 
sort, to be aware of my opportunities. In short, I need those material and social 
conditions that were almost entirely absent from the lives of the poor in the 19* 
Century.
Britain during this era has been lauded for its aversion to legislation -  arguably it 
came as close as any society ever has to the ideal of laissez-faire. This society 
provided extensive legal freedoms, insofar as state interference with the individual 
and groups was minimised. Should we therefore implement the principles of laissez- 
faire in order to protect individual liberty? Of course not, for freedom in a capitalist 
economy is worthless unless accompanied by the economic capacity to enjoy it. 
Whilst the laissez-faire model might produce great freedom, it also produces great 
miseiy, disenchantment and poverty for a great many people. If our freedom is 
valuable as a means to pursue our purposes, then there is a strong moral case to satisfy 
the conditions that make the pur suit of our purposes viable.
Against Libertarianism
If freedom is to be of any value to its possessors, it must be accompanied by certain 
all-purpose means; that is the implication of the argument I have sketched above. To 
this extent, interventionist government is justified in order to provide the social 
conditions in which people are able to take advantage of their legal freedoms. General 
taxation ought to be used as a means to generate a fair distribution of social goods, 
which is required to effectuate a system of basic liberties.
Berlin, I., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford U niversity Press, 1969, p. 125
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Yet, libertarians contest this argument, suggesting it is unjustified to provide social 
goods without the direct consent of those who fund their provision. By this view, a 
welfare state supported by general taxation imposes a condition of forced labour upon 
those who fund the welfare system. When a government takes from me in taxation, it 
is effectively forcing me to work for the good of another person. The most notable 
advocate o f this view is Robert Nozick, for whom the redistribution of wealth through 
taxation involves “the violation of people’s rights.”’"’"’ More generally, Nozick argues 
that “a minimal state, limited to the #airow functions of protection against force, theft, 
fraud, enforcement of contracts... is justified,” and that “any more extensive state vrill 
violate persons’ rights not to be forced to do certain things.”’"’^  Consequently, “the 
state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid 
others.”’"’^
Yet, how does Nozick arrive at these rules of justice? Despite his famous Lockean 
defence of private property, and despite Iris failure to detail the normative foundations 
of his libertarianism,’"’^  the moral sentiment that imderpins Nozick’s theory can 
roughly be categorised as Kantian - he upholds the maxim that human beings should 
be treated as ends in their own right, and should never be used simply as a means to 
an end. For Nozick, this sentiment entails certain moral constraints, which “reflect the 
fact of our separate existences. They reflect the fact that no moral balancing can take 
place among us; there is no moral outweighing of one of our lives by others so as to 
lead to a gieater overall social good. There is no justified sacrifice of some of us for 
others.”’"’^  For Nozick, the moral constraints specified by the Kantian maxim are best 
realised through the laws of the minimal state. Any more extensive state will 
inevitably offend against the Kantian principle by forcing some citizens to labour for 
the good of others. All such states ignore the fact that “there aie only individual
Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Blackwell, 1974, p. 168 
Ibid, p.ix 
Ibid, p.ix
That the moral foundations o f  Nozick’s rights-based argument is left under-developed is freely admitted 
by Nozick himself: “The completely accurate statement o f  the moral background, including the precise 
statement o f  the moral theory and its underlying basis, would require a full-scale presentation and is a task for 
another time.” Ibid, p.9 Many o f  Nozick’s opponents have taken him to task over this admission. See, for 
example, Nagel, T., ‘Nozick: Libertarianism Without Foundations’ Other Minds: C ritical Essays 1969-1994, 
Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 137-149
Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Blackwell, 1974, p.33
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people, different individual people, with their own individual lives.” Any attempt 
to impose a distributive ‘pattern’ on society will inevitably transgress the moral tmth 
that there is no justified sacrifice of one person for another. Consequently, coercive 
taxation cannot be used to fund, say, unemployment benefit without violating the 
right of the individual not to be forced to subsidise the life of another person. To force 
a person to labour for the good of another “does not sufficiently respect and take 
account of the fact that he is a separate person.”’ ’^’
However, it seems that Nozick %rives the wrong conclusion from his premise 
(irrespective of the justifiability of that premise). He suggests that human beings 
should be respected as ends in diemselves because we are all agents capable of giving 
our life meaning.’^’ Yet, an appeal to agency would seem to justify a more 
interventionist approach to government that Nozick allows. After all, the capacity to 
live a meaningful life in a capitalist society requires more than rights to own property 
and personal freedom; rather, as Simon Scheffler points out, it requires sufficient 
access to those distributive goods “whose enjoyment is necessary to have a 
reasonable chance of living a decent and ftilfilling life.”’^^  In other words, Nozick’s 
theory of rights is unlikely to achieve its aim, since an unrestrained capitalist 
economy provides little means for the vulnerable and disadvantaged to construct a 
meaningful life. If freedom is to be worth anything to the individuals who possess it, 
it must be accompanied by certain all-purpose means; yet, the libertarian society does 
not provide for these.
Fui'thermore, it is unreasonable of Nozick to suggest that taxation necessarily 
disallows a meaningful life for affected taxpayers. Only if the level of taxation were 
particularly severe (leaving me unable to exercise discretion over how my income is 
spent), would Nozick have a case. Yet, in reality, a modest level of redistributive 
taxation (enough, say, to fund a comprehensive health service, unemployment benefit, 
pUDiic euucaiion anu so on; aoes noi aisaiiow aiieciea Taxpayers trom nvmg
Ibid, p.33
Ibid, p.33 Importantly, Nozick suggests that redistributive taxation is justified as a means to fund the protection 
o f  individual rights (i.e. where is used to fund the coercive apparatus o f  the minimal state, which merely protects 
the integrity o f  the individual and his propeity). This does not violate the rights o f  the individual since the taxpayer 
is compensated by the institution o f  a protective minimal state.
Ibid, p.50
Scheffler, S., ‘Natural Rights, Equality, and the Minimal State,’ Reading Nozick, Paul, J., (ed.), Rowman & 
Littlefield, p. 159
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meaningfully. No matter how strongly Nozick promotes his libertarian utopia, he 
must accept that it is possible to have part of our earnings taken from us and yet still 
live well.
The Value of Liberty and Egalitarian Liberalism
According to Berlin, freedom is not an inviolable good. Recognition of the 
importance of negative liberty need not lead to libertarianism or anarchism, for 
freedom is not the only good that ca% be pursued: “If the liberty of myself or my class 
or nation depends on the misery of a number of other human beings, the system which 
promotes this is unjust and immoral.” Coercion may be inherently evil, but it is not 
the only evil, nor even the greatest, and thus may be justified in order to protect a 
more important good. Berlin champions the importance of liberty, but he is also in 
favour of the welfare state, a basic standard of living, the alleviation of poverty, and 
other goods that combat human suffering. Thus, it is justified to sacrifice a certain 
degree of individual liberty in order to protect a minimum of human dignity. Indeed, 
for Berlin, the value of liberty is partially contingent upon certain other goods. As he 
writes:
“To offer political rights, or safeguards against intervention by the state, to 
men who are half-naked, underfed, and diseased is to mock their condition; 
they need medical help or education before they can understand, or make 
use of, an increase in their freedom. Wliat is freedom to those who cannot 
make use of it? Without adequate conditions for the use of freedom, what 
is the value of freedom?” ’^ '*
Thus, in order to make use of fr eedom, an individual must also have access to certain 
other social goods such as education and wealth or income. Perhaps it is for this 
reason that Berlin writes: “the case for social legislation or planning, for the welfare 
state and socialism can be constructed with as much validity from considerations of 
the claims of negative liberty as from those of its positive brother.” ’
Berlin, I., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 125 
“""Ibid., p. 124 
Ibid, p.xlvi
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Therefore, Berlin does not look to defend a libertarian perspective, which (at its most 
extreme) contends that natural human characteristics and socially created 
disadvantage should not be altered or compensated for. According to the libertarian, 
individuals should be left free to determine their own affairs, for better or worse. 
Government has no business in taking the wealth of some in order to better the 
conditions o f others. Yet, as Berlin realises, such a rigid position will lead to massive 
suffering, desperation and misery. As he points out, one of the great evils of laissez 
faire economies is that they fail to provide “the minimum conditions in which...any 
degree of ‘negative’ liberty can bg exercised by individuals or groups.” Hence, 
without some form of social justice, negative liberty “is of little or no value to those 
who may theoretically possess it.” ’^  ^ In this regard, Berlin illuminatingly 
distinguishes between freedom and the conditions that make its exercise meaningful.
The distinction between liberty and its worth to individuals is not only highlighted by 
Berlin; it also featmes prominently in the work of Rawls. Consider the following 
passage from A Theory o f Justice:
“The inability to take advantage of one’s rights and opportunities as a result of 
poverty and ignorance, and a lack o f means generally, is sometimes counted 
among the constraints definitive of liberty. 1 shall not, however, say this, but 
rather I shall think of these things as affecting the worth of liberty.”
In other words, we should not consider poverty to be a constraint on freedom, but 
rather as a scourge on its value to individuals. This distinction is crucial, not only in 
Rawls, but also in the general literature more broadly, for once we acknowledge that 
poveify erodes the value of liberty, there is a case to be made for an egalitarian 
distribution of social goods. Only then will the fair value of liberty for all be secured.
This belief has been central to the rise of egalitarian liberalism, an ideological hybrid 
that has fused respect for individual freedoms (classical liberalism) with the quest for 
a lair uispersai oi social goods (socialism;. J.S. Mill was among the first to integrate
Berlin, I., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.xlvi Indeed, one o f  Berlin’s lasting regrets 
was that ‘Two Concepts o f  Liberty’ did not fully express the evil o f  a laissez faire society. According to Berlin, “1 
ought to have made more o f  the horrors o f  negative liberty and what that led to ... The sufferings o f children in coal 
mines or poverty.” Berlin quoted fimm Lukes, S., ‘In Conversation with Isaiah Berlin,’ Salmagundi, 120, 1998 
Rawls, J., A Theory o f  Justice, Clarendon Press, 1972, p. 204
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these ideas when he began to think of personal freedoms in terms of individual 
welfare. Although many commentators now suggest that his project to marry 
liberalism and utilitarianism failed, he was crucially aware that individual pursuits and 
experiments in living required more than just diversity and liberty; it also required 
social goods, like education, equal opportunity, and income and wealth. Still, the 
notion that individuals ought to be empowered in their pursuits was left 
underdeveloped by Mill. Arguably T.H. Green came closer to this ideal, although his 
argument was undermined by a fatal conceptual confusion: he mistook the 
empoweiment of the individual for |h e  expansion of liberty. In truth, empowerment 
does not liberate, it makes existing liberties more valuable. Still, Green represented an 
important step in liberal egalitarianism, inasmuch as he confirmed the importance of 
material resources to personal freedom. The Fabians took this further in their quest for 
a fairer distribution of wealth and income, and in their support of a welfare state. 
However, Fabian thinking was often more ‘socialist’ than it was ‘liberal’, a n d  many 
honourable goals -  a higher standard of living for the working class, the expansion of 
education, and the welfare state -  were justified in collectivist teims: progressive aims 
were held to be good for ‘society’ rather than individuals, a notion that Hayek soon 
put paid to.
Nonetheless, much of the Fabian agenda was assimilated into liberal thought, which 
was increasingly concerned with piecemeal social engineering. People like Karl 
Popper, Isaiah Berlin, Bernard Williams, Thomas Nagel and, of course, John Rawls 
consolidated the idea of egalitarian liberalism: they proposed that a system of 
individual liberties should be supported by an empowering state. Of this group, earlier 
proponents like Popper and Berlin - both born in the first decade of the 20* Centuiy - 
were rather cautious in the egalitarian component of their liberalism, confining 
themselves to a broad support of the welfaie state. Yet, as the school of thought grew 
more self-confident, so theorists became more ambitious in their quest for fairness, 
culminating with Rawls’ A Theory o f  Justice. Indeed, it was in this work that 
egalitarian liberalism began to explore one of its central tenets, namely, that basic 
liberties ought to be supplemented with all-purpose means, such that eveiyone has the
T he Fabians were split on the respective importance o f  liberty and equality. Critics such as Sydney Webb 
favoured a collectivist ideal, which was prepared to relegate the primary status o f  individual freedoms; by contrast, 
Tawney held firm to the liberal democratic ideal. See Gutman, A., Liberal Equality, Cambridge University Press, 
1980, Chapter 3.
76
capacity to take advantage of their freedom and pursue a vision of the good. 
Individuals in a capitalist society cannot be left alone to acquire these resources by 
themselves, since some will not have the requisite financial, physical or intellectual 
capacity. To this end, there ought to be a fair distribution of primary goods that 
empower the individual to act in accordance with his plan of life, whatever that plan 
may be. This generic argument is set out by Rawls in the following manner:
“Liberty and the worth of liberty are distinguished as follows: liberty is represented 
by the complete system of the liberties of equal citizenship, while the worth of 
liberty to persons and groups is proportional to their capacity to advance their ends 
within the framework the system defines. Freedom as equal liberty is the same for 
all; the question of compensating for a lesser than equal liberty does not arise. But 
the worth of liberty is not the same for everyone. Some have greater authority and 
wealth, and therefore greater means to achieve their aims. The lesser worth of 
liberty is, however, to be compensated for... The basic structure is to be arranged 
to maximise the worth to the least advantaged of the complete scheme of equal 
liberty shared by all. This defines the end of social justice.”
Rawls’ Theory o f  Justice is a remarkable work, which has rightly received significant 
attention, yet the justificatory role of the principle identified above -  that the basic 
liberties must be made meaningful by egalitarian principles of distributive justice -  
has received insufficient attention. My aim in the next section is to consider how this 
rubric is woven in to the fabric of egalitarian liberalism. To this extent, my 
investigation now turns to the very foundations of liberalism, to the sacred values that 
underpin its existence.
Conclusion
In the final chapter of this section, I suggested that although capitalism reduces certain 
freedoms, it also generates and sustains other freedoms. Capitalism might deny me the 
opportunity to use my neighbour’s property without consent, but it also allows me 
certain freedoms debarred under alternative social arrangements, the most important 
of which refers to the freedom to buy and sell. The injustices of capitalism have
Rawls, J., A Theory o f  Justice, Oxford University Press, 1971, p.204
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motivated critics from the left to argue that poor people are often not free to buy and 
sell, or at least not beyond a bare minimum; the poor consequently face greater 
constraints on liberty that the wealthy. To this complaint I offer a familiar response: 
the poor are not interfered with any more than the wealthy and hence are not any less 
free; simply because the poor lack resomces does not mean they are unfree. Rather, 
they lack the resources that would allow them to take advantage of their liberties in 
pursuit of a conception of the good. Importantly, however, the inability that comes 
with poverty matters as much as the unfreedom that comes with persecution. 
Consequently, I suggest that a qpmmitment to individual freedom requires a 
commitment to other social goods, upon which the value of liberty is contingent. This 
position was defended against libertarianism, which holds that a redistributive welfare 
state offends against the Kantian principle that human beings should never be treated 
merely as a means to an end. In response, I argued that the redistributive state does 
not treat taxpayers as mere means, so long as they are allowed a minimum of 
economic freedom. Indeed, such redistribution is necessary if every citizen is to be 
given access to the conditions under which it is possible to exercise liberty in a 
meaningful way.
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Section II - Justifications
As mentioned, the broader aim of this thesis is to examine the idea that a system of 
basic liberties ought to be supplemented with all-purpose means, such that everyone 
has the capacity to take advantage of their freedom and pursue a vision of the good. 
This, I argue, is among the defining characteristics of egalitarian liberalism. Yet, I am 
anxious not depict a false sense of cohesion within this school - egalitarian liberals do 
not share identical views; their just||icatory schemes are very different. To this end, 
this section focuses on the issues tliat divide egalitarian liberals. I will pick up again 
on the unifying aspiration that individuals should be empowered in their pursuit of the 
good towards the end of this section.
Before that, the morality of freedom will be examined. Is liberty a universal moral 
value, a minimum of which every human being has a right to? Or is liberty merely a 
cultural norm, and hence lacking in universal prescriptive force? Moreover, is liberty 
valuable because it forms part of a specific character ideal, or vision of the good? Or 
is liberty valuable merely because it allows us to choose the ends that we prefer, 
iiTespective of what those aie? Finally, what is the relationship between freedom and 
other social values? These basic questions will be addressed by examining the 
ar guments of four eminent theorists who have written on the subject of fr eedom (and 
liberalism more broadly): Joseph Raz, Isaiah Berlin, Alan Gewirth, and John Rawls.
Each author has his own chapter, and each chapter has a different focus. The chapter 
on Raz investigates the relationship between liberty and autonomy and asks which of 
these values is the energising force o f liberalism. The chapter on Gewirth focuses on 
his unique form of dialectical reasoning and asks if it truly delivers the conclusions he 
suggests; to this extent, the focus is on the logical consistency of his justification. 
When discussing Berlin, I spend considerable time on the meta-ethics that underpins 
his commitment to personal freedom; this involves an extended discussion of his view 
on human nature. Finally, with Rawls, I look in detail at the fair value of liberty in 
relation to the issue of distributive justice. Thus, the fbui' chapters do not necessarily 
cover the same gi'oimd, although all are broadly concerned with the value of freedom.
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I should perhaps say a final word on prominent egalitarian liberals that I have decided 
to exclude fiom this section: Ronald Dworkin, Amartya Sen, Thomas Nagel, Bernard 
Williams and Richai'd Rorty. Dworkin and Sen have been left out since neither 
subscribes to the understanding of liberty forged in the first section of the thesis, and 
since both construct their liberalism on the foundational value of equality.’’*’’ Thomas 
Nagel was omitted because of his affinity to Rawls, and Williams was excluded 
because o f his affinity to Berlin. By contrast, Rorty was left out - despite his interest 
in questions of justification - because he fails to engage vrith the specifics of the issue 
at hand: What makes liberty valuably? What other social goods are required to make it 
meaningful?
In spite o f  this, both have important contributions to malce on the subject o f  distributive justice, and hence will 
be considered more broadly in the final section o f  the thesis.
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C h ap te r 4: A utonom y and  the Search  fo r Perfection
“Having said that... it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can 
produce, well-developed human beings, I might here close the argument: for what 
more or better can be said of any condition of human affairs than that it brings human 
beings nearer to the best thing they can be? Or what worse can be said of any 
obstruction to good than that it prevents this?” - J.S. Mill, ‘On Liberty’’^ ’
Introduction
Joseph Raz is the most eloquent modem day advocate of Millian liberalism. He starts 
from the position of the concrete human agent, from the individual who has 
substantive plans and ideals. He elicits a specific vision of human excellence and 
regards the autonomous life as an integral part of the good. Yet, he does not, for all 
that, merely repeat what Mill said a century before. Most notably, he rejects the 
utilitarian foundation of Mill’s liberalism. For Mill, autonomous choice is a 
constituent component of well-being and as such," it should be developed; this 
development attains its normative force in Mill insofar as it maximises utility. For 
Raz, the liberal way of life does not flow from the maximal aggregation of individual 
well-being, but from the fact of value-pliiralism. He believes, with Berlin, that there 
exists a myriad of incompatible ends that might constitute human happiness and that 
there are many human values that rmderpin these. According to Raz, Mill’s venture is 
bound to fail, since utilitarianism presupposes the ranking of ends and values that are . 
potentially incomparable and incommensurable.
The central idea I wish to consider in this chapter is that liberty is valuable as a 
constitutive ingredient of personal autonomy, and that this conespondingly entails a 
commitment to certain social conditions designed to promote individual well-being. 
This idea can be found in foetal form in Mill, who claims that freedom is valuable as 
an intrinsic component of individuality. Yet, Raz articulates this thesis more 
persuasively, or at least more extensively, inasmuch as he identifies a specific 
relationship between freedom, autonomy, and the social conditions upon which 
human well-being is contingent. Raz casts his argument as a form of perfectionism.
M ill, J.S., On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford U niversity Press, 1991
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He thus distances himself from the other theorists I will consider, inasmuch as he 
portrays government as having to provide more than the basic social conditions that 
will empower individuals in living free lives. Rather, he appeals to human excellence. 
He suggests that the purpose of government is to actively promote human well-being, 
which entails the sponsorship of an array of valuable opportunities. However, in spite 
of the many truths espoused by Raz on this matter, I ultimately disagree with his 
argument on the scope of governmental responsibility. Contrary to Raz’s perfectionist 
inclinations, I suggest that government must only provide the conditions for the 
exercise of freedom; it should not promote or recommend the specific ends at which 
freedom should be directed.
J.S. Mill on IndividnaUty and Well-Being
Mill imderstood very well the instrumental value of freedom. He claimed that liberty 
was a means to truths of science and reason, just as it was a means to realise our 
subjective ideals. Mill rejected any vision in which men were fitted with 
straightjackets, instructed as to the absolute ends of life; human life need not have a 
particular shape or structure in order to attain fulfilment. For Mill, the ends of life 
were many, diverse, and could not be apprehended by a utopian blueprint. Just as 
different flowers flourish in different conditions, so too for human beings. He realised 
that not all paths lead to the horizon. Visions of the ultimate, truest, or happiest life for 
the human being could not be uniformly understood. He maintained that if a man 
could not get a coat or pair of boots to fit unless they are made to measure, then this 
must also be the case for human lives as a whole. The best life could not be known in 
the abstract. Diversity of preference alone was reason enough for not shaping 
humanity after one model. He was to this end essentially plmalistic, claiming: “the 
only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own 
way.””*^ Hence, there is no reason that all human existence should be constructed on a 
‘small number of patterns’. The sanctity of individual choice was, for Mill, a good 
basis from which to defend our commitment to liberty. He was suspicious of the 
collective freedom propagated by Rousseau and his followers, who offered a 
paternalistic understanding of liberty, and was distinctly aware of the tyranny that an
M ill, J.S., On Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 17
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elected majority could impose on a dissenting minority. Undoubtedly, then. Mill 
defended the importance o f negative liberty, celebrating the private space in which an 
individual could act unhindered by other people. In short, his embrace of pluralism 
fits nicely with the instrumental value of freedom as want satisfaction.
Yet, it is also tme that Mill viewed liberty as having a constitutive value, which 
follows from his perfectionist inclinations. Liberty is a constituent part of a specific 
character ideal, namely, individuality. Mill cites, with obvious support, Wilhelm von 
Humboldf s claim that the object ‘to^iyards which every human being must ceaselessly 
direct his efforts... is the individuality of power and development.’ Every man should 
strive towards ‘the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a 
complete and consistent whole.’ The requirement for this is freedom and a diverse 
environment - whereas freedom allows for individual choice, a diverse environment 
secures the authenticity of that choice. It was this seed (planted in Mill’s mind by 
Humboldt and other romantics such as Goethe) that engenders an original vision of 
liberal morality, which incorporated a perfectionist account of human flourishing. 
Broadly speaking, Mill believed that human beings excelled when they strived to 
develop their uniqueness. He was consumed by the idea of spiritual independence: the 
capacity to resist convention, to swim against the tide; to live a life full o f expression, 
experimenting in different forms of existence; to realise through autonomous thought 
and choice a form of life in which one’s individual needs, ambitions and eccentricities 
are realised. The individual alone must decide on his understanding of the good, in 
line with his critical, thinking capacities. Truths must be examined, questioned, and 
disassembled in order to search for any flaws or ambiguities. Self-awareness, 
rationality, and intellectual growth are therefore the foundation stones of Mill’s 
seimon on human perfection.
For as much as Mill’s argument reverberates down the ages, it has also been subjected 
to detailed criticism. For one, Mill’s vision of the good life is loaded with a higlily 
particularised morality. He could not bring himself to accept the intrinsic worth of 
unexamined or sensual ends, for it was plain, he thought, that those with greater 
experience would settle on a life of higher pur suits. He argued that the boundaries of 
the good life were objectively discernable by a competent judge. Mill was convinced 
that those who had experimented in living would settle on the pursuit of intellectual
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and spiritual ends as their prefened way of life /”^  a notion that seems empirically 
unfounded in our own age. Mill’s Victorian sensibilities are reflected by his devotion 
to education and all things cerebral; yet, these also betray a broader prejudice against 
physical and sensual pleasure, hideed, it is from this historically localised morality 
and from a quasi-Aristotelian vision of the good life that Mill’s perfectionist 
inclinations are revealed.
His suspicion of tradition, popular opinion and social convention have been criticised 
as little more than a type o f fetishisr#., To ground one’s life in social convention is not 
necessarily to live without individuality. As Anschutz points out, Mill’s mistake was 
to consider that a “man is only himself when he succeeds in being different from other 
men, as if individuality meant peculiarity and idiosyncrasy.”’^ "’ Mill’s fundamental 
point — if only he was clearer on this — is that the acceptance of dogma without 
thought or reflection amounts to a betiayal of individuality. Yet, there is no reason to 
suggest, as Mill often implies, that an independent person cannot think critically about 
social norms before accepting their validity. Burke was undoubtedly a great social 
critic, endowed with a sense of his own individuality, yet he found his values 
coalesced with the traditions and conventions of his country. Mill, then, arguably 
overstates the corrosive effects of social convention on individuality. His enemy is not 
tradition or convention but dogma; yet, he fatally confuses these phenomena.
Mill’s hatred of dogma is made cleai' when he warns that the demise of the 
independent mind is the great danger facing humanity. Convention renders our ideas 
dull, unoriginal and pedestrian. On what basis can we claim to prize our individuality, 
if, at every turn, we seek shelter in conformity, if our identity is shackled to a 
conception of what others think? Mill was certainly aware of the lure of the tribe, yet 
looked on this with disdain:
“It does not occur to them to have any inclination, except for what is 
customary. Thus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke: even in what people 
do for pleasuie, confonnity is the first thing thought of; they like in 
crowds; they exercise choice only among things commonly done:
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peculiaiity of taste, eccentricity of conduct, are shunned equally with 
crimes...Now is this, or is it not, the desirable condition of human 
nature?”
Mill thus recognised that many people lived in conformity, and considered humanity 
the worse for it; what he failed to appreciate was the genuine value that many people 
derive from life in the herd. Many people aspire to, indeed actively pursue, 
conformity. Everywhere we look, we are confronted by the predominance of the tribe. 
Mill’s mistake was to think that th#  deep spiritual need to belong could simply be 
wrenched from our nature; our self-identity is as much bound up with our 
relationships with others as it is with individual self-expression. At the same time, we 
should not, in taking Mill to task over his distaste for popular opinion, tradition, and 
social convention, forget his ultimate point. He asks that we cast a critical eye on the 
general sentiments of society, to choose for ourselves rather than accept - simply for 
the sake and safety of confoimity - the dogmatic braying of our peers.
There are other problems with Mill’s thesis, which pertain to his perfectionist view of 
the human being. How can Mill square his belief that we should each pursue our own 
good in our own way with the idea that there is an ideal form of life, which is - 
roughly speaking -  that which involves the higher faculties? On the one hand, it is 
important not to overstate Mill’s perfectionism, which stops well short of a definitive 
theory of the good. Indeed, the only substantive claim Mill makes is that individuality 
and an independent mind are more valuable than heteronomy and dependence, a claim 
many liberals would find hard to condemn. Nonetheless, Mill’s perfectionism does 
generate some awkward conclusions, which are difficult to square with some of his 
more liberal principles. As we witnessed above, in order to defend his argument vis-à- 
vis the value of higher pleasures. Mill invokes the dubious suggestion that those who 
have experienced both lower and higher pleasures are bound to favour the latter. In 
this fashion, Mill’s argument can accommodate both the value of choice and an 
objective understanding of the good life - there will be a tendency among autonomous 
human beings to choose the higher pleasures. Yet, in making this argument Mill is 
presented with a problem, since there are certain individuals who, having experienced
M ill, J.S., On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford University Press, 1991, p .69
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both types of pleasures, would nonetheless prefer the lower. In order to address this 
dilemma. Mill amends his argument with the unlikely claim that a commitment to the 
lower pleasures cannot truly be deemed a ‘voluntary’ choice/**^ As Lindley points out, 
this renders Mill’s thesis unfalsifiable; and more worryingly, it commits the same 
error that the most dangerous proponents of positive freedom make -  it debases the 
actual desires of individuals insofar as they are judged misguided, errant, or false. Of 
course. Mill’s position is a long way from the authoritarian tendencies of, say, 
Rousseau; nonetheless, his argument as regarding the worth of freedom would be 
more convincing if it were not atta#ied to his own understanding of the good life. In 
the end. Mill is in no doubt that the individual must be left alone to pursue his own 
good in his own way.
From Mill to Raz: An Exploration of Autonomy
Autonomy is a protean concept that has acquired many different meanings in the 
history of ideas. If we study its etymology, we find that it simply means ‘self-rule’ -  
the Greek ‘autos’ (meaning self) combines with ‘nomos’ (meaning law or rule). This 
would seem to imply personal independence from some kind of domination. 
However, beyond this, the concept has an elasticity and frizziness that has ensured a 
various and divergent usage. According to Gerald Dworkin, “autonomy is a term of 
art introduced by a theorist in an attempt to make sense of a tangled net of intuitions, 
conceptual and empirical issues, and normative claims.” ’^ ' It might be useful, 
therefore, to sketch the different ways in which the idea of autonomy has been cast. I 
hope to show that Raz’s understanding of autonomy can be fiimly placed within the 
Millian tradition.
Although Mill never used the term ‘autonomy’, it nonetheless captures his broader 
view of human excellence: individuality, active choice making, critical awareness, 
and intellectual development. We might say, then, that for Mill, the autonomous 
person must have a self-conception that is not bound up with convention or with the
Mill writes: “many who are capable o f  the higher pleasures, occasionally, under the influence o f  temptation, 
postpone them to ttie lower...but I do not believe that those who undergo this veiy common change, voluntarily 
choose the lower description o f  pleasures in preference to the higher.” Mill, J.S. ‘Utilitarianism’ On Liberty and  
Other Essays, Oxford Universiiy Press, 1991, p. 141
Dworkin quoted by Blokland, H ., Freedom and Culture in Western Society, R outledge, 1997, p .47
86
behaviour of others. By this argument, autonomy requires an ability to justify and 
uphold one’s beliefs and opinions on their own merit, irrespective of whether they are 
popular or accepted; to be autonomous is therefore to be authentic and reflective. It 
requires that we cast a critical eye on received wisdom and question the assumptions 
hidden beneath accepted truths. Lindley calls this process - the subjection of Icnown 
truths to critical assessment - ‘active theoretical rationality.’’^ ^
The Millian school differs from two other key traditions of autonomy. Kant represents 
the first and most recognisable of these. Here, the notion of autonomy is intimately 
linked with self-legislation. According to Kant, the autonomous individual assumes 
independence from the cause and effect of nature. The individual makes free decisions 
that are not determined by the laws of the phenomenal world, meaning his decisions 
are informed by the dictates of reason. In this regard, there is an intimate relationship 
between autonomy and the rational will. The autonomous individual is able to 
rationally determine the mles by which he thinks he ought to live, and assumes full 
responsibility for these.
The problem with this idea is that self-legislation might generate different rules 
depending on whether it is the rational will (Wille) or the arbitrary will {Willkür) that is 
consulted. Kant thinks autonomous action ought to be directed by the rational will; 
this alone will deliver moral precepts. Tliis has led some commentators -  most 
notably Isaiah Berlin -  to conclude that Kant provides an argument for positive 
freedom, according to which our subjective preferences and ideals may be quashed by 
truths of reason. That is to say, if I want to live by my mles, and yet if others consider 
these rules to be demonstrably irrational (tmths of reason are universally understood 
by all rational beings), then I may be forced to accept their ‘rational’ mles and hence 
forego my self-legislative ideal.
Berlin is correct to point out that a vision of rational autonomy is dangerous when 
employed as a political concept; the rational demands of Wille may lead to the 
restriction of Willkiir. However, it is not clear that this dark mutation from autonomy 
to authority can tmiy be found in Kant’s work. He allows more scope for the exercise
Lindley, K., Autonomy, M acinillan, 1986, p .46
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of Willkür than Berlin would have us believe: individuals are under no political 
obligation to act in accordance with Wille\ they are free within the bounds of the right 
to pursue whatever ends they wish, so long as they respect the freedom of everyone 
else.’^  ^We will return to this distinction in later chapters.
The other tradition of autonomy that should be identified belongs to certain post­
romantics and existentialists. This tradition is similar to the Millian view, insofar as 
individuality is a central component. Indeed, the two traditions were born of the same 
ethic, namely, the romantic vision o f the individual expressing his uniqueness through 
the free expression of his ideals. Here, the individual is portrayed as an originator, an 
architect who constructs his ideals irrespective of social mores. Yet, whereas Mill’s 
post-romantic ideal was developed within the confines of a liberal theory, and to this 
extent remained rather cautious in its moral outlook, the existentialist vision 
radicalised the idea of originality. Consequently, we find in the writing of Nietzsche 
and Sartre an autonomous agent who not only has a powerful sense of his 
individuality, but who is also self-creating. The individual personality generates his 
own ethical and aesthetic standards; he breaks social norms and formulates his own 
moral ideal. Such an ideal is not contextually derived but is rather a pure expression 
of will, or freedom.
Yet, it is not clear that this radical notion is supported by human psychology, for the 
idea of self-creation must be couched in terms of the environmental and biological 
factors over which we have little or no control. As Gerald Dworkin points out: “We 
are born in a given environment with a given set of biological endowments. We... are 
deeply influenced by parents, siblings, peers, culture, class, climate, schools, accident, 
genes, and the accumulated history of the species. It makes no more sense to suppose 
we invent the moral law for ourselves than to suppose that we invent the language we 
speak for ourselves.”’™ To this extent, the existentialist ideal of autonomy is 
unrealistic, inasmuch as it fails to consider human limitations and socialisation.
W illiams, H., K a n t’s P olitica l Philosophy, Blackwell, 1983, p.69, 110
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Of the three traditions outlined above, Joseph Raz develops an ideal of autonomy that 
has its roots in the Millian school. He is not sympathetic to the post-romantic ideal 
aiticulated by Sartre or Nietzsche. The good, for Raz, is contextual, delimited by 
habituation, social norms and institutional structures. Our comprehensive plans for 
life are not implemented from an ‘original choice’, as Sartre claims; our goals are 
culturally and historically situated. For Raz, an individual does not invent the good or 
make radical decisions as the Nietzschean man might; his understanding of autonomy 
is much less demanding.
A -
Moreover, Raz’s understanding of autonomy differs markedly from that of Kant or 
Spinoza. For Raz, the fact of value-pluralism ensures that we often have to make hard 
choices. On occasions, the comparative assessment of divergent ends is not viable 
because of incomplete information; if we cannot fully weigh the implications of a 
choice, then there may be no means to decide on the best option. Yet, there are times 
even with perfect infoimation that a comparative judgement is impossible. In such 
circumstances, the alternatives are simply incommensurable, and as such cannot be 
ranked in the abstract. If certain values are incommensurable, then there is no 
objective means by which we can rationally discern their worth. Our decisions are 
‘under-deteimined by reason’. This does not mean “equality of merit and demerit. It 
does not mean indifference. It marks the inability of reason to guide our action, not 
the insignificance of our choice.” Far from reason being the defining characteristic 
of autonomy, Raz contends that reason is potentially under-determining in the 
formulation of autonomous choice. Consequently, autonomy is not conceived in a 
rigid Kantian sense, where the object of choice is delimited by truths of reason; rather, 
autonomous choice may consist of diverse and heterogeneous pursuits. It does not 
infoim us of any substantive plan of life bar the notion that it must be our own:
“The autonomous person is part author of his life... [His] well-being 
consists in the successful pursuit of self-chosen goals and 
relationships...Autonomy is opposed to a life of coerced choices. It 
contrasts with a life of no choices, or of drifting through life without ever 
exercising one’s capacity to choose... The autonomous life calls for a 
-crcain acgrcc of scif-awarcness. To choose one must be aware of one’s
171 Raz, J., The Morality o f  Freedom, Clarendon Press, 1986, p.334
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options... The autonomous person must be aware of his life as stretching 
over time. He must be capable of understanding how various choices will 
have considerable and lasting impacts on his life. He may always avoid 
long-term commitments. But he must be aware of their availability.”'^ ^
Raz’s understanding of autonomy shares certain characteristics with that of Mill. For 
instance, he insists that the autonomous person should be part author of his own life, 
involving active-choice making and a general awareness of one’s opportunities. The
autonomous person must have a degree of foresight, consider the consequences of his%actions, and take responsibility for these; he must be loyal to his principles, even if 
these are unpopular. Raz calls this latter virtue ‘integrity’.’™ At the same time, Raz’s 
understanding of autonomy is importantly different from that of Mill. The notion of 
individuality (as uniqueness) does not feature heavily in Raz’s argument and hence he 
avoids the charge of fetishism. Raz understands that one may cast a critical eye on 
convention or tradition and yet ultimately affnm its value; indeed, for Raz, the 
concept of autonomy must be grounded in a social and cultural context. To this extent, 
whilst Raz’s interpretation o f autonomy clearly belongs to the Millian school, he 
purges Mill’s concept of its well-known prejudices. Raz’s understanding of autonomy 
is less demanding than that of Mill. An autonomous life does not always require “a 
reflective attitude to one’s life,” or the evaluation of one’s plans “in a very reflective, 
intellectual way.”’ "^’ Raz maintains that the autonomous person need not 
contemplatively endorse every action, even though some activities might require this. 
In other words, autonomy does not necessarily always require self-reflection, even if 
the autonomous ideal cannot do wholly without this phenomenon.
Raz on the Facilitation of Autonomy and Human Well-Being
Raz’s argument on the social conditions of autonomy can again be related to Mill. As 
we witnessed earlier. Mill held that individuality could be best realised in an 
environment characterised by freedom and diversity - whereas freedom allows for 
individual choice, a diverse environment secures the authenticity of that choice. Thus, 
we approacn an autonomous life insofar as we make free choices among a diverse
Raz, J., The M orality o f  Freedom, Clarendon Press, 1986, p.370-1 
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range of opportunities and insofar as we exercise our critical capacities in the 
examination of our self-chosen ends and principles.
Similarly for Raz, autonomous agency is possible only with the satisfaction of three 
criteria: appropriate mental abilities, independence from coercion and manipulation, 
and an adequate range of op t io n s .A p p ro p r ia te  mental abilities refer to the 
minimum degree of self-awareness and rationality that is necessary to form and 
pursue a vision of the good. Autonomous action entails a sense of self-direction, 
which requires independence from,|ÿhe psychological compulsions experienced, for 
instance, by schizophrenics, the autistic, paranoiacs, and kleptomaniacs. If I am 
autistic and hence compelled to behave in a certain fasliion, then I may never be able 
to establish a vision of the good, and even if I could, it would constantly be at the 
mercy of my compulsions. The autonomous individual, by contrast, constructs a life 
from a nested structme of goals, comprising comprehensive, long-term and immediate 
goals, which combine to form an individual’s conception of the good.
Independence refers to freedom from coercion and manipulation by others. We cannot 
act autonomously if we ai'e subject to the will of another, whether in a corporeal 
sense, or in a psychological sense. The latter is just as important to autonomy as the 
former. In Huxley’s ‘Brave New World’, human beings have the physical opportunity 
to act in accordance with their projects, but these projects are shaped for them by a 
combination of genetic engineering, indoctrination, and drug use -  the individual is 
therefore manipulated according to a utopian vision. Yet, this is at odds with living 
autonomously, ‘from the inside’. Nozick, among others, points to the value of 
authentically shaping one’s life -  we do not simply want to experience, we want to 
live, to do and If we are subject to the benevolent utopia of Huxley, we lose 
something very dear to human existence - the capacity to make our own genuine 
decisions, whether for good or bad. In other words, to be autonomous is to live 
authentically, to be part author of our life, for better or worse. Autonomy in this sense 
requires a minimum of independence from the manipulative will of others. The
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absence of coercion and manipulation is therefore key to the autonomous life since it 
protects the viability and authenticity of one’s projects.
An adequate range of options requires that the individual has an array of worthwhile 
opportunities from which to choose. For instance, in a recent case, a woman who was 
pai'alysed from the neck down and unable to recover was granted the right to die. Her 
misery seemed to stem from the fact that her condition had all but eliminated her 
autonomy. Once able to live purposefully, she was reduced to a life of dependence, 
where even the very breath she toi|k was made possible by a machine. Now this 
woman was clearly rational and had an extremely lucid mind; moreover, she enjoyed 
comprehensive legal freedoms, and was not manipulated by another’s will. Yet, 
insofar as she was unable to cany out a plan of life from an array of options, she had 
almost no autonomy. This would seem to demonstrate the tmth of Raz’s claim that 
autonomy requires the capacity to take advantage of worthwhile opportunities.
The allusion to valuable options is where Raz reveals his perfectionism. He writes: 
“Autonomy requires that many morally-acceptable options be available to a 
person.” In other words, Raz’s understanding of the value of autonomy is bound by 
a specific vision of the good, by options that he considers worthwhile. Consequently, 
visions of the good must play a role in the political process. Considerations of the 
good are reflections “of what does and what does not contribute to people’s well- 
being, which options and what aspects of the common culture are valuable and to be 
encouraged and which are ignoble and to be discouraged. Thus, for Raz, the value 
of autonomy derives from its contribution to his perfectionist interpretation of human 
well-being.
Does this mean that there is an onus on the government to engender human well­
being? For Raz, this is a difficult question, for well-being is a subjectively generated 
phenomenon -  “no one can make a success of another person’s life.” *^  ^Thus, whilst 
government might have a duty to protect and promote well-being, it cannot actually 
make human lives flourish. My ambition, say, to become a successful teacher is
Raz, J., The Morality o f  Freedom, Clarendon Press, 1986, p.378 
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ultimately contingent upon my own efforts, even if the state, friends and family can 
provide the conditions that would facilitate this plan. The state might provide training 
and financial support, while my personal relationships might provide me with 
emotional stability, which would allow me to whole-heartedly pursue my ambition. 
Hence: “Governments, and otlier people generally, can help people flourish, but only 
by creating the conditions for an autonomous life, primarily by guaranteeing that an 
adequate range of diverse and valuable options be available to all.” *^ ^
The conditions required for an a%onomous life presuppose both security and 
empowerment. Without security, we would be unable to execute our decisions and 
plans. At the most fundamental level, then, governments must protect us against harm 
by others. Without the rule of law, we would be vulnerable to murder, tortme, terror 
and intimidation by others, which would lead to the erosion of individual well-being. 
Yet, more than this, governments have a positive obligation towards well-being, to 
empower individuals and encourage flourishing lives. For Raz, we can “promote 
people’s chance of a good life not only by helping them acquire the skills they need 
and develop the motivation and strength of will which will stand them in good 
stead...but also by providing them with the material resources, and with the natural, 
social, cultural and economic environments, which facilitate a good life.” ^^  ^ This 
requires that the material preconditions of well-being be met or guaranteed. The 
absence of our basic needs, which include food, warmth, shelter, health, income, and 
so on, renders autonomous activity impossible or difficult. This would seem to 
suggest that some kind of social insurance, designed to protect the most vulnerable in 
society, must be established by a government concerned with human well-being. For 
Raz, the material preconditions of autonomy should be financed through redistributive 
taxation, since: “reasonably affluent people can give up quite a lot with no cost at all 
to their well-being.” Yet, the duty to ameliorate the material conditions of the most 
vulnerable is not the only consideration of government. For Raz, human well-being 
consists in the whole-hearted and successful pursuit of valuable activities, meaning 
the mere redistribution of wealth will fail to increase well-being if it is unsuccessful in 
generating valuable opportunities.
Ibid, p.105 
Ibid, p. 10 
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The Value of Autonomy
For Raz, the importance of autonomous choice derives from the incompatibility and 
incommensurability of values and ends. When Raz claims that certain values are 
incommensurable, he means that they aie incapable of being ranked in the abstract; 
there is no objective means by which their worth can be rationally discerned. By 
contrast, the notion o f incompatibility points to the fact that certain values cannot be 
fully realised at the same time. These two facets characterise the condition of value 
pluralism.
Manifest at the level of the individual, value pluralism requires that we often have to 
make difficult choices. We often have to choose between “many different and 
incompatible valuable ways of life.” ^^  ^ A life devoted to work cannot be combined 
with a life devoted to family, just as a life o f action is at odds with a life of 
contemplation. If active and contemplative lives are not merely incompatible but also 
display distinctive virtues then moral perfection is impossible. Different occupations 
and styles of life require different qualities, yet these can often only be developed at 
the expense of others -  no person can combine eveiy ideal in a single life. I might 
have the opportunity to assume control of my family business, yet this would involve 
sacrificing a career in medicine. I cannot realise both of these opportunities; they are 
necessarily incompatible. Moreover, the value of these respective careers cannot be 
ascertained in the abstract; it is left to the individual to decide on his concrete 
priorities.
It is because the moral universe is characterised by value pluralism that autonomy is 
so valuable. Without autonomy, we would be less capable of deciding between 
diverse and incompatible valuable options. Fui tliermore, the necessity of choosing 
between incompatible goals is increasingly demanded by the social conditions of 
liberal democracies. According to Raz, autonomy has never been so important: “the 
autonomous life depends not on the availability of one option of freedom of choice. It 
depends on the general character of one’s enviromnent and culture. For those who live
Raz, J., Ethics in the Public Domain, Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 103 
Ibid, p. 104
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in an autonomy supporting environment there is no choice but to be autonomous: 
there is no other way to prosper in such a society.”^ R a z  means by this that certain 
societies, such as our own, often require an autonomous lifestyle. He points to the 
example of changing attitudes to marriage - once pre-arranged, people now marry out 
of choice, if at all; co-habitation and other non-contractual relationships are now 
becoming common. This produces and requires greater autonomy, iixespective of 
whether it is desirable as such. Similar' trends towards the autonomous life are 
engendered by modern labour markets, which call for more flexibility and choice, for 
both employers and employees. Oftqpurse, that is not to say all relationships in our' 
society engender autonomy; for instance, the child/parent relationship has less room 
for free choice, even if the options available to parents are now becoming greater -  
women are having children later in life, some without a male partner; parents can 
choose to combine work and family; and so on. The point, for Raz, is not that a life 
without autonomy is worthless; some valuable lives - say the life of a devoted parent - 
are often less than autonomous. Yet, even if Raz admits that some people might not 
value autonomy in itself, he is at least convinced of its necessity. An autonomy- 
enhancing culture requires autonomous citizens.
Some commentators have criticised this argument of Raz. For instanee, Bhikhu 
Parekh notes the success of the Asian tiger economies, which have embraced 
technological and economic change, and yet the central values of such cultures have 
not included autonomy. Similai'ly, Asian immigrants to western societies have often 
functioned vei'y successfully, yet without embracing an autonomous l i f es ty le .Y e t ,  
Parekh’s criticism is only partly justified. He is correct that autonomy has not been 
embraced in Asian societies such as Japan or Singapore, despite their modern 
economies. These cultures still emphasise traditional values such as uncritical 
deference to senior members of staff in the work place or submission to familial and 
collective responsibilities. At the same time, even within this context, the necessity of 
autonomous choice is becoming more apparent. Individuals living in these societies 
increasingly have to forge a life for themselves from an array of competing 
possibilities - career paths are more frequently determined by choice than by
Raz, J., The M orality o f  Freedom, Clarendon Press, Î986, p.391
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impersonal factors over which individuals have no control, such as class or familial 
expectations. And the same can be said of Asian immigrants living in western 
societies -  whilst they have no doubt retained their own cultural identity, many of 
their traditions have been eroded by the capacity for individual choice. The example 
of fewer arranged maniages illustrates this point well.
Taken as a whole, Raz’s empirical observations demonstrate considerable insight. 
Many of his critics understate the extent to which life in western democracies requires 
autonomous decision-making. For iuftance, John Gray criticises Raz for propagating a 
misguided view of progress, in which society inexorably edges towards liberal 
homogeneity. However, Raz makes no such claims -  he merely suggests that 
minority groups will gradually approach the autonomous lifestyle that is increasingly 
required by modem economies, and hence will naturally assimilate into liberal 
society. This does not mean that immigrant cultmes will inevitably subscribe to liberal 
values, only that they will be able to integrate into liberal society. Raz does not 
foresee the production of liberal homogeneity but rather liberal multiculturalism.*^^
Nonetheless, Raz must demonstrate more than the necessity of autonomy; he must 
also establish its value. His sociological treatise cannot arm his broader thesis with 
prescriptive force; values cannot be derived from facts. Recognising this problem, Raz 
looks to formulate a normative response to the truth of value plmahsm - he looks to 
malce a virtue out of necessity. According to Raz, autonomy becomes inherently 
valuable in the face of value-pluralism, since the latter requires that we make 
informed decisions about our values and ends. Insofar' as we must choose between 
incompatible and incommensurable values, the idea of conscious self-direction has 
intrinsic appeal. However, it does not seem that Raz’s normative argument holds. 
Even if value pluralism does force us into making choices, it remains to be shown 
why we should value autonomy as such. We may prefer to shirk the responsibility of 
choice in favour of the safety of conformity, for instance. What value can autonomy 
have if I prefer a life of dependency or submission to dogma? If the great goods in life 
cannot be realised together, why should the submissive or deferential plump for 
auionom) ;
' Gray, J., Two Faces o f  Liberalism, Polity Press, 2000, p.97
Raz, J., Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the M orality o f  Law and Politics, Clarendon Press, 1994
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Indeed, it is uncertain that the value of autonomy can be given any special status in 
Raz’s pluralistic world. Consider the thiee conditions on which Raz’s particular' brand 
of value pluralism is constructed. First, an individual calculus as to the worth of 
different pursuits is not necessarily attainable given the incompatibility and diversity 
of one’s pursuits. Second, no impersonal ranking of values is rationally possible, 
meaning we cannot settle conflicts by referring to an objective hierarchy of values. 
Third, incompatible virtues often reflect diverse fundamental concerns and hence are 
not reducible to a common principleÿNow, if all of the above holds, on what basis can 
we construct an argument in favour' of the privileged status of autonomy? If a vision 
of the good cannot be articulated in relation to a hierai'chy of objective values, does 
autonomy not become just one value among o t h e r s ? O f  course, Raz attempts to 
bolster his argument by pointing to certain sociological truths about the necessity of 
autonomy in a modern economy. Yet, witliout the weight of a more recognisable 
normative argument, this is tantamount to accepting liberal values as ephemeral and 
groundless.
The Value of Freedom iu Relation to Autonomy
“No one would deny that autonomy should be used for the good. The question is, has 
autonomy any value qua autonomy when it is abused?” Raz, J., ‘The Morality of Freedom’’^ '’
If we claim that fr eedom is constitutively valuable, we mean that it is neither a means 
to something else that is valued nor an end in itself. Rather, it is a constitutive par t of 
something more complex, which itself is intrinsically valuable. Often, proponents of 
this idea are unhappy at assigning to freedom only an instrumental value (in which 
case freedom is only as valuable as the end pursued), and yet do not wish to go as far 
as to say it is intrinsically valuable (which would be difficult to demonstrate). 
Theorists such as Raz hold that freedom has a constitutive value in relation to 
autonomy; “Negative freedom, freedom from coercive interferences, is valuable 
inasmuch as it sei-ves positive freedom... In judging the value of negative freedom one
This criticism o f  Raz lias been levelled by Crowder, G„ ‘Pluralism and Liberalism’, Political Studies, 1994, 
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should never forget that it derives from its contributions to autonomy.”*^  ^ For Raz, 
then, individual liberty is a constitutive ingredient of an autonomous life. The 
essential virtue of liberty lies in its support of autonomy; it is autonomy, not liberty, 
which is valuable in itself/
This is an appealing argument that has struck a chord with liberals down the ages. If, 
as Mill and Raz demonstrate, autonomy can be pitched in a way that is consistent with 
the spirit of freedom and pluralism, then there seems little reason to fear some 
mutation into the dark monism that.fe rlin  warns against. Raz’s argument is overtly 
pluralistic inasmuch as autonomy comprehends a myriad of incompatible forms of 
life. To this extent, his understanding of autonomy is not defined in a way that is 
coloured by the moral right; Raz’s perfectionist understanding o f the good is pitched 
in terms of the value of autonomy. Consequently, he recognises that one may be 
autonomous and choose to do wrong, or pursue worthless ends. This is in contrast to 
Kant, say, for whom it is impossible to autonomously choose to do wrong. Indeed, for 
Raz, moral condemnation only makes sense if an evil act has been autonomously 
chosen. If a person drifts into a wasteful, self-degiading way of life because she 
knows no better, because alternative opportunities were blocked, then we should 
acknowledge her predicament as regiettable, and mitigate our moral judgement with 
the fact that she had little choice. Yet, if a person develops such a lifestyle in spite of 
having the opportunity to pursue a valuable life, then our moral indignation should not 
be mitigated. Raz is under no illusion, then, that one may be autonomous and choose 
morally questionable ends - an autonomous life is not necessarily for the better.
Nonetheless, Raz’s account of autonomy remains problematic. He suggests that the 
value of autonomous choice, and hence of freedom, ought to be delimited by an 
understanding of valuable ends; he is adamant tliat autonomy contributes to well­
being only if a person can choose between worthwhile goals. Autonomous choices 
therefore have little value when directed at degenerate or depraved activities; they are
Raz, J,, The M orality o f  Freedom, Clarendon Press, 1986, p.410
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desirable “only if they are choices of what is valuable and worthy of choice.” In 
other words, the value of autonomy is intrinsically related to worthwhile pursuits. 
Even though one can autonomously choose morally questionable ends, this is true 
only insofar as one could otheiwise have chosen a morally valuable end. If I do not 
have an array of valuable opportunities from which to choose, I cannot exercise 
autonomy in any meaningful sense.
To this extent, autonomy is a more stringent ideal than freedom, and hence is valuable 
for a subtly different reason. Autonomy is valuable inasmuch as it allows us to pursue 
worthwhile ends. By contrast, freedom is valuable inasmuch as it allows us to choose 
whether or not to pursue worthwhile ends. The value o f liberty therefore derives in 
part from the value of choice itself. As Berlin writes: “The essence o f liberty has 
always lain in the ability to choose as you wish to choose, because you wish so to 
choose, uncoerced, unbullied, not swallowed up in some vast system; and the right to 
resist, to be unpopular', to stand up for your- convictions merely because they are your 
convictions.” Dworkin also ties the value of negative liberty to the predilections of 
individual choice, irrespective of whether that choice comprehends worthwhile or 
worthless ends: negative liberty “applies to the tawdry as well as the heroic.”*^  ^ The 
ends at wliich our freedom is directed can be self-destructive, capricious, or foolish; 
they may even be morally dubious.
Of course, it may be asked, what possible value does liberty have if it is directed at 
morally dubious ends? Why should we freely allow for the use of pornography, say, if 
most agi'ee that it is morally odious? What value does freedom have if we make fools 
of ourselves, if we harm ourselves, or make morally dubious decisions? There are no 
unproblematic answers to these questions. The best we can do is simply to state that 
our choices are valuable inasmuch as they are our' own. Some, such as Charles Taylor, 
might be tempted to question this notion by asking if our choices are genuine (for they 
might derive from a character weakness or an illness, in which case our choice does
Raz, J., Ethics in the Public Domain, Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 105; Raz, J., The Morality o f  Freedom, 
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not flow from onr true selves). Yet, this argument (as Ï have shown in the first 
chapter) is forcefully dealt with by Berlin’s critique of enlightened rationalism.
The important strand of thought that illuminates Berlin’s thesis is that choice is 
valuable because it allows me to express my will, not because it allows for the pursuit 
of worthwhile ends. For Berlin, libeity is valuable irrespective of whether it 
constitutes an autonomous life. Raz has mentioned that autonomy requires an 
understanding of one’s life stretching over time, knowledge of options, and the 
possible impact of one’s decisions, f p  short, the autonomous life calls for a certain 
degree of self-awareness. For Berlin, the value of liberty should not be attached to 
such a demanding ideal. Some choices may be good, considered, or reflective, others 
may be unwise or hasty or foolish; but they are choices all the same. It is from this 
pluralistic interpretation of choice that, in Berlin’s view, liberty attains its value. 
Berlin believes the moral universe comprises many incompatible and 
incommensurable values, between which men must choose. Such choices may be 
agonising, and may incur inetrievable losses; yet, thp moral ideal in which all the 
great goods coalesce is mere fantasy, and to pretend otheiwise is to embrace a 
monistic view that is both incoherent and menacing. So, even if autonomy is deemed 
a good, it is not the only good, and hence the vision of worthwhile ends, which the 
concept of autonomy requires, must be placed beside the myriad of other ends that 
human beings pursue, many of which are worthless, unpopular, and even dangerous. 
Liberty might be valuable as a constitutive ingredient of autonomous agency, yet it is 
not only this, for there are other ways in which our freedom acquires value. In other 
words, the value of liberty is unnecessarily narrowed if we think of it only as 
contributing to autonomy.
In this sense, Berlin’s imderstanding of the value of libeify is coloured by the same 
anti-perfectionism and radical pluralism that underpins Rawls’ political liberalism. 
Rawls maintains that his preferred political conception of justice is not informed by 
what he calls a comprehensive moral ideal, such as autonomy or individuality. 
According to Rawls, “As comprehensive moral ideals, autonomy and individuality are 
imsuited for a political conception of justice. As found in Kant and J.S. Mill, these 
comprehensive moral ideals, despite their very great importance in liberal thought, are 
extended too far when presented as the only appropriate foundation for a
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constitutional regime. So understood, liberalism becomes but another sectarian 
doctrine.”*^  ^Rawls is not arguing that Mill’s vision of the good cannot be legitimately 
pmsued in the context of a modern liberal democracy, for it can.^^^ Yet, such a pursuit 
must be accepted as merely one vision of the good, competing with other goods, some 
secular, some religious, some philosophical, some not. None of these controversial 
comprehensive ideas, or conceptions of the good, should contribute to the basic 
structure of society, precisely because they are not acceptable to all reasonable 
persons. By contrast, the idea of the right, which does inform on the basic structure, is 
decided by this very criterion. Rawl^: tries to establish this by way of his overlapping 
consensus, that is, by the shared ideas that undeiwrite a just constitutional regime.
Conclusion
This chapter has considered the notion that liberty is valuable as a constitutive 
ingredient of personal autonomy. Although this idea was traced to Mill, it is Joseph 
Raz who has most recently articulated this thesis. Raz,casts his argument as a form of 
perfectionism. The purpose of government is to actively promote human well-being, 
which entails the sponsorship of an array of valuable opportunities, thus enabling 
autonomous choice. Yet, how, in Raz’s pluralistic universe, are these valuable 
opportunities to be identified? How can we identify morally worthwhile ends from an 
array of incompatible and incommensurable values? There are no satisfactory 
responses to such questions. It is not for the state to provide valuable opportunities, 
for the question of what is good can only be settled at a subjective level. The role of 
the state is to merely secme basic liberties, after which individuals must be left alone 
to formulate their ends. The liberal state, within the boimdai’ies of the right, ought to 
respect the revealed preferences of individuals, irrespective of how undesirable or 
unattractive these might be. There may be value in freely choosing an end that is 
eccentric, imprudent, unhelpful or morally ambiguous.
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Chapter 5: The Dialectics of Reason
“If I am rational, 1 cannot deny that what is right for me must, for the same reasons, 
be right for others who are rational lilce me.” - Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’
Introduction
In this chapter, I will carefully consider Gewirth’s answer to the three questions 
hinted at in the introduction to Sec%on IL First, why should we privilege liberty over 
other values? Second, is freedom instrumentally, intrinsically or constitutively 
valuable? Third, what is the relationship between freedom and other social goods? In 
answering these questions, I will consider Gewirth’s claim that universally binding 
moral principles can be derived from considerations of prudential agency. This 
argument evolves into a broader justification of rights to freedom and well-being. 
Nonetheless, Gewirth’s work is hampered by an irreconcilable antinomy, namely, the 
tension between moral truth and the prudential interests of purposive agents. He is 
wrong to suggest that moral imperatives can be derived from prudential 
considerations. Indeed, this tension between the moral and pmdential ultimately leads 
Gewirth to adopt a conception of freedom as rational autonomy, which entails the 
dangerous belief that tiuth has priority over liberty.
Gewirth, Kant, and Moral Reasoning
I shall begin by sketching Gewirth’s affinity to Kant, The central aim of Kant’s ethics 
is to justify a supreme moral principle, the Categorical Imperative, in order to make 
morality binding on all agents. The moral law, however, cannot be based upon 
sentiment, because this would lead to a form of subjectivism and hence to a 
contingent morality. Certain emotions such as sympathy may be present when an 
individual is acting morally, but this does not properly characterise moral action. 
Neither is action that is motivated by self-interest morally commendable, even when 
this has benevolent results. Rather, moral worth is found in action carried out in the
Beriin , I., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford U niversity Press, 1969, p .145
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name of duly, that is, action undertaken out of reverence for the moral law. The moral 
law can only be determined by reason.
Gewirth subscribes to a similar understanding of morality. Like Kant, he characterises 
morality as being objective and universally binding;
“A morality is a set of categorically obligatory requirements for action that 
are addressed at least in part to every actual or prospective agent, and that are 
concerned with furthering the,,.most important interests of persons or 
recipients other than or in addition to the agent or the speaker.”’
Gewirth also considers morality to be a truth of reason. However, he is aware that 
“determining the correct or justified criterion for moral rightness has been a perennial 
difficulty for moral philosophy.”^^® He acknowledges the argument that this difficulty 
may lie in the fundamental incommensurability of values:
“The crucial difficulty...is that...different person^ may give conflicting 
answers to the authoritative question and uphold conflicting criteria of moral 
rightness, and thus conflicting moral judgements, even if they have made no 
logical or empirical errors.” ”^’
In other words, even if a person’s argument in favoiu of a particular moral scheme is 
logically flawless, this may not be sufficient to justify that morality. Nevertheless, 
Gewirth is optimistic that this problem can be resolved, that it is possible to arrive at a 
true morality. The notion that values are incommensurable often ignores the question 
of whether the predicates of an argument aie contingent or necessaiy. Ultimate moral 
disagi’eements can only be rationally resolved i f  moral obligations are based on 
necessary contents. Once this qualification is admitted, Gewirth is adamant that the 
cold logic constitutive o f rationality is capable of ascertaining an objective moral 
position: “I hold that the rational analysis of [necessaiy predicates] is both the 
necessary and sufficient condition of solving the central problems of moral
Gewirth, A., Reason and Morality, The University o f  Chicago Press, 1978, p. I 
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philosophy.”^^  ^ Thus, through the application of our rational faculties we can avoid 
arbitrariness in moral argument and derive universally valid inferences.
For Gewirth, the necessary predicates on which morality must be based aie the 
generic features o f  human action. This is because all moral judgements are 
necessarily connected, directly or indirectly, and irrespective of further contents, with 
how people ought to act. Whilst the specific modes of action required by morality are 
highly variable, the root concept of action is unifonnly present. Moreover, Gewirth 
argues there are two generic charadpristics of action that must be present before a 
person can be judged morally accountable: voluntariness or fieedom, and 
purposiveness or intentionality. Voluntary action is defined as the unforced choice of 
an action undertaken by an agent, where that agent knows the ‘relevant proximate 
circumstances’ of his action.^’’^  Without voluntariness, we cannot be said to be acting 
in the morally relevant sense. Purposive action occurs where the end or purpose for 
which the agent acts constitutes the reason for his action. By definition, then, all 
actions are characterised by purposiveness since pmposiveness is equated with 
intentionality.^’’'^  Taken together, voluntariness and purposiveness are the most general 
features of action. Other candidates for generic features of action, such as adherence 
to rules or principles, or deliberation or calculation of consequences, must be 
discounted since they “either do not characterise all actions or else are derivative from 
and subsumable under [voluntariness and purposiveness].”
Gewirth’s argument aims to show that the voluntary pursuit of purposes commits an 
agent to accept certain noimative judgements about the generic features of action on 
pain of self-contradiction. Here Gewirth employs certain of Kant’s justificatory 
tecliniques: for instance, he contends that the test of the moral law is that its denial 
involves a self-contradiction.^”^  However, his ai'gument is also importantly different 
from Kant. In Kant’s ethics, there is a tension between the self-interested, sensuous
Gewirth, A., Reason and M orality, The University o f  Chicago Press, 1978, p.22
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self and the rational moral self; Kant fails to accurately explain why a self-interested 
agent would be motivated to act morally. Gewirth looks to escape this problem by 
employing a dialectical method, where an agent’s rational thoughts are conveyed in 
terms of the agent’s linguistic expressions.^”^  By employing his dialectically 
necessary method, Gewirth looks to show that the self-interested position from which 
all people act, necessarily involves certain moral obligations. In this way, he can 
overcome the problematic dualisms that beset Kant’s theory.
Freedlom, WeH-bcmg, and the Conditions of Action
In Reason and Morality, Gewirth aims to establish that every purposive agent is 
committed to upholding the freedom and well-being of every other purposive agent. 
This idea involves three main steps:
“First, every agent implicitly makes evaluative judgements about the 
goodness of his purposes and hence about the necessary goodness of freedom 
and well-being that are necessary conditions of his acting to achieve his 
purposes. Second, because of this necessary goodness, eveiy agent implicitly 
makes a deontic judgement in which he claims that he has rights to freedom 
and well-being. Third, eveiy agent must claim these rights for the sufficient 
reason that he is a prospective agent who has purposes he wants to fulfil, so 
that he logically must accept the generalisation that all prospective purposive 
agents have rights to freedom and well-being.
This argument rests upon the normative structure of action. For Gewirth, to act 
purposively with a given end in mind, is to accept that end as good. However, this 
conception of ‘good’ is based upon certain distinctions. First, it implies only that the 
agent values the end: he regards the goal as being worthy of pui'suit. This use is 
cleai'ly different from the narrower moral sense of ‘good’.^ ”” Second, ‘good’ does not 
necessarily involve the reflective appraisal or evaluation of the agent’s purpose.
Therefore, it is dialectical in the Socratic sense, where a method o f  argument begins from the assumptions, 
opinions, statements, or claims made by protagonists, before examining their logical implications.
 ^ ® Gewirtlr, A., Reason and M orality, The University o f  Chicago Press, 1978, p.48
For instance, an agent may pursue an action that he believes is immoral, but nevertheless may justify or ignore 
this immorality by recourse to some more pressing principle or desire. In this case, the agent, by Gewirth’s 
definition, must consider that goal good, even though immoral. Thus, the value o f  the end is not that it is 
intrinsically good in a moral sense, but simply that it is perceived to be worthy o f  pursuit by the agent.
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Rather, it is sufficient to judge an end ‘good’ solely on the basis that the perceived 
worth of the end was the motivating factor before instigating the action, whether or 
not the desirability of this end is later re-evaluated. Therefore, Gewirth contends that 
eveiy agent makes an implicit judgement that the purposes for which he acts are good. 
Crucially, by judging his particular pursued ends as good, the agent must extend this 
evaluation to the generic features of his actions. All purposive action is valuational, 
and hence the agent must not only prize the object of his action, but also the 
voluntariness and pmposiveness that characterises his action. Furthermore, if we are 
to view action generically-dispositiomally, we can establish the generic goods required 
by the agent in the pursuit of his purposes. These goods, according to Gewirth, are 
freedom and well-being.
Freedom is an essential condition of the agent’s action since without this the agent 
would not be able to pmsue his self-chosen ends. Freedom allows the agent to control 
his action by making unforced choices, such that his action is a means of pm'suing 
what he considers good. As a whole, the agent in valuing his self-chosen end must 
also value the freedom that allows him to pursue that end. Of course, certain 
conditions are more coercive than others, and for this reason Gewirth differentiates 
between occurrent and dispositional freedom. Wliereas absence of the former debars 
only particular actions, absence o f the latter makes almost all-purposive action 
impossible.^’”
As well as freedom, the agent must also value the basic, nonsubtractive, and additive 
goods, which constitute his well-being. Basic goods are the physical and 
psychological bases of well-being, such as life, food, clothing, shelter, mental health, 
and confidence in the possibility of attaining one’s goals. Not all basic goods are 
equally necessaiy for action; there are degrees of indispensability, with life being the 
most important. Nevertheless, the rational agent must accept the value of all basic 
goods so long as he upholds the value of his self-chosen ends; basic goods viewed in 
this way are the “general necessary preconditions of action.”^” Without these goods.
An example o f  the former would be traffic lights, which temporarily interrupt a person’s purposes. For this 
reason the good that traffic lights create (i.e. safety for pedestrians and motorists) easily outweigh their evil. An 
example o f the latter would be imprisonment, which more or less makes purposive action impossible. 
Consequently, imprisonment can only be justified in serious cases.
Ibid., p.54
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the agent “would be able to act either not at all or only in certain very limited 
ways.”^’^  As well as basic goods, the rational agent must value nonsubtractive and 
additive goods. Whilst the absence of these goods do not debar action altogether, 
nevertheless, they are necessary for generally successful action. For Gewirth, non­
subtractive goods “consist in [the agent] retaining and not losing whatever he already 
has that he regards as good.”^’^  Hence, to lose a non-subtractive good is to have one’s 
level of purpose fulfilment lowered; an example of a non-subtractive good would be 
protection against theft. Additive goods relate to a person’s capacity to increase their 
levels of purpose-fulfilment, to perpetuate their capacity to pursue self-chosen 
projects; education, or opportunities for income and wealth, aie examples of additive 
goods. Of course, it is clearly possible to undertake a given act without many of the 
goods Gewirth elicits. As Gewirth admits, “an agent may perfoim some successful 
actions without having well-being in all o f its three dimensions; and he may have such 
well-being and yet not succeed in some particular action.”^’'’ Gewirth is able to avoid 
any problematic implications by viewing well-being generically-dispositionally. By 
doing so, the generic goods he lists can be seen as the general conditions and abilities 
required for fulfilling more particular purposes. As such, generic goods are viewed as 
a means to an end; they ai e valued by the agent in virtue of their instrumental value.
In this regard, Gewirth’s understanding of generic goods is comparable to Rawls’s 
conception of primary social goods. In the first instance, the list of generic goods that 
each author elicits is relatively similar. For Rawls, primaiy social goods refer to 
rights, liberties, and opportunities, the social bases of self-respect, and income and 
wealth. This list is easily translatable into Gewirth’s generic goods: what Rawls terms 
‘liberties’ Gewirth understands as ‘freedom’; the ‘opportunities’ and ‘income and 
wealth’ referred to by Rawls could be viewed as ‘additive goods’ in Gewiith; and so 
on. Beyond this obvious initial similarity, both authors view these goods in the same 
way, as all-purpose means to agents’ ends. For Rawls, primaiy goods are valued 
because they increase the agent’s capacity to realise his self-chosen ends. It is in the 
interest of agents to maximise social primary goods; it is rational for an agent to want 
more of these goods rather than less, irrespective of what plan of life that individual
Ibid., p.63 
Ibid., p.54 
Ibid., p.62
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adheres to. Accordingly, Rawls states that primary goods ai'e “things that every 
rational man is presumed to want. These goods normally have a use whatever a 
person’s rational plan of life.”^’  ^ Gewirth too, recognises this position: the agent 
values his freedom and well-being because these goods increase his capacity to 
satisfy his purposes. For instance, Gewirth claims that the agent views his freedom 
“as a means to attaining his ends.”^’  ^ More broadly, all generic goods are 
instrumental in the achievement of the agent’s purposes: “Since the agent regards his 
purposes as good, he must, insofar- as he is rational, regard these conditions as at least 
instrumentally good, whatever his p ^ icu la r contingent and variable purposes.”^’  ^To 
this extent, Gewirth and Rawls argue virtually the same point, namely, that there are 
certain generic goods that assist the individual in the pursuit of purposes; hence such 
generic goods are necessarily valued by purposive agents.^
However, Gewirth takes his argument further than Rawls in that he suggests the 
capabilities of action constitute the well-being of the agent. As Gewirth writes, “any 
rational agent must regard these abilities and conditions as constituting his well-being 
because of their strategic relation to all his purposive actions.”^’” Whereas Rawls 
limits himself to the supposition that primary goods are all-purpose means to the 
individual’s ends, Gewirth provides a more demanding account of the role of social 
goods in our lives: he implies that well-being is not fully attained unless an agent has 
access to an array of basic, nonsubtractive, and additive goods. Yet, if these criteria 
for well-being ultimately derive from the purposiveness of the agent, it is hard to see, 
for example, how a monk who determines to live in poverty has a lower level of 
purpose-fulfilment than a university educated businessman.
The next step in Gewirth’s argument is to justify an agent’s right claim. According to 
Gewirth, because the rational agent necessarily values his freedom and well being, 
me agent must make a claim on these goods. This right claim is extremely strong in
Rawls, J. A Theory o f  Justice, Revised Edition, Oxford University Press, 1999, p.54 
Gewirth, A., Reason and Morality, The University o f Chicago Press, 1978, p.52 
Ibid., p.54
Nevertheless, Rawls can justify limiting his considerations to all-purpose goods, whereas Gewirth cannot.'This 
point will be developed later in the chapter.
Ibid., p.61
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the sense that it is ‘required’ or ‘mandatory’ relative to the agent’s position. The 
nature of the claim ‘I have a right to freedom and well-being’ is such that the agent is 
making an implicit or explicit demand that all other people ought to respect this right. 
As Gewirth writes:
“The agent holds that other persons owe him at least non-interference with 
his freedom and well-being, not because of any specific transaction or 
agreement they have made with him, but on the basis of his own prudential 
criteria, because such non-inteiference is necessary to his being a purposive 
agent.”^”
It should be recalled that for Gewiith, freedom and well-being are the necessary 
generic conditions for all purpose-fulfilling actions, without which such action would 
be impossible or futile. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between my 
stating that ‘ray freedom and well-being are valuable’ and my stating that ‘I am 
entitled to freedom and well-being’. There is no direct entailment from ‘X is good for 
A’ to ‘A has a right to X’. In recognition of this point, Gewirth suggests that the right- 
claim in question is correlative with the agent’s perspective that other people ought to 
respect his freedom and well-being. The agent makes this demand since he recognises 
that his freedom and well-being aie necessary goods for him, and as such they must 
be kept inviolate:
“In saying that freedom and well-being are necessary goods for him, the 
agent is not merely saying that if he is to act, he must have freedom and 
well-being; in addition, because of the goodness he attaches to all his 
purposive actions, he is opposed to whatever interferes with his having 
freedom and well-being and he advocates his having these features, so that 
his statement is prescriptive and not only descriptive.”
In other words, the necessary goodness of the agent’s freedom and well-being entails 
the necessaiy prudential judgement that other people ought not to interfere with his 
having them. Gewirth suggests that it is positively contradictory for an agent to say 
my freedom and well-being are necessary goods’ and uphold the notion that ‘it is not
Ibid., p.66 
Ibid., p.79
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the case that other purposive prospective agents ought not to interfere with my 
freedom and well-being.’ This claim is prudential rather than moral in that it refers to 
the agent’s own freedom and well being; it is only as a means to his purposes that the 
agent is required to defend his freedom and well being from interference. The ‘ought’ 
judgement involved is asserted from the standpoint of the agent, not that of the 
respondent.
However, according to Gewirth, the agent who claims freedom and well-being as a 
right must now admit, on pain of #ntradiction, that this right also belongs to any 
other person who meets the criterion of justification. That is, the rights the agent 
claims for himself must also be granted to all other people who share relevantly 
similar’ characteristics. This is simply a matter of l o g i c . O n  pain of contradiction, 
the agent must accept that his right to freedom and well-being, being based on the 
sufficient reason that he is a prospective agent who has purposes he wants to fulfil, 
must be extended to all other prospective agents who have purposes they want to 
fulfil. This generalisation is a direct application of logical universalisability.
Following universalisation, Gewirth argues that any prospective purposive agent’s 
right-claim to freedom and well-being ought to be respected by other agents, at least 
to the extent of non-interference. The agent rs rationally required to accept this 
‘ought’ judgement, which must be considered as binding on all conduct towards other 
prospective agents. Thus, the prudential becomes moral as soon as the right-claim is 
miiversalised, where the agent acknowledges the rights of others to claim freedom and 
well-being. Accordingly, the transition from the prudential to the moral is not 
motivational but logical:
“The agent is logically compelled to make this transition from a prudential to 
a moral judgement, because if he did not he would be in the position of 
denying what he had previously had to affirm, namely, that being a 
prospective purposive agent is a sufficient justifying position for having 
rights to freedom and well-being.”^^'*
222 If the predicate P belongs to the subject S because S has the property Q, then P must also belong to all other
subjects SI, 8 2 .-.Sn that have Q. 
Ibid., p. 147
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Thus, every agent logically must admit to having certain generic obligations;
“Negatively, he ought to refrain from coercing and from harming his 
recipients; positively, he ought to assist them to have freedom and well-being 
whenever they cannot otherwise have these necessary goods and he can help 
them at no comparable cost to himself. The general principle of these 
obligations and rights may be expressed as the following precept addressed to 
every agent: Act in accord with the generic rights o f your recipients as well
as yourself. I shall call this the Principle o f Generic Consistency
'«%,
In this respect, Gewirth’s supreme moral principle is Kantian in essence; a morally 
binding right is realised when the denial of that right to others is self-contradictory. 
However, as I now hope to show, by basing his theory upon the self-interest of 
purposive agents, Gewirth’s argument leads not to a Kantian universalisation, but to a 
practical compromise similar to that found in Hobbes.
Moral and Prudential Agency: An Unresolved Tension?
For all of the novelty that Gewirth exhibits in Reason and Morality, there is a 
significant problem with the aigument he presents; there is a tension in Gewirth’s 
work that pulls in two directions. As said, the central claims of his argument are 
Kantian in spirit, but his justificatory method, being based upon the claims of self- 
interested agents, tends towards a Hobbesian conclusion. In other words, Gewirth, 
contrary to his suggestions, creates an antinomy between moral and prudential 
agency.
This becomes clear when we examine the cogency of his reasoning. For the sake of 
argument, let us assume that all purposive agents value freedom and well-being since 
they are goods necessary for action. For Gewirth, it follows that each agent thereby 
demands that his or her freedom and well-being be kept inviolate, which thus 
engenders a right claim. The nature of this claim is such that the individual agent is 
making an implicit or explicit demand that all other people ought to respect this right, 
at least to the extent of non-interference. In other words, the value placed ppon
Ibid., p .135
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freedom and well-being by a purposive agent logically entails the prudential and 
prescriptive ‘ought’ judgement that these goods be kept inviolate against interference 
horn others. The agent’s own pmdential interests are sufficient to justify the demand 
that his freedom and well-being ought not to be interfered with. In other words, “it is 
sufficient that the agent has her reasons for making the judgement; it is not required 
that her addressees also have their own reasons for complying with it.”^^  ^ Hence, the 
right is gi'ounded solely upon the agent’s perspective that her interests should be 
protected against interference from others.
Gewirth looks to consolidate this argument by rebutting the incisive objection of an 
amoralist. While the amoralist may consider his freedom and well-being to be 
necessary goods for action, he would argue that other people do not have to respect 
his claim on these goods. In order to counter this objection, Gewirth asks us to 
imagine a situation in which an agent’s well-being is threatened by Z, which could be 
avoided by undertaking action X. According to Gewirth, it follows that the agent must 
make the pmdential prescriptive judgement that ‘I ought to do X ’, insofar as the agent 
values his own well-being. Crucially, Gewirth suggests, the premise ‘I ought to do X’ 
entails the judgement ‘I ought to be free to do X’, where ‘to be free’ means not being 
interfered with by others, and where the ‘ought’ is prudential rather than moral. 
This follows since the pursuit of action X is contingent upon the agent’s freedom.
Now, given that the statement ‘1 ought to be free to do X’ appears to be other-directed 
and morally situated,^^^ it acquires a prescriptive force that is quite different from the 
first statement, which is self-directed. Yet according to Gewirth, an other-directed 
‘ought’ statement is not illegitimate in this context; the claim ‘I ought to be free to do 
X’ remains pmdential given that it stems from the self-interest of the purposive agent 
- even though this statement is other-directed, it is not other-directing. By this, 
Gewirth means that the ‘ought’ judgement is generated from the agent’s prudential 
uernanas, and whilst these demands may be directed at another and are to this extent
Gewirth, A., The Community o f  Rights, University o f  Chicago Press, 1996, p.22
It seems peculiar that Gewirth directs this argument specifically against an objecting amoralist; after all, 
morality (or amorality) should not affect Gewirth’s argument - wc are concerned only with the logical implications 
o f  a  purposive a g en t’s prudential interests.
Gewirth, A., Reason and Morality, The University o f  Chicago Press, 1978, p.91
In the second statement, the ‘ought’ is attached to the idea o f  freedom, rather than to the purpose set out by the 
agent. Freedom is asocial phenomenon, meaning the agent’s freedom is dependent upon the co-operation o f  other 
people  (which implies the statement is other-directed an morally situated).
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prescriptive, they do not have the normative weight required to be other-directing, 
since no moral transaction has taken place.
However, this argument simply will not do: even if we accept that a statement can be 
other-directed without being other-directing (which in itself is dubious), Gewirth fails 
to demonstrate that an other-directed ‘ought’ claim based solely on prudential 
considerations can generate a right. In order to demonstrate this point, let us probe the 
criteria Gewirth invokes to justify a prudential ‘ought’ judgement. First, the agent 
must outline factual requirements%or restrictions pertinent to the conduct of other 
people. Second, the agent has a pmdential reason on which he grounds this 
requirement. Third, the agent holds that “this requirement and reason justify in some 
way preventing or dissuading the persons addressed from violating the 
requirement.”^^ ” Upon examination of these criteria, it is clear that the purposive 
agent satisfies the first and second conditions: he demands that others do not interfere 
with his freedom and well-being since these are necessary goods for the pursuit of his 
purposes. Yet, it is not clear that a pmdential claim satisfies the third criterion. As I 
see it, only a moral ‘ought’ could satisfy this condition and hence generate a right 
claim; a moral ‘ought’ expresses a ‘categorically obligatory requirement for action,’ 
which is addressed ‘to every actual or prospective agent.’ In this sense, only a moral 
‘ought’ has the required persuasive force to prevent or dissuade a recipient from 
violating this judgement, and hence generate a right claim.
Following this analysis, it seems that Gewirth tacitly smuggles a moral ‘ought’ into 
his theory in the guise of a pmdential demand. If the agent were to remain solely 
within a prudential perspective, he would not be able to persuade the recipients that 
the Aught’ judgement was owed to him. In other words, Gewirth’s aigument falters 
because he provides no reason for agent B to accept the pmdential demands of A; the 
fact that agent A considers his freedom and well-being to be necessary prudential 
goods does not mean that agent B ought to respect A’s claim on these goods. Thus, an 
agent’s pmdential demand that all other agents ought to respect his freedom and well­
being cannot lead to a right claim.^^” MacIntyre expresses this point well:
Ibid., p.79
If we remain strictly within a prudential perspective, tlie agent must abide by self-directed statements: these 
alone are non-prescriptive relative to the actions o f  others. Importantly, i f  this is the case, then a right claim does
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“The claim that I have a right to do or have something is quite a different type 
of claim from the claim that I need or want or will be benefited by something.
From the first -  if it is the only relevant consideration -  it follows that others 
ought not to interfere with my attempts to do or have whatever it is, whether it 
is for my good or not. From the second it does not.”
The fact that an agent claims something as a necessary good according to his 
prudential interests does not thereby give him a right to that good. The right in 
question requires that the respondents refrain from interfering with the freedom and 
well-being of die agent, but there are no good reasons for the respondents to accept 
this ‘ought’ judgement. In this light, it seems that the logical progression of Gewirth’s 
argument cannot lead to a Kantian universalisation, for this presupposes the 
legitimacy of the individual agent’s right claim.
Indeed, by stressing the prudential interests of the purposive agent, Gewirth has made 
it impossible to generate moral inferences through a process of universalisation. 
Gewirth envisages a situation in wliich die self-interested agent necessarily resists all 
limitations on his freedom of action; yet following universalisation, Gewirth 
postulates a moral law that entails the limitation of freedom. In other words, the 
moral conflicts with the prudential: universalisation ultimately contradicts the agent’s 
demand for freedom. Gewirth deals with this problem in typical Kantian fashion. 
Even though the moral law places obligations on the agent, this does not constitute a 
reduction in the agent’s freedom “since, being rational, he accepts what is rationally 
justified.”^^  ^ Consequently, in acting morally (i.e. rationally) the agent’s fruedom is 
unaffected. However, this response is unsatisfactory. Gewirth’s conception of moral 
freedom is entirely different fr om that of prudential freedom; and the former cannot 
be deduced from the latter. Gewirth assumes that an agent would accept limitations 
on his freedom, but why should this be so if an agent’s interests are puiely 
prudential? Why should an agent uphold or accept the moral law if he has no 
motivation for doing so based on his own self-interest? In this regard Gewirth's
not follow since, as Gewirth admits, a right claim necessarily has a respondent (i.e. it is always claimed against 
another).
MacIntyre, A., After Virtue, Duckworth, 1981, p.64; See also Raphael, D.D., ‘Rights and Conflicts,’ Gewirth's 
Ethical Rationalism, Edward Regis Jr., (ed.) The University o f  Chicago Press, 1984, p.88 
Gewirth, A., Reason and Morality, The University o f  Chicago Press, 1978, p. 195
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inability to derive moral rights from a pmdential basis reveals a deep tension that 
exists between the self-interest of the agent and the duty to act morally. It seems, 
then, that Gewirth’s argument is ridden by a duality in the agent comparable to that in 
Kant: there is no connection between the pmdential self and the moral self.^^^
However, that is not to say we should thereby discard Gewirth’s argument, for it may 
be possible to generate rights to freedom and well-being from the pmdential 
motivation of the agent. This could occur through something like a Hobbesian 
covenant. Gewirth is certainly aw(%e that there is a strong individual motivation to 
secure freedom and well-being as a right: “Self-interested individuals must be 
concerned vrith their own having rights. For, as self-interested, they have interests and 
they want them to be protected for their ovra sakes, or at least not harmed or 
infringed.”^^ '^  However, Gewirth explicitly denies that a Hobbesian covenant could 
generate rights; he looks to Kant rather than to Hobbes in order to justify his supreme 
moral principle:
“The reason why the agent must endorse the generic rights of his recipients is 
not the Hobbesian prudential or contingent one that if he violates or fails to 
endorse these rights for others he may probably expect them to violate his 
own rights, but rather the logically necessary one that if there is a sufficient 
condition that justifies the agent’s having the generic rights, then it must 
justify that these rights are had by all other persons who satisfy that sufficient 
condition.
Flowever, as we have witnessed, Kantian conclusions cannot be generated out of 
Hobbesian premises; only by something like a Hobbesian covenant can self-interest 
generate a moral law. Now, if it were tme that every purposive agent necessarily 
values his or her freedom and well-being, perhaps it would be mutually advantageous 
to create institutions that uphold individual rights to these goods. If there existed 
rights to an array of basic freedoms and well-being, then the agent would be 
guaranteed a level of secmity; otherwise, the agent’s freedom and well-being could be 
tlueatened by the self-interest of other agents. At the same time, if a group of self-
U should also be pointed out that Kant at least acknowledges this duality whereas Gewirth does not. 
Gewirth, A., The Community o f  Rights, University o f  Chicago Press, 1996, p. 11 
Gewirth, A., Reason and Morality, The University o f  Chicago Press, 1978, p. 146
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interested agents were to enter into agreement -  and have their freedom and well­
being enshrined in rights - this would mean sacrificing certain freedoms that the agent 
could have used to his own advantage prior to the agreement. The question, then, is 
whether this sacrifice would be offset by the gain in security (in having some freedom 
and well-being protected).
Perhaps as Gewirth realised, it is unlikely that all purposive agents would be equally 
motivated to universalise rights to freedom and well-being. In the first instance, there 
would be little reason (moral considerations aside) for someone who already enjoys 
freedom and well-being to expend effort in ensuring that others also enjoy such 
goods; and even if motivation was provided by some sort of natural equality, or 
through the feai* of losing these goods at a future date, justice-as-mutual-advantage 
would still flounder on the free rider problem: it is maximally advantageous for the 
self-interested individual to gain the security of rights to well-being without 
compromising his own freedom. This problem also troubled Hobbes, who recognised 
that whilst it is in the interest of all to respect the covenant that allows political life to 
exist, for any single agent the best possible scenario would involve everyone 
respecting the covenant bar himself (thus retaining the freedom of the state of nature 
and gaining the security o f political life). Hobbes was able to avoid this problem only 
by invoking the leviathan, an authority bestowed with such power that no-one would 
risk cheating. Yet, it is unlikely that the leviathan is compatible with a regime that 
concedes comprehensive rights to freedom and well-being.
As such, we must conclude that justice-as-mutual advantage cannot save Gewirth’s 
theory: pmdential interest ultimately frustrates the quest to generate moral relations. 
The only way in which this argument could work requires a starting point in which no 
one person is advantaged in any way, where all persons are free and equal; perhaps 
then we could generate some kind o f right to freedom and well-being. Even then, 
however, the moral grounding is assumed as the premise of the argument: morality is 
not derived fr om, but rather constrains self-interest. This, of couise, is not the territoiy 
of Gewirth but of Rawls; these conditions form the foundation of his original position. 
We shall reseiwe judgement on this idea for a later chapter.
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The Autonomous Agent and Gewirth s Theory of the Good
Moving from the reasoning and implications of Gewirth’s argument, we can now 
address the foundations of his theory. As I mentioned in my fust chapter, the broad 
pmpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between two central liberal goods, 
freedom and well-being. Gewirth writes extensively on this topic, and claims that 
rights should uphold these goods. Yet, most of the authors I consider in this thesis 
suggest something similar. What makes Gewirth unique among other liberal theorists 
is that he looks to demonstrate a%ecessary tmth. In this regard, Gewirth hopes to 
avoid the contingency of otiier liberal viewpoints. Rawls, for example, admits that his 
argument demonstrates no necessary truths, and that his theory of justice is only one 
among several possibilities: “I do not claim for the principles of justice proposed that 
they are necessary truths or derivable from such truths. A conception of justice cannot 
be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles.”^^  ^ Gewirth, by 
contrast, claims universal validity for his liberal principles of justice; he claims to 
present an argument which “culminates in a categorical moral principle.” This is 
because “it proceeds within a context -  the necessary conditions of action -  that no 
agent can rationally or consistently reject.
In pursuing this argument, Gewirth claims that his supreme principle of morality is 
derived from an amoral basis: the necessary conditions of purposive action. As such, 
he hopes to avoid the contingency of other liberal viewpoints: whereas theorists such 
as Rawls begin from certain moral intuitions, and while the perfectionist liberals base 
their argument on a specific account of human flourishing, Gewirth’s theory rests 
upon a concept he claims is value-free. Such neutrality is necessary if he wishes to 
support the impartiality of his moral theory - otherwise the legitimacy of his starting 
point could be questioned. Consequently, Gewirth contends “the concept of action 
that is to be used as the basis of the justificatory ar gument is morally neutral.
Yet, this is a dubious claim. Consider the voluntariness that Gewirth suggests 
characterises action. He claims that a voluntary action occurs where an “unforced and
Rawls, J. A Theory o f  Justice, Revised Edition, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 19 
Gewirth, A., The Community o f  Rights, University o f  Chicago Press, 1996, p.27 
Gewirth, A., Reason and M orality, The University o f  Chicago Press, 1978, p.25
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informed choice is the necessary and sufficient condition of the behaviour. 
According to Gewirth, then, voluntary action requires a given amount of freedom; this 
allows the agent to control his action by making unforced choices, such that his action 
is a means of pursuing what he considers good. In this regard, voluntary action 
requires “certain causal conditions” to be fulfilled. '^^® In Gewirth’s view, an agent 
cannot be said to be acting voluntarily where he is subject to direct physical or 
psychological compulsion; where behaviour is induced by internal causes beyond the 
agent’s control, such as reflexes, ignorance, or disease; and where a person’s choice is 
indirectly forced by someone else’s coercion.
Yet, it is not clear that freedom is a necessary condition of voluntariness; it is possible 
to act voluntarily under coercive conditions. Witness the countless people who have 
protested against tyrannous governments throughout history, and who have often paid 
with their lives. It would be peculiar indeed to say that such protestors did not act 
voluntarily. Yet this Sartrean understanding of voluntai'iness cannot generate a liberal 
concept of fr eedom as the absence of coercion, for we can still act voluntarily even if 
civil liberties are not afforded to us. A more generous understanding of voiimtariness 
would accept that it is possible for a person to act under coercive circumstances. 
Therefore, whilst Gewirth is right that voluntariness necessarily characterises action, 
he is wrong to think that this requires liberty. Gewirth’s theoiy is undermined by a 
gap between voluntaiy action and its conditions: voluntary action does not require the 
absence of coercion.
This, of course, creates a problem for Gewirth in justifying the liberal state, since a 
person can act voluntarily without legal fieedoms. Gewirth skips around this problem 
by imposing his vision of the good upon the agent: the agent does not simply require 
generic conditions of action, but conditions of autonomous action.^^^ If a person is to 
have a meaningful capacity to act according to their own ideals and values, then they 
will require an extensive measuie of freedom and well-being including civil liberties 
and rights to goods such as housing, education and wealth. Thus, it appears Gewirth’s 
understanding of the concept of action is value-loaded; he bases his theory upon a
!bid.,p.3I
Ibid.
This is a point made by M oore, M, Foundations o f  Liberalism, Clarendon press, 1993, p.26
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tacit notion o f the good; his conclusions are more a derivative of his conception of the 
autonomous person rather than the impartial outcome of his dialectical method. In this 
regard, the foundation of Gewirth’s theory is not morally neutral, as he contends, but 
relies on a specific concept of the person; Gewirth’s purposive agent is motivated by a 
conception of the good life as autonomy. Hence, he does not derive moral imperatives 
from a value-free basis.
Gewirth’s Monistic Rationalism
Gewirth’s specific conception of the person becomes even more pronounced 
following the derivation of the supreme moral law; he ultimately comes to define 
freedom in the Kantian sense, as rational autonomy. For Kant, autonomy is necessary 
in order to uphold the sanctity of the moral law. Autonomy means being free from the 
object of volition . Yet, freedom is not lawless; rather, it involves the self-imposition 
of moral law. Hence, freedom must be a “causality conforming to immutable laws,” 
and consequently a “free will and a will under moral laws are the same.” Gewirth 
also upholds this idea:
“The agenf s freedom or voluntariness of action is thus not violated when he 
is subjected to the duties or requirements imposed by the FGC...The PGC 
hence indicates to him that, as rational, he must choose to act in accordance 
with its requirements rather than in the other ways left open to him. Such 
choice is not forced because it is based on rational criteria he accepts, and 
indeed accepts as categorically obligatory for his actions. In choosing to 
comply with the PGC the agent is rationally autonomous in the strict 
sense.
However, the implications of this view can be quite illiberal. If we are to uphold the 
principle of rational autonomy, then choice can become redundant, and freedom can
As Moore points out, Gewirth anticipates this criticism towards the end o f  Reason and Morality. Gewirth is 
aware that by using a deductive method he is open to tlie criticism that the conclusion he has generated must have 
been implicit in the premise, meaning the premise itself is value-loaded. To this Gewirth responds that the concept 
o f  action he has used is a general, universal concept that does not presuppose any specific moral values; in deriving 
his moral imperatives Gewirth claims simply to have recognised the logical implications o f  the normative structure 
o f  action through the dialectical method. Yet, as we have just witnessed, he is wrong in this belief.
I ll ^ ' ‘^ ^^f^d'^orkfor the M etaphysics o f  Morals, trans. Paton, H. J., Hutchinson, 1948, p. 107-8
Gewirth, A., Reason and Morality, The University o f  Chicago Press, 1978, p. 139
119
become equivalent to compliance with truth. Gewirth illustrates his acceptance of 
freedom as rational autonomy when he engages in a hypothetical discussion about a 
man who will not consent to a life-saving blood transfusion on religious grounds. 
Gewirth argues that in this situation, the dying man is incapable of giving his rational 
consent (i.e. he is not acting autonomously, from a correct application of reason), and 
as such, should be given the transfusion in order to save his life. In other words, the 
religious man is not in a position to make a reasoned decision about his own welfare 
since his spiritual convictions camiot be squared with a blood transfusion that serves 
“to refute or cast doubt upon his bÿiefs.” '^^  ^ Hence, he should be forced to have the 
transfusion.
This, of course, is a dangerous interpretation of the concept of freedom, the type of 
which Berlin has been so critical. According to Berlin, this understanding of freedom 
makes it “easy for me to conceive of myself as coercing others for their own sake, in 
their, not my interests. I am then claiming that I know what they truly need better than 
they know it themselves. What, at most, this entails is that they would not resist me if 
they were rational and as wise as I and understand their interests as I do.” '^^  ^This line 
of thought is clearly evident in Gewirth’s theoiy, and is at odds with a liberal point of 
view. For Berlin, such excesses typically derive from metaphysical accounts of what 
it is to be human:
“This demonstrates (if demonstration of so obvious a truth is needed) that 
conceptions of freedom directly derive from views of what constitutes a self, 
a person, a man. Enough manipulation with the definition of man, and 
freedom can be made to mean whatever the manipulator wishes.” '^^ ^
This certainly seems to be the case for Gewirth, who defines the person in terms of 
rational autonomy. The problem with this, as we have witnessed, is that rational 
autonomy is associated with moral tmth, and hence any act that does not accord with 
the moral law must thereby be irrational.^'^^ Flowever, it is perfectly plausible that the 
religious man is aware that a blood transfusion would save his life. He may still
Ibid., p.262
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Ibid., p. 134
M oore, M. Foundations o f Liberalism, Clarendon press, 1993, p.30
120
refuse this transfusion on the grounds that it would undermine his deeply held beliefs. 
This need not be an iiTational decision, so long as we uphold Gewirth’s definition of 
rationality as “the canons of deductive and inductive l o g i c . I n  other words, the 
religious man may be aware of the implications of his choice, that his decision will 
result in his death, and yet sustain his objection to treatment. This judgement can be 
rendered in a perfectly rational manner.
Contrary to claims made by Gewirth about the compatibility of negative freedom and 
rational autonomy, an irresolvable$tension exists. On the one hand, Gewirth looks to 
uphold a certain degree of negative fr eedom: “Persons must be left free to live their 
lives as they please and to make and perhaps profit from their own mistakes.”^^  ^
However, as we have witnessed, this is potentially at odds with the dictates of the 
moral law he claims to derive. Consequently, an irresolvable conflict emerges. As 
Moore points out, “if the person’s negative freedom or choice is respected, the 
rational (moral) result may not obtain; and if Gewirth directly applies the PGC to 
obtain the morally justified result, the actual choices of individuals may not be 
respected.”^ ’^
This tension also arises in Gewirth’s discussion of political obligation. Here, he looks 
to come to teims with several points of debate: whether there should be a political 
state; what kind of constitution a state should have; who should govern; and what 
laws should be enforced. In addressing these issues, Gewirth uses his supreme moral 
principle as a point of reference. He suggests that the right of every purposive agent to 
freedom and well-being requires the existence of a minimal state including criminal 
law, democratic rule, and a constitution that upholds civil liberties. These institutional 
features are necessary in order to uphold and protect the sanctity of the supreme moral 
principle, and thus have an instrumental justification. For instance, a person’s rights to 
freedom must be protected by criminal law since without this legal framework such 
rights could not be effectively held. Moreover, “since the criminal law directly 
embodies and enforces basic aspects of the [moral law] its obligatoriness can no more 
be contingent on persons’ optional consent than can that of the generic loiles
Gewirth, A., Reason and Morality, The University o f  Chicago Press, 1978, p.22 
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themselves.”^^  ^ Thus, the existence of these institutional features is non-negotiable 
given that they derive directly from a rational consideration of the supreme moral law; 
hence, they “share its inherently rational justification.”^^  ^ Beyond these basic 
constitutional requirements, laws and legislators must, as fai' as possible, be subject to 
democratic ratification: the moral law “requires that all persons have equal rights to 
freedom [which] include equal rights...to participation in the political process.
The effective capacity to participate in democratic procedure is “required for the 
dignity and rational autonomy of every prospective purposive agent.
Yet, this line of argument becomes problematic for Gewirth when he comes to discuss 
the scope of democracy and its relation to the welfare state. According to Gewirth, the 
moral right to well-being does not neeessarily translate into a political right: the 
welfare state, which to all intents and purposes supports individual well-being, is 
subject to democratic ratification. This is because democratic ratification imbues the 
welfare state with a greater sense of legitimacy, given that its status and scope is a 
point of great debate. Furthermore, whilst it is morally correct that well-being be 
upheld as a moral right, the moral law cannot give definitive answers about what kind 
of welfare support should be given, how the various facets of this support inter-relate, 
when support should give way to self-help, and how redistribution impacts upon 
broader economic considerations. In other words, even if the ends ai’e agreed, the 
means are not: there are different ways in which a state can provide for the needs of 
the worst-off.
However, as Gewirth realises, it may be problematic to subject welfare measures to 
democratic ratification, since the outcome of democratic procedure is potentially at 
odds with the substantive requirements of the moral law. For instance, a majority of 
people could vote for a laissez-faire economy, and hence place certain members of the 
community in a situation of disadvantage or poveity, thus endangering their well­
being. Thus, there is a potential clash between the will of a majority and the needs of 
an impoverished minority. The question that arises from this clash is whether the rule 
m  law ana uemocracy can oe oy-passed by an individual or group in an effort to effect
Gewirth, A., Reason and Morality, The University o f  Chicago Press, 1978, p.302 
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their moral right to well-being. According to Gewirth, this may be justified: if  a 
minority is on the brink of starvation, and incapable of escaping their plight through 
democratic procedure, there may be grounds to engage in forms of civil
disobedience.^^^
This, of course, is a standaid answer within liberal circles, but it does not make sense 
within the broader context of Gewirth’s argument. He cannot offer a framework for 
resolution for the simple reason that there exists in his argument an irresolvable 
tension between the rationally derived moral law and the rule of democracy. 
According to Gewirth, issues of public policy, including the status and scope of the 
welfare state, are points o f great debate “in which there are many legitimate conflicts 
of interest and differences of opinion.”^^  ^ However, this view does not sit easily with 
a morality that is necessarily true. Surely, if the right to well-being can be rationally 
demonstrated then much of the debate on the welfare state is superfluous; we are left 
to discuss frivolous technical details; the normative outcome of the debate is already 
decided. Hence, it is not clear why the status and scope of the welfare state should be 
subject to democratic ratification. Ultimately, it seems that Gewirth struggles to 
harmonise the opposing demands of morality and democracy, of truth and freedom. 
Indeed, it may be that such antinomies are endemic to Gewirth’s theory. At best, this 
undermines the cogency of his moral theory. At worst, it becomes dangerously 
illiberal.
In the end, his only escape is to put his faith in reason. He argues that if people are 
properly educated and informed, the outcome of democratic resolution will probably 
be in favour of the supportive state:
“The rationality that is dispositionally present in every purposive prospective 
agent and that leads him to accept the PGC, and with it the democratic 
constitution of the method of consent, will also tend to lead him to uphold the
256 Gewirth qualifies his thoughts here by stating that civil disobedience is only justified where the dictates o f  the 
moral law have been compromised; it is not justified, for instance, for the offended racist to engage in civil 
disobedience.
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redistributive justice of the supportive state, if he is given suitable means of 
public communication and information.”^^®
Yet, the conception of rationality that is contained within this statement goes far 
beyond the powers of deductive logic that Gewirth originally described. Ultimately, 
Gewirth emerges as an archetypal monistic rationalist, of the kind against which 
Berlin writes so vehemently. His view is indicative of a belief in an unrealistic 
rational consensus; rationality is synonymous with justice, freedom, democracy, and 
welfare; every truth accords in universal harmony; all true solutions to all genuine 
problems must be compatible and fit into a single whole. As Berlin writes:
“If the universe is governed by reason, then there will be no need for 
coercion; a correctly planned life for all will coincide with full freedom — the 
freedom of rational self-direction ~ for all. This will be so if, and only if, the 
plan is the true plan -  the one unique pattern which alone fulfils the claims of 
reason. Its laws will be the rules which reason prescribes: they will only seem 
irksome to those whose reason is dormant, who do not understand the ‘true’ 
needs of their own ‘real’ selves.”^^ ^
The implications of this view can be dangerous. Through his portrayal of man as a 
rational being, Gewirth sees the enforcement of rational truth upon the irrational or 
ignorant as a paternalistic responsibility, and hence as a justifiable assault on negative 
freedom. Consequently, the voices of all that do not meet the criterion of reason may 
be lost. Potentially, all those who prefer religion to science, myth to fact, instinct to 
logic, may be hushed in the name of truth. Ultimately, Gewirth abides by Fichte’s 
notion that no one has rights against reason.
Ibid., p322
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Chapter 6 -  Crooked Timber and the Priority of Freedom
“Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made”
- Immanuel Kant^ *^^
Introdïictiom
hi a paper discussmg his intelleetual heritage, Isaiah Berlin tells of how upon his 
return to Oxford following the end ^ f  World War II he became preoccupied with two 
philosophical problems. The first was value monism -  the belief in a harmonious 
system of moral truths - and the second was the meaning and application of the notion 
of freedom. These two issues dominated his thought and writing for much of his 
subsequent eareer. It was through the rejection of value monism in favour of pluralism 
that Berlin became known as a champion of personal freedom. Indeed, this was the 
cause he supported in his seminal lecture ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’. However, as 
many critics have pointed out, the sanctity of liberty is uncertain in a truly pluralist 
world.
This chapter has three main parts. First, I aim to sketch the central tenets of Berlin’s 
liberalism, beginning with his historical analysis of monism and pluralism. I will 
concentrate on the most persuasive of Berlin’s arguments for liberalism; the great 
goods of life collide, and hence an anti-utopian politics of compromise is required to 
accommodate these conflicting goods; this gives us reason to defend liberal 
institutions. The second section investigates Berlin’s central argument on liberty and 
choice. I question whether his appeal to the intrinsic value of liberty is compatible 
with his understanding of the structure of human values. Finally, the third section 
examines Berlin’s distinction between ethical relativism and value pluralism; I 
consider how this relates to the notion of cultural incommensurability. This leads to a 
broader discussion of value pluralism, which draws upon the arguments of Bernard 
Williams, Jolm Gray and William Galston.
This is Berlin’s favoured rendering o f  Kant’s quotation. For a more literal translation, see Berlin, L, The 
Crooked Timber o f  Humanity, Fontana Press, 1991, p.v
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Monism and Pluralism
For Berlin, monism is an intellectual perspective characterised by harmony; it is the 
idea that “all true solutions to all genuine problems must be compatible [and]...fit into 
a single whole.”^^  ^ Monism is reducible to three broad assumptions. First, to all 
genuine questions there can only be one correct answer, all other answers being 
incorrect. Second, a method exists for the discovery of these correct answers. Even if 
the proper method does not exist in practice - human knowledge may not be 
sufficiently advanced -  it is at leastf.attainable in principle. Third, all conect answers 
must be compatible with one another. This follows from simple logic - one truth 
cannot conflict with another. When applied to the moral universe, these assumptions 
tend towards a harmonious ideal, where all true values accord in “a single, systematic, 
interconnected whole.
According to Berlin, monism has dominated European philosophy since the time of 
Plato and Aristotle. It has characterised the great theological systems of Judaism and 
Christianity; it governed the middle ages, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. 
Indeed, during the Enlightenment the application of monistic principles proliferated -  
its domination could be found not only in the natural sciences, but also in sociology 
and ethics. It was commonly thought that once immutable truths were discovered, the 
social or spiritual condition of man could be improved. This roughly accorded to the 
notion of Progress. On this issue much ink was spilled. Witness those such as 
Helvetius and Holbach, who believed that scientific investigation was the means to 
discover truth, upon which great societies could be built. Marx argued something 
similar, though he applied his scientific method to historical development. Others, like 
Rousseau, put their faith in introspection, but nevertheless believed in immutable 
principles - society must look to simple truths that can be found in the innocence of 
man. Others again, such as Kant and his followers, argued that reason could deliver an 
objective morality - there were certain universal ethical truths that all men could 
realise, if they would only think about it rationally. All of these thinkers were
Berlin, I., ‘Two Concepts o f  Liberty,’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 147 
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convinced that problems of value were temporary aberrations in human development; 
in the end, a single system of ultimate truths would be revealed.
In contrast to the pervasive doctrine of monism, value pluralism contends that the 
important moral questions addressed by humanity can be legitimately answered in 
different ways. These answers may not always be compatible with each another; 
indeed, the answers might not even be commensurable. Pluralism is therefore 
chaiacterised by discord: “the perfect universe is not merely unattainable but 
inconceivable, and everything don^ to bring it about is founded on an enormous 
intellectual fallacy The incompatibility and incommensurability of values ensures 
that friction is a permanent featuie of human life. Human ends cannot always be 
graded according to a common measure, or moulded into a definite hierarchy. Our 
values will always be in perpetual rivaliy with one another. Pluralism therefore 
generates immensely difficult choices:
“If...the ends of men are many, and not all of them in principle compatible with each 
other, then the possibility of conflict -  and of tragedy -  can never wholly be 
eliminated from human life, either personal or social. The necessity of choosing 
between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the human 
condition.”^^^
According to Berlin, few thinkers in the history of European thought have repudiated 
monism in favour of pluralism. The first, perhaps, was Machiavelli, who perceived 
that moral values often conflict: Christian morality, which expressed the values of 
humility and submission could not always be harmonised with pagan virtues such as 
pride and fortitude. Machiavelli does not argue that one of these value systems is 
necessarily correct, only that they are incompatible. Berlin also celebrates the cultural 
pluralism of Giambattista Vico and J.G. Hamann. These authors insist there is not 
merely a plurality of values but o f entire civilisations, each with its own temporal 
identity, language, religion and institutions. This idea was repeated and expanded 
upon by J.G. Herder. Eveiy society has its own centre of gravity, which differs from 
that of others; different cultures give different answers to their centi’al questions. For
Berlin, I., ‘M y Intellectual Path’, The Power o f  Ideas, Clialto & W indus, 2 0 0 0 , p.23
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Berlin, Herder “maintained that values were not universal; every human society, every 
people, indeed every age and civilisation, possesses its own unique ideals, standards, 
way of living and thought and action. There are no immutable, universal, eternal rules 
or criteria o f judgement in terms of which different cultures and nations can be 
graded.”^^  ^ In short, Herder’s writing sought to contest the very principle on which 
European thought had been built: “The central assumption [of the Western tradition] 
was that problems of value were in principle soluble, and soluble with finality...This 
is the keystone of the classical arch, which, after Herder, began to crumble.”^^ ^
Berlin’s flirtation with these counter-enlightenment figures has been a point of great 
curiosity for many commentators. Some contend that the ideas of these authors are 
neither original nor perceptive, but are dogmatic, uninspiring, and dangerous.^^® It is 
surprising, then, that a liberal should look for inspiration in the work of Machiavelli, 
Vico and Herder, who are all, prima facie, enemies not protagonists of liberalism. It 
equally surprising that Berlin should tacitly criticise Kant, whose arguments are often 
cited as foundational in liberal discourse. Berlin defends himself against such 
criticism by claiming that the authors he has studied disturb the settled liberal vision 
in which he believes: “I am bored by reading people who are allies, people of roughly 
the same views, because now these things seem largely to be a collection of 
platitudes...what interests me is what is wi'ong with the ideas in wliich I believe.”^^  ^
Yet, this response is unsatisfying. Berlin does not present these authors as anti­
liberals; rather, he points to tlie virtues of their pluralism. If Berlin presents his case as 
that of a pluralist fighting against monism, then what argument does he employ to 
defend his treasured liberal values?
Berlin’s least persuasive defence of liberty pertains to the ‘necessity and agony of 
choice’. It is because our moral predicament requires that we choose between 
incommensurable ends that fieedom is supremely valuable:
Berlin, I., ‘The Decline o t  Utopian Ideas in the West,’ The Crooked Timber o f  Humanity, Fontana Press, 1990 
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“The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced 
with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the 
realisation of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others. Indeed, it 
is because this is their situation that men place such immense value upon their 
freedom to choose; for if they had assurance that in some perfect state, realisable by 
men on earth, no ends pursued by them would ever be in conflict, the necessity and 
agony of choice would disappear, and with it the central importance of the freedom to 
choose.” ™^
This conclusion is thoroughly inadéquate as a straightforward normative deduction. 
As I pointed out in my discussion of Raz, there is no immediate link between the 
necessity of choice and the valuing of freedom. Simply because a choice must be 
made between competing ends does not require that such a choice should be made 
freely.
Still, this simplistic reading is arguably a misrepresentation of Berlin’s broader view, 
which is admittedly vulnerable to obfuscation given the colourful but loose manner in 
which he expresses his position. An appreciation of Berlin requires a holistic 
interpretation of his thoughts and ideas. His argument for liberalism is more complex 
than implied by the extract above -  it derives from the anti-utopian implications of 
value-pluralism and from the intrinsic value that he attributes to libeity. The substance 
of this argument will be detailed below.
Anti-Utopianism, Liberalism and the Polities of Compromise
According to Berlin, the need to establish a system of social rules is made difficult by 
the collision between civic goods. Freedom, security, equality, community, culture, 
tradition, respect, discipline and economic vitality are only some of the values around 
which different societies organise themselves. Not all of these goods are frilly 
realisable together. A government might have to sacrifice economic vitality for 
greater equality. National security might clash with basic liberties. Moreover, certain 
of these civic values cannot be rationally compared. How, then, should we proceed?
Berlin, I., ‘T w o Concepts o f  Liberty,’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 168
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For Berlin, the truth of pluralism commits us to an anti-perfectionist politics. This 
follows from the belief that pluralism is incompatible with a final solution: “The very 
notion of a final solution is not only impracticable but, if I am right, and some values 
cannot but clash, incoherent also.”^^ * For Berlin, if pluralism is true, and human 
values are incommensurable, no final solution will be able to solve our deepest moral 
or political problems. No ultimate or absolute ranking of values can eliminate the 
need for hard political decisions. As human beings, we must acknowledge the truth 
that we cannot have everything. We must not reach for final solutions predicated upon 
an eternal, all-embracing value sys|f m; the idea of a harmonious system of values is 
chimerical. We should acknowledge with Burke the constant need to compensate, to 
reconcile, and to balance; we should celebrate J.S. Mill’s observation that human 
beings are permanently prone to error.^^^ Therefore, value pluralism requires an anti- 
utopian political response: “the best that one can do is to try to promote some kind of 
equilibrium, necessarily unstable, between the different aspirations o f differing groups 
of human beings.”^^ ^
Berlin’s anti-utopianism draws heavily on the ideas of the Russian critic Alexander 
Herzen, who rallies against the ‘despotism of formulas’. Any doctrine that subsumes 
the individual to its goals is a menace; individual human beings should never be 
sacrificed in the name of philosophical abstractions - History or Nation or Class or 
Progress. Human life is fragile and should not be dismissed as a means to some far-off 
goal. Despotic ideas have often wrought destruction and violence. The echo of 
Herzen’s voice can be heard in Berlin’s campaign against final solutions.
Yet, in what sense, if at all, does this anti-utopianism appeal to the value of liberty? 
For Berlin, the association between monism and some sort of illiberal utopia is all too 
clear*:
“Since I know the only true path to the ultimate solution of the problems of society, I
know which way to drive the human caravan; and since you are ignorant of what I
Berlin, I., ‘The Pursuit o f  the Ideal’, The Croofæd Timber o f  Humanity, Fontana Press, 1991, p. 15 
“ — Berlin, J., ‘ I wo Concepts o f  Liberty,’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 170
Berlin, I., ‘The Decline o f  Utopian Ideas in the W est,’ The Crooked Timber o f  H um anity , Fontana Press, 1991, 
p.47
130
know, you cannot be allowed to have liberty of choice even within the narrowest 
limits, if the goal is to be reached.”^^'*
According to Berlin, plui'alism is more humane tlian the rigid, authoritarian structures 
of monism because it does not deny to men, in the name of some distant and fantastic 
ideal, the variety of opportunities that is central to their life as choice-makers?^^ In 
other words, pluralism recognises the diversity of ends that men value; and it is 
liberalism that best appreciates this diversity, and best understands the role of human 
agency in creating a meaningful life:,.‘the richest development of human potentialities’ 
can occur only in societies in which there is ‘liberty of thought and expression’, where 
views and opinions clash . A variety of opportunities will be respected if we 
commit to a social system that upholds a measure of negative liberty: “there must be 
some frontiers of freedom which nobody should be permitted to cross.”^^  ^Liberalism 
protects the deep multiplicity of human ends; it acknowledges that “men can live full 
lives only in societies with an open texture.”^^  ^ It is in this sense that Berlin commits 
to non-negotiable liberal principles of justice. A genuine belief in the ‘inviolability of 
a minimum extent of individual liberty entails some such absolute stand’
Still, any truthful expression of liberalism will recognise that its central values are 
antagonistic. The more emphasis that is placed on individual liberty, on leaving the 
individual alone, the more other values like equality will lose out. Yet no sensible 
solution will yield unless the gi'eat goods are balanced or compromised. If my liberty, 
say, is dependent upon the misery of other human beings, then the system that 
sustains this is immoral and unjust. The first public obligation is to avoid extremes of 
suffering, and freedom for the wolves means death to the lambs. A balance must 
therefore be struck between liberty and other goods like security or equality or well­
being or community. Freedom is not an inviolable good - it might have to be curtailed 
for the sake of other values. Indeed, one freedom may have to be limited in order to 
allow space for other freedoms to grow; one freedom may abort another. Reconciling
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such discord can be ‘complex’ and ‘painful’. No political decision is without loss, and 
to have to compromise on something of intrinsic value must be regretted; yet, it may 
well be unavoidable. For Berlin, then, and contrary to the likes o f Rawls, there exists 
no scheme of liberal values that is capable of being ranked in the abstract. No 
lexicographical ordering of goods can be discerned as universally valid. When it 
comes to deciding on the choice between conflicting values, the outcome will be a 
stark reflection of priorities, which cannot be accounted for in terms of an over­
arching rationality:
“It remains true that the freedom of some must at times be curtailed to secure the 
freedom of others. Upon what principle should this be done? If freedom is a sacred, 
untouchable value, there can be no such principle. One or other of these conflicting 
rules or principles must, at any rate in practice, yield: not always for reasons which 
can be clearly stated, let alone generalised into rules or universal maxims. Still, a 
practical compromise has to be found.” ®^”
Thus, the liberal society is predicated upon the need to compromise between the great 
goods, the reasons for which cannot always be systematically expressed. Berlin 
therefore proceeds by considering the virtue of compromise in specific circimistances. 
For instance, liberty without education and material well-being is meaningless, just as 
education and material well-being are meaningless without liberty. Indeed, to the 
extent that Berlin identifies a symbiotic relationship between liberty and the social 
goods that support its exercise, he would seem to be arguing that conflicting liberal 
values can be reconciled by appealing to their point or worth. Without sufficient food, 
or secuiity, or education, say, political freedoms will be of little use in our broader 
lives. Liberalism requires that certain social conditions be met in order that freedom 
can be meaningfully exercised. This involves a commitment to certain safeguards in 
relation to material well-being; it is a mockery to tell a poor man that he is free to live 
on his own terms if he can barely afford to buy basic provisions. Poverty erodes the 
value of freedom. This is also true for education - unless human beings are given the 
chance of a general education, they will continue to walk in darkness.
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At the same time, Berlin warns against sacrificing too much liberty for the salce of 
other social goods. A balance must be attained, which is nevertheless difficult to 
realise, “for in their zeal to create social and economic conditions in which alone 
freedom is of genuine value, men tend to forget freedom itself.”^^  ^For instance, if, in 
an effort to make freedom more valuable, we redistribute wealth, or place limitations 
on the liberty to choose private education or private health care, then an absolute loss 
of liberty occuis, ceteris paribus, even if that loss can be justified in terms of the 
greater good. Yet, if the scope of such an enterprise is deepened, the more liberty will 
disappeai* until, finally, the condÿions that were absent beforehand are realised 
completely, but without freedom, meaning the conditions themselves become 
worthless. This warning is given repeatedly by Berlin -  historically, the provision of 
social goods designed to empower individuals in living free lives has often been 
attained only with serious infringement of l i b e i t y .T h u s ,  a balance or compromise is 
required between liberal goods -  so much liberty, so much equality, never forgetting 
the essence of fr eedom, or just what is lost when people accept limitations on their 
actions for the sake of some other value or end.
The incommensurability of values does not therefore render moral or political 
decisions impossible, as difficult as value conflict may sometimes be to resolve. 
Pluralism does not mean that an appropriately weighted liberalism cannot obtain. 
Practical solutions are hard found, but in the end, they must be found. The particular 
balance that obtains will derive in part fr om the implications of liberal values, from 
their internal logic. Freedom without some degree of material equality is a sham; 
equality without freedom is prison sentence. Thus, for Berlin, it is this constant need 
for balance and compromise that defines liberalism:
“Collisions, even if they cannot be avoided, can be softened. Claims can be 
balanced, compromises can be reached: in concrete situations not every claim is of 
equal force -  so much liberty and so much equality; so much for sharp moral 
condemnation, so much for understanding a given human situation; so much for the 
full force of the law, so much for the prerogative of mercy; for feeding the hungry.
Berlin, I., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.liv
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clothing the naked, healing the sick, sheltering the homeless. Priorities, never final 
and absolute, must be established.” ®^'’
Still, it remains to be shown why Berlin’s anti-utopianism specifically prescribes a 
liberal response. After all, liberalism is not alone in its aversion to utopian politics -  
conservatism, pragmatism, and some variants of socialism and nationalism also 
concede that the great goods collide. As such, if Berlin is to make a positive case for 
liberalism, he must claim that coercion is in some sense evil, or else appeal to the 
intrinsic value of freedom. He must develop the notion that human beings are choice- 
makers who value the freedom to decide between competmg ends. This, indeed, is the 
path followed by Berlin, as I will explain below.
The Intrinsic Value of Liberty
“To coiiti'act the areas of human choice is to do haim to men in an intrinsic...sense.”
- Berlin, ‘Four Essays on Liberty’ ®^^
According to Berlin, there are both universal and contingent components to our 
nature. The universal is implied by the existence of basic human values. For Berlin, 
value is constrained by a common human horizon; there are many values that can be 
pursued, but not an infinite amount. The number of values is restricted by our shared 
physiological needs and psychological drives: “I believe [the scope of values] to be 
finite, because I think that in the end there is something called human natuie.” ®^^ In 
this regard, a person’s values are not ungrounded beliefs that begin and end in 
subjectivity; rather they derive from, and are bounded by, human nature.^^^ Human 
values are therefore delimited by their intelligibility. If a man declares his love of 
trees on the basis that they are made of wood, we are left flummoxed; v/e can 
understand what he is saying, but we cannot understand why. In other words, values 
are contingent upon mutual understanding: “what makes men human is common to 
them, and acts as a bridge between them.”^^  ^More broadly, there are certain common 
V aiue-caiegones invoked by human beings in order to make sense of themselves and
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their moral universe. These basic categories pertain to the nature of human ends or 
duties or interests and provide a framework in terms of which our worldview is 
constructed. Human beings utilise categories of thought pertaining, say, to duty and 
freedom, emotion and rationality, suffering and happiness, good and bad, right and 
wrong, truth and illusion, and so on. WTiilst the normative conclusions that flow from 
these categories vary in accordance with personality, culture, and history, the common 
framework remains.
Yet, our nature is also characterised by the contingent. For Berlin, the necessity of 
choosing between absolute ends is “an inescapable characteristic of the human 
condition.”^^  ^ Whilst our values might be held in common with others - whilst we 
arrive at oui* values through the interaction of cultural norms, family and peer 
relations, national identity, social class and so on - they are not experienced as a 
given; ultimately they are a product of choice. In this regard, there is an existentialist 
slant to Berlin’s conception of value.^^’^ Our choices are made by appealing to those 
values that govern our moral being - honesty, compassion, integrity, thoughtfulness, 
self-interest, courage, tenacity, duty, prudence, resilience and loyalty, among others. 
How such choices are made and what values should be prioritised is ultimately a 
decision for the individual; it is an existential matter. Often, we are required to decide 
between cherished values, like the wartime student in Sartre’s anecdote who had to 
choose between joining the resistance and caring for his ailing mother. For Berlin, as 
for Sartre, the answer to such a moral dilemma is incapable of being articulated in the 
abstract - the individual is condemned to choose what he thinks is right. Such choices 
can be agonising; an individual may be tom between two conflicting ends.^^’ Yet, a 
decision must be made: “The concrete situation is almost eveiything. There is no 
escape: we must decide as we decide; moral risk cannot, at times, be avoided.”^^ ^
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Ascertaining the importance Berlin places on each of these facets of our nature -  the 
universal and the contingent - is a particularly difficult task. Consider the following 
quote from John Gray:
“There is in Berlin no account of a common human nature that is universal and the 
same for all, since the propensity to diversity, to difference, is itself implied by the 
human capacity for choice... Such choice is for Berlin choice among goods that are 
not only distinct and rivalrous but sometimes incommensurable: it is radical choice, 
ungoverned by reason... Human nature is something invented, and perpetually 
reinvented, through choice, and it is inherently plural and diverse, not common or 
uni versai.
For Gray, Berlin’s depiction o f the human being differs from that of the great social 
contract theorists, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Whereas the latter depict timeless 
human passions and motivations, Berlin sees human nature merely as an 
indeterminate capacity to choose, which suggests a general ability for self-creation. 
Although Gray arguably overstates the idea of self-creation in Berlin, it is true that the 
notion of choice plays a frmdamental role in his understanding of the human being. 
Whilst humanity has an essence, it is not purely a given - human beings can and do 
choose.
Berlin’s position involves the rejection of various doctrines that look to eliminate 
meaningful choice from human existence -  predestination, natural determinism, 
historical inevitability, and so on. These ideas deny that which Berlin holds to be 
fundamental, namely, that human beings make real choices in the pursuit of their 
ends, rather than being swept along by the impersonal force of History, or Nature, or 
by the will of God. For Berlin, such doctrines wrongly transfer the weight of human 
choice -  and the responsibility this entails - from the shoulders of men to vast 
impersonal forces: “Freedom notoriously involves responsibility, and it is for many 
spirits a source of welcome relief to lose the burden of both.”^^ '’ Of course, the 
determinist might ask in response to those who would uphold the power of human 
agency, how ‘a feeble thinking reed like man’ beset by ‘physical and moral frailty’
Gray, J., Berlin, Fontana Press, 1995, p.22
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can be responsible for the workings of ‘Nature’ or the ‘Spirit’?^ ^^  To this Berlin 
responds that the boundaries of human choice might not be unlimited, yet neither are 
they nothing at all. The faculty of choice is not necessarily imagined or impotent. He 
abides by the words of the Russian critic Alexander Herzen: “Man is freer than he is 
commonly thought to be. He is greatly dependent on his environment, but not to the 
degree of being subjugated to it. The greater part of our destiny lies in our own 
hands.
In addition, Berlin argues with Striwson and Austin that the elimination of a belief in 
human choice is unthinkable: the way in which we interact with others, emotionally, 
morally, and linguistically, suggests that choice is firmly rooted in the basic human 
condition. Practices such as praise and blame, and emotions such as gratitude and 
resentment, are so ingrained in the human character that the capacity for choice must 
be assumed. Our basic virtues - honesty, courage, taith, compassion, and justice - and 
our vices - bmtality, deception, wickedness, ruthlessness, cormptlon, insensitivity, 
emptiness - become meaningless unless we think o f  human beings as capable of 
pursuing ends for their own sake by deliberate acts of choice. This alone makes 
“nobility noble and sacrifices s a c r i f i c e s . H u m a n  souls are destroyed and moral 
value annihilated when men are not credited with choice: “men are made human by 
their capacity for choice -  choice of evil and good e q u a l l y . B e r l i n  consequently 
aligns himself with:
“ ...all those who protest against despotism wherever they find it, not merely in the 
oppression of priests or kings or dictators, but in the dehumanising effect o f those 
vast cosmologies wliich minhnise the role of the individual, curb his freedom, 
repress his desire for self-expression, and order him to humble himself before the 
great laws and institutions of the universe, immovable, omnipotent and everlasting, 
in whose sight free human choice is but a pathetic illusion.
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Berlin therefore rejects the grand metaphysics of Hegelian Idealism, and its 
materialist inversion, Marxism, and indeed, all other systems that devalue individual 
human freedom. He is adamant that human beings can choose meaningfrxlly. The 
importance of liberty derives from respect for human choice, which is a fundamental 
feature of our basic humanity. If we qualify slavery as barbaric, say, then we 
implicitly recognise human beings as ends in themselves, who should not be treated as 
a commodity, and who are capable of acting as moml agents. In other words, the idea 
of liberty seems to be a basic human good. This does not mean liberty should trump 
all other values, but it does mean th%$ without a minimum of liberty human beings are 
not fully human. When this truth is upheld alongside the notion that our moral 
umverse exists as a constellation of competing and incommensurable goods, then the 
freedom to choose as we wish becomes intrinsically valuable. Hence, it is better to be 
free to err than to live correctly but without free choice; otherwise, something dear is 
lost to human beings.^®^
Yet, this allusion to the intrinsic value of liberty is controversial since it implies 
choice is valuable irrespective of the ends it comprehends. Unlike the instrumental 
value of freedom, which is contingent upon the value of the ends o f the individual, the 
intrinsic value of liberty is detached from all such considerations. Those who believe 
in the intrinsic worth of liberty maintain that something valuable is lost when it is 
sacrificed for some other end, iirespective of what that end might be. This notion jars 
with our moral intuitions. If a law prevents murder, say, then in what sense does its 
enforcement involve the loss of something valuable? What worth is there in being fr ee 
to kill? Berlin might complain that this rejoinder is only successful insofar as it 
attributes an instrumental value to liberty, where our freedom is only as valuable as 
the end it allows. To say that liberty is intrinsically valuable is to say that it is 
inherently valuable to choose for oneself, rmbullied and uncoerced. Hence, whilst 
there is no instromental value in being free to Idll, the intrinsic value of choice is 
nonetheless undennined when tlie liberty to kill is outlawed. Berlin is not against laws 
that prohibit murder, yet, he believes that however just such laws are, something 
valuable is lost when they are imposed on human beings and their free choice is 
eliminated.
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Presumably, one would accept this argument only if one subscribed to Berlin’s view 
of the human being. He portrays liberty as having intrinsic worth precisely because of 
our moral predicament -  we are condemned to choose between incompatible and 
incommensurable ends. Liberty therefore exists as an ultimate value because without 
it we cannot live as normal human beings: “Those who have ever valued liberty for its 
own sake believed that to be free to choose, and not to be chosen for, is an inalienable 
ingredient in what makes human beings human.” ®^^ Yet, as I will argue below, it is 
uncertain that Berlin’s belief in thegntrinsic worth of liberty is compatible with his 
non-realist meta-ethical position.
Liberty, Relativism, and Non-Realist Meta-Ethics
I would argue, somewhat controversially, that Berlin is best characterised as a meta- 
ethical non-realist -  he would claim that values are a derivative of human experience. 
This judgement does not concur with other commentators’ reading of Berlin. John 
Gray, for example, casts Berlin as a moral realist, as subscribing to the belief that 
human values are “independent subject-matters, in respect of which our beliefs may 
be tme or false.”^^  ^ In fairness to Gray, it is tme that Berlin often gives us reason to 
believe he is sympathetic to moral realism. He often invokes quasi-Kantian categories 
to make sense of human experience, and, more famously, he repeatedly suggests: 
“there is a world of objective values.”^^  ^ Nonetheless, this realist reading of Berlin 
seems to be mistaken. Berlin is clear- that it does not make much sense to think of 
values as being true or false independently of human experience. He thus distances 
himself from the moral realism of Kant, say, for whom the moral experience of 
individuals made no difference to the status of moral truth; such principles were an 
outcome of rational inquiry, not of subjective (or inter-subjective) beliefs. Berlin, like 
Hume, appeals to human nature, not to a Kantian view of morality as rationally 
determinable. He disagrees with the idea that ‘moral law is revealed by reason’, that
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time, we should remember that the intrinsic value o f  liberty does not imply it is an inviolable good. Berlin himself 
could not be cleaier on this point. The idea (often presented by libertarians) that freedom is sacred and inviolable is 
nonsense; every society restricts certain liberties, even those constructed around libertarian principles.
Gray, J., Berlin, Fontana Press, 1995, p.72
Berlin, I., ‘The Pursuit o f  the Ideal’, The Crooked Timber o f  Humanity, Fontana Press, 1991, p. 11
139
its truth can be apprehended ‘outside the empirical r e a l m . F o r  Berlin, such moral 
realism is incomprehensible:
“I don’t loicw what it would be like to recognise certain beliefs as being true 
independently of what anyone might possibly think. I can see that kind of realism 
about the external world... but to say that for example, murder is wrong whether I 
think so or not seems to me to be... puzzling.
Therefore, Berlin doubts that moral rules can have an a priori status. He rejects the 
notion that “certain values are absolute quite independently of what... [people] may 
think or want.” ®^^ He adopts a mode of moral inquiiy that begins from human 
experience. There is no Platonic or Kantian moral order, which exists a priori and 
which renders moral problems determinate in principle. Indeed, Berlin could not be 
clearer on this matter: “I am bound, given my general view, to deny the possibility of 
some over-arching criterion which objectively determines what... all men in all 
places are required to pursue.” He continues: “In that sense I am neither a Platonist 
nor a seventeenth-century rationalist, nor a philosophe, not a Kantian... nor a believer 
in any other objectivist doctrine.”^^ ^
Nonetheless, Berlin believes that it is possible to identify certain moral norms that 
hold for all human beings. There is a moral minimum without which life becomes 
intolerable.^^^ Berlin claims that our common human experiences, which are 
comprehensible through communication and imaginative insight, reveal certain 
evaluative principles that collectively form a basic human morality, the adherence to 
which allows us to function as normal human beings. Berlin therefore commits to the 
idea of a minimum standard of moral decency. Cmcially, Berlin’s criterion for 
decency is contingent upon the beliefs of actual human beings -  there is no such thing 
as ‘direct non-empirical knowledge, intuition, inspection of eternal principles’; there 
is only ‘universal human beliefs’. T h e  existence of such moral rules cannot be 
established by the insights of great philosophers, rationalists, theologians, or mystics;
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it is a matter for anthropologists, psychologists, historians, and the like.^^^ In other 
words, Berlin derives his understanding of a moral minimum from empirical 
generalisations about our moral existence. He appeals to those values that human 
beings have held over gi'eat stretches of time. Thus, Berlin’s meta-ethical position 
amounts to “an empirical, undemonstrable, de facto acceptance of what... human 
experience provides.”  ^ This reliance on human experience to ascertain moral rules 
clearly points to Berlin as a non-realist, which in turn suggests a Humean 
interpretation of ‘objective human values’ - a value acquires objective validity insofar 
as it is normally held by human b%ngs.^^^ As Berlin writes: “Objectivity of moral 
judgement seems to depend on (almost to consist in) the degree of constancy in 
human responses.”  ^ This, of course, requires an empirical judgement, independent 
of belief.
The problem for Berlin comes in reconciling the actual moral sentiments of human 
beings with the belief that liberty is intrinsically valuable. For instance, Berlin is 
aware that human beings do not natmally gravitate towards free lives, tacitly 
accepting Herzen’s argument that “the masses... are indifferent to individual freedom, 
libeity of speech; the masses love authority. They are still blinded by the arrogant 
glitter of power, they are offended by those who stand alone.” *^'^  Herzen imderstood 
that the urge for freedom and independence is not borne out by history. It is true, he 
notes, that certain strata of society -  primar ily the liberal bomgeoisie - have pui'sued 
freedom, but this urge has been neither very strong, nor indeed consistent. To claim 
that man naturally seeks freedom even though most people live in conditions of 
servitude is the equivalent of saying fish are born to fly even though they primarily 
live under water.^^^ Moreover, Herzen accepts that the burden of fieedom is often too 
great for man to bear: “We speak so much about freedom; we are so proud of it and, at 
the same time, ai'e vexed that nobody undertakes to lead us by the hand, that we 
stumble and pay for the consequence of our acts.”^^  ^ He continues: “Freedom is the
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very thing [the people] dread: they must have a master to keep them in hand, they 
must have authority because they do not trust themselves.”^
This sentiment is also expressed in Dostoevsky’s fable about the Grand Inquisitor 
who condemns a resurrected Christ to death. The Inquisitor’s decision rests on the 
notion that human beings do not primarily value liberty - they want food, water, and 
security: “Turn [stones] into loaves and mankind Avill go trotting after you like a 
flock, grateful and obedient.”^ F o r  the Inquisitor, the burden of freedom is too great 
for a feeble creature like man toiybear. The Church will reconstruct the sermon 
preached by Christ in the light o f man’s true image -  weak, depraved, and pathetic. 
Ultimately, the people will surrender their freedom for the earthly bread that they 
crave:
“They will bring us their freedom and place it at our feet and say to us: ‘Enslave us 
if you will, but feed us.’ At last they will understand that freedom and earthly bread 
in sufficiency for all are unthinkable together, for never, never will they be able to 
share between themselves... so terrible will being free appear to them at last.”^^ ^
In return for their freedom, the Church will give the people bread, it will keep them in 
health, and the people will be eternally grateful. They will be happy to subordinate 
themselves to the authority of the Chmch, convinced by the mystery and miracle the 
Church professes. They will attain the ‘quiet, reconciled happiness’ o f ‘pathetic 
children’. They will be allowed to sin, which can be redeemed under the authority of 
the Church, and so they will tell every secret of their conscience: “All, all will they 
bring to us, and we shall resolve it all, and they will attend our decision with joy, 
because it will deliver them from the great anxiety and fearsome present torments of 
free and individual decision.”^^  ^ The Church will have a monopoly of power and 
knowledge, and it will make men happy precisely because it denies them freedom but 
provides the conditions that sustain life.
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The implication of Dostoevsky’s fable is that far from freedom being a universal 
value, human beings actively resist it; they look to flee from the responsibility that 
freedom entails. They place more importance on secuiity and material well-being. 
Yet, this being the case, how can Berlin derive a commitment to liberty from a meta- 
ethical position that relies upon the actual beliefs of human beings? How many 
liberals live, and have lived, in om- world? Does humanity speak with a voice that 
supports freedom? Or do human beings consider liberal freedoms a burden? However 
one answers these questions, it is clear that the value of liberty as Berlin would 
conceive it cannot rest on the actu# beliefs of human beings. The priority of freedom 
cannot be asserted as a universal feature of human life; at most, limited freedoms may 
be sanctioned. However, if  freedom is relegated to one value among others, then 
liberalism becomes extremely unlikely. The only way to rescue Berlin’s thesis would 
be to adopt the view that the people often do not recognise the intrinsic value of 
liberty, in spite of themselves. Yet, by second-guessing the values of individuals in 
this manner, we enter the terrain of positive liberty, a venture Berlin would be 
disinclined to take on.
What is more, Berlin’s non-realism generates difficulties beyond the identification of 
liberty as an intrinsic good - it also blurs his distinction between pluralism and ethical 
relativism. Berlin is adamant that he should not be classified as a value relativist. To 
suggest that all values are relative is to claim that they are merely an expression of 
cultural or social norms, which have no force beyond those who accept their validity. 
In other words, relativism is incompatible with an objective account of good and evil 
-  it happily recommends liberalism for the liberals and cannibalism for the 
cannibals.^^^ Relativism is inconsistent with the idea that certain values have universal 
force.
By contrast, pluralism can accept that though human goods are diverse, 
incommensurable and incompatible, they are nonetheless objectively identifiable. 
Equally, pluralism can accept that there are certain universal evils that transcend 
culture and time. Pluralism is therefore compatible with what might be called a 
minimum morality. It can accept, as Berlin maintains, that there are “general
This axiom o f  Martin Hollis is quoted by Lukes, S., ‘An Unfashionable Fox’ The Legacy o f  Isaiah Berlin, 
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principles of behaviour and human activity without which there cannot be a minimally 
decent society.”^^  ^ In other words, it is pluralism’s compatibility with a basic moral 
code that separates it from ethical relativism.
What fixed ethical principles might constitute this basic moral code? Berlin refers to 
mles or commandments that “are accepted so widely, and are grounded so deeply in 
the actual nature of men as they have developed throughout history, as to be, by now, 
an essential part of what we mean by being a normal human being.”^^  ^ In otlier words, 
Berlin thinks he can identify in ^fruman nature certain basic moral principles that 
cannot be interpreted as mere idiosyncrasies, or norms that vary according to time and 
custom:
“We know of no court, no authority, which could, by means of some recognised 
process, allow men to bear false witness, or torture freely, or slaughter fellow men 
for pleasure; we cannot conceive of getting these universal principles or rules 
repealed or altered; in other words, we treat them... as presuppositions of being 
human.”^^'*
The problem for Berlin is that his non-realist meta-ethics requires a trans-historical 
and cross-cultural recognition of such evils, yet this is not supported from an 
historical or cultural sweep. For instance, 1 might argue that the following moral 
principles are necessary for a tolerable existence: respect for human life, respect for 
the physical and moral integrity of the individual, certain basic freedoms, and a 
system of justice designed to arbitrate between competing moral claims. How many of 
these norms have been respected by human beings across time and culture? Not many. 
Slavery, for example, has been an acceptable human norm for most of our history; 
tortiue is still viewed by many human beings as an acceptable means to derive 
important information; the moral imperative to avert staiwation or genocide has not 
been consistently respected; freedom of religion is scarcely recognised in some 
cultures. This implies, if  we are to employ a non-realist meta-ethic, that many of the 
basic noims considered above (being culturally and temporally specific) have only a
Berlin quoted from Jahanbcgloo, R., Conversations with Isaiah Berlin, Phoenix Press, 2000, p.! Î4
Berlin, I., ‘Two Concepts o f  Liberty,’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 165
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relative validity. This fatally imdeimines Berlin’s distinction between pluralism and 
relativism.
Liberalism and Cultural Pluralism (Beyond Berlin)
In order to avoid the relativistic implications of Berlin’s argument, we need to adopt a 
realist meta-ethic. This could potentially re-invigorate Berlin’s failing case for 
liberalism by allowing him to re-state his case for the intrinsic worth of freedom. Yet, 
even then, authors such as John Gipy doubt that this argument will lead to liberalism. 
The final section of this chapter will test Gray’s scepticism.
Let us begin by revisiting Berlin’s anti-utopian argument, which appeals to the 
diversity of value allowed by both pluralism and liberalism. According to Berlin, 
pluralism is more humane than the ‘great, disciplined, authoritarian structures’ of 
monism because it does not deprive men, in the name of some utopian ideal, of the 
variety of opportunities that are central to their life as ‘self-transforming b e i n g s . I n  
other words, pluralism recognises the diversity of ends that men value; and it is 
liberalism that best appreciates this diversity, and best understands the role of choice- 
making in creating a meaningful life. This argument is filled-out by Bernard 
Williams, who portrays liberalism as the most truthful response to the fact of value- 
pluralism.^^^ According to Williams, value pluralism advances a tmth claim about the 
structure of human values. It amounts to the meta-ethical belief that human beings 
subscribe to a myriad o f values that are potentially incompatible and incomparable, 
which therefore precludes an objectively justified lexicographical ordering of values. 
Nonetheless, it is exactly because liberalism, as a political doctrine, best 
accommodates the truth of value pluralism that it is justified. Liberalism allows room 
for incompatible ways of life to co-exist; it commits to liberty and tolerance; it is 
extremely generous in the diversity it allows. As Williams writes: “If there are many 
and competing genuine values, then tlie greater the extent to which a society tends to 
be single minded, the more genuine values it neglects or suppresses .Liberal i sm,  in 
contrast to this single-mindedness, allows for a greater army of genuine values:
Berlin, L, T w o  Concepts o f  Liberty,’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p .171 
Williams, B., ‘Introduction’ to Berlin, I., Concepts and Categories, Oxford University Press, 1980 
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“More, to this extent, must mean better.”^^  ^It is better because it recognises ‘the deep 
and creative role’ that these various values play in human life.^^  ^ Consequently, the 
virtue of liberalism is not merely that it recognises the greatest array of legitimate 
values, but that it understands the importance of having these values available for 
individual self-creation. It is to this extent that liberalism is more truthfiil than other 
positions. It understands -  within definite boundaries - that there is value in different 
ways of life.
However, John Gray believes this pgument is unsuccessful. First, on what basis can 
the value of ‘self-creation’ be placed before other human goods, such as community 
or tradition? Second, if  liberal societies are to be commended on the basis that they 
harbour more genuine values than illiberal or barbaric societies, does it not follow that 
the human world would be richer still if it contained both liberal and non-barbaric 
non-liberal societies?^^^ There may be worthwhile forms of life embodying authentic 
varieties of human flourishing whose sm*vival depends on the denial of negative 
liberty. Liberal societies often lack certain geniime values like security, or 
community, which are more strongly felt in other, less liberal social systems. 
Liberalism, it should be remembered, does not encapsulate all good things; its viitue 
is not without loss.
Gray poiirays liberalism as an archetypal doctrine of the Enlightenment, inasmuch as 
it privileges an array of ahistorical goods, which are deemed to be in the interests of 
all human beings. Yet, he argues that the subversive implication of value-pluralism 
erodes this belief -  if human values are incommensurable, there is no good reason to 
privilege liberal values over others. The priority of freedom cannot be asserted as a 
‘universal feature of human life’ nor deduced from ‘the pluralist thesis of value- 
incommensurability.’^ ^^  Consequently, value pluralism provides no reason to promote 
“distinctive liberal freedoms of the press, religion, or autonomous choice.”^^  ^ So long 
as a moral minimum is protected, there is nothing in value pluralism that recommends 
a more comprehensive liberal society. It is wrong, therefore, to suppose that liberalism
Ibid, p.xix 
Ibid, p.xx
Gray, J., Berlin, Fontana Press, 1995, p .152, 157-158 
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embodies a rational solution to the problems created by value pluralism: “liberal 
institutions can have no universal authority.”^^ ^
Contrary to Berlin’s liberal response to value pluralism. Gray believes we must 
content ourselves with particularist justifications of political obligation; value 
pluralism “undermines the fundamentalist belief in the universal authority of any 
single way of life.”^^ "^  Gray’s argument has sometimes taken the form of 
conservatism, whereby judgements made between incommensurable values rely on 
the moral authority of a given cultural tradition.^^^ However, his considered opinion 
seems to be that value pluralism commits us to a pragmatic modus vivendi. Here, Gray 
retains the belief that liberalism is but one acceptable form of life among many. It has 
no foundations in human nature or natural law; it is a relatively recent phenomenon, 
culturally specific and upheld by a people who believe unfettered choice is of 
paramount value. In other words, liberalism cannot be asserted as the most truthful or 
most rational response to the fact of value-pluralism. Whilst liberalism is compatible 
with value-pluralism, it is not prescribed by it. To claim that a life of free choice 
should always be privileged above other forms of life “is precisely the pure 
philosophy o f right that.. .value-pluralism undercuts.
t hat is not to say Gray believes all cultural practices must be condoned. Only those 
societies that acknowledge a plurality of goods are acceptable: "^Modus vivendi is 
impossible in a regime in which the varieties of the good are seen as symptoms of 
eiTor or heresy. Without institutions in which different ways of life are accorded 
respect there cannot be peaceful coexistence between them.”^^  ^ Gray therefore rejects 
all theocratic, fundamentalist and dictatorial regimes that prescribe a single way of life 
for the general population. Value pluralism requires a political response that respects 
the diversity of human goods. Gray concedes that often a liberal regime will best 
protect this diversity, though maintains that it would be wrong to think that liberalism 
is the sole regime-type that is compatible with value pluralism: “The political 
implication of strong pluralism is not liberalism. It is modus vivendi,.. Liberal
Gray, J., Berlin, Fontana Press, 1995, p. 155
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institutions are merely one variety of modus vivendi, not always the most 
legitimate.”^^  ^ In other words, political regimes that are non-liberal but pluralistic and 
tolerant of minority groups cannot be criticised from the perspective of value 
pluralism.
However, if  Gray concedes that one human group cannot impose a way of life on 
another (since there is a plurality of valuable ways of life), why should a group be 
allowed to impose a way of life on an individual? Gray’s explication of cultural 
incommensurability stresses the rig^t o f cultural autonomy but ignores the right of 
individual autonomy. Consider Amartya Sen’s distinction between two types of 
cultural practice. The first insists that people should be allowed to decide fi'eely what 
traditions they wish to follow. The second insists that people should obey the 
decisions of religious or secular’ authorities that enforce established traditions.^^^ The 
first presupposes freedom as a universal value, the second stresses cultural autonomy. 
According to Sen, “the force of the former precept lies in the basic importance of 
human freedom, and once that is accepted there are strong implications on what can or 
cannot be done in the name of tradition.” '^^  ^ Sen therefore maintains that ‘ayatollahs’, 
‘guardians of culture’, and ‘political rulers’, have no justification for forcing a way of 
life upon an individual. Sen is surely right here -  without a commitment to individual 
freedom, cultural autonomy is compatible with abusive political power.
William Galston offers a similar’ defence of liberal universalism. He argues that Gray 
ignores the interests of minority groups within cultures. Gray, he claims, is guilty of 
portraying cultures as monolithic constructs, when in reality they are internally 
diverse, incorporating disparate groups and factions.^"^* It is therefore important to 
remember the groups and individuals residing in non-liberal societies that do not 
identify with the dominant norms. Should their voices be ignored simply for the sake
Gray, J., ‘Where Pluralists and Liberals Part Company’ Pluralism -  The Philosophy and Politics o f  Diversity, 
Baghramian, M. and Attracta, L, (eds.) Routledge, 2000, p. 101
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of increasing diversity?^"^  ^ Galston thinks not; diversity must be a derivative o f free 
choice:
“To say tliat a life is collectively worthwhile is to say (in part) that it is worthwhile 
for those who are actually leading it. It is hard to see how that claim can be sustained 
unless the people in question identify (for whatever reason) with the way of life in 
question. But if they do so, the regime need not use coercion to maintain it.” '^*^
For Galston, then, a given regime cannot enforce compliance or continued 
membership on those who do not identify with its values; otherwise, that society 
becomes like a prison, which, for Galston, is intolerable: “This rejection of human 
imprisonment...is a principle with moral force across political boundaries. It extends 
to cultural communities within specific regimes as well.” "^*^ In other words, diversity 
is desirable only insofar as it is the product of ‘expressive libeity’ or free choice. 
Galston acknowledges that the essential value of negative liberty cannot be derived 
from the truth of value pluralism. Rather, in asserting the importance of negative 
libeify, we should follow Berlin in claiming that the preservation of ‘a minimum area 
of personal freedom’ is necessary if we are not to ‘degrade or deny om' nature 
Galston therefore believes it is possible to provide “a rational basis for defining a 
domain of basic moral decency for individual lives and for societies.” "^*^ This entails a 
commitment to negative liberty, without which human beings are unfairly condemned 
to live a prison-like existence. Coercion is a basic human evil.
Of course, on its own, the evil of coercion is not enough to justify a fully liberal 
regime. There remains a gap between the minimmn of freedom required by a basic 
standard of morality and the extensive freedoms that characterise liberalism. 
Nonetheless, Galston maintains that when a belief in the basic evil of coercion is 
combined with the anti-utopian implications of value pluralism an argument for 
liberalism follows. The state should not impose a single solution on its citizens - it 
should accommodate the various and divergent ways of life that flow from the rational
Galston, W.A., ‘Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory’, American Political Science Review, 1999, p.778 
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indeterminacy of value pluralism; and when this truth is combined with the premise 
that a way of life is valuable only insofar as it is freely chosen, Galston believes there 
is a case for liberalism.
Still, the development of liberalism from a theory of value pluralism appeals to 
uncertain foundations. As Berlin points out, pluralism has its roots in the counter­
enlightenment and r o m a n t i c i s m , a nd  though romantic themes are evident in some 
articulations of liberalism (most notably in J.S. Mill), the same themes have often led 
to less desirable conclusions. To avpid this fate, strong moral claims must be made 
about the dignity and inviolability of the individual. Yet, if one accepts the 
romantic/pluralist aigument and its scepticism about universal moral truths, the scope 
to invoke such absolute claims is extremely limited. This is because romanticism 
typically refers to the cult of individual authenticity, which is at root an expression of 
“the proud, indomitable, untrammelled human will.” "^^  ^ Though Berlin correctly 
points out that this vision can be a great liberator -  it pitches itself against convention, 
oppression and cynicism - it is also true that the unshackled expression of the human 
will knows no moral bounds; its exercise may lead to heroic acts of martyrdom, or to 
the celebration of intensity of feeling, as in Goethe’s Werther, but it may also cause 
great suffering, destruction, and conflict, as in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, 
It is therefore rather dangerous for liberalism to refer to romantic/pluralist 
foundations. The moral license associated with romanticism, which Berlin celebrates 
for its pluralistic overtones and its anti-perfectionism, is silent on the content of the 
moral right, so long as moral rules are genuinely created, an authentic expression of 
individual will. By contrast, Berlin often writes as if the Enlightenment, which 
declares its faith in reason and a set of moral imperatives for all of humanity, was an 
enemy of freedom, alleging that it stifles the expression of the will.
This accounts for Berlin’s casting of Kant in an ambiguous light: he pays lip service 
to Kant’s liberal heritage while offering a more sustained attack against the (despotic) 
Kantian vision of rational freedom. It may well be that Berlin misrepresents Kant 
here, for whatever the weaknesses of Kant’s notion of rational freedom, he makes a
Berlin, I., ‘The Apotheosis o f  the Romantic W ill,’ The Crooked Timber o f  Humanity, Fontana Press, 1991, 
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clear distinction between the right and the good. That is to say, Kant allows that the 
individual may pursue whatever path she wishes, so long as she respects the freedom 
of o ther s .Moreover ,  Kant provides grounds for establishing principles of right, 
which romanticism with its cult of individual authenticity cannot do: from an 
assumption that human beings have an inviolability based on their rational autonomy, 
Kant is able to make certain inferences about the moral right. To this extent, Kant 
provides the most acceptable foundation for liberalism. As Galston asserts:
“To most theorists, it no longer feems acceptable to base moral theory on divine 
authority, on cultural tradition, on die consensus gentium, on the direct intuitive 
perception of moral tmth, or on any form of naturalism. The remaining possibility 
is a law of reason in the Kantian sense: a standard immanently derived from the 
fact and form of moral rationality itself... Kantian moral theoiy provides a 
philosophical foundation for the derivation of legitimate authority and rational 
principles of social organisation from freedom, equality, and autonomous consent 
-  the predominant values of our democratic age.”'^ °^
Thus, a Kantian justification of liberalism is more persuasive than its rivals. Building 
upon the ‘fr eedom of every member of society as a human being’ and the ‘equality of 
each with all the others as a subject’ Kant is able to generate inviolable rules of 
justice that define the boundaries of freely chosen, subjectively determined ends. This 
formula has been given more recent expression by John Rawls, the most famous 
contemporary Kantian. His argument for liberalism will be considered in the next 
chapter.
Conclusion
In the opening paragraphs of ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, Berlin’s principled position 
vis-à-vis the value of personal freedom is beyond doubt: “If individual liberty is an 
ultimate end for human beings, none should be deprived of it by others; least of all
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that some should enjoy it at the expense of others.”^^  ^Equality o f liberty, he claimed, 
forms the foundation of liberal morality. Yet, Berlin’s exploration of value pluralism 
and his aversion to a priori principles gradually weakened his faith in this premise 
and his case for liberalism consequently began to erode. In a revealing essay, Mark 
Lilia portrays Berlin as a liberal “haunted by the worry that liberalism’s attachment to 
universal principles, discovered through reason, somehow rendered it less liberal and 
tolerant than it ought to be.”^^  ^ This, I think, captures the essence of Berlin’s 
predicament.
This chapter has considered the efficacy of Berlin’s argument in relation to the value 
of liberty. Several interconnected themes were pursued. What is the relationship 
between liberty and other social goods? On what basis does Berlin justify a 
commitment to liberty? What is the connection between human nature, choice and 
liberty? The answers to all of these questions revolve around Berlin’s understanding 
of value pluralism. The central difficulties of Berlin’s thesis derive from his ill- 
considered meta-ethical position. His non-realism precludes an argument in favour of 
the intrinsic value of freedom, which is integral to his defence of liberalism. Further, a 
non-realist conception of human value malces it difficult to derive an objective moral 
floor, which is necessary if we are to distinguish pluralism fr om ethical relativism. 
And even if a basic morality could be identified, it would be so weak and contestable 
that it would be unable to support an appeal to the evil o f coercion, upon which the 
value pluralist’s defence of liberalism must rest.
Berlin, L, ‘Two Concepts o f  Liberty,’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 125 
Lilia, M., ‘W olves and Lambs’ The Legacy o f  Isaiah Berlin, Dworkin, R., Kelly, A., and Lilia, M., (eds.), The 
New York Review o f Books, 2001, p.40
152
Chapter 7: Liberty and Primary Goods
‘By what title does the individual claim his particular share? What is the basis of 
allotment?’
‘His Title,’ replied Dr Leete, ‘is his humanity. The basis of his claim is the fact that 
he is a man,’
‘The fact that he is a man!’ I repeated, incredulously. ‘Do you possibly mean that all 
have the same share?’
‘Most assuredly.’...
‘Some men do twice the work df others!’ I exclaimed. ‘Are the clever workmen 
content with a plan that ranks them with the indifferent?’
- Edward Bellamy, ‘Looking Backward’^ '^*
In troduction
Although John Rawls is famous for his treatise on justice, he has written much on the 
meaning and application of liberty. Indeed, as all who have read Rawls know, the 
value of liberty is fundamental to his principles of justice. In this chapter, I vrill 
carefully consider Rawls’ answer to three familiar' questions. First, why should we 
privilege liberty over other values? Second, is freedom instrumentally, intrinsically or 
constitutively valuable? Third, what is the relationship between freedom and other 
social goods? In answering these questions, I will to consider Rawls’ general and 
special conceptions of justice, and pay particular attention to Chapter IV of A Theory 
o f Justice and to Lecture VIII of Political Liberalism, both of which directly pertain to 
the argument on liberty.
I will also attempt to engage with Rawls’ critics. Initially, my analysis will be limited 
to Hart’s critique of Rawls’ first principle of justice, though I will later consider the 
critical merits of Gray, Daniels, Sen and Dworkin. The response to Rawls’ work has 
been voluminous and hence I have carefully limited my battles to those that directly 
pertain to a discussion of liberty. Consequently, and in spite of tlie breadth of the
Bellamy, E. ‘Looking Backward’ in Rosen M., Wolff, J., (eds.). Political Thought, Oxford University Press, 
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criticism that I aim to consider, I will concentr ate my efforts on Rawls’ argument for a 
scheme of basic liberties.
The Original Position and A  Theory o f  Justice
Rawls’ broader task is to articulate and defend a theory of social justice. Any given 
society requires rules of justice because the conflicting interests of individuals and 
groups give rise to competing claims on common resources. A society in which ‘all 
can achieve their complete good,’ o | in which there are ‘no conflicting demands’ and 
the wants of all ‘fit together without coercion into a harmonious plan of activity,’ is a 
society ‘beyond j u s t i c e . T h e  aim of justice, then, is to generate an appropriate set 
of rules that is capable of arbitrating between the competing and incompatible claims 
that men malce on each other. Historically, responses to the problem of justice have 
been numerous and diverse: Hobbes argued for a benevolent dictatorship, Rousseau 
for the General Will; Hume invoked the institution of private property, while Bentham 
appealed to the gieatest happiness. Rawls, by contrast, recommends ‘justice as 
fairness’.
Rawls suggests that a settlement of justice requires all affected parties to agr ee on the 
principles that govern the basic structure o f society. However, it is extremely unlikely 
that such agreement is attainable, given our conflicting interests and ideals; and even 
if it did, it would probably derive from inequalities in bargaining power. 
Consequently, there would be no reason to tliink of such an agreement as being fair. 
For Rawls, then, a fair settlement must be resolved from a situation in which the 
affected parties ai*e unable to dominate one another, which implies that the parties be 
allowed to freely voice their interests from a position of equality. This is the basic 
idea behind justice as fairness,
Rawls develops the idea of justice as fairness by constructing an elaborate thought 
experiment. He imagines a situation in which a group of free and equal promulgators 
have to decide on the rules that should govern the basic structure of society. The 
promulgators are free in the sense that they are capable of pui'suing a vision of the
Rawls, J., A Theory o f  Justice, Oxford U niversity Press, 1971, p.281
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good; they are equal in the sense that they are all inviolable moral agents. This 
philosophical conception of the person ensures that Rawls cannot claim to derive any 
necessary truths from his theory; his evaluative assumptions are implicit in the initial 
set-up of his argument. Nonetheless, the virtue of Rawls’ project is that he derives a 
strong conclusion from a weak premise, i.e. a premise that is widely acceptable.
Rawls makes two assumptions about the psychological make-up of the parties 
involved -  that they are reasonable and rational. To be rational is to be able to form, 
revise and pursue a vision of the good; it is to establish the appropriate means to one’s 
self-chosen ends. Without the assumption of rationality, the promulgators could not 
pm sue their self-interest or vision of the good in a coherent manner. To be reasonable 
is to be able to accept fair terms of co-operation, to acknowledge conditions of 
reciprocity and mutuality -  all who co-operate in society must benefit and shaie 
common burdens. Without the assumption of reasonableness, the promulgators would 
be unable to form and abide by a sense of justice.
In order to secure the condition of equal freedom that is required by justice as 
fairness, Rawls places the promulgators under a ‘veil of ignorance’. In other words, 
the imaginary promulgators are prevented from formulating principles of justice based 
on their own ‘thick’ theories of the good. Here, the parties operate under considerable 
limitations -  they do not know what skills and talents they have; they are denied 
knowledge of their conception of the good, of their psychological propensities and of 
their status and position in society.^^^ The veil of ignorance thus ensures that the 
promulgators are unable to assert principles of justice that privilege their own 
conception of good: “no-one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of 
principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social 
circumstances.”^^  ^ These constraints guarantee the equality of bargaining power 
required by justice as fairness.
Yet, how, in the context of the original position, can the promulgators rationally 
pursue their purposes if they ai’e denied all knowledge of their subjective good? How,
Rawls has been criticised for constructing his tlieory o f  justice upon such an ethereal conception o f  the person. 
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if the parties do not know what ends they want to pursue, can they arrive at the 
principles of justice? According to Rawls, rules of justice can still be formulated, 
since there are certain ‘primary goods’ that rational people want more of, whatever 
else they might want. These social goods normally have a use irrespective of the 
specific plan of life one pursues. Rawls lists ‘rights and liberties, powers and 
opportunities, income and wealth’ among such goods. These all-purpose means are 
the substantive goods that underpin the rules of justice.
Importantly, Rawls does not groui^ these basic goods on an account of universal 
human needs or human psychology; the primary goods are not what all men at all 
times desire. Rather, they are to be thought of as “what persons need in their status as 
free and equal citizens, and as normal and fully cooperating members of a society 
over a complete life.”^^  ^ This point has been overlooked by certain communitarian 
critics, who claim that Rawls gives an unduly abstract account of human wants.^^^ In 
fact, Rawls avoids this charge by relating the primary goods specifically to his 
conception o f the person. Thus, it is rational, in light of the imcertainties produced by 
the veil of ignorance, to select principles of justice that secure these goods for all 
persons; and even if it turns out ex post facto  that one’s plan of life does not involve 
these goods (perhaps for religious reasons), then one is not obligated to accept them 
(even though one must accept the rules of justice, which confers the right to have 
them).^^^ As such, Rawls believes that the self-interested promulgators in the original 
positional would arrive at the following conception of justice:
“All social values -  liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the 
bases of self-respect -  are to be distributed equally unless an unequal 
distribution of any, or all, of these values is to eveiyone’s advantage.
The promulgators will adopt this general principle since they do not know what 
position they will occupy in society. Their choices will be guided by the ‘maximin
Rawls, J., ‘Preface to the French Edition o f  A  Theory o f  Justice’, Colie ted  Papers, Harvard University Press, 
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rule’, whereby decisions tend towards the alternative that provides the best worst-case 
scenario.^^^ For example, the promulgators will not sanction a society based on a 
single religious view, since they cannot be sure that they themselves will subscribe to 
that religious view (meaning they camiot be sure they will not be persecuted for 
heresy or blasphemy). They have much to lose by sanctioning a theocratic society and 
veiy little to gain. In other words, by the maximin ruling, it would be irrational to take 
a chance with religious freedom.
Yet, why does Rawls insert the condition that certain inequalities are justified so long 
as they are to everyone’s advantage? According to Rawls, the principle of equality 
must be qualified, or else it might sanction an overall reduction in well-being. This is 
best demonstrated by considering the efficiency and justice of different forms of 
economic systems. For example, most commentators acknowledge the effectiveness 
of capitalism in generating wealth, as opposed say, to the inefficiencies of a centrally 
planned e c o n o m y . A t  the same time, capitalism will inevitably generate unjustified 
inequalities - it will reward those with marketable talent or industry or power, all of 
which Eire arbitrary from a moral point of view. However, if it can be shown that the 
worst off under capitalism (with its tendency towards material inequality) are better 
off than the worst off under a planned economy (which looks to secure material 
equality), then there is a prudential reason to favour capitalism (at least as a starting 
point). This follows from the maximin principle. In other words, Rawls marries the 
concerns of economic self-interest with the demands of justice.
How, then, do these broad principles translate into an institutional framework? 
Anxious to avoid an unlikely ahistorical structme, Rawls articulates a theory of Justice 
that is specifically applicable to a society that has attained a certain degr ee of wealth. 
Such a society will be characterised by the ‘effective establishment of fundamental 
rights’ and by the capacity of its citizens to fulfil their ‘basic w a n t s I n  this 
circumstance, Rawls argues the primary goods that underpin the general conception of 
justice will be cast in lexicographical order. That is to say, a reasonably affluent 
society will begin to discriminate between the VEilue of different social primary goods.
Ibid, p. 152
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For Rawls, after a certain level o f material well-being is attained (roughly equivalent 
to the satisfaction of basic needs), people will begin to place more importance on the 
liberties that sanction the pursuit of their purposes.^^^ This is because, beyond a 
certain minimum, increases in material well-being will have a diminishing value. In 
this context, the acquisition of liberty becomes a more pressing concern.^ Hence, for 
a reasonably affluent society, two broad principles of justice will be chosen;
First Principle Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total 
system of e q ^ l  basic liberties compatible with a similar system 
of liberty for all.
Second Principle Social and Economic inequalities ar e to be arranged so that 
they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, 
and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.^^^
Thus, Rawls generates his two principles of justice, the first of which has priority over 
the second. Consequently, the basic liberties “can be restricted only for the sake of 
liberty,” and not for the sake o f greater material equality or any other social good. 
The basic freedoms that will be protected by the rules of justice include political 
liberty (i.e. the freedom to vote and stand for office); freedom of speech and 
assembly; freedom of thought and conscience; freedom of the person including the 
right to hold personal property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as 
detailed by the rule of law.^^^ Thus, when Rawls claims that each person is to have an 
equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties, it is these 
fundamental fr eedoms that he has in mind.
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Yet, why are these liberties in particular identified by Rawls as being in the interests 
of the promulgators? We have already examined the reasoning behind the protection 
of fi-eedom of conscience. Given that the promulgators are unaware of their religious 
or moral convictions, or how their views fare in society, it is in everyone’s interests to 
give each person the freedom to subscribe to any religious or moral view compatible 
with the freedom of others. From the standpoint of the original position, then, no 
particular interpretation o f religious truth can be acknowledged as binding upon 
citizens generally; “equal liberty of conscienee is the only principle that the persons in 
the original position can a c k n o w l e d g e . W h e t h e r  or not this argument justifies 
prioritising freedom of conscience over material well-being is uncertain -  Rawls’ 
argument gives the promulgators reason to prize liberty without necessarily giving 
them reason to privilege it. This issue will be explored more thoroughly in the next 
section.
A slightly different reasoning delivers the political liberties. For Rawls, when the 
eonstraints of the original position are applied to a reasonably affluent society, a 
democratic constitution will be derived in which all citizens have an equal right to 
participate in the legislative process. This is because democracy maintains the equal 
moral standing of the parties in the original position:
“If the state is to exercise a final and coercive authority over a certain territory, and if 
it is in this way to affect permanently men’s prospects in life, then the constitutional 
process should preserve the equal representation of the original position to the degree 
that this is feasible.”’^^ *
In other words, if  it is assumed that the promulgators are required to decide upon the 
best form of government (which is implicit in the broader seaich for principles of 
justice), it may well be that there is no rational reason to move fi'om the position of 
equality conferred by the original position. Thus, when the constraints of the original 
position are applied to a reasonably affluent society, a democratic constitution will be 
derived in which all citizens have an equal right to participate in the legislative 
process since this will best preserve the equal representation of the original position.
Rawls, J., A Theory o f  Justice, Clarendon Press, 1972, p.207 
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159
This constitutional arrangement requires the protection of certain basic liberties, 
including the freedom to vote and stand for public office, freedom of speech and 
assembly, and the freedom to form political associations/^^ A just constitution also 
presupposes the rule of law and hence freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizur’e. 
Without these basic freedoms, a just eonstitution could not function as such.
For Rawls, the constitution must also ensure the fair value of the political libeiTies. 
Briefly, this means that those of equal talent and motivation should have the same 
chances of attaining positions of poMtical authority irrespective of race, sex, or class. 
Moreover, all citizens should have roughly equal means to influence political power. 
This might mean compensating steps have to be taken. Property and wealth must be 
widely dispersed, and government funds should be provided to encourage free public 
discussion. Political parties should be independent of private economic interests, in 
case wealthy corporations and individuals acquire unfair political bargaining 
power.^^^ This idea of the fair value of libeify is an important one, to which we shall 
return.
For now, let us consider two central questions which arise from Rawls’ broader 
aigument on the priority of liberty. First, given a eertain level of affluence, would 
rational promulgators necessarily prize the basic liberties more than an increase in 
wealth? Second, how are we to resolve conflict between these essential freedoms, if 
our only appeal is to ‘the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties’?^ ^^  ^
These two issues will be taken up below.
As mentioned, Rawls is aware that people may not place much value on personal 
liberty if they aie hungiy and poor. Nonetheless, where a minimum standard of living 
is achieved, people will begin to prize a ‘free internal life’ and the opportunity to 
pursue the specific ‘ends and excellences to which they are drawn’. In addition, men 
will ‘aspire to some control over the laws and mles that regulate their association,’
Ibid, p.223
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either by directly participating in governmental affairs or else by sanctioning an 
elected representative to act on their behalf/^^ Played out in the context of the original 
position, the promulgators will therefore understand that ‘beyond some point’ it 
becomes ‘inational’ to acknowledge ‘a lesser liberty for the sake of a greater material 
means’ In other words, when deciding the rules of justice for a relatively affluent 
society, the priorities of the promulgators will turn towards freedom of conscience and 
political liberty.
However, some critics have doubte^ that it is ‘rational’ to select all the basic liberties 
before an increase in wealth.^^^ It is true that if  we were reasonably affluent and 
concerned with fuifhering our- private ends, then we would place great importance on 
freedom of the person and freedom of conscience. Yet, is it necessarily the case that 
we would prefer the right to vote as opposed, say, to a significant increase in wealth? 
After all, the right to vote offers only a limited protection of one’s interests -  only 
large blocks of votes count in a democracy. The problem for Rawls, then, is that the 
basic liberties are unequal in terms of their impact arid value in life. Hence, the basic 
freedoms would seem to be qualitatively distinguishable as more or less fundamental 
to the promulgators’ interests. Not much can be achieved without liberty of the person 
-  if one is a slave, one’s options are radically curtailed; yet, one can realise many 
initiatives without having the right to stand for election, say. The rational requirement 
of the promulgators to select freedom of the person is therefore more pressing. Critics 
argue that Rawls overcomes this problem only at the expense of encumbering the 
promulgators with a highly moralised ideal of the free life. Hail, for example, 
suggests that the promulgators are east as ‘public-spirited’ citizens who are unwilling 
to exchange the good of political life for ‘mere material goods’. I f  this criticism 
holds, then Rawls’ claim that the principles of justice are based purely on the rational 
self-interest of the promulgators is fatally imdermined.
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Rawls addresses this issue in the final pages of Political Liberalism. He accepts that a 
conception of the person ‘in some sense liberal’ underlies the argument for the 
priority of the basic liberties/^^ However, he claims this is not an illicit ideological 
insertion, but rather a direct consequence of his conception of citizens as free and 
equal. It is not a moral ideal passed-off as rationality, but is rather a consequence of 
the ‘reasonable’ constraints that define the original position. Moreover, the notion of a 
‘public-spirited’ citizen should not be confused with a more fundamental idea, 
namely, that persons are able to form and abide by a sense of justice - citizens are 
regarded as having a “certain natura%political virtue without which hopes for a regime 
of liberty may be umealistic.”^^  ^This defence arguably reflects a stronger conception 
of the person tlian Rawls was prepared to acknowledge in A Theory o f Justice.
Hart also complains that Rawls’ list of basic liberties is slightly aihitrary; even though 
Rawls accepts that his list of basic freedoms is not definitive, he nonetheless fails to 
adequately explain his selection.^^^ Hait is particularly finstrated by the rather 
arbitrary way in which Rawls includes the right to personal property among the basic 
freedoms. Whilst the other liberties are either grounded in freedom of conscience or 
else flow from the political and legal requirements of a just constitution, the inclusion 
of personal property as a basic freedom seems to be an unargued assertion.^H art is 
correct to point to Rawls’ rather careless approach to this issue, but that is not to say 
there is no reason for rational promulgators to invoke the institution of personal 
property. For instance, it might be argued with Flayek that the freedom to hold 
personal properly is itself a basic liberty, since it provides for a private space in which 
we can act unencumbered by social norms. Indeed, in the later work of Rawls, the 
promulgators’ rational interest in personal property is clarified: “The role of this 
liberty is to allow a sufficient material basis for a sense of personal independence and 
self-respect. In other words, personal property is a requisite condition for realising 
a rational conception of the good.
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Nonetheless, a seemingly intractable problem remains. According to Rawls, though 
the basic freedoms detailed are potentially conflictual, this clash can be resolved by 
appealing to the greatest liberty. Rawls explains how this principle could render a 
determinate result by alluding to the mles of order in a debate, without which 
“freedom of speech loses its value.”^^ "^  Whilst such rules of order might restrict our 
liberty to speak whenever we please, they are nonetheless required ‘to gain the 
benefits’ of free speech - otherwise the debate will deteriorate into to a rabble of 
unintelligible voices. In other words, the conflict between the freedom to speak 
uninterrupted by others and the freedom to challenge the speaker is resolved by 
forming rules of debate, which, whilst limiting the opportunity of speech in some 
circumstances, nonetheless improves the value of the liberty in question.
Now, this is all well and good, but as Haid points out, it is misleading to describe this 
resolution as yielding a ‘greater liberty,’ since this suggests that “no values other than 
libeity and dimensions of it, like extent, size, or strength, are i n v o l v e d . I n  tmth, the 
rules of debate do not increase the extent of free speech (which would be a 
quantitative judgement), but rather secure the value of free speech (which is a 
qualitative judgement). In other words, the rules in question acknowledge the point of 
debate, i.e. that different protagonists should be allowed to express and consider 
various points of view. Yet, this being the case, we are making an appeal to evaluative 
judgements beyond that allowed by Rawls’ first principle.
How, then, if we cannot appeal to the ‘greatest liberty’, can we resolve conflict 
between basic freedoms? In some cases, such as the imposition of rules of debate, a 
single solution would seem sensible to all. Other cases, however, yield more disparate 
responses. In such circumstances, there is no ‘rational’ solution, only an array of 
reasonable prescriptions. Hart gives the example of trespass laws, which prevent the 
public having a right of way through privately owned land. How do we determine, in 
this circumstance, whether the trespass laws reflect the correct balance between 
freedom of movement and the right to private property? Whilst Rawls acknowledges
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that conflicting freedoms might reasonably be settled in different ways/®^ he casts this 
as a problem to be decided at the level of procedural justice, w^hich can take account 
of contingent circumstances. Nonetheless, the clash between basic freedoms remains a 
significant problem for Rawls -  there seems to be no determinate principle upon 
which the decisions of procedural justice could be grounded.
Rawls’ Revision of the First Principle of Justice
In the final section of Political Liberalism, Rawls reformulates his first principle in 
order to exorcise its troublesome indeterminacy:
Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties 
which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.^ ®^
Two points should be made about Rawls’ revised first principle. In terms of its 
implications for justice, it does not amount to a major reconstruction. Indeed, the 
central claim - that none of the basic liberties can be justifiably restricted for the sake 
of the public good or perfectionist values - remains the same. However, in tenns of its 
derivation, the revised first principle is now more specifically related to a political 
conception of the citizen, which is latent in the public culture of a constitutional 
democracy.^^^
This justification represents a departur e from A Theory o f Justice, in which Rawls 
places significant emphasis on the deliberative outcome of the original position. He 
sharply distinguished between the self-interested and rational promulgators motivated 
to pursue their own good and the reasonable constraints that characterised the original 
position. These constraints were reflective of a specific moral point of view. In 
Political Liberalism, the balance changes: the outcome of the original position is now 
said to derive fr om a conception of citizens as rational and reasonable moral agents. 
Rather than operating solely from the perspective of their determinate self-interest, the
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parties are now additionally said to act in accordance with their moral personality/^^ 
Thus, the parties are rationally autonomous in two ways:
“They are free within the constraints of the original position to agree to whatever 
principles of justice they think most to the advantage of those they represent; and in 
estimating this advantage they consider those persons’ higher order interests.”^^®
According to Rawls, the higher order interests of citizens are met by securing the 
conditions that allow for the full development of citizens’ two moral powers: the 
capacity to act upon a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good. 
These moral powers are presupposed by the idea of citizens advancing their 
determinate conception of the good within a system of justice.
Retmning to the original position, the promulgators are motivated to secure the 
conditions necessary for citizens to effectively pur sue determinate conceptions of the 
good with widely different contents; and in judging this the promulgators additionally 
consider the conditions necessary for the developmerlt and exercise of citizens’ two 
moral powers The reasoning that considers the determinate good of citizens 
remains much as it did in A Theory o f  Justice. For instance, adumbrating principles of 
justice that secures freedom of conscience is said to be the most rational choice for 
promulgators placed under a veil o f ignorance. The promulgators will not sanction a 
society based, say, on a single religious view, since they cannot be sure of the 
religious views of the citizens they represent; thus, in forwardirrg citizens’ detenninate 
conception of the good, it would be irrational to take a chance with religious freedom.
Yet, how does the motivation to secme the conditions for the development of the two 
moral powers affect the outcome of the original position? Let us first consider the 
capacity for a conception of the good. This is defined as the capacity to form, to 
revise, and to rationally pursue a determinate conception of the good.^^^ This capacity 
might be understood as a means to a determinate conception of the good: since there
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is no guarantee that our present way of life is the most rational for us, our deliberative 
reason is instrumental in our assessment of whether we need to revise our ends. This, 
in turn, gives the promulgators further reason to secure freedom of conscience and its 
associated liberties,^ for they are not only interested in securing conditions under 
which citizens can pursue their self-chosen ends, they are also motivated to secure 
conditions that allow citizens to revise those ends. Liberty of conscience allows 
citizens to ‘fall into error and to make mistakes’, and hence is among the social 
conditions necessary for the development of citizens’ capacity for a conception of the 
good.^ "^^  Rawls’ argument is surefy well made in this regard. It is not merely our 
determinate conception of the good that must be considered in the original position, 
but also our interest in revising this (by means of our deliberative reason). Will 
Kymlicka appreciates the force of this point in his dissection of religious freedom:
“A liberal society not only allows individuals the freedom to pursue their existing 
faith, but it also allows them to seek new adherents to their faith (proselytization is 
allowed), or to question the doctrine of their church (heresy is allowed), or to 
renounce their faith entirely and convert to another faith or to atheism (apostasy is 
allowed). It is quite conceivable to have the freedom to pursue one’s current faith 
without having any of these latter freedoms... These aspects of a liberal society only 
make sense on the assumption that revising one’s ends is possible, and sometimes 
desirable, because one’s cuirent ends are not always worthy of allegiance. A liberal 
society does not compel such questioning and revision, but it does make it a genuine 
possibility.”^^^
Thus, we find that Rawls strengthens the reasoning behind freedom of conscience and 
association by appealing to our capacity to form, to revise, and to rationally pursue a 
determinate conception of the good, which is the first of citizens’ two moral powers.
The second of citizens’ two moral powers is the capacity for a sense of justice. Rawls 
is carefril to point out that citizens’ capacity for a sense of justice should not be 
confused with a determinate conception of justice. The parties in the original position
Freedom o f association is required to give effect to liberty o f conscience; for unless we are at liberty to 
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are rationally autonomous representatives and as such are moved solely by 
considerations relating to what furthers the determinate conception of the good of the 
persons they represent: ‘‘no antecedent notions or principles of justice are to guide 
(much less constrain) the parties’ reasoning”. T h e  capacity for a sense of justice 
refers only to citizens’ ability to be moved by terms of social cooperation. 
Nonetheless, Rawls claims that citizens’ capacity for a sense of justice motivates the 
parties to adopt principles securing the basic liberties and assign them priority. For 
example, a just and stable scheme of social cooperation, made effective by citizens’ 
capacity for a sense o f justice, advances citizens’ determinate conceptions of the 
good. If citizens can rely on each other to abide by the rules of justice, then they are 
left free to pursue their ovm good in their own way. In other words, a scheme made 
stable by an effective public sense of justice is a better means to the good of citizens 
than a scheme that requires a severe and costly apparatus of penal sanctions. 
According to Rawls, the most stable scheme of social cooperation is ‘justice as 
fairness’, with its requirement for the priority of a scheme of basic liberties:
“The most stable conception of justice is one that is clear and perspicuous to our 
reason, congruent with and unconditionally concerned with our good, and rooted not 
in abnegation but in affirmation of our person... The two principles of justice answer 
better to these conditions than other alternatives precisely because... they are to be 
public and mutually recognised.”
To summarise on the revised argument from the original position: In promoting the 
interests of citizens, the promulgators are motivated to secui’e the conditions in which 
the two moral powers can be exercised and in which citizens can forward a 
determinate conception of the good with widely different contents. This is 
accomplished by adumbrating principles o f justice that secure the primary goods (or 
all-purpose means) normally needed for this puipose.^^^ The principles of justice arc 
then hierarchically ordered so as to protect the higher order interest of the parties. 
Thus, the basic liberties are accorded a superior place because they are required to
Rawls, J., Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1993, p.315 
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advance any conception of the good and are fundamental for the exercise of the two 
moral powers, which any such conception presupposes.
In modifying his account of the original position, Rawls looks to overcome one of the 
central problems identified by Hart, namely, that the parties to the original position 
have no clear grounds for preferring liberty to a given level o f economic well-being. 
Rawls accepts that in A Theory o f  Justice citizens’ rational interests were not 
sufRciently explained and that these failed to demonstrate what was asked of them."*^  ^
Hence he incorporates the idea o f the citizens’ higher order interests in securing the 
conditions required for the exercise of the two moral powers.
However, Rawls must also consider the problem of conflicting basic liberties. In A 
Theory o f Justice, he wrongly supposed that the basic liberties could be “specified and 
adjusted so as to achieve the most extensive scheme of these liberties.” He now 
accepts that this criterion, being purely quantitative, “does not distinguish some cases 
as more significant than others.”'*^  ^ He acknowledges, then, that an appeal to the 
greatest liberty is incoherent, since liberty cannot be summed in a meaningful way - 
the expression ‘greatest liberty’ wrongly implies the existence of ‘liberty’ conceived 
as a homogenous and measurable whole. The ‘best scheme of liberties’ is not ‘the 
most e x t e n s i v e . R a w l s ’ revised principle requires that the basic liberties be 
moulded according to their adequacy (a qualitative criterion), not according to their 
extent (a qualitative criterion).
According to Rawls, a scheme of liberties is adequate if it allows for the exercise o f 
the moral powers in ‘two fundamental cases’. The first of these concerns ‘the 
application of the principles of justice to the basic structure of society’ and is 
connected with the capacity for a sense of justice. The second fundamental case 
concerns ‘the application of the principles of deliberative reason in guiding our 
conduct over a complete life’ and is connected with the capacity for a conception of
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the good."^ ®^  The adequacy of each of the basic liberties is to be judged with reference 
to at least one of the two fundamental cases. The political liberties and freedom of 
thought “are to secure the free and informed application of the principles of justice, by 
means of the full and effective exercise o f citizens’ sense o f justice, to the basic 
structure of society.” By contrast, liberty of conscience and freedom of association 
“are to secure the full and informed and effective application of citizens’ powers of 
deliberative reason to their forming, revising, and rationally pursuing a conception of 
the good over a complete life.”"*^  ^ The remaining basic liberties -  the freedom and 
integrity of the person and the right'^ and liberties covered by the rule of law -  are the 
necessary supports of the scheme as a whole.
Rawls accepts that some of the basic liberties may be more important than others, yet 
believes his revised justification provides a determinate criterion for deciding on the 
appropriate range of a basic liberty: “A liberty is more or less significant depending 
on whether it is more or less essentially involved in, or is a more or less necessary 
institutional means to protect, the full and informed and effective exercise of the 
moral powers in one (or both) of the two fundamental c a s e s . I n  other words, the 
basic liberties are to be airanged, adjusted, and in some instances limited, depending 
on their significance for the exercise of the moral powers in the application of justice 
and deliberative reason.
Consider the basic liberty of free speech. According to Rawls, fi'ee political speech is 
necessary because it allows citizens to exercise their moral powers in applying the 
principles of justice to the basic structuie of s o c i e t y . W i t h  this in mind, the basic 
liberty of fr ee speech can be contoured to guarantee certain points of principle deemed 
essential for citizens to be moved by a sense of justice in the first fundamental case. 
Rawls suggests three points of principle should be respected. First, there can be no 
crime of seditious libel. If citizens are not free to criticise the government, then they 
are unable to publicly endorse the principles of justice ‘in light of their own
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reason’ Citizens’ capacity to be moved by a sense of justice is therefore 
undermined when criticism and dissent are suppressed. The other two principles are 
the necessary supports of this first point: the discussion of political, religious and 
philosophical doctrines can never be censored and as such there can be no prior 
restraints on freedom of the press; and the advocacy of revolutionary and subversive 
doctrines is fully protected, meaning there should be no restrictions on the content of 
political speech. To forego any of these points of principle is to undermine the free 
and infoimed use of our public reason in judging the justice of the basic structure of 
society. %
Rawls also believes that his revised criterion suggests the prohibition of certain types 
of speech that do not affect citizens’ capacity to form a sense of justice. For instance, 
there are no special protections given to freedom of speech when discussing private 
citizens, since this has “no significance at all for the public use of reason to judge and 
regulate the basic stmctuie.”'^ ^^  Indeed, the defamation of private persons should be 
prohibited since it is in addition ‘a private wrong’ Other types of speech go beyond 
the requirements of justice. For instance, incitements to the ‘imminent and lawless use 
of force’ are too disruptive of the democratic process to be permitted by the rules of 
order of political debate."^^* In other words, violence is not a necessary means for 
democratic citizens to assess the basic structure of society in light of their own reason. 
In this specific case, then, freedom of speech is justifiably restricted. To this extent, 
Rawls believes his revised criterion is able to deliver a scheme of basic liberties 
suitably adjusted to accommodate the exercise of the moral powers in the two 
fimdamental cases.
Still, it may be that Rawls unnecessarily complicates matters by referring to the moral 
powers of citizens in the two fundamental cases. Whilst certain alterations were 
forced on Rawls by Hart’s insightful critique, it is doubtful that he needed to make 
such a direct appeal to the moral personality of citizens in order to contour the scheme 
of liberties. Indeed, this revision is included at considerable cost to the elegance and 
lucidity of his argument. In truth, his efforts to provide for an adequate scheme of
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basic freedoms might not require the complex criterion he suggests; the conflict 
between basic liberties might be partially resolved by appealing to an independent 
conception of right understood in relation to the interests of rational promulgators 
subject to a veil of ignorance. And where conflict is not resolved, it may be that 
rational reflection cannot provide a satisfactory conclusion: not all questions of justice 
have an a priori answer.
The Conflict of Right and Right
Is it possible to settle conflict between the basic liberties without appealing to the two 
fundamental cases? I hope to show that we can go some of the way towards shaping a 
scheme of liberties without making an appeal to criteria beyond the teims of the 
original position. Consider the argument of Jurgen Habermas, who takes Rawls to 
task over the ‘umosolved competition’ between the ‘liberties of the ancients’ and the 
‘liberties of the modems’. I n  particular, Habeimas is critical of the way Rawls 
limits the scope of the political liberties in order tp protect civil liberties. This is 
problematic, he claims, because Rawls holds that all the basic liberties are co-original 
in his normative framework. That these liberties have the same root suggests that civil 
liberties cannot be imposed as external constraints on the democratic process."  ^
Habermas complains that Rawls nonetheless deduces a ‘rigid boundary’ between the 
political and private spheres: “this boundary is set by basic liberal rights that consü'ain 
democratic self-legislation, and with it the sphere of the political, the beginning,
that is, prior to all political will formation.”" ^ In  other words, Habermas is critical of 
Rawls’ suggestion that there should be constitutional principles allowing for the 
constraint of majoritarian rule, since this quells the ‘radical democratic embers’ that 
existed in the original position.
In response, Rawls denies that there is an unresolved competition between the 
political and civil liberties. Rather, it is a matter of ‘weighing the evidence one way or 
the other’ To this extent, Rawls refers to the central range of the liberties in
This, o f  course, was Constant’s expression, used to distinguish between political and civil liberties. 
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question. The scope of some liberties may have to be lessened if the point of other 
liberties is to be protected. The point of political freedom is to allow citizens to 
promote their determinate good through the political process. There are no prior or 
external bounds on this until we consider the central range of other basic liberties, 
such as freedom of conscience. In order to attain an appropriate balance between these 
competing claims, one freedom may have to be restrained in order to secure the 
central range of the other. Of course, Habermas complains that Rawls consistently 
gives precedence to the civil liberties. Yet, this is not without good cause. Consider 
the rational deliberations of promulgators acting to advance the determinate interests 
of citizens from behind a veil of ignorance. Here, the political liberties are said to be 
the ‘necessary institutional means’ for the promotion of other basic liberties, such as 
freedom of conscience.M oreover, we have a prima facie reason for restraining the 
political liberties, namely, that an unchecked majority rule may result in collective 
tyranny; such oppression would do serious damage to the determinate interests of 
those in the mi no r i t y . Th u s ,  the promulgators have reason to contour the political 
liberties such that freedom of conscience is appropriately seemed. Again, that is not to 
say the political liberties are not basic -  they are the essential institutional means to 
protect and preserve other basic liberties; we should simply point out that not all the 
basic liberties are valued for the same reasons and that a suitable process of 
adjustment will allow us to arrive at a basic scheme of liberties that is equally 
advantageous to all."^ ^^
Other critics, such as John Gray, argue that conflict between the basic libeities can 
only be resolved by appealing to a particular' account of the good. Consequently, 
incompatible applications of Rawls’ principles can be justified by appealing to 
different human interests, which destroys the possibility of a strictly ‘political’ 
liberalism whose application is independent of any comprehensive religious, moral or 
philosophical doctrine."^^  ^ This argument betrays Gray’s broader suspicion of 
freestanding principles of right that are capable of arbitrating between competing 
conceptions of the good. Gray maintains that principles of right cannot be insulated 
from the force of value incommensurability:
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“The central flaw in this conunon reasoning is in the assumption that principles of 
liberty or justice can be insulated from the force of value-incommensurability...
This is an illusion, since there are conflicting liberties, rival equalities, and 
incompatible demands of justice... [If] negative liberties do not form a harmonious 
system but are often incompatible with one another, we will resolve such conflicts 
only if we attach weights or values to the rival liberties. Sometimes, however, we 
will have no measure whereby we can give the rival liberties values in a common 
currency; their values will be incommensurable.”"^^^
Gray’s argument is not particularly original -  it is a fusion of ideas expressed 
elsewhere by Berlin and Hart. Even then, Rawls’ framework can answer Gray’s 
objections. In the first instance, it may be that Gray overstates value conflict and 
understates the extent to which the basic liberties are mutually supportive. Whilst he 
acknowledges that some basic freedoms coalesce, he underestimates the extent to 
which individual liberties are mutually sustaining. For instance, if  a free media can 
scmtinise government policy, it is unlikely that that government will have the scope to 
undermine the basic liberties of its political opponents (as often happens in states 
without a free press). Equally, freedom of speech and assembly would not be worth 
much without freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure; otherwise, a government 
could swiftly eradicate any dissenting voices. In other words, the effectiveness o f 
some freedoms requires the institution of other freedoms.
Of course, that is not to say conflict cannot exist between the basic liberties. Again 
though, this does not mean that Rawls must abandon his revised first principle of 
justice since he accepts that the regulation of the basic scheme of liberties might 
require the restriction of certain specific liberties. Note that this does not mean 
annihilation -  to limit freedom of speech in some circumstances does not mean it is 
therefore incoherent to claim it as a right. Gray’s tendency to think in absolutes leads 
his critique of Rawls off course. He argues that Rawls’ ideal regime is unattainable 
because “a regime in which all basic liberties are fully  protected is not even 
conceivable.”'^ *^ Compare this with Rawls’ claim that “each person has an equal right 
to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar
Gray, J., Berlin, Fontana Press, 1995, p. 147
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scheme of liberties for Indeed, Rawls explicitly argues against the idea that all
basic liberties should be fully protected:
“Since the basic liberties may be limited when they clash with one another, none 
of these liberties is absolute; nor is it a requirement that, in the finally adjusted 
scheme, all the basic liberties are to be equally provided for (whatever that might 
mean). Rather, however these liberties are adjusted to give one coherent scheme, 
this scheme is secured equally for all citizens.”^^ ^
Given this mandate to contour a scheme of liberties, the problems identified by Gray 
become less troublesome. Consider the conflict between personal property rights and 
freedom of assembly. The liberty to acquire personal property grants the material 
basis for a sense of personal independence and self-respect, which all citizens have an 
interest in seeming. By contrast, fr eedom of assembly is necessary in order to protect 
citizens’ freedom of speech, without which citizens’ would be rendered impotent in 
the political process. Clearly, these liberties cannot both be fully protected: the 
ownership o f personal property (such as land and housing) prevents citizens from 
assembling wherever they please. In one sense, then, citizens’ determinate interests 
are harmed, for they cannot have everything. Yet, that is not to say an appropriate 
balance cannot obtain between these competing liberties. If we cast the problem back 
to the original position, we might ask what balance would promote the determinate 
good of citizens. The promulgators, subject to a veil o f ignorance, must decide 
whether it is in citizens’ interests to constrain freedom of assembly in order to grant 
personal property rights. It is hard to imagine that the interests of citizens would be 
protected if eveiyone were allowed to tramp wherever they pleased (indeed, this is a 
condition of Hobbes’ state of nature, which self-interested persons are motivated to 
eseape); and by granting property rights, citizens are accorded a private space in 
which they can enact their conception of the good. Thus, there is no reason to think 
that the institution of personal property would offend against citizens’ interest in 
secur'ing freedom of assembly.
422 Rawls, J-, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1993, p.291 Em phasis added  
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Indeed, an effective right to freedom of assembly does not even entail unimpeded 
access to public places (in order to express our political views). As Rawls points out, 
these extensions of liberty, when granted to all, are so ‘unworkable’ and ‘socially 
divisive’ that they would greatly reduce the effective scope of fr eedom of speech. For 
Rawls, then, there must be “reasonable regulations relating to time and place, and the 
access to public facilities.”'*^ '* At the same time, it would be unfair to impose heavy 
restrictions on the use of public places for political speech, since this might adversely 
affect poorer communities that lack the necessary frmds for other forms of political 
expression.'*^^ The precise details regulations pertaining to public assembly would 
obviously have to consider contingent circumstances. Indeed, this is an important 
point: it would be wrong to think that the conflict between basic libeilies has an a 
priori solution. Rawls is clear- that there can be no objective reading of the right at the 
legislative and constitutional stages. Some legislators may favour more extensive 
political freedoms, others may shore up the right to privacy; and a given judgement 
will often be dependent on contingent circumstances. The point, then, is not to give a 
final judgement on the boundaries between the public and private spheres, only to 
acknowledge the need to contour the liberties in accordance with some process of 
adjustment and balancing at the level of procedural justice.
Crucially, however, the point of the basic liberties can only be respected if their worth 
is maintained: “The worth of liberty is not the same for everyone. Some have gieater 
authority and wealth, and therefore greater means to achieve their aims.”'*^  ^As such, 
Rawls emphasises the relationship between the basic liberties and the material 
conditions that are necessary to guarantee their value. He claims the political liberties 
should have their fair value maintained, while the value of the non-political liberties 
should be regulated in accordance with the difference principle. The cogency of this 
argument will be assessed below.
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The W orth of the Basic Liberties
As mentioned, Rawls distinguishes between liberty and the worth of liberty. Whereas 
liberty is ‘represented by the complete system of the liberties of equal citizenship’, the 
worth of liberty to persons and gi'oups is ‘proportional to their capacity to advance 
their ends within the framework the system defines.’'*^  ^ According to Rawls, a just 
constitution will not only provide for a scheme of basic liberties, it will also ensure 
the fair value of the political liberties, such that all citizens have a roughly equal 
political influence. The first principle of justice can therefore be fully articulated as 
follows:
Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and 
liberties...compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all; and in this scheme 
the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair 
value.'*^ ^
Notably, tliis guaranteed fair value, which is roughly equal for each citizen, does not 
extend to all the basic liberties. For Rawls, the value of the non-political liberties 
(those which pertain to out private ends) should be determined by the difference 
principle.
Yet, Norman Daniels argues there is no reason, fi'om the perspective o f the 
promulgators in the original position, to regulate the worth of freedom through the 
difference principle. For Daniels, equal liberty is a ‘hollow abstraction’ if it is not also 
accompanied by ‘equality in the ability to exercise liberty’. As such, the promulgators 
have a rational interest in securing the equal worth of liberty, given that they do not 
know their position in society and given that tlrey are primarily concerned with the 
advancement of their ends.'*^ ** hi other words, they would not sanction the inequalities 
of wealth and income potentially allowed by difference principle since this would 
reduce the relative worth of liberty for the worst off members of society and deliver a 
substantial competitive advantage to the affluent. Daniels would therefore prefer to
Ibid, p.204
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see the first principle of justice recast with a stronger ‘egalitarian punch’, such tliat it 
secured the fair value of all the basic liberties.
However, contrary to Daniels, it is unlikely that a first principle of justice committed 
to the equal value of freedom would produce desirable results. A revised first 
principle (that guaranteed the equal value of freedom) might entail that wealth and 
income should be distributed equally. This would make the basic liberties equally 
valuable for all citizens by giving them equal access to primary social goods. Yet, as 
Rawls points out, if a society distributes social and economic resources equally in 
order to equalise the worth of freedom for all, it would be ignoring other pressing 
concerns such as economic efficiency, wealth generation and so on. The result of 
extreme egalitarian distributive principles might ensure equal worth of the basic 
freedoms, but at the cost of degrading the absolute value of the (non-political) 
freedoms -  it would diminish the capacity of individuals to advance their ends. If a 
command economy suffers from inefficiency and limited wealth production, then the 
equal freedoms it provides for will be worth less than might have been the case if 
economic justice was governed by the difference principle. In other words, social 
policy designed to ensure the equal value of freedom is self-defeating if it is acquired 
at the expense of widespread poverty. This type of dogmatic egalitarianism is, for 
Rawls, simply irrational.'*^** By contrast, if social and economic resources were 
regulated by the difference principle, it would protect the value of freedom for the 
worst-off in society in absolute terms. For Rawls, this solution is more amenable to 
the interests of rational and mutually disinterested promulgators looking to advance 
their ends.'*^ *
Rawls provides a further reason as to why the first principle of justice should not 
provide for the equal value of the basic liberties, namely, that an extreme 
egalitai’ianism might be socially divisive. If the state were to protect the equal value of 
freedom for all, it may be required to support very particular or specific goals. For 
example, Daniels makes the point that the equal value of religious freedom might 
require the public funding of expensive pilgrimages, which are required by certain
Rawls, J., Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1993, p,329 
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religions.'*^^ Rawls thinks this is absurd -  from the perspective o f political justice, this 
means that pilgrims are entitled to a greater proportion of public frmds than atheists, 
say, on the grounds that it takes more to satisfy the value of their religious freedom. 
Such inequity is bound to be socially divisive, and lead to civil unrest. At any rate, the 
point of justice is to ensure an appropriate distribution of primary goods (irrespective 
of the ends individuals choose to pur sue). Thus, the case for upholding the equal value 
of all the basic liberties is quite unconvincing.
Still, there is problem for Rawls in that the difference principle does not take account 
of citizens’ different capacities to convert wealth into agency outcomes. This is 
especially important in relation to disabilities or other disadvantageous circumstances. 
As Amartya Sen points out: “Since the conversion of these primary goods and 
resom'ces into freedom of choice...may vary from person to person, equality of 
holdings of primary goods or of resources can go hand in hand with serious 
inequalities in actual freedoms enjoyed by different persons.” Thus, if the 
difference principle is to regulate the worth of the non-political liberties, the result 
will be that people with disabilities will be placed in a position of disadvantage 
relative to the able bodied because the former have to spend more of their resources to 
achieve similar- agency outcomes,
Rawls responds to this charge by making a counter-factual assumption that citizens 
have the moral, intellectual and physical capacities that enable them to be fully 
cooperating members of society over a complete life. In other words, the principles of 
justice ar e derived fr om a conception of the person stripped of the psychological and 
physical differences that characterise actual human beings. The principles of justice 
‘specify the fair terms of cooperation’ among free and equal persons.'* '^* Still, this 
raises the question: how will the mentally and physically disabled fare in Rawlsian 
society given that their additional needs are not recognised at the level of the basic 
structure of society? Rawls responds by casting this problem as an issue to be settled 
at the level of legislative justice. At this stage, “the prevalence and kinds of 
misfortunes are known and the costs of treating them can be ascertained and balanced
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along with total government expenditure.”'*^  ^ In principle, however, he agrees witli 
Sen that basic capabilities ‘are of first importance’ and that the use of primary goods 
is always to be assessed fin the light of assumptions about those capabilities’.
Let us now consider why Rawls believes that the political liberties in particular- should 
have their fair value guaranteed. Rawls is adamant that this guarantee cannot be 
grounded on any perfectionist account of the human being as a political animal. 
Democratic self-government cannot be held as a pre-eminent good; it is but one 
conception of the good among ma@y. Rather, the political liberties must have then- 
equal value maintained since this is a necessary feature of just legislation and a fair 
political process. For Rawls, this means that the worth of the political liberties to all 
citizens, whatever their social or economic position, “must be approximately equal, or 
at least sufficiently equal, in the sense that everyone has a fair opportunity to hold 
public office and to influence the outcome of political decisions.”'*^ ^
According to Rawls, the competitive nature of democratic politics means that 
disparities in wealth and income can dramatically affect the worth of the political 
liberties, more so than for other liberties. Oui' private ends are to a lesser extent in 
competition with each other, especially when governed by the difference principle. 
Citizens can often advance their specific ends fairly and without conflict. In other 
words, the ‘social space’ in which individuals can pursue their vision of the good is 
extensive. By contrast, the public sphere is characterised by a more limited social 
space, which generates greater conflict and competition. Here, the effects of 
inequalities in wealth and income are amplified in relation to the capacity of 
individuals to advance then ends. Even allowing for the governance of the difference 
principle, disparity in wealth can generate considerable harm to the fairness of the 
political process. This is because it engenders an effective competitive advantage for 
those with the financial means or requisite bargaining power. Justice as fairness 
cannot allow such inequality in the value of political liberty.
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How, then, are we to ensure the fair value of the political liberties? Rawls admits that 
the issue is ‘complex and difficult’ and that the requisite historical experience and 
theoretical understanding may be lacking. Nonetheless, “one guideline for 
guaranteeing fair value seems to be to keep political parties independent of large 
concentrations of private economic and social p o w e r . R a w l s ’ argument seems to 
be informed by the subversive effects of unregulated private finance on the US 
political process. Altliough legal argument is ongoing, the US constitution does not 
forbid extensive individual freedom in relation to the financing of political parties, 
which potentially gives wealthy citizens a disproportionate degr ee of political power. 
If I am a billionaire I can make significant financial contributions to both major 
parties; in return, my patronage can buy me significant political influence 
(irrespective of which party gains power). The result of this financial fieedom is that 
citizens with more money have greater political power, which is an assault to the idea 
that each citizen is entitled to “fair and equal access to the political process as a public 
facility.”'*^** Consequently, “public financing of political campaigns and election 
expenditures, various limits on contributions and other regulations are essential to 
maintain the fair value of the political liberties.”'*'***
However, do limitations on the private financing of political parties not unjustly limit 
one’s political freedom? Rawls believes not - it is entirely acceptable to prevent large 
contributions from corporations or wealthy individuals going to political parties or 
candidates for election if it results in the fairer value of the political liberties:
“Such a prohibition may be necessary so that citizens similarly gifted and motivated 
have roughly an equal chance of influencing the government’s policy and of attaining 
positions of authority irrespective of their economic and social class. It is precisely 
this equality which defines the fair value of the political liberties.”'^ '^ ’
Indeed, Rawls demonstrates at length the injustice of the US Supreme Court in not 
allowing for such regulation and restriction. In Buckley vs. Valeo the Com! ruled that 
such provisions place direct and substantial restrictions on political speech and that
Rawls, J., Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1993, p.328 
Ibid, p.328 
Ibid, p.357 
Ibid, p.358
180
the government had no business in restricting the speech of some in order to enhance 
the voice of others/'*^ Yet, for Rawls, this judgement not only contradicts judgement 
rendered elsewhere by the Court, but it actively endorses the view that fair 
representation in the political process accords to the amount of financial influence 
effectively asserted. For Rawls this is an assault on what we understand by justice. 
Justice requires a political procedure that secures for all citizens a full and equally 
effective voice in a fair scheme of representation.'*'*^
The Instrum ental Value of Libertjfiand Rawls’ Anti-perfectionism
Let us finally explore the way in which Rawls’ instrumental view of liberty supports 
his anti-perfectionism more broadly, hi pure conceptual teims, Rawls agrees with 
MacCallum: the skeletal structure of an expression of freedom is best captured by the 
XYZ formula -  X is free from Y in order to do Z. I have already cast doubt over the 
adequacy of this position,'*'*'* paitly because it fails to appreciate the value that we 
place on being free to choose. Whilst we must distinguish between freedom and 
choice, and whilst choice is not sufficient for the existence of freedom (for I may be 
forced to choose), the value o f freedom derives fr om our desire to choose uncoerced 
and untlireatened. Therefore, freedom is valued inasmuch as it permits choice in a 
general sense, a point that is obscured by MacCallum’s argument. All the same, 
Rawls has a specific reason for abiding by MacCallum’s XYZ formula, namely, that 
he wants to portray freedom as a means to the pursuit of our puiposes. The component 
Z necessarily speaks of the instrumental value of freedom - it represents the positing 
of an end at which our freedom is being directed. Consequently, our freedom is 
valuable only insofar as Z is valuable.
Rawls’ focus on the instrumental value of freedom is necessary for two reasons: first, 
for the coherence of the original position; and second, for his articulation o f a strictly 
political liberalism. Let us deal with the first point. In the initial set-up of the original 
position, the promulgators look to secure social primary goods, defined as all-purpose 
means for the pursuit of purposes. According to Rawls, all rational persons whose
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primary interest is the satisfaction o f their ends desire social primary goods. Although 
such ends are multifarious and divergent, there are certain goods that are relevant to 
any plan of life. One such primary good is liberty. Hence, whatever one’s system of 
ends might be, liberty is an all-purpose means. Consequently, it is valuable in a purely 
instrumental sense. A more specific value cannot be attributed to liberty since the 
promulgators are unaware of their thick theory of the good and hence are unable to 
know whether they view liberty as being valuable in itself -  as those who believe in 
the intrinsic value of making a free choice would claim -  or valuable as a constitutive 
ingredient of another good, such %s autonomy. In this sense, Rawls affirms the 
instrumental value of liberty as a consequence of the limitations incumbent upon the 
promulgators under the veil of ignorance.
Nonetheless, this is an incomplete appraisal of Rawls’ reasons for casting freedom as 
instrumentally valuable. In order to understand this more fully, it is necessary to 
elaborate upon the concept of the rational good. According to Rawls, a man is happy 
when he is more or less successful in the pur suit of his rational plan of life. In other 
words, “the good is the satisfaction of rational desire.”'*'*^ Rationality is itself 
instrumentally conceived and hence is in no way associated with one true end; it is 
compatible with a plurality of disparate ends. As such, it is reasonable to assume that 
the individual’s rational plan of life may alter according to changing circumstances or 
feeling. It is this tendency to revise one’s conception of the good that supports the 
central value of freedom:
“As free persons, citizens recognise one another as having the moral power to have a 
conception of the good. This means that they do not view themselves as inevitably 
tied to the pursuit of the particular conception of the good and its final ends which 
they espouse at any given time. Instead, as citizens, they are regarded as, in general, 
capable of revising and changing this conception on reasonable and rational grounds. 
Thus it is held to be permissible for citizens to stand apart from conceptions of the 
good and to survey and assess their various final ends.”'^ '*^
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For Rawls, then, freedom is valuable not only because it allows for the rational 
pur suit of the good, but also because it allows for a revision of that good. To pursue 
one’s ends rationally is merely to establish appropriate means; it says nothing of the 
inalterability of those ends. Indeed, reasonable people can expect to alter their notion 
of the good across time, depending on contingent circumstance, shifting priorities, 
internal reflection and so on. I may dedicate all my energies and time to writing a 
great novel only to discover that it is human relationships that holds true value; and, 
in time, I may also reject this ideal, preferring to pursue a life of travel and adventure. 
The point is, our ends shift with ,|ime, place, and temper, and so our freedom is 
valuable inasmuch as it allows us to reassess the value of oui* projects.
This portrayal of a pluralistic rational good, defined in part by its revisability, speaks 
not only of the instrumental value of freedom, but also of an anti-perfectionist view of 
life more broadly. Perfectionists might argue that human fallibility is one reason to 
support a determinate vision of a common or objective good. In fact, the contraiy is 
true. That I do not comprehend an unchanging rationd good does not thereby justify 
imposing an unalterable ideal on me. In the first instance, how would we determine 
which vision of the good should be followed? As Rawls points out, it is a ‘given’ that 
there is a ‘plurality’ of ‘non-negotiable’ and ‘firmly-rooted’ comprehensive theories 
of the good.'*'*^  Reasonable people may disagree about the ultimate ends of life 
because our mutual powers of reason and judgement often diverge over questions of 
source, evidence, meaning and weight. Such disagreement is also entailed by the 
fragmentation and incommensurability of values. In making these claims, Rawls 
follows Nagel and Berlin.'*'***
The fact of reasonable pluralism underlies much of Rawls’ thinldng in Political 
Liberalism, which is centrally concerned with the following question: “How is it 
possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens 
who still remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines?” '*'*^ Rawls’ answer to this lies in his articulation of a freestanding political 
conception of justice that derives from an ‘overlapping consensus’, or ideas latent in a
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public culture. For Rawls, a political conception of justice is acceptable to people who 
nonetheless affirm very different philosophical and religious doctrine; even though 
such comprehensive views might be inconsistent with each other, they are compatible 
with political liberalism. This is partly because political liberalism does not derive 
from a comprehensive philosophical view, as found in Kant or Mill, but is grounded 
on values that are specifically applied to the basic stmcture of society. Political 
liberalism is confined to the political sphere -  it is concerned with the right, not the 
good.
We therefore find another reason for focussing on the instrumental value of liberty: it 
is invoked as a strictly political value that is not tied to a comprehensive philosophical 
view. This would not be the case if freedom were portrayed as being valuable in itself 
(as in Berlin), or valuable as a constituent component of some more basic good like 
autonomy (as in Raz) or individuality (as in Mill). This would render liberty a 
sectarian value and hence would become less acceptable to those whose 
comprehensive moral view is inconsistent with the intrinsic or constitutive value of 
freedom, such as those with strong religious views. Rawls’ argument for liberty 
therefore diverges from traditional defences at the point where liberty becomes 
attached to a comprehensive viewpoint - freedom can only be presented as a means to 
a comprehensive perspective, if  political liberalism is to obtain.
In order to demonstrate this, let us return to the idea of reasonable pluialism and its 
relation to the value of liberty. Consider the traditional argument, invoked since the 
Wars of Religion, that fr eedom of conscience and toleration sensibly accommodates 
divergent beliefs in contrast to the imposition of an overarching conception of the 
good. The argument runs as follows: even if there are compelling reasons to force a 
determinate vision of the good on individuals, its worth would be lost on those who 
disagreed with it. If I commit to a vision o f the good not because I understand its 
value, but because I fear the repercussions of not submitting to it, then the point of the 
good is beyond me. As such, the good -  if it is to have any worth at all - must be lived 
fr om the inside. Even though I may be wrong about my chosen ends -  they may be 
foolish or misguided - 1 am more likely than anyone else is to be able to ascertain my 
good; and anyway, I would rather be free to determine my own life (even if it goes 
badly), than allow another to deteimine it for me (even if it goes well).
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Notably, whilst this traditional argument for liberty and tolerance begins from the fact 
of divergent beliefs, it ultimately appeals to the intrinsic worth of autonomous choice, 
which is inconsistent with Rawls’ quest for a strictly political liberalism. In particular, 
the idea that a life characterised by mistake and regret is valuable simply because 
fi-eely chosen does not sit well with anti-perfectionist principles. Neither would the 
value of autonomy always be compatible with certain religious views. If Rawls is to 
derive a political liberalism, then, he must use a concept of liberty that is amenable to 
all reasonable comprehensive doctri#es.
For Rawls, the state should not impose a certain religious or philosophical ideal upon 
its citizens, including a specific view of the worth of a free or autonomous life. Yet, 
this does not mean, as Nozick argued, that the state should leave individuals alone, for 
better or worse. Rather, public funds should be distributed such that individuals are 
empowered in their pursuit of the good. Rawls favours measures that assures for all 
citizens “adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their liberties and 
opportunities.”'*^** This strong egalitarian perspective is manifest at the institutional 
level through equality of opportunity and through the difference principle. Again, it is 
important to point out that this is not an attempt to ‘pattern’ society. Rawls is clear 
that the use of public funds should not be distributed according to any perfectionist 
principle:
“The principles of justice do not permit subsidising universities and institutes, or 
opera and the theatre, on the grounds that these institutions are intrinsically 
valuable. Taxation for these purposes can be justified only as promoting directly or 
indirectly the social conditions that secure the equal liberties and...the long term 
interests of the least advantaged.”'*^ '
For Rawls, individuals should be provided with the basic goods that will enable them 
to pursue their subjectively derived conceptions of the good. This means a society 
must provide for the basic needs of its citizens: a ‘social minimum’ must be observed, 
which entails family allowances and benefits for the sick or unemployed, or some
Rawls, J., Political Liberalism, C olum bia U niversity Press, 1993, p.6
Rawls, J., A Theory o f Justice, Oxford University Press, 1971, p.332
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kind of negative income tax.'*^  ^ It also means that fair equality of opportunity should 
be upheld, meaning those of equal talent and motivation should have the same 
educational or cultural opportunities irrespective of their class, sex or race. In 
addition, there should be an attempt to secme the fair value of the political liberties 
through regulations that prevent ‘concentrations of power’ and encourage the ‘wide 
dispersal of propeify.’'*^  ^ Finally, there should be a general facilitation of private ends 
through the governance of the difference principle. This means there should be an 
equal distribution of wealth unless inequalities are to the benefit of the least well off. 
Rawls’ substantive prescriptions for #pcial policy can be summarised as follows:
a. Public financing of elections and ways of assuring the availability of public 
information on matters of public policy.
b. Fair equality of opportunity, especially in education and training.
c. A decent distribution of income and wealth: all citizens must be assured the all­
purpose means necessaiy for them to take intelligent and effective advantage of their 
basic freedoms. This does not merely entail provision for food, clothing, housing or 
other basic needs, but rather a system that ensures all the basic liberties are 
meaningfully held.
d. Social and economic policies that provide all citizens with an opportunity to work. 
Lacking a sense of long-term security and the opportunity to work is destructive of 
self-respect and generates social exclusion, which can lead to self-hatred, bitterness 
and resentment.
e. Basic health care assured to all citizens'*^ '*
For Rawls, the types of institutions that derive from the two principles of justice 
promote a ‘property owning democracy’. This, he tells us, is distinct from the idea of 
a welfare state, which only seeks to assist those who lose out through accident or 
misfortune by providing benefits such as imemployment compensation or medical 
care. Importantly, the welfare state is compatible with large and inheritable 
inequalities of wealth, yet such disparity undermines the fair value of the political 
liberties and offends against the difference principle. By contrast, a property owning 
democracy not only protects against misfortune and accident but it additionally
Ibid, p.275 
Ibid, p-277
Rawls, J., Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, Second Edition, 1996, p.lviii-lix
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empowers all citizens to manage their own affairs and to cooperate on a footing of 
mutual respect under ‘appropriately equal conditions’. This is achieved through a 
system of competitive markets and through the dispersal of ownership of wealth and 
capital.
In a property owning democracy, Rawls believes individuals will be empowered in 
their pursuit of the good. Individuals are not told how to live, but aie provided with 
the support that facilitates meaningful choice. Again, there is a great difference 
between the philosophy of a p ro p e ^  owning democracy and the principles of the 
welfare state. While the latter provides a safety net against misfortune, it also 
encouiages dependency and apathy; it provides a maternal comfort for those who are 
incapable of providing for their needs and accordingly diminishes the value of 
freedom and personal responsibility. The welfare state therefore fosters social and 
economic relations in which some are “servilely dependent on others.”'*^  ^ Rawlsian 
institutions go beyond the welfar e state: they must provide for basic needs (via some 
sort of social safety-net), but they also ensure fair opportunities in education and 
public life, and guarantee the fair value of political liberties. Individuals are 
encouraged to forge a life for themselves through cooperative interactions and 
competitive markets; they are made aware of the opportunities that are available to 
them, and yet the state is agnostic as to the value of those oppoifrmities.
Rawls may or may not be right to point the inadequacies of the traditional welfare 
state, yet he is too short on detail to make a persuasive case for his alternative. It may 
be that his conception of the property owning democracy is a response to pervasive 
criticisms of the difference principle. Much to the delight of reactionary forces, Rawls 
has difficulty in dealing with those who remain apathetic and idle in the face of 
empowering institutions. He maintains that considerations of moral desert should be 
eliminated from his theory of justice -  no one deserves his gieater natural capacity 
(which is an accident of birth), or the character that cultivates his abilities (since this 
is largely dependent on family and social circumstances). The problem is that Rawls 
implies that citizens can rightly expect their basic needs to be met without
Rawls, J., ‘Preface to the French Edition o f  A  Theory o f  Justice’, Collated Papers, Harvard University Press, 
1999, p.419-20; Rawls, J., Justice a Fairness: A Restatement, Harvard University Press, 2001, p. 139-40 
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contributing to their own welfai’e. Someone who chooses idleness can claim that it 
has been forced upon him by a combination of undeseiwed natural and social 
contingencies, in which case other citizens must work to support him. Yet, this 
conclusion would seem to go against om* basic intuitions about justice -  the idle 
should not be allowed to gain from the efforts of the industrious because normal 
human beings have a choice about whether they wish to work or not (or at least 
whether or not to apply effort). As Dworkin points out;
“Individuals should be relieved of ^ consequential responsibility for those unfortunate 
features of their situation that are brute bad luck, but not from those that should be 
seen as flowing from their own choices. If someone has been bom blind or without 
talents others have, that is his bad luck, and, so far as this can be managed, a just 
society would compensate him for that bad luck. But if he has fewer resources than 
other people now because he spent more on luxuries earlier, or because he chose not 
to work, or to work at less remunerative jobs than others chose, then his situation is 
the result of choice not luck, and he is not entitled to any compensation that would 
make up his present shortfall.”'*^^
In response to this criticism, Rawls accepts that those with a predilection for 
‘expensive wines and exotic dishes’ should not be subsidised by those who are 
satisfied with a diet of ‘milk, bread, and beans’. This is because as moral persons, 
citizens have some part in forming and cultivating their objectives and preferences. 
Hence, we must view citizens as being ‘responsible for their ends’ - in any particular 
situation, “those with less expensive tastes have presumably adjusted their likes and 
dislikes over the course of their lives to the income and wealth they could reasonably 
expect; and it is regarded as rmfair that they should now have less in order to spare 
others from the consequences of their lack of foresight or self-discipline.”'*^  ^ He 
builds upon this view in Political Liberalism - if one chooses idleness over work then 
one is not entitled to support by public frmds; individual citizens must be held partly 
responsible for their decisions and choices.'*^^ For Rawls, then, justice demands that 
those inequalities that unfairly affect citizens’ life chances should be ameliorated, 
while inequalities that arise fi'om life choices should be allowed. Unfortunately, it is
Dworkin, R., Sovereign Virtue, Harvard University Press, 2000, p.287
Rawls, J., ‘Social Unity and Primary Goods’, C olleted Papers, Hai'vard University Press, 1999, p.369 
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difficult to sustain this notion without fundamentally changing the difference 
principle. As Will Kymlicka points out, the difference principle does not distinguish 
between chosen and unchosen inequalities -  wliilst it mitigates the unjust effects of 
natui’al and social disadvantage, it also mitigates “the legitimate effects of personal 
choice and effort.”'*^** In other words, justice demands that we acknowledge the 
difference between chance and choice. This distinction will be pursued in the next 
chapter.
Conclusion
This chapter has surveyed Rawls’ conception of justice, with specific attention being 
paid to the argument for the priority of liberty. H.L.A. Hart pointed out the 
inadequacy of Rawls’ position on this matter, complaining that conflict between basic 
freedoms could not be settled if our only appeal was to the greatest liberty. 
Nonetheless, Rawls’ revised argument for the priority of liberty maintains that a 
scheme of basic libeifies can be prioritised by appealing to a conception of the person 
as rational and reasonable.
The virtue of Rawls’ endeavour' derives from liis formulation of a systematic 
understanding of justice from a jumble of egalitarian and libertarian intuitions. The 
central message that should be taken fiom his writing on liberty is that individuals 
ought to be reasonably supported in their pursuit of the good - hence his (admittedly 
imprecise) notion of the property owning democracy, which largely empowers 
individuals in effecting choices about their preferred ends. The Rawlsian society is not 
paternalistic in that it is agnostic about the good life; neither is it a conventional 
welfare state with its protective, sheltering instincts. Rather, it affords individuals the 
rights and liberties to live meaningful lives while providing against misfoi-tune; it 
commits to social institutions that are designed to maintain the fair value of political 
liberty. All o f these social prescriptions are admirable. Yet, Rawls’ ai'gument for the 
difference principle is weaker - its aim to regulate the distribution of wealth such that 
any disparities are to the benefit of the least well off is prima facie appealing, but it 
does not adequately accommodate the idea of personal responsibility.
Kymlicka, W ,, Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1990, p.75
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Section III -  The Ideal of Liberty
Social institutions greatly affect the capacity of citizens to take advantage of their 
basic freedoms. If institutions allow significant want, squalor, idleness, ignorance, or 
disease to go unchecked, the essential value of freedom will be undermined. The 
presence of such evils precludes individuals from making meaningful choices in the 
pursuit o f their purposes. The liberal state should, as fax' as possible, look to eliminate 
these burdens on individuals. Ignorance can be alleviated by education, disease by 
universal healthcaie. Want and squalor can be ameliorated by cultivating employment 
opportunities and by introducing some form of income support for the unemployed 
and disabled. Idleness can be overcome through public schemes designed to give 
people opportunities, whether educational, community based, or work related. To this 
extent, liberal institutions will roughly accord with Rawls’ recommendations for;
a. Fair equality of opportunity, especially in education and training.
b. A decent distribution of income and wealth; all'citizens must be assured the all­
purpose means necessary for them to take intelligent and effective advantage of their 
basic freedoms.
c. Social and economic policies that provide all citizens with an opportunity to work.
d. Basic health care assured to all citizens.'*^ ’*
Although these recommendations are broad, they are the type we need if citizens are 
to have the capacity to act on their conception of the good. The hope is that we can 
give a determinate account of what these social policies might entail. Three ideas will 
be advocated; A voucher-governed education system that ensmes equal opportunity 
(policy a); asset-based welfare in conjunction with market capitalism (policy b); 
proactive employment policy that rests upon the notion of reciprocity (policy c); and 
basic health care funded by general taxation (policy d). As a whole, I argue that social 
institutions should be designed to empower individuals in their pursuit of a conception 
of the good.
Rawls, J., Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, Second Edition, 1996, p.lviii-lix Rawls adds to this 
list the ‘Public financing o f  elections and ways o f  assuring the availability o f  public information on matters o f  
public policy’. However, I consider Rawls’ work on the value o f  the political liberties to be sufficiently detailed 
(discussed in the previous chapter) and have nothing to add to his commentary.
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Chapter 8 -  Freedom, Welfare and Responsibility
“A person’s well-being depends not only on himself. It also requires that the 
conditions which make his pursuits possible, and give them their meaning, obtain.”
-  Raz, ‘Duties of Well-Being’"“
Introduction: A Prescription for Freedom
This chapter deals with the econoMc and social institutions that ought to support 
egalitarian liberalism. It builds upon the argument that a system of basic freedoms 
ought to be made valuable by securing access to an array of social primary goods. It 
holds that social institutions ought to empower individuals in pursuit of their 
conception of the good. Three specific areas of social policy will be considered: 
economic institutions and the distribution of wealth, employment opportunities, and 
healthcare. More broadly, this chapter provides a liberal-egalitarian response to the 
realities of our current politics; it provides a manifesto for radical change; and it 
supports a commitment to individual freedom, fairness, reciprocity, and personal 
responsibility.
Markets, W ealth, and Freedom
Let us begin by considering the epigraph found at the beginning of this thesis: “No- 
one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of 
others, for each may seek happiness in whatever way he thinlcs fit, so long as he does 
not infringe upon the freedom of others to pursue a similar end which can be 
reconciled with the freedom of everyone else.”'*'’^  Here Kant implies that the morality 
of political freedom is characterised solely by negative obligations: so long as people 
live within the boundaries of the moral law, they should be left alone to do as they 
wish. My argument is different: formal freedoms are not sufficient for individuals to 
do as they wish -  social institutions must exist to enable individuals to take advantage 
of their freedoms. Hegel criticised Kant along these lines, as did Marx. Yet, in lodging
Raz, J., Ethics in the Public Domain, Clarendon Press, 1994
Kant, I., “On the Relationship of Theory to Practice in Political Right’, Kant’s Political Writings, 
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this complaint, both Hegel and Marx obscured the nature of freedom, and it became 
amenable to authoritarian designs. For this reason, my argument stays within the 
boundaries of negative liberty, which is properly defined as the opportunity to act 
without interference from others.
Still, if  we are to commit to a system of basic negative liberties (specified by the 
right), we must also commit to a system of distribution that suitably supports these 
liberties (through an adequate allocation of all-purpose means). O f all the modem 
theorists, John Rawls understands #iis best of all: he prescribes social institutions that 
allow people to talce advantage of their freedoms; he understands that the value of our 
liberty is to a lai’ge extent contingent upon personal resources like income or wealth; 
he acknowledges that unless efforts are made towards a more equitable distribution of 
material resources, a minority will be able to dominate the majority, particularly in the 
political arena. At the same time, parts of Rawls’ argument are problematic. In 
particular, his view of reciprocity as the basis of social cooperation is inconsistent 
with his second principle of justice (viz., inequalities in social and economic goods 
are only justified if they are to the benefit of the least advantaged). Rawls understands 
the idea of reciprocity in terms of the mutual obligations that arise from justice as 
fairness. In other words, all who are engaged in cooperation and who fulfil their 
obligations as the mles and procedures require are to benefit in an appropriate way.'’^ '* 
By implication, then, those who do not fulfil their obligations should not be entitled to 
the benefits generated by cooperation. Yet, the difference principle conflicts with this 
reasoning -  it supports the conditions of freedom at the expense of personal 
responsibility for choice and effort; it allows the idle to gain fiom the efforts of the 
industrious. This has the effect of eroding the reciprocity upon which Rawls places so 
much importance.
There are fiirther problems associated with the difference principle. First, it provides 
no criterion according to which we can determine which citizens belong to the worst 
off group: should it be the poorest third or the poorest tenth, for example? Both of 
these cut-off points are arbiti*ary, and yet are likely to have huge impact upon the way 
wealth is distributed in society (arbitrai'ily favouring one section o f society over
Rawls, J., Political Liberalism, Colum bia U niversity Press, 1993, p. 16
Dworkin, R., Sovereign Virtue, Harvard University Press, 2000 , p.330
192
another). Moreover, the difference principle attends only to the position of those with 
fewest primary goods, irrespective of how this impacts on those who have more. Yet, 
as Dworkin points out, it seems unfair “wholly to ignore the impact of a welfare 
scheme on people who are not in the worst off gi’oup.”"^ ^^ Thus, if  we are to establish a 
system of distribution that assures to all citizens the all-purpose means necessary for 
them to take intelligent and effective advantage of their basic freedoms, then the 
difference principle is not the answer. We should not be bound by such a demanding 
code. We need a more flexible approach, which acknowledges the right to gain from 
personal industry and toil.
How should we proceed? I have argued that an egalitaiian distribution of wealth and 
income underpins a commitment to the worth of freedom. Yet, we must bear in mind 
that equality and libeily can conflict, and that a fairer distribution of wealth and 
income may require certain restrictions on economic freedom (to buy, sell and 
exchange as we please). In other words, there is a tension between leaving people 
alone (and paying respect to their liberty) and investing in social practices that aim to 
ensure the worth of liberty for all (which may involve restraining certain freedoms). 
A fair balance is difficult to strike, as Berlin recognised; “In their zeal to create social 
and economic conditions in which alone freedom is of genuine value, men tend to 
forget freedom itself.”''^  ^ With this in mind, I suggest the following strategy. Let us 
begin by affliining a system of distribution that upholds individual freedom and then 
ask how far this must be restrained in order to promote the fair value of libeity- More 
specifically, we should commence by affirming the freedoms and efficiency of the 
market, and then ask what social policies appropriately ensure that each person has 
the all-purpose means necessaiy for them to take intelligent and effective advantage 
of their basic freedoms within that context.
There are both normative and pragmatic reasons for favouring the market as the most 
desirable system of allocation. In the first instance, most commentators now accept 
the legitimacy of the mai’ket as the most effective means to generate wealth and 
economic growth.'^^^ Indeed, it is a widely respected truth in the discipline of
Ibid, p.331
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economics that a competitive market mechanism can achieve a type of efficiency that 
a centralised system cannot. This is because of the economy of information (each 
person acting in the market does not have to know very much) and because of the 
compatibility of incentives (each person’s prudent actions can merge nicely with 
those of others) Thus, the efficiency of the market is predicated upon the 
interaction of self-interested individuals acting in a way that best satisfies their 
requirements. That is to say, “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest. %.
Irrespective of the powerful economic reasons for supporting market mechanisms, it 
is a basic liberty to be able to exchange goods and services. Indeed, the primary 
reasons for which classical economists such as Adam Smith or David Ricardo (and 
later economists such as Hayek) favoured the free market was not simply that it was 
more efficient than other modes of production, but that it was an extension of freedom 
itself. This rationale for affirming the market mechanism is taken up by Sen. In a neat 
thought experiment, he imagines an omniscient dictator attempting to match the 
efficiency of the market through a centrally planned economy. Sen points out that 
even if the dictator achieved a reasonable degree of economic efficiency, something 
extremely valuable would be lost on the way, namely, ‘The freedom of people to act 
as they like in deciding on where to work, what to produce, what to consume, and so 
on.”'^ ^^  Thus, there are both moral and prudential economic reasons for favouring the 
market.
The freedoms associated with market society are not only a powerful antidote to the 
centrally organised labour of socialist dictatorships; they also act as beacons of hope 
for those who are enslaved or bonded by feudal ties. There are still many developing 
countries in which people are tied to the land. This propagates, among other evils, 
child labour and female subjugation.'^^^ Capitalism might generate injustice, but even 
Marx recognised that it also liberates, in the sense that it allows one to voluntarily sell 
one’s labour (as opposed to slavery, which forces one to laboui). The question, then,
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is not whether the free market should be supported, but to what extent it should be 
supported. As Sen surmises:
“The market mechanism...is a basic arrangement through which people can interact 
with each other and undertake mutually advantageous activities. In this light, it is 
very hard indeed to see how any reasonable critic could be against the market 
mechanism, as such. The problems that arise spring typically from other 
sources...[such as] unconstrained concealment of information or unregulated use of 
activities that allow the powerful to capitalise on their asymmetrical advantage. These 
have to be dealt with not by suppressing the markets, but by allowing them to 
function better and with gieater fairness, and with adequate supplementation. The 
overall achievements of the market are deeply contingent on political and social 
arrangements.”'*^^
Thus, if we are looking for the institutional conditions in which people can take 
advantage of their fr eedoms, then we must establish how far free market principles 
should be compromised in order to provide people with the appropriate all-purpose 
means to their self-chosen ends. What is not in question is the fact that the market 
offers a system of disfribution that both respects individual freedom and fosters 
economic growth.
Still, it is an open question as to what mix should obtain between free market forces 
and benign social engineering. According to Sen, the appropriate role and reach of 
markets cannot be predetermined on the basis of some grand, general formula either 
in favour of placing eveiything under the market, or of denying eveiything to the 
market. Rather, we need to apply critical scrutiny to the efficiency of markets, to 
establish when they work in our interests and when inteiventionist approaches are 
required. The wholehearted liberalisation of markets will inevitably produce many 
casualties, unless it is supported by comprehensive state education, social security 
guarantees, social opportunity, considerations of equity, and so on. On the other hand, 
overly fussy state inteivention will stifle growth, efficiency and the generation of 
wealth. As with many aspects of life, a balance is desirable. What institutions are 
conducive to this balance? Pure capitalism establishes what should be produced, how
Ibid, p. 142
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it should be produced, and for whom it should be produced. Yet, the market 
mechanism is silent on the question of social justice; it does not consider the need to 
disüibute wealth so as to improve the worth of freedom for the worst off. Thus, we 
need to consider how an equitable distribution of wealth witliin a capitalist context 
might be achieved. One answer lies in the diffusion of capital assets.
Asset-based W elfare and the Property Owning Democracy
Rather late in the day, Rawls bega% to talk about the concept of a property owning 
democracy. Although his exploration of this idea was limited, he clearly suggests that 
a stable and well-ordered society should promote the diffusion of capital assets, such 
that material wealth and hence power does not accumulate in the hands of the few: 
“the aim is to encourage a wide and far more equal dispersion of real property and 
productive assets.”'^ '^^  This is to be achieved through the regulation of bequest and 
restriction o f inheritance. Not only would this ensure the fair value of the political 
liberties, it would also provide citizens with the general means to take advantage of 
their civil liberties (and hence allow them to act upon a determinate conception of the 
good)."^ ^  ^A more equitable distribution of wealth is therefore a key component of the 
property-owning democracy: “Institutions must, from the outset, put in the hands of 
citizens generally, and not only of a few, sufficient productive means for them to be 
fully cooperating members of society on a footing of equaiity.”"^ ^^
In a recent article, Samuel Brittan gives this idea greater credence."^^  ^ He points out 
that differences in personal wealth are far greater than differences in income. This 
should give us reason for disquiet: extreme inequalities in the ownership of capital are 
undesirable quite apart from any inequalities of income which they might imply. In 
normal circumstances, a person with capital investments has a sense of secmity and 
independence; she can rely on her investment when other sources of income 
disappear. By contrast, in times of hardship, the propertyless person has only the state 
or the benevolence of her peers to fall back on.'^ ^^  It therefore malces little sense to
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impose punishing tax regimes on high-income earners since the amount earned in 
salaries is trivial compared to the wealth passed on at death and through the 
movement of capital.
The radical solution to economic inequalities is to redistribute wealth, not income. An 
appropriate dispersal of wealth can potentially be achieved through asset-based 
welfare: the distribution of a significant one-off sum of money to all members of 
society at the beginning of their adult lives, to be used for their broader purposes, 
however conceived. The thinking behind asset-based welfare embraces capitalism as 
a means to generate wealth for all, in contrast to the exploitative beast that Marx 
believed he had exposed. Indeed, Mai'x’s diagnosis that capitalism is inherently unfair 
because the bourgeoisie are able to extract surplus value from their capital assets is 
confused: “The trouble with capital assets and investment income is not that they 
exist but that too few of us have them.” With this in mind, Brittan suggests that 
western countries are now affluent enough to spread some of the benefits of property 
ownership to all their inhabitants rather than relying on “inheritance or the luck of the 
draw alone.”
The idea of creating a more diffuse spread of assets was originally propagated in the 
UK by the political right. One strategy was to privatise state-owned assets; citizens 
were given the opportunity to buy shaics at below market prices. Although this 
initially created a large increase in the number of shareowners in the UK, the new 
capitalists were mostly quick to sell their shares. Alternative schemes were more 
successful: Under Thatcher, council houses were sold off at heavily discounted prices, 
introducing tenants to capital investments. This was tire UK’s first step towards a 
property owning democracy. Still, the significance o f this transformation can be 
overstated. For one, the poorest members of society could not afford to buy their 
council houses and hence were unable to make the leap to the property market. 
Moreover, home ownership does not readily produce an investment income, unless 
one ‘trades down’ and reaps the profit of a house sale. Although houses are certainly 
capital investments, they are essentially built to live in."^ ^^  More recognisable asset-
Brittan, S., ‘Assets for AH’, Prospect, August 2003, p.24 
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based schemes have recently been implemented in the UK. In his last budget, Gordon 
Brown committed the government to funding a child trust fimd. Each new bom infant 
should be provided with a small capital sum - £500 for the poorest third o f families, 
£250 for the rest -  to be invested in the financial markets and from which bearers 
shall be free to draw at the age o f eighteen. The treasury has suggested that, with 
modest contributions from the exchequer at a later stage, the capital investment will 
be worth around £1,600 when it matures.
Thinking on the distribution of capilal assets currently transcends the political reality. 
In a recent publication, the Fabian Society recommends a scheme that entitles 
everyone to a one-off grant of £10,000 upon reaching the age of eighteen."^^  ^The cost 
of £6.5bn per year, which would be required to fund the scheme, would be found by 
transforming the way in which wealth is passed on through inheritance. Even more 
radical is the scheme promoted by Ackennan and Alstott, who recommend a payment 
of $80,000 to each US citizen at the beginning of their adult life. This sum is 
sufficient to provide citizens with a cushion against, market shocks and provides a 
means of investing in their futme. Recipients can use this money ‘for any purpose 
they choose’, although stakeholders have a responsibility to repay the money upon 
death, at least where this is financially possible. The scheme as a whole would be 
funded by an annual 2 percent tax on the nation’s wealth."^^^
Four main benefits might be identified in relation to asset-based welfare. First, a more 
equal overall distribution of wealth is generated, and in particular among young 
adults. Capitalism is excellent at generating wealth, but this wealth primarily rests 
with those who are already affluent; the effects of wealth ‘trickling down’ might help 
some, but others are left without any kind of material gain. By contrast, the 
distribution of a significant one-off sum of money to all members of society at the 
beginning of their adult lives would go some of the way towar ds Rawls’ demand for a 
fairer distribution of income and wealth. Second, asset-based welfare generates 
progressive incentives to accmnulate capital; it familiarises citizens with financial 
markets and provides them with a means to purchase private property. It therefore 
gives recipients a measure of economic independence, which allows for a sense of
Nissan, D., Le Grand, J., C apital Idea: Start-up Grants fo r  Young People, The Fabian Society, Feb 2000  
Ackerman, B., Alstott, A,, The Stalceholder Society, Yale University Press, 1999
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personal autonomy and self-respect.'^**'  ^ It thus takes us closer to Rawls’ ideal of the 
property-owning democracy. Third, asset-based welfare means people are equitably 
supported in their pursuit of a determinate conception of the good, hnportantly, 
investments will mature when recipients are still young enough to use the wealth in a 
way that promotes their conception of the good (unlike retirement pensions, say). 
Some recipients might choose to fund a university education; some might choose to 
travel. Others might invest the money in a house or in the stock exchange; others 
again might launch a business venture. The important point is that young adults are 
empowered in making life-shaping decisions at a time in their lives when they might 
otherwise have been economically impoverished and hence forced into short-term 
compromises (e.g. taking a job that pays tolerably in the short-term instead of 
studying for a degree that promises long-teim benefits).'*^^ Fourth, asset-based welfare 
encourages individuals to become responsible for their choices. Gifted with a large 
sum of money, it is up to recipients to decide whether to spend or invest their asset. 
However the sum is used, recipients must take responsibility for their choices: “their 
triumphs and blunders are their own.”'*^  ^ Asset-based welfare therefore succeeds 
where Rawls’ difference principle fails: it rewards the canny and penalizes the self- 
indulgent. Asset-based welfare asserts the right of each person to make the most of his 
or her opportunities, without having to make concessions to those who have acted 
differently in their choices.
Of course, the flip side of this is that asset-based welfare does not protect citizens 
against their own imprudence. The idea of an equitable distribution of assets works on 
the assumption that people will invest wisely, making some kind of lasting 
contribution to their future well-being. Flowever, we know that people do not always 
make sensible decisions, especially, perhaps, in young adulthood. Indeed, while 
Ackennan and Alstott argue that recipients can use their asset ‘for any pmpose they 
choose’ (to start a business or pay for more education, to buy a house or raise a family 
or save for the future) they fear that some people will hitter their money away on 
‘drugs and decadence
Rawls, J„ Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1993, p.298 
Ackerman, B., Alstott, A., The Stakeholder Society, Yale University Press, 1999, p.35 
Ibid, p.5
Other people -  the profoundly mentally disabled -  will be unable to manage their assets on their own
199
Given this opportunity for ruin, the temptation might be to place the administration of 
the scheme under some form of external bureaucratic control. Ackerman and Alstott 
recommend paternalistic safeguards; full control of their proposed $80,000 
stakeholding should be conditional upon high school graduation, a test by which 
recipients can demonstrate their ‘self-discipline’.'*^  ^For those who fail to graduate, a 
sum of $4,000 would be released each year over the course o f twenty years, unless the 
recipients wished to make a large capital investment, such as buying a house. 
Moreover, high school classes on ‘How to Manage Your Stake’ would be 
mandatory.'*^^ Even for those w h f succeed at high school, the scheme would be 
administered tlirough fom* graduated payments of $20,000 every two years from the 
age of twenty-one.
From the anti-perfectionist perspective that I have defended, the administration of the 
Ackerman Alstott scheme is overly paternalistic. We should certainly encourage 
citizens to think about their assets and promote wise investment, yet wresting control 
of assets out of the hands of citizens is entirely counter-productive. Moreover, high 
school dropouts will be radically disempowered; they will be unfairly stigmatised; 
they will lose their financial autonomy; they will effectively be forbidden the 
opportunity to use their assets to accumulate wealth; and they will be constantly 
reminded of their incompetence as citizens. This offends against the equal moral 
worth of all persons and against the notion of reciprocity. Yet, most importantly, it 
denies that which should be encouraged: individual responsibility for one’s choices.
In contrast to this recommendation for limited bureaucratic control, Samuel Brittan 
takes an anti-patemalistic line; if some people wish to use their assets in order to ‘opt 
out of the rat race for while’ or to ‘enjoy an extra bit of leisure or riotous living’, then 
so be it; only, they must live with their decision.'*^** By this argument, we should be 
waiy of attaching overly paternalistic conditions to asset-based welfare, since this 
could potentially undermine the very reasons for implementing the scheme in the first 
place -  to empower individuals in the pursuit of their purposes. This notion is more in 
keeping with the anti-perfectionist, empowering society envisaged by Rawls.
Ackerman, B., Alstott, A., The Stakeholder Society, Yale University Press, 1999, p.9 
Ibid, p.37
Brittan, S., ‘Assets for AH’, Prospect, August 2003, p.24
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However we decide on the specifics of administration, a more diffuse spread of 
capital assets is undoubtedly required if we are to facilitate citizens’ pursuit of the 
good on a fairer basis. The aforementioned schemes represent a radical solution to the 
concentration of wealth and should therefore be commended in principle. 
Nonetheless, even if  we look to spread capital assets more fairly, some members of 
society will continue to struggle, perhaps having lost their assets through addiction, 
fraud, folly, or brute bad luck. To this extent, asset-based welfare is not sufficient for 
all citizens to be assured the all-pmfîpse means necessaiy for them to take intelligent 
and effective advantage of their basic freedoms. This also requires some form of 
social security.
Unconditional Income Guarantee (Why Should I Subsidise You?)
An unconditional income guarantee ensures that every citizen receives regular 
monetary instalments from the state, irrespective of their occupational or marital 
status, and inespective of their ability or eagerness to work. Such a scheme, advocates 
claim, would minimally allow each person to pursue a vision of the good, it would 
provide financial support during unemployment, it would redistribute income from 
men to women, and it would give extra support to those in poorly paid jobs.'*^* 
However, such a proposal is immediately placed on a defensive footing by two 
powerful criticisms.
First, if a basic income were afforded to all, iirespective of income or eai'nings from 
other sources, then payment would be delivered to those who do not need it, at the 
expense of those who do. Means testing, by contrast, dispenses benefits according to 
financial need, reduces overall spending and ensures that the limited resources in 
public coffers are directed to citizens in the direst circumstances.'*^^ In other words, 
there is a strong case to be made for selective welfare payments rather than universal 
provision.
Van Parijs, P., ‘Why Surfers should be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic Income’, Philosophy  
and Public Affairs, 1991, p .102
Gilbert, N., Transformation o f  the Welfare State, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 136
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Second, the idea that all people should be adequately empowered in their pursuit of 
the good inespective of whether they contiibute to the production of personal wealth 
is an impracticable social ethic. We tend to think it is unfair that the indolent should 
be allowed to gain from the industrious, ceteris paribus. This partly derives, it would 
seem, from our evolutionary development. In his excellent study of human nature and 
genetics, Steven Pinker suggests that social altruism (in contrast to nepotistic 
altruism) in human beings has evolved on the back of reciprocal exchange o f favours, 
where organisms confer large benefits on others at small costs to themselves and 
where others are impelled to recipr(%ate accordingly: “social generosity comes from a 
complex suite of thoughts and emotions rooted in the logic of reciprocity"' hi other 
words, human beings are unlikely to concede goods to strangers unless there is a 
commitment on the part of the recipients to reciprocate. Taxpayers aie consequently 
unlikely to support a practice in which some receive a non-contributory income from 
the state (at taxpayers’ expense).
In spite of these objections, Philippe van Parijs provides sustained argument in favour 
of the unconditional income guarantee, claiming - among much else - that it is 
superior to asset-based welfare. He argues that all citizens should have a grant paid to 
them, irrespective of their occupational or marital status, and irrespective of their 
ability or eagerness to work. What is more, he argues not only for a minimal income -  
enough, say, to satisfy basic needs -  but ‘a veiy substantial basic income’.'*^ '* This is 
because any defensible conception of liberal justice ought to be concerned with 
maximising the ‘real freedom’ of those with the least all-purpose means. An 
unconditional income guarantee would maximise the capacity of the worst-off citizens 
to realise their conception of the good.
In order to give his idea credence, Parijs imagines two people. Crazy and Lazy, who 
have identical natural talents but who are differently disposed towards work. Crazy is 
keen to earn a high income and will work tirelessly for that reason. Lazy, by contrast, 
is content with a low income and prefers not to exert himself. According to Parijs, a 
minimum income guarantee would satisfy both of their conceptions of the good:
Pinker, S., The Blank Slate, Penguin Books, 2002, p.255
Van Parijs, P., ‘Why Surfers should be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic Income’, Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, 1991, p. 102
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Crazy could work any amount to supplement his basic income, while Lazy would gain 
a modest income without having to tire himself. Of course, this arrangement might be 
held to be unjust: since both parties have equal talent it is unfair that Crazy should be 
forced to redistribute the fruits of his labour to support the basic income of Lazy. 
Parijs looks to overcome this powerful objection by drawing upon Dworkin’s idea of 
equal resources. He imagines that Crazy and Lazy are given an equally sized patch of 
land, to do with as they please. Now, given their respective conceptions of the good, 
Crazy is dissatisfied that his labour is restricted to his share of the land, while Lazy 
has been granted land that he does^ gipiot wish to use. Hence, neither maximises their 
real freedom. A better arrangement, Parijs thinks, would be for Lazy to concede his 
land to Crazy in exchange for an income: “If Lazy gives up the whole of his plot of 
land, he is entitled to an unconditional grant at a level that corresponds to the value of 
that plot.” This type of argument, Parijs suggests, can ground an argument for an 
unconditional basic income.
However, tliis argument fails to demonstrate that an income guarantee ought to be 
delivered at a ‘very substantial’ level in the real world. Parijs tackles this issue by 
suggesting that jobs should be thought of as assets, the value of which ought to be 
distributed equally among all citizens. To this end, ‘employment rents’ will be used to 
swell the basic income.'*^^ This is justified because some people are involuntarily 
unemployed. Yet, Parijs’ argument is wholly unpersuasive in this regard. He 
acknowledges but does not fully account for the problems his theory of distributive 
justice would have in relation to economics; it is likely that a ‘very substantial’ 
unconditional income guarantee would implode having destroyed the economic 
incentive to work. What is more, his scheme is altogether alien to our intuitions about 
desert. For instance, he claims that the voluntarily unemployed ought to be entitled to 
the same generous income guarantee than the involuntarily unemployed receive (even 
though the former evidently do not think of jobs as ‘assets’). This is because the 
liberal state cannot be seen to privilege one vision of the good life (work-based or 
leisure-based) over another.'*^  ^This, of course, is liberal neutrality gone mad.
Ibid, p. 112
Van Parijs, P., Real Freedom For All, Clarendon Press, 1995, p, 108-9 
Van Parijs, P., Real Freedom For All, Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 109
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The idea of asset-based welfare is far superior to Parijs’ scheme. Although the idea of 
equal resources supports both, only the former requires citizens to take responsibility 
for their choices. Consider my earlier recommendation that each citizen be given a 
significant one-off grant upon reaching adulthood. Now, it is conceivable that a 
recipient predisposed to surfing might decide to live off this grant for a number of 
year s without attempting to invest or work. This might give the surfer ten years of life 
by the beach (perhaps slightly more if part of the money is invested). To my mind, 
this would not be unjust. From a position of initial equality, the money is spent in 
accordance with the surfer’s con^ption of the good. Yet, what if  we were to 
guarantee the surfer a lifetime o f easy living through regular income payments? Parijs 
reckons this scheme is superior to asset-based welfare given that the latter allows 
citizens to squander their stakeholding: “A mildly paternalistic concern for people’s 
real fi*eedom throughout their lives, not just ‘at the start’, makes it sensible to hand out 
the basic income in the form of a regular- stream.” Yet, paternalistic concerns about 
citizens’ welfare, however noble or well intentioned, can only lead to the reduction of 
freedom. Moreover, an unconditional guarantee provides an income irrespective of 
the choices individuals make in their lives and hence undermines personal 
responsibility. In doing so, the policy offends against the idea of reciprocity (some 
people will be content to live off the industry of others) and creates a disincentive to 
work (since recipients know they will receive an income, come what may). The 
unconditional income guarantee can foster dependency in a way that is unlikely with 
the asset-based scheme.
Asset-based welfare upholds personal responsibility for choices in a way that the 
unconditional income guarantee does not. The asset-based scheme offers a one-off 
sum to be spent or invested as the recipient thinks appropriate; thereafter, recipients 
are responsible for the choices they make, for better or worse. In order to maintain the 
value of the original asset, the recipient has an incentive to remain productive and 
prudent: if a recipient invests wisely, she will reap the rewards of a good life. Of 
course, we aie not all productive and prudent, and some will lose their assets thiough 
a series of foolish or self-indulgent decisions. Others will be happy to allow their 
funds to diminish in accordance with their vision of the good. Either way, the
V a n  Parijs, P., Real Freedom For All, Clarendon Press, 1995, p.47
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recipient must live with the outcomes of their choices. If after a ten-year stint at the 
beach a surfer finds that his funds have disappeared, then he will be required to work 
for a living. It would be unfair to ask those who have acted prudently to continuously 
support the lifestyle of free spirits.
Nevertheless, critics might argue that the asset-based scheme is equally disloyal to the 
notion of reciprocity -  it looks to empower people in their pursuits, irrespective of the 
contributions they have made to their personal wealth. Here we must contest the 
charge. In the first instance, recipients ought to repay the initial sum at death (where 
this is financially feasible), at which point their wealth is no longer of use to them (by 
contrast, the unconditional income guarantee asks for nothing in return). Moreover, 
since recipients acquire their asset at the beginning of their adult life, they cannot be 
criticised for having not contributed to the benefit received: beneficiaries have had no 
real opportunity to work (by contrast, we can reasonably chastise recipients of an 
unconditional income guarantee who are content to live off the productivity of others).
Consequently the asset-based scheme, unlike the unconditional income guarantee, is 
compatible with Rawls’ idea of citizens co-operating over a complete life, taking 
responsibility for their ends. Rawls’ later work is suffused with terms that bespeak 
shared obligation: reciprocity, responsibility, mutuality, commitment, and
cooperation. These key concepts are either missing or stunted in Parijs’ argument, 
which ultimately undermines his ability to make certain key distinctions. He fails to 
distinguish between the voluntary and involuntary unemployed. He sees no moral 
difference between someone who is out of work and seeking employment and 
someone who has made a conscious decision to live off the benefits provided by 
others. We ordinarily distinguish between the voluntary and involuntary unemployed 
because without it we would offend against the principle of reciprocity -  that society 
should administer a fair distribution of benefits and burdens. One certainly should 
have the option to opt out of the reciprocal agreement, but only if one also accepts the 
consequences.
Yet a central problem remains unresolved. Some citizens will squander their 
stakeholding and, notwithstanding another income source, face destitution. We have 
already discounted an unconditional income guarantee as a means to protect those
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who have lost their stakeholding. Should we therefore leave the imprudent, reckless, 
self-indulgent and idle to fend for themselves? This notion is discussed below.
Fighting the New Right: A Defence of Unemployment Compensation
Those who identify with the New Right, argue against intervention in the labour 
markets. They tell us that it is best to leave each citizen alone to find a job on his or 
her own terms. The labour market ought to clear like any other; we cannot be 
sentimental about those who are p/ild poorly or work in dangerous jobs. This way, 
they claim, we can avoid the problem of dependency. If a person wishes to dedicate 
his life to surfing, at the very least he will have to work part-time to support himself. 
This strategy embraces the value of self-help, industry, prudence, and personal 
responsibility.
The New Right agenda objects to unemployment compensation at both a normative 
and practical level. At the normative level, the objection goes, a welfare state 
supported by general taxation imposes a condition of forced labour upon those who 
fund the welfare system. When a government talces from me in taxation, it is 
effectively forcing me to work for the good of another person. Yet, this argument is 
unpersuasive: a laissez-faire approach places undue burdens on the involuntaiy 
unemployed and allows those with wealth and income to dominate those with less.'*^  ^
More importantly, it erodes the essential value of the political and civil liberties. If 
unemployment is not compensated for by the state, then a certain section of society 
will be condemned to poverty; and, more often than not, these evils render one 
incapable of advancing one’s determinate conception of the good, and erodes one’s 
influence in the political sphere, thus offending against the very reasons that we have 
for valuing liberty in the first instance.
Still, at a practical level, proponents of laissez-faire point to the huge fiscal burden of 
welfare costs and to the undesirable economic and social consequences this can 
generate -  there is, they claim, a pragmatic reason to limit the tax and spend strategy. 
They point to generous levels of unemployment compensation provided in European
R aw ls, J., Political Liberalism, Paperback Edition, Colum bia U niversity Press, 1996, p .lix
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comitries like Germany and France and to their high levels of unemployment. They 
point to figures that suggest almost a third of the unemployed in these countries have 
been out of work for over a year.^ **** There is, then, an undoubted economic reason to 
pursue policy that delivers lower unemployment rates, even if it means reducing the 
levels of benefits and applying conditions to them. This thinking has driven a social 
policy agenda that aims to deliver economic conditions in which people can earn an 
income through employment. Indeed, this policy is increasingly being pursued in 
western democracies. As Gilbert points out: “Stretching across the political spectrum 
from Sweden to the United States,%g)olicies to activate the unemployed have created 
new incentives and strong pressures for welfare beneficiaries to find work.”
Prominent thinkers on the left have sensibly assimilated this argument into their 
broader economic policies. Consider Sen’s argument that loss of work leads to 
‘capability poverty’. If we examine income levels in Europe and the US, it seems that 
the former does significantly better at restraining material inequalities -  the difference 
in income between the unemployed and the employed is far smaller in Europe. 
Nonetheless, unemployment of aromrd five percent in the US compares favourably 
with the ten percent or more in Europe.^®  ^ This level of unemployment has a greater 
impact on capability poverty in Europe because, as Sen points out:
“Unemployment is not merely a deficiency of income that can be made up through 
transfers by the state (at heavy fiscal cost that can itself be a veiy serious burden); it 
is also a source of far reaching debilitating effects on individual freedom, initiative 
and skills. Among its manifold effects, unemployment contributes to the ‘social 
exclusion’ of some groups, and it leads to losses of self-reliance, self-confidence 
and psychological and physical health.” ”^^
The scourge of unemployment, then, is not simply that it lowers income but that it can 
affect capability in more damaging ways. Unemployment must be considered broadly 
in terms of the various ends that it prevents us from achieving. Policy directives
Figui'cs taken from  G aiy  B eck er’s 1996 study o f  unem ploym ent rates in France and A m erica, 
quoted in Schmidtz, D., and Goodin, R., Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility, Cambridge University 
Press, 1998, p. 15
Gilbert, N., Transformation o f  the Welfare State, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.62 
^  Sen, A., Development as Freedom, Anchor Books, 2000, p.95 
Ibid, p.21
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designed to tackle unemployment will then promote the empowerment of the 
individual rather than encourage dependency. For Sen, “the creation of social 
opportunity makes a direct contribution to the expansion of human capabilities and 
quality of life.
A good employment policy will therefore look to get people off benefits and into 
work. This strategy empowers people in their pursuit of the good -  it focuses on 
personal responsibility, inclusion, and self-direction. Yet equally, in order to make use 
of the precious freedoms that people aie morally entitled to, employment policy 
should also be predicated upon social support and a systematic attempt to tackle the 
causes of unemployment. This suggests a policy of conditional imemployment 
compensation.
Conditional Unemployment Compensation
The idea of reciprocity is crucial to social justice. We cannot be content with a system 
that concedes all to the vulnerable and asks for nothing in return; yet, neither can we 
support a system that leaves everything to the individual. If an unemployed man is 
not prepared to take chai’ge of his situation and actively seek employment, then he 
evades his responsibility to those who provide him with benefits. Equally, if  we are 
not prepared to support the unemployed man in seeking employment, then we are 
evading our responsibility to him. Consequently, we might recommend the following 
unemployment policy:
1. The beneficiary who is out of work must be willing to accept a suitable job or 
undergo suitable training if offered. Failure to cooperate shall result in the 
reduction of benefits.
2. Benefits should be contingent upon the absence of other mechanisms of support 
and hence the beneficiaiy must pass a means test.
3. Benefits should be assessed relative to the circumstance of beneficiaries - whether 
they live in an expensive part of the country, whether they have dependents, 
whether they have a disability, and so on.
Sen, A ., Development as Freedom, A nchor B ooks, 2000 , p. 144
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4. Suitable provisions must be made available to the beneficiary in order to make 
the transition to work tenable; childcare, education, vocational training, 
counselling services, financial support, rehabilitation services, and so on.
These prescriptions are made on the assumption that people are better off in work than 
out of work - the latter is a central feature of social exclusion and has debilitating 
effects on the individual: low self-esteem, apathy, dependency, and depression.^**  ^
There is now virtually a consensus in western democracies that employment rather 
than welfare should be the focus of policy initiatives. The successful implementation 
of such policy is contingent upon securing economic conditions conducive to full 
employment and through a flexible employment agency designed to get the 
unemployed off benefits and into work. The latter must be responsive to the 
heterogeneous difficulties faced by the unemployed. Following recent thinking in the 
UK, different strategies might be discerned for: young unemployed people; long-term 
unemployed people; single parents; people with disabilities or long-term illnesses; and 
partners of the unemployed. The idea is that employment initiatives must adopt a 
flexible strategy based on the different needs of welfare recipients. The reasons that a 
blind man cannot find suitable work will typically differ from the problems faced by a 
single mother; a heroin addict will face employment difficulties radically different 
from those of a graduate.
Unemployed persons should be encouraged to apply for work that is consistent with 
their general abilities and qualifications, or be allowed to enter vocational or academic 
study in order to improve their marketable talents. A man with no qualifications (and 
who is not willing to undergo training) ought not to be supported if he laments that he 
cannot secure his preference for work on the international space station; if the 
beneficiary proves unwilling to set out realistic employment goals and hence 
demonstrates disregard for the principles o f reciprocity and mutuality, then there is a 
case to reduce his benefits accordingly. To this extent, unemployment benefit might 
be delivered via some kind of contract that identifies the rights and obligations of each 
party. The state would be required to provide employment opportunities, education
As Gîddens points out, the effects o f  unemployment me not limited to financial loss, devastating as these might 
be. Rather, unemployment can erode confidence, generate apathy, reduce social interaction, adversely affect 
personal identity and self-esteem, and eliminate diversity o f  opportunity. Giddens, Sociology, Second Edition, 
Polity Press, 1993, p.513
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and. financial and social support. The beneficiary would be required to accept a 
suitable job or undergo training. Failure to respect these obligations should result in 
the reduction of benefits.
Still, it might be asked how practical measuies that sanction mild coercion in order to 
get those on benefit into work can increase the value of freedom. Surely, by 
thi’eatening the reduction of state support, the individual is made less fi'ce. In one 
sense, this is correct. An opportunity that would otherwise exist (to stay on benefit 
without trying for employment) is r#led out. Moreover, if we are to appeal to an anti­
perfectionist conception of justice, we cannot say that a vision of the good that is 
grounded on the value of employment is inherently better than one that is la2y, 
without structure and directionless. Yet, attaching conditions to the receipt of benefit 
does not render a conception of justice perfectionist. As Rawls points out, society 
should administer a fair distribution of benefits and burdens: all who are engaged in 
cooperation and who fulfil their obligations as the rules and procedures require are to 
benefit in an appropriate way; those who do not fulfil their obligations should not be 
entitled to the benefits generated by cooperation.
At the same time, it is clear that not everyone is capable of work. We do not expect 
children to work, or adults with certain physical and mental disabilities, or adults who 
are required to care for dependents. Such people have no obligation to find 
employment and should be given income support. Other people in receipt of state 
support can be reasonably expected to work and yet choose not to. This might be 
because of motivational problems; it might be a result of a pathological disregard for 
the efforts o f others. Whatever reason is given, the efforts of the state to facilitate 
employment may well be in vain. What should be done in this circumstance? If our 
sole concern is with personal responsibility, we ought to let the slothful fend for 
themselves. Yet, as sentimental beings, we ought to have a minimum regard for the 
welfare of others, which is divorced from blame and expectation. As Sen argues:
“As reflective creatures, we have the ability to contemplate the lives of others. Our 
sense of responsibility need not relate only to the afflictions that our own behaviour 
may have caused (though that can be very important as well), but can also relate more
210
generally to the miseries that we see around us and that lie within our power to help 
remedy.
By this view, we should always provide for the basic needs of citizens (such as food, 
shelter and clothing). We have no obligation to support anything beyond this, but this 
minimum should at least be respected. That is to say; if, in spite of our efforts, a small 
minority are unable to function in line with the principles of reciprocity and mutuality, 
it would be unconscionable to allow this minority to sink into destitution and misery. 
No decent society should completely withdraw support from its citizens. This may or 
may not create dependency in a small minority of cases but alternative strategies elude 
us. As Rawls concedes, a residual underclass may very well be a result of “social 
conditions that we do not know how to change, or perhaps cannot even identify or 
understand.” When society faces this impasse, and when it has done eveiything else 
possible to empower individuals in their pursuit of the good, “it has at least taken 
seriously the idea of itself as a fair system of cooperation between its citizens as fi'ee 
and equal.
As a whole, then, several points of policy might be identified as flowing from our 
assumptions about the value of freedom and its relationship with employment policy 
and capitalist institutions. Briefly, employment policy must secure meaningful 
opportunities in the labour market. Where the market fails to clear, unemployment 
compensation should be conditional upon reciprocal contracts between state and 
beneficiaiy. The individual should be empowered in seeking and gaining employment 
(so long as the individual is capable of working) through an appropriate mix of 
financial support, support services and coercive obligations. This in turn will approach 
the goal of social inclusion, where each individual has a meaningful opportunity to 
work or study, and where, ultimately, each individual will be able to direct their lives 
in accordance with their conception of the good.
Sen, A., Development as Freedom, Anchor Books, 2000, p.283
Rawls, J., Justice a Fairness: A Restatement, Harvard University Press, 2001, p. 140
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Health Care
If employment policy crucially affects the ability of citizens to pursue their 
conception of the good, then healthcare is equally important. We cannot take 
advantage of our freedoms if we are plagued with illness and disease. Health is 
something without which the good becomes illusory. The point of healthcare policy, 
then, is to provide the support needed in order that individuals can live as fulfilling a 
life as possible. In what follows, I will argue for universal access to basic health care.
As Sen points out, there are certain goods that ought not to be left to market provision, 
one of which is healthcare (along with other goods, like epidemiology, policing, and 
environmental preservation).^**^ This is because the market produces casualties and 
hence is not amenable to the perfect provision of goods and services. That is not to 
say the market per se is morally odious -  imperfect provision does not matter so much 
in relation to consumption goods like apples or shirts. In the market place, we buy 
what we can afford, and if  we find silk shirts too expensive, then we settle for cotton. 
Health care is different; it is less about preference and more about need. Here, we 
cannot simply match oui' preferences to our means, as we do with consumer goods. If 
we need heart surgery, we cannot trade down or opt for a less expensive option. This 
provides us with an initial reason to identify the provision of healthcare as a special 
case.
Yet, Robert Nozick contests this assumption. He doubts that the provision of 
healthcare ought to be considered as a case apart from other goods. If a man decides 
to use his wealth in order to contract the services of a particularly skilled heai't 
surgeon, he ought to be allowed to do so, for this not only acknowledges the economic 
fi'cedom of the purchaser, it also respects the liberty of the provider to broker a 
maximally beneficial contract. Nozick recognises, of course, that medical caie is of 
fundamental importance to human well-being and that everyone has an interest in 
securing it, but he goes on to point out that people need food as well, although we do
Sen, A ., Development as Freedom, Anchor B ooks, 2 000 , p. 127-8
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not insist that the allocation of food be distributed on terms other than those of the 
market/**^
Crucially, however, the reason that we are content that food be allocated by market 
forces is that, by and large, most people have the ability to buy enough food to satisfy 
their nutritional needs. When people are unable to acquire food (whether through 
famine or poverty), we recognise that accepted rules of exchange should no longer 
apply -  we provide food (or the means to buy it) without asking for a return. Equally, 
if some people are unable to acquir%hasic healthcare when it is needed, then we deem 
the situation unfair or unjust. In other words, there is a moral obligation to ensure that 
basic healthcare is distributed fairly. For some to receive more, or better, or quicker 
medical attention on the grounds of an arbitrary qualification -  wealth, ethnicity, 
class, location, age -  is morally dubious. Our social and economic position should not 
determine our access to a good as important as healthcare. This is because we 
recognise that our health is a precondition of our pursuit of the good and so we all 
have an equal interest in receiving medical attention when ill.
What type of justification might we appeal to in order to generate the type of 
healthcare that suitably supports people in their pursuit of the good? One strategy 
might be to alter Rawls’ argument fiom the original position such that healthcare is 
included among the social primary goods. Yet, this approach presents immediate 
difficulties. As Kenneth A it o w  points out, if healthcaie was to be identified as a 
primary good, Rawls’ second principle of justice, which requires inequalities to work 
to the advantage of the worst-off, would potentially drain public resources in order to 
meet the needs of those with extreme health care needs. It would also complicate the 
second principle by forcing a trade-off between healthcaie and income and wealth, 
thus generating the type o f utility comparison that Rawls set out to avoid.^ ***
Moving away fiom a Rawlsian framework, we might proceed in a formal manner. 
Bernard Williams looks to justify equal access to healthcare on the basis of medical 
need:
 ^ ‘■'Nozick, ~R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Blackwell, 1974, p.233-4
Arrow, K., ‘Some ordinalist-utilitarian notes on Rawls’s theory o f  justice’ Journal o f  Philosophy, 1973
213
“Leaving aside preventive medicine, the proper ground of distribution of medical 
care is ill-health: this is a necessaiy truth. Now in veiy many societies, while ill 
health may work as a necessary condition of receiving treatment, it does not work as 
a sufficient condition, since such treatment costs money, and not all who are ill have 
the money ; hence the possession of sufficient money becomes in fact an additional 
necessaiy condition of actually receiving treatment. [This situation raises a further 
example of inequality]...not now in connexion with the inequality between the well 
and the ill, but in connexion with the inequality between the rich ill and the poor ill, 
since we have straightforwaidly the situation of those whose needs are the same not 
receiving the same tieatment, thoi!|h the needs are the ground of the treatment. This 
is an irrational state of affairs.” *^*
In spite of Williams’ honourable aspiration to eliminate personal wealth from the 
provision of healthcare, his argument contains several errors. First, there is the 
problem of moving fi'om an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’. Williams implies that need alone 
should be the basis for the provision of healthcare. Yet he manages this by moving 
from the necessaiy truth that healthcare is the treatment of ill-health to the normative 
conclusion that ill-health ought to be a sufficient condition for the provision of 
healthcare, thereby smuggling a value judgement into an ar gument that purports to be 
purely formal. Moreover, Williams’ argument fails to distinguish between essential 
and non-essential healthcare. A society should look to provide for the former, but to 
provide for all of the latter is economically inconceivable. If a nation devoted every 
possible resource to the medical needs of its citizens, it would have nothing left to 
spend on other important areas of social policy, such as education or income support. 
In other words, Williams’ prescription for healthcare provision does not recognise the 
fact of scarce resources.
Ronald Dworkin constmcts a better argument. He begins by conceding the 
impracticability of the rescue principle: not all the health tests and treatments that 
citizens might want arc affordable for a nation. Medical technology is now so 
expensive that a community which channelled every possible resource into healthcare 
would have nothing left to spend on other social goods (because of scarce resources).
Williams, B., ‘The Idea o f  Equality’, Equality: Selected Readings, Pojman, L., and Westmoreland, R., (eds.), 
Oxford University Press, 1997, p.97
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No sane society would try to meet this standard/*^ Yet, neither should we allow 
healthcare to be allocated on the free-market; it ought not to be left to the individual 
(or employers) to purchase health insurance. This would lead to something like the 
current US healthcare system, which Dworkin finds morally odious: “Forty million 
Americans have grossly inadequate medical coverage or none at all, and many who 
now have adequate insurance will lose it, because they will lose their jobs or develop 
a disease or condition that makes them uninsurable.” *^^  He concludes: “It is 
disgraceful that so prosperous a nation cannot guarantee even a decent minimum of 
health care to all those over whom exercises dominion.” *^'*
Why does Dworkin think we should not merely leave the individual alone to pmehase 
an appropriate level of healthcare insurance? In the first instance, we do not have 
equal resources; some people could afford a comprehensive insurance package while 
others could not even afford basic coverage. And while economic inequality is partly 
due to the choices individuals make in their lives (some people work and save hard, 
others live free and easy), it is also due to unchosen circumstances beyond our control 
(money bequeathed at birth, parental income, natui-al talent and so on). As such, 
people with less money are unjustly penalised in a system that requires us to fund our 
own healthcare insurance. However, even if equality of resources obtained, there 
would still be reason to provide healthcare collectively: in reality, we face unequal 
risks in relation to our health; we are not all equally likely to succumb to disease or 
injury. It is consequently unfair that a person blessed with good health can use his 
resources for leisure while another person that is hampered by poor health has to 
spend his resources on medical care. Thus, even if people had equal funds to purchase 
healthcare insurance, some would be unfairly penalised by their undeserved natural 
disadvantage.
How, then, should we proceed? Dworkin suggests we can work out what kind of 
medical coverage is appropriate by engaging in a thought experiment. He imagines a 
counter-factual world in which each person has equal resources and is of appropriate 
age and ability to malce a judgement about a desirable level of health insurance. These
Dworkin, R., Sovereign Virtue, Harvard University Press, 2000, p.309 
Ibid, p.307 
^'Hbid, p.318
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decision-makers have appropriate information about the costs and side effects of 
various medical procedures, although they are otherwise subject to a veil of ignorance 
about their prospective health. They only know that a certain proportion of them will 
develop disease or illness and must assume that each person is equally susceptible to 
this. They must therefore decide on an appropriate level of insurance, to be generated 
through compulsory taxation, which will protect them against misfortune. According 
to Dworkin, from this initial position of fairness, whatever amount a community 
agrees to spend on health care will be just, since it will be grounded on the well- 
informed choices of individuals. ï.
Dworkin argues that these coimterfactuals help us to decide what level of healthcare 
we should aim to provide in our own imperfect and unjust community. For instance, it 
would be irrational, he argues, for a young man to insure himself for life-sustaining 
treatment if  he falls into a permanent vegetative state -  the money spent on the 
insurance premium would be better spent on enhancing his actual conscious life. This 
claim might be enlarged to include Alzheimer’s disease and other forms of dementia. 
Whereas most people would like to ensure that they receive appropriate palliative 
care, they would not wish to insure themselves, say, for organ transplants or renal 
dialysis once dementia has set in. By contrast, most people would like to insure 
themselves for ordinary medical care, hospitalisation when necessary, prenatal and 
paediatric care, and regular checkups and other preventative me d i c i ne . ^ I t  is 
therefore reasonable to assume that anything less than this coverage is a consequence 
of the unfairness inherent in a society.
Dworkin’s ingenuity lies in the fact that he aims to derive universal health care 
principles from considerations of pmdential insurance coverage. He is also correct to 
marry our concern for equality of access in medical care with the reality of scarce 
resources. And while his recommendations are, on his own admission, debatable, his 
framework provides a platform from which we can consult public opinion and 
medical expertise as to what level of health coverage is desirable.
Dworkin, R., Sovereign Virtue, Harvard U niversity Press, 2000, p .3 15
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Barring this broader consultation, let us work with Dworkin’s proposals for 
mandatory health insurance; ordinary medical care, hospitalisation when necessary, 
emergency medicine, prenatal and paediatric care, and regular checkups and other 
preventative medicine. This scheme ought to be provided to all equally. It would 
ensure that key healthcare provisions are distributed on the basis of need and not 
according to arbitrary factors such as wealth, class, ethnicity, age, or location. The 
scheme would be paid for through mandatory taxation. Were specific individuals to 
judge the coverage insufficient, justice would allow individuals to purchase from their 
own funds any additional insuiant^, as required. For instance, particularly cautious 
individuals might wish to purchase an additional insurance package, which included 
physiotherapy or fertility treatment. In this circumstance, the provision of healthcare 
would derive from an agreement between private persons, private insurers and private 
providers. Indeed, vrith regard to non-essential medicine, moral objections to market 
allocation become less forceful.
Still, the implications of Dworkin’s conception of sopial justice do not always match 
his proposals for healthcare. His idea of justice is predicated upon discrimination 
between chance and choice. He coiTectly argues that one’s life chances should not be 
affected by unchosen circumstances but should be sensitive to one’s choices. Put 
another way, this means we should not be held accountable for our bad 'brute luck’, 
but that we should be responsible for our bad ‘option luck’, i.e. events which we 
could reasonably be expected to foresee and protect ourselves against. Relating this to 
healthcare, we might say that some medical conditions -  say, being diagnosed with a 
brain tumour, or being injured in an accident -  are instances of bmte bad luck. At 
other times, our ill health is partially contingent upon our choices: our decision to 
smoke in spite of the risk of lung cancer, or our decision to eat fried food despite the 
chances of acquiring hear t disease. In a rather brutal sense, then, people get what they 
deserve from their option luck. Yet, how, if at all, should option luck impact upon the 
provision of medical care? It might be argued - if we are to uphold the notion of 
personal responsibility -  that the lifestyle choices of a patient should be considered in 
determining whether treatment is given. Thus, the treatment of lung cancer for 
smokers should be conditional on their abstinence from smoking; the treatment of 
heart disease should be conditional upon beneficiaries eating more healthily; and so 
on. Yet, not only does this jar with Dworkin’s proposed collective insurance scheme
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(which requires that certain tests and procedures be unconditionally available), it also 
strikes us as a rather vindictive way to run healthcare. Indeed, where would oui* 
moralising end? Would we withhold treatment form those who acquired HIV after not 
taking adequate precautions? Would we refrain from treating a drug user who has 
taken an overdose? Our intuitions, it would seem, would have us divorce the 
provision of medical attention from moral judgements about a person’s responsibility 
for their medical condition, at least where devastating consequences follow fr om non- 
intei-vention. Yet Dworkin’s theoiy of justice is blind to this notion.
Conclusion
This chapter focused on the practical implications of the relationship between 
freedom, material goods and social institutions. The point of market society is to 
produce opportunities for wealth production and to allow individuals to act on their 
economic freedom. However, a laissez faire society produces significant casualties, 
and hence the capacity of many people to pursue a vision of the good is imdermined. 
The task, then, is to generate conditions in which people have a good chance to pursue 
their own ends without undermining personal responsibility or transgressing against 
basic freedoms. I argued this could be achieved through a mixed economy that 
fostered economic independence, and through social institutions that promoted 
personal responsibility and reciprocity. Specific policies that might facilitate this 
included asset-based welfare, unemployment benefit and universal basic health care.
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Chapter 9 -  Freedom and the Welfare of Others
‘‘A government might be established on the principle of benevolence towards the people, like 
that of a father towards his children. Under such a paternal government...the subjects, as 
immature children who cannot distinguish between what is truly useful or harmful to 
themselves, would be obliged to behave purely passively and to rely upon the judgement of 
the head of state as to how they ought to be happy, and upon his kindness in willing their 
happiness at all. Such a government is the greatest conceivable despotism.'’'’
- Kant, ‘On the Relationship of Theory to Practice in Political Right’
Introduction
Isaiah Berlin was convinced that paternalism, no matter how benevolent or cautious or 
rational, is infinitely patronising and degrading; it implies that men are too foolish or 
irresponsible to live by their own light. Indeed, Berlin goes as far as to describe 
paternalism as despotic, “not because it is more oppressive than nalced, brutal, 
unenlightened tyranny, nor merely because it ignores the transcendental reason 
embodied in me, but because it is an insult to my conception of myself as a human 
being, determined to make my own life in accordance with my own (not necessarily 
rational or benevolent) purposes, and, above all, entitled to be recognised as such by 
others.”^ F o r  all that, Berlin recognised there is a need for paternalism in certain 
circumstances.
This chapter is centrally concerned with the value of fr eedom in relation to thr ee areas 
of social life in which there is a genuine case to be made for paternalism: the 
education of children, the care of the mentally ill, and the prevention of suicide. As far 
as possible, I wish to uphold the value of freedom in each area. Briefly, I will look to 
support a pluralistic schooling system that is consistent with Rawls’ notion of political 
liberalism. I will defend the right of the mentally ill to determine the course of their 
own life. Finally, I will affirm the right to die, whether through suicide or assisted 
suicide: the opportunity to shape the cour se of one’s life includes, I argue, the right to 
control one’s death.
Kant, I., ‘On the Relationship o f  Theory to Practice in Political R ight’, K ant’s Political Writings, R eiss, H.,
(ed.), N isbet, H .B ., (trans.), Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1970, p .74
Berlin, I., ‘T w o Concepts o f  Liberty,’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford U niversity Press, 1969, p. 157
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Part I - Education
The idea of education as a social good is problematic in two senses. First, how can we 
educate children and engender the skills required for a good life without recourse to a 
comprehensive philosophical or religious doctrine? Second, how do we ensure, given 
the importance of education, that children have fair access to schools and colleges, 
irrespective o f wealth or social status? These are the two central issues that need to be 
addressed when we consider the necessary steps for children to be able to take 
intelligent and effective advantage of their basic freedoms upon reaching adulthood.
Education, Political Liberalism and the Good
Education, it would seem, is a means to enlightenment; it is the light by which 
individuals can navigate their pursuit of tire good. Yet, this being so, must education 
itself be coloured by a vision of the good? Should it aspire to truth and certainty, 
albeit of a sectarian nature? Or should it be agnostic on the larger questions of life? 
Depending on one’s view, sectarian education either respects the right of parents to 
have their childr en educated in accordance with their vision of the good, or else it is a 
frightful imposition of dogma and doctrine on immature minds. The problem is that 
the liberal state would seem to be sympathetic to both positions: it acknowledges a 
plurality of comprehensive doctrines and the right of citizens to advocate these 
doctrines; and yet it is duty-bound to foster the independent judgement and normal 
development of its citizens.
Ever since state-sponsored education was first promoted as a progressive social 
policy, liberals have tended to favour some form of compromise between sectarian 
education and children’s rights. J.S. Mill attempts to deal with this tension by 
sanctioning a plmalist education system that nonetheless protects the determinate 
interests of children. Mill begins by asserting the inalienable right of children to be 
treated as distinct beings: “A person should be free to do as he likes in his own 
concerns; but he ought not to be free to do as he likes in acting for another.”^^  ^ The 
implication here is that parents ought not to be able to raise children without
M ill, J.S., On Liberty, Oxford U niversity Press, 1998, p. 116
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consideration for their well-being; practices that are essentially to the child’s 
disadvantage must be prohibited. For instance, if a father looks only for the labour of 
his child, without consideration for the child’s imagination or intellect, then we might 
say that the child’s development has been harmed. “To bring a child into existence 
without a fair prospect o f.. .instruction and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both 
against the unfortunate offspring and against society.”  ^ To this extent. Mill insists 
that the state is justified in compelling parents to educate their children: “the state 
should require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of every human 
being who is bom its citizen.”^^  ^ 'L.
However, that is not to say Mill favour's the state as an appropriate authority to decide 
upon the instruction children should receive. If the state were to assume responsibility 
for education. Mill feai's the views of powerful elites would be imposed upon 
children, leading to ‘despotism of the mind’.^ ^^  As such, the state should leave it to 
parents to decide where and how their children aie educated; the state should merely 
compel parents to school their children and, in cases of impoverishment, offer 
financial support. This, Mill believes, is the most effective way of ensuring the full 
development of each person: “All that has been said of the importance of individuality 
of chai'acter, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same 
unspeakable importance, diversity of education. A general state education is a mere 
contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another.”^^  ^ Mill’s 
prescriptions are therefore radically pluralistic, sanctioning both religious and secular 
curricula: “There would be nothing to hinder them being taught religion, if their 
parents chose.”^^  ^ His only proviso is that children should be made to sit public 
examinations in literacy and the sciences in order that there are reliable standards of 
educational attainment.
Yet, there ai'c certain problems with Mill’s thesis. Although his general policies are 
sound enough, his reasoning cannot legitimate an education system in a modem 
liberal democracy chaiacterised by a plurality of comprehensive viewpoints. This is
p.117 
Ibid, p. 116 
Ibid, p. 117 
''Hbid.
Ibid, p.119
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because Mill’s argument is inspired by a sectarian ideal -  the reason that he favours a 
pluralist system derives from his interest in securing ‘individuality of character’ and 
‘diversity in opinions and modes of conduct’. In other words, his educational policies 
flow from a comprehensive view of the good rather than from considerations of the 
right. More shall be said on this later.
It also seems that Mill’s feai* of a uniform education system is unwarranted; he 
underplays the positive contribution such a system could make to the general welfare 
of children and overstates its homogenising effects. Moreover, his argument that a 
pluralist education system will avoid ‘despotism of the mind’ is not altogether 
convincing. If parents are free to educate their child in accordance with a 
fundamentalist view of religion, say, then certain scholarly virtues may be relegated 
or rejected by those in control of the curriculum. Obedience, confoimity and faith 
might be promoted at the expense of autonomy, inquisitiveness and critical thought. 
In extreme cases, then, religious education might lead to the ‘despotism of the mind’ 
that Mill feared only from a state education. Thus, Mill does not frilly consider the 
tension that exists between the liberty of paients to educate their child in accordance 
with their beliefs and the interests of children in receiving an education that fosters 
normal development, including the growth of their capacity for independent 
judgement. The question, then, is what balance should obtain between these factors.
William Galston concedes significant ginund to the right of pai*ents. The reason for 
this pertains in part to the intimacy of the relationship that normally obtains between 
paient and child. As Galston points out: “On average, parents understand their 
childien’s individual traits better than public authorities do, their concern for their 
children’s welfare is deeper, and they are not subject to the homogenizing imperatives 
of even the best bureaucracies in the modern state.”^^ '^  Thus, any education policy that 
ignores the views of parents offends against those who are normally best placed to 
defend a child’s welfare. Moreover, Galston suggests that the value of freedom of 
conscience extends to our desire to raise children in accordance vrith oui' deepest held 
beliefs: “we cannot detach our aspirations for our children from our understanding of
Galston, W .A ., Liberal Pluralism, Cambridge University Press, 2002 , p. 100
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what is good and virtuous.”^^  ^ At the very least, then, parents ought to be entitled to 
introduce their children to what they regar d as vital sources of meaning and value, and 
to hope that their children will come to share this orientation.
Yet, that is not to say Galston is polemical in his view of education. He maintains (as 
any liberal ought to) that parents cannot educate their children in a way that prevents 
them from pursuing a foreign or unwelcome conception of the good. Parents have no 
right to mould their children’s character in ^ way that precludes the children from 
making a decision to break with tfre traditions in which they were raised. As such, 
parents should not have complete control over their children’s education, for the 
deteiminate interests of children ar e not necessarily concomitant with the interests of 
parents. Indeed, parents may adversely affect a child’s development through neglect, 
abuse, or indoctrination. It is not umeasonable, then, to concede some power to the 
state in order to prevent these wr ongs.
Still, critics argue that Galston grants too much influepce to parents and, in par ticular, 
to the right of parents to educate their children in accordance with the practices of a 
traditional culture. For instance, Macedo criticises Galston for his view that a liberal 
education system should maximally accommodate diversity o f beliefs and practices, 
including those that challenge the central values of liberalism. To cite a well- 
rehearsed example, Galston advocates that parents living in the Amish community in 
the US ought to be allowed to pull their clirldren out of school aged only fourteen (in 
order to satisfy the religious tr aditions of the community), so long as this accords with 
the wish of the child. Yet, according to Macedo, this practice could “thwart children’s 
ability to make adequately informed decisions about how to live their lives. 
Indeed, it is a cormnon liberal complaint that Amish practices restrict children from 
making independent judgements, such that they are unable to pur sue a vision of the 
good from an array of viable alternatives. Whether or not this is true, the logic of 
exempting the Amish community fr om national standards may sanction more extreme 
educational practices. For instance, we might imagine a particular religious view 
which holds that girls should be educated to serve the needs of the home, that they
Ibid, p. 102
Macedo, S., ‘Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The case o f  God vs. John Rawls?’ John 
Rawls: Critical Assessments o f  Leading Political Philosophers, Volume IV; Political Liberalism and The Law o f 
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should be instructed in needlework and cookery, and that they should not be taught 
mathematics or language beyond that required for their role. If a parent holds this 
patriarchal view and attributes it to a religious belief, ought we to accommodate the 
parent’s desire to withdraw the child from state education?
Faced with the prospect of unregulated diversity (to the detriment of the child’s well­
being), many liberals prefer a child-centred approach to education, with an emphasis 
on critical thinking and autonomy. It is claimed that unless children are equipped with 
the intellectual tools with which tqAypothesise, criticise, and review, their adult lives 
will be hampered and stunted, devoid of intellectual imderstanding. By this view, 
autonomy is valuable because it allows one to determine the extent to which reasons 
justify certain beliefs, claims, or decisions. Its inculcation requires the teaching of 
certain intellectual virtues: an aspiration for truth, intellectual honesty, clarity, respect 
for evidence, and a willingness to enter rational discussion.^^^ Moreover, autonomy is 
valuable as a means to revising one’s conception of the good. Without an education 
that includes autonomy as a central aim, children will be unable to make rational 
judgements about the value of different ways of life. If we are to equip children with 
adequate skills to steer a comse through life, then we must nurture their autonomous 
capabilities when young by promoting open-mindedness, experiments in living, and 
tolerance.
The problem with this argument is that it relies on a comprehensive philosophical 
position. If we are to privilege the value of autonomy then the state provision of 
education loses its impartiality and becomes sectarian. The reason that liberals take so 
easily to this comprehensive perspective is that it is amenable to their conception of 
the good, broadly defined. Yet, we can imderstand the disquiet of religious 
fundamentalists and conservatives by considering how liberals would react to their 
children being taught values and ideas that are alien to the liberal worldview. If 
parents look to instil in then child the viitues of autonomous choice, critical reflection 
and scepticism of unsupported claims to truth, then they will contest a schooling 
system that promotes religious faith, deference and obedience to tradition. It seems.
5 27 Steutel, J., and Spiecker, B„ ‘Liberalism and Critical Thinking’, The Aims o f  Education, Maiples, R., (ed.), 
Routledge, 1999, p.62
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then, that liberal sensibilities must be watered down if  they are to be agreeable to all, 
or most, citizens.
This indeed is the central point that Rawls makes in Political Liberalism. A legitimate 
liberal society ought to be founded upon civic values that are consistent vrith a wide 
array of competing comprehensive perspectives. The state has no business promoting 
one sectarian view over adother, including those which claim to be liberal. Liberalism 
must be restricted to the political sphere;
■h
'i-
“The liberalisms of Kant and Mill may lead to requirements designed to foster the 
values of autonomy and individuality as ideals to govern much if not all of life. But 
political liberalism has a different aim and requires far less. It will ask that children’s 
education include such things as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights so 
that, for example, they know that libeity of conscience exists in their society and that 
apostasy is not a legal crime, all this to ensure that their continued membership when 
they come of age is not based simply ignorance of their basic rights or fear of 
punishment for offences that do not exist. Moreover, their education should also 
prepare them to be fully cooperating members of society and enable them to be self- 
supporting; it should also encourage the political virtues so that they want to honour 
the fair terms of social cooperation in their relations with the rest of society.”^^®
According to Rawls, although education ought to advance an array of civic ideals, it 
should stop short of promoting a comprehensive liberal view of the good: ‘the 
question of children’s education’ ought to be answered from ‘entirely within the 
political concep t i on . None t he l es s ,  the educational requirements of political 
liberalism remain controversial. Let us first consider the proviso that children are to 
be made aware of their civic rights and obligations. This policy will not be agreeable 
to all citizens. For instance, we can imagine a religious fundamentalist objecting to an 
education system that makes a point of giving information on citizens’ right to break 
with their cultural and religious traditions. By this view, instruction on civic rights 
will encourage a child to forsake their heritage and family values. Rawls himself 
concedes that his prescription for education may inadvertently lead to a stronger 
liberal position than is strictly required by political liberalism, although he maintains
Rawls, J., Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 199 
Ibid, p.200
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that we should not shy away from this: “the unavoidable consequences of reasonable 
requirements for children’s education may have to be accepted, often with regi*et.”^^  ^
Political liberalism holds that just as one has the right to follow a traditional lifestyle, 
one equally has the right to break with that tradition. Thus, education has a negative 
obligation not to foreclose either option, and a positive obligation to make children 
aware of their legal opportunities.
Rawls’ commitment to stop short of a comprehensive liberal perspective is further 
strained by his broader strategy t%, secure the conditions under which citizens can 
form, revise and rationally pursue a determinate conception of the good. According to 
Rawls, this requires the frill, deliberate and reasoned exercise of our intellectual and 
moral powers:
“This rationally affirmed relation between our deliberative reason and our way of life 
itself becomes pait of our determinate conception of the good... Thus, in addition to 
our beliefs being true, our actions right, and our ends good, we may also strive to 
appreciate why our beliefs are true, our actions right, and our ends good and suitable 
for us. As Mill would say, we may seek to make our conception of the good ‘our 
own’; we are not content to accept it ready-made from our society or social peers.”
Rawls is very carefril with his language here, noting only oui’ opportunity (rather than 
om- obligation) to critically examine our ends. Indeed, he goes on to say that “many 
persons may not examine their acquired beliefs and ends but take them on faith, or be 
satisfied that they are matters of custom and tradition. They are not to be criticised for 
this.”^^  ^ Nonetheless, Rawls faces severe difficulties in reconciling these outcomes. 
Our critical capacities aie not ready made; they are nurtured and developed by 
education. In other words, the agnosticism of political liberalism and its obligation to 
foster the development of citizens’ moral powers pulls its educational policy in 
different directions: the more room we leave in education for faith, acceptance and 
tradition, the more our critical capacity to revise and rationally pursue a determinate 
conception of the good will suffer.
Ibid, p.200
Rawls, J., Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1993, p.313 
Ibid, p.314
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Even if autonomy is not an essential component of a good life, it may still be 
necessary if citizens are to acquire the ‘political’ virtues of reciprocity, tolerance, and 
reasonableness. Citizens must recognise that the ‘burdens of judgement’ render their 
own ‘comprehensive’ position inappropriate for argument in a political sphere 
characterised by reasonable pluralism. As Eamonn Callan points out, this potentially 
imposes educational requirements on children that are tantamount to the promotion of 
autonomy; the capacity to accept the reasonableness of comprehensive philosophical 
or religious positions opposed to one’s own; the capacity to set aside our ‘thick’ 
ethical beliefs in political deba%; the ability to reflect critically upon other 
comprehensive p e r s pec t i ve s . Ye t ,  it may be that this criticism of Rawls is 
overcooked slightly: it is grounded on the premise that people who hold 
comprehensive viewpoints are intolerant of competing views and hence need to be 
instructed on the requirements of political liberalism. In truth, however, many people 
loyal to a comprehensive religious or philosophical perspective are perfectly willing 
to live and let live, and so the obligation to foster autonomy and critical thought as an 
educational goal is radically diminished.
As such, we should not merely discard the distinction between political and 
comprehensive liberalism vis-à-vis the education of the children. Whereas the former 
is potentially homogenising (offering only state run secular schools), the latter is 
consistent with a plurality of different school types: some might be religious, others 
secular; some might specialise in a specific academic area (like drama or science), 
others may provide a general edueation. The pluralistic approach would provide 
parents with a choice over how their cliildren are to be educated; and it would prevent 
the state from having to favour a deteiminate conception of the good. Yet, even then, 
certain liberal values ought to be universally respected, even if  in diluted form. As we 
have witnessed, political liberalism may not be a comprehensive doctrine, but that 
does not mean it is uncontroversial or equally accommodating of all religious or 
philosoplncal beliefs.^^"  ^ Some modicum of critical thought must be encouraged even 
within religious schools. Without a minimum degi’ee of rational reflection, citizens
Callan, E., ‘Political Liberalism and Political Education’, Review o f  Politics, 1996, p.5-33 This point is also 
made in Levinson, M., The Demands o f  Liberal Education, Oxford University Press, Chapter 1.
Macedo, S., ‘Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The case o f  God vs. John Rawls?’ John 
Rawls: Critical Assessments o f  Leading Political Philosophers, Volume IV: Political Liberalism and The Law o f  
Peoples, Kukathas, C., (ed.), Routledge, 2003, p. 151
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may not be able to understand their freedom to revise their conception of the good, or 
their obligation to treat others with respect or tolerance. Thus, while political 
liberalism can have no objection to religious schools, it must challenge dogma and 
censorship.
Consequently, we might discriminate between weak and strong religious instruction 
(in the context of a general education). Weak religious instruction might favour a 
specific doctrine, but would also point to the various arguments (religious and secular) 
that contest its veracity; moreov#, weak religious instruction would allow (and 
sometimes require) children to read sources other than those which convey the central 
doctrine. A strong conception of religious instmction would, by contrast, inculcate 
belief by dogmatically imposing one version of the truth on pupils and by prohibiting 
heretical texts, thus rendering the pupils ignorant of alternative viewpoints. A liberal 
state should grant the first type of religious education but not the latter, which 
sanctions a type of doctrinal censorship that is unacceptable in an open society. And if 
advocates of a specific religion criticise this position, as a veiled secularism, then we 
must point them back to rights of children to break with tradition, to the right of the 
state to promote openness, cooperation and tolerance, and to their right as parents to 
provide religious instruction outside the elassroom.
Admittedly, tins policy will generate controversial educational requirements. For 
instance, few concessions can be made to flindamentalists regarding the teaching of 
science in schools. Fundamentalists have argued that science in general (and 
Darwinism in paiticulai) is a comprehensive doctrine and as such should be 
considered sectarian; reasonable people may believe that in some areas science pulls 
up short. Yet this argument is unpersuasive. Of course science pulls up short in some 
areas, but it is a mere truism to claim that human knowledge is incomplete; and 
anyway, this provides no reason not to teach the scientific knowledge that we do have. 
Moreover, science is not a comprehensive doctrine in the Rawlsian sense: while it 
makes claims about the nature of the external world, it is silent on questions about 
what is good or what gives life meaning. Indeed, people who would restrict the 
teaching of science are usually motivated by the fact that they do not want their 
comprehensive worldview to be challenged. Yet, a liberal society is a market place of 
ideas, and whilst it does not prohibit the free expression of religious sentiment, neither
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does it give religious sects any special protection against competing ideas, or 
guarantee them members. To this extent, even in religious schools, scientific claims 
must be rejected on their own terms. It is insufficient to say that a scientific theory is 
false because it conflicts with one’s view about how the world came into being; 
reasons must be provided to explain why it is false; there-in lies the difference 
between belief and knowledge (and the primary aim of education must surely be to 
impart knowledge) .Unl es s  children are educated to approach science in this way, 
they will be unfairly limited in their view of reality. Admittedly, some religious 
devotees might present their obje^ons to Darwinism in scientific form. This is 
entirely legitimate, so long as it is presented in an honest fashion. That is to say, a 
teacher might legitimately point to the weaknesses o f evolutionary theory, but only if 
he also discusses the (compelling) evidence that supports it. Good scientific thought 
allows and indeed requires that openness.^^^
Education and Equal Opportunity
Having affirmed that a liberal society ought to sanction a plurality of school types, so 
long as certain core liberal values are respected, let us move on to the issue of equal 
access. A consequence of granting greater choice in education is that it becomes more 
difficult to ensure equal opportunity. Admittedly, equity in education is not always 
presented as being of overriding concern - some people concede more importance to 
the right of parents to privately finance the education of their children. Two questions 
therefore have to be settled: First, ought we to allow paients to purchase an 
advantaged education for their children? Second, if we insist that education ought to 
be financed solely from public funds, how are we to provide for choice in schooling?
Let us first deal with the issue of privately financed schooling. According to 
libertarians like Hayek, it is unjust to prevent parents from investing in the education 
of their childi’en. The proscription of private education ignores parents’ moral right to 
make a material sacrifice in order to progress the education of their child. What is
For an excellent defence o f  ‘liberal science’ see Rauch, J., Kindly Inquisitor, The University o f  Chicago Press 
1993
In the US, some religious devotees are asking for equal curricular time between Darwinism and Creationism. I 
view this as an unreasonable demand, even i f  the amount o f  time devoted to religious and scientific matters in 
school is less important than the way each is taught. The crucial point is that Darwinism should not be portrayed in 
relativistic terms -  i f  one claims it is false, one must give scientific reasons as to why  that is so.
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more, Hayek is not ti'oubled by the notion that this will thereby confer on some 
children an mideseiwed advantage: that some children might enjoy the advantages of a 
favourable home atmosphere is an asset to society, which egalitarian policies can 
destroy. Finally, the attempt to manufacture equal opportunity in education will 
necessarily repress some children’s natural talents: “The desire to eliminate the effects 
of accident, which lies at the root of ‘social justice,’ can be satisfied in the field of 
education, as elsewhere, only by eliminating all opportunities which are not subject to 
deliberate c o n t r o l . I n  sum, if we were to forbid all opportunities to children 
beyond those available to the leagt foitunate, significant harm would be done to 
children’s welfare, paiental liberty, and the ‘growth of civilisation’.
Some consider this a strong defence of private education, although I am not 
convinced. First, according to what moral imperative must we prioritise conditions 
that facilitate an amorphous phenomenon like the ‘growth of civilisation’? Surely our 
responsibility is to the individuals whose opportunities are delimited or expanded by 
education? Second, while an egalitarian rubric may well place limitations on parental 
libeity, this is nonetheless justified since it ensures that no child is arbitrarily 
advantaged by the wealth of the family into which she is bom. It is unfair to make 
educational opportunities dependent on circumstances over which a child has no 
control. Moreover, the issue is not simply a case of liberty versus equality, for as 
Berlin argues, the future worth of children’s liberty is also at stake:
“It is, I believe, desirable to introduce a uniform system of primaiy and secondary 
education... If I were asked why I believe this, I should [point to]... the intrinsic 
claims of social equality; the evils arising from differences of status created by a 
system of education governed by the financial resources or the social position of 
parents rather than the ability and needs of the children; the ideal of social 
solidarity; the need to provide for the bodies and minds of as many individuals as 
possible, and not only of members of a privileged class; and, what is more relevant 
here, the need to provide the maximum number of children with opportunities for 
free choice, which equality in education is likely to increase. If I were told that this 
must severely curtail the liberty of parents who claim the right not to be interfered 
with in this matter -  that it was an elementaiy right to be allowed to choose the
537 Hayek, F.A. von. The Constitution o f  Liberty, Routledge & Regan Paul, 1960, p.385
Ibid, p .384-6
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type of education to be given to one’s child, to determine the intellectual, religious, 
social, economic conditions in which the child is to be brought up - 1 should not be 
ready to dismiss this outright. But I should maintain that when (as in this case) 
values genuinely clash, choices must be made. In this case the clash arises between 
the need to preserve the existing liberty of some parents to determine the type of 
education they seek for their children; the need to promote other social purposes; 
and, finally, the need to create conditions in which those who lack them will be 
provided with opportunities to exercise those rights (freedom to choose) which they 
legally possess, but cannot without such opportunities, put to use.”^^®
Berlin is clear about the need to eliminate money and privilege from education, for a 
host of reasons that pertain to fairness and equality. However, his most interesting 
argument appeals to liberty itself; equality in education provides for the future worth 
of children’s freedom. In the first instance, education is often a route Ifom poverty, a 
means by which a person can secure fulfilling employment. To the extent that an 
education can lead to greater material wealth, persons are thereby placed in a position 
to take advantage of their basic freedoms, to advance their ends or conception of the 
good. Moreover, education provides a knowledge base that allows us to act upon our 
basic civil and political liberties. Without a decent education, we could vote, but we 
might not understand the relative merits of the candidates; we could stand for election, 
but we would be unable to articulate a persuasive sermon; we could subscribe to any 
reasonable morality or religion we like, but we would be incapable of comprehending 
its full message; we could resist arbitrary arrest, be we might not be able to defend 
ourselves in court. In short, a decent education improves the worth of the basic 
liberties.
Thus, there is a strong rationale to ensure that universal standards in education are met 
and that every child is given an adequate opportunity to learn, neither advantaged nor 
disadvantaged by family wealth. Unfortunately, this is blatantly not the case in the 
UK. Children in independent sehools have twice as much spent on them per head as 
those in state schools. The teacher-pupil ratio is 1:10 compared with 1:17 in state 
secondary schools and 1:23 in state primary schools. While pupils from independent 
schools amount to 7 percent of the total school-age population, they account for 29
Berlin, L, ‘Introduction, ’ Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford U niversity Press, 1969, p.Iiii-iv
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percent of entrants to the top universities.^'*^ Moreover, inequalities relate not just to 
academic performance; children at independent schools enjoy sporting, artistic and 
cultural opportunities that nurture strong and confident personalities. If we are to draw 
any conclusions from these figures, it is this; allowing parents to buy an advantaged 
education for their children is unfair on those who do not have the means to do 
likewise.
An easy solution to the problem of inequality would be to institute a uniform 
education system, which would e# u re  that a school represents the entire economic 
spectrum of society and that each child receives the same type of education. By 
levelling out the playing field in this way, the children of wealthy parents are not 
arbitrarily advantaged. As Adam Svrift points out: “Education is, in part, a positional 
good: one’s education leaves one better or worse placed in the competition for other 
desirable things -  places at good universities, desirable jobs. Preventing some people 
from buying positional advantage increases the value of education received by the 
rest.” '^** In other words, a uniform state education wifi be more effective at providing 
equal opportunity than a heterogeneous system that allows wealthy parents to 
purchase an advantaged education for their children. The problem, however, is that a 
uniform system is at odds with our previous conclusions about the type of education 
that follows fr om political liberalism. Whereas concern for equity promotes a uniform 
service, respect for liberty and pluralism promotes a fragmented provision. Wliat, 
therefore, are we to do? Do we argue with Berlin that whilst the liberty of parents to 
send their children to a school of their choice is an important consideration, it must 
give way to the requirements of fairness and equal opportunity? Or do we argue witli 
Galston that the relationship between parent and child is so fundamental to our being 
that to ignore freedom of choice in education is tantamount to the prevention of 
fr eedom of conscience?
We might respect both freedom and equity by adapting the type of inquiiy favoured 
by Dworkin: we should ask what kind of education system citizens living in a liberal 
democracy would choose if they had equal resources and were subject to a partial veil 
of ignorance. The par ties know that there is a wide plurality of religious positions and
Seldon, A., ‘Rethinking the Private School Problem’ Prospect, June, 2003, p. 18-22 
Swift, A., ‘Rethinking the Private School Problem’ Prospect, June, 2003, p.20
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conceptions of the good in society, and that the children (who will make use of the 
education system) vary in intelligence, although they are otherwise ignorant of their 
own vision of the good and life circumstances (whether or not they have children, 
whether or not they are religious, and so on). The only proviso is that the parties must 
ensure that all cliildren receive an education. Equipped with this knowledge, what 
type of system will be selected?
Although highly speculative, we might offer the following as a rough suggestion. In 
the first instance, the parties will %  motivated to select a pluralist education system 
that accommodates an array of comprehensive doctrines. Not loiowing what 
philosophy or religion they subscribe to, the parties will protect their determinate 
interests by leaving the system open to all reasonable comprehensive doctrines.^'*^ 
Schools might therefore be granted a degree of autonomy to be run in accordance 
with a comprehensive philosophy or religious perspective. At the same time, the 
background cultur e and basic structure of society prevents the parties from instituting 
schools whose values challenge the liberal democratic ideal. Second, the parties will 
be averse to the idea of a private fee-paying system. Though private schooling may 
protect choice and promote pluralism (different schools compete for the patronage of 
parents), it does not take account of the unequal financial risks faced by the parties 
(equal resources are already assumed). Some citizens will have no children (meaning 
education will not impinge upon their personal wealth), while others will have several 
children (which could lead to an unacceptable burden on their resources). Given this 
uncertainty, the parties are motivated to spread the financial burden of education 
between them and hence decide that schools ought to be financed from general 
taxation. Third, the education system will benefit children of all abilities. Importantly, 
this does not mean that equal resources should be devoted to each child: for instance, 
a child with severe learning difficulties might require additional time and resources, 
and it would be unfair to ask parents to shoulder these extra costs. Yet equally, the 
system cannot be designed solely to satisfy the needs of the most vulnerable, for then 
the interests of the majority will be harmed. Therefore, the parties might agree in 
advance how much should be set aside for the special needs of students with learning
An alternative solution might be to forbid all comprehensive perspectives, meaning no doctrine would be.- 
privileged. However, from behind the veil o f  ignorance, the parties do not know that they will not want their 
children (should they have any) to be instiaicted in accordance with their religion (should they have one). The only 
way not to foreclose certain options, then, is to leave the system open to a plurality o f  comprehensive perspectives.
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difficulties. Whatever amount is agieed to, the system must be able to deliver a 
suitable education to all, free at the point of use.
Thus, we ought to work towards an education system that accommodates a plurality 
of school-types - to be financed from the public purse - which guarantees an 
education for children of all abilities. This might be realised through a voucher 
system. By this idea, schools are given greater independence than has traditionally 
been granted in the state sector. This would allow schools to provide a differentiated 
service, which would be responsNe to the requirements of parents (schools might 
position themselves on educational or religious grounds). Parents would then use 
government-funded coupons to pay for what they consider to be the most suitable 
education for their children; they would choose between the schools that were 
competing for their business. This notion has its origins in the writing of free-market 
liberals like Friedmann and Hayek, but it works equally well as an egalitarian scheme. 
The vouchers ensure equality of resouioes (mirroring our thought experiment), since 
each parent is given the same purchasing power. A vgucher scheme therefore protects 
choice from a position of equity. This system would also avoid allegations of 
government bias since the existence of different school types -  including religious 
schools - would be driven by overall demand.
It is pertinent at this point to compare the voucher scheme for education with the 
policy for healthcare discussed earlier. Although both policies are derived from a 
thought experiment in which the policy makers are subject to a partial veil of 
ignorance, the outcomes aie different: whereas citizens would be allowed to top-up 
their medical coverage by investing in a more comprehensive insurance policy, the 
voucher system expressly forbids the supplementary financing of education. This is 
because the equality of resources assumed in the thought experiment is preseiwed 
through a voucher scheme that gives each parent equal purchasing power. To give 
parents the right to supplement the voucher scheme with private finance would 
undermine the equality condition far more radically than would the right to purchase 
additional medical care. This is because education is to a greater extent than 
healthcare related to the competitive element in society; education is a ‘positional 
good’ that can greatly affect a person’s opportunities in life.
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Still, additional supports may be required if the voucher system is to work 
successfully. For instance, if  a paient decides to send his child to a religious school at 
the far end of town, then transport to and from school may have to be provided if the 
choice is to be feasible. In the absence of such support, parents may find it easier 
simply to send their children to a more conveniently located school, irrespective of its 
academic reputation. In other words, efforts should be made to ensure that parents are 
able to make ‘active choices’ regarding their children’s education. Without a 
proactive approach to the voucher scheme, it may fail to accomplish what it promises. 
Experiments with the voucher sysffm in the US suggest that better-educated, more 
affluent parents are more likely to deliberate over the choice presented; poorly- 
educated parents are more likely to rely on ‘hearsay’ or ‘blind luck’ when 
choos i ng . S t i l l ,  these problems suggest only that the practical implementation of 
the voucher scheme could be improved, not that the scheme itself is fundamentally 
flawed.
Under what conditions might schools be allowed to compete for vouchers? In order to 
operate the voucher scheme fairly and efficiently, the following safeguards might be 
introduced:
® Schools must not discriminate in their admissions policies against children on 
grounds of race, class, religion, or intelligence.
@ Schools must make pupils aware of their civil rights and civic responsibilities through 
citizenship classes.
© Reliable standards of education should be established via examinations in core 
subjects like mathematics, languages and sciences.
Let us consider each of these conditions in turn. The first condition generates a 
problem inasmuch as successful schools will receive more applications than they can 
accommodate. As such, there must be a means to select pupils. Race and class are 
immediately ruled out as iiTelevant prejudices that ought to play no part in selection. 
This follows directly from the principle of equal opportunity. A religious criterion is 
perhaps more difficult to judge because faith-based schools are allowed in the system. 
However, the voucher scheme is meant to empower, not delimit, parental choice. As
Levinson, M ., The Demands o f Liberal Education, Oxford University Press, p. 152-4
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such, non-religious children should be allowed to attend faith-based schools and 
should have the right to opt out of religious ceremonies, teachings and assemblies. '^*'* 
Intelligence is perhaps the least controversial criterion that could be used in a 
selection process. Indeed, at the academic extremes of genius and learning disabled 
there is a strong case for employing this criterion. However, for the vast majority of 
pupils who are either slightly above or below average ability, intelligence tests might 
place artificial constraints on their educational attainments. Pupils might be 
channelled into an educational environment that does not reflect their best interests or 
requirements. As such the problenijpf selection might be best settled by invoking a 
purely arbitrary procedure. A lottery might be the least unfair means of selection for 
over-subscribed schools, since it would give every pupil an equal chance of 
admittance. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Programme in the US has used this 
criterion.
Part II - Liberty, Irrationality and Harm
Let us now turn to a more difficult issue, namely, the right of a government to detain 
or forcibly treat people who are incapacitated by mental illness. Should the state have 
the right to restrict the freedom of those whose behaviour is irrational or self­
destructive? What criteria would justify this position? Should we distinguish between 
the restraint of a person on grounds of paternalism (the prevention of self-harm) and 
on grounds of public interest (the prevention of haim to others)? How intrusive, 
pervasive and debilitating should intervention be in each case?
Regarding the issue of mental illness, the UK government seems not to recognise the 
moral distinction between harm to others and harm to oneself. Under the Draft Mental 
Health Bill (2002), a person will automatically be subject to compulsory powers if the 
following conditions are met:
® The patient is suffering from a ‘mental disorder’
The reasons for a non-religious parent to send their child to a religious school would obviously be based on 
considerations o f  educational excellence, not religious doctrine.
Brighouse, H., Egalitarian Liberalism and Justice in Education, U niversity o f  London, 2002 , p.23
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The mental disorder is ‘of such a nature or degree as to warrant the provision of 
medical treatment’
A patient is ‘at substantial risk’ of causing ‘serious harm to others’; or is a risk to his 
or her own ‘health or safety’
‘Appropriate medical treatment is available in the patient’s case’ 546
This section aims to persuade the reader of two fundamental points. First, that there is
a crucial moral difference between paternalistic intervention and intervention to
prevent harm to others (the latter is more easily justified). This rubric derives from%
Mill’s distinction between self-regarding conduct and other-regarding conduct. 
Second, that it is wrong to ground mental health legislation primarily on the notion of 
risk; such a move places insufficient importance on the rights and liberties of those 
diagnosed with a mental illness.
Mental Illness, Liberty, and the Harm Principle
“The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised 
community, against his will, is to prevent harni to others.” -  J.S. Mill, ‘On Liberty’^ '^ ^
According to Mill, the state is justified in forcibly detaining someone who poses a 
threat to the safety and well-being of others. This principle rightly commands broad 
support. Yet, there is a problem in its application: establishing whether someone is a 
risk to the public is extremely difficult to determine. Modem sensibilities suggest that 
the ascription of criminality ought to be retrospective: the restriction of an 
individual’s liberty ought to be dealt with by criminal law. We think of citizens as 
being free within the bounds of the law, innocent until proven guilty of a crime - only 
then can we legitimately imprison someone. To pre-empt the matter by imprisoning 
individuals on grounds of their criminal potential would place such sweeping and 
intrusive restrictions on liberty as to be inconsistent with all but the most tyrannical of 
political systems. Unfortunately, it is this standard that curi'ently shadows the lives of 
those diagnosed with a mental illness; their personal freedoms are far less certain than
http://www.doh.gov.ulc/mentalhealth/draftbill2002/index.htm
Mill, J.S., On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford University Press, 1991
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the basic rights and liberties that most citizens enjoy. My task is to strike a blow 
against this injustice.
Let us begin by considering the nature of mental illness. According to the British 
Psychological Society, mental illness is a broad term that encompasses a wide range 
of diagnoses, including ‘schizophrenia’, ‘psychosis’, and ‘manic depression’. 
Symptoms include hallucinatory and delusional experiences as well as strong 
fluctuations in mood. About one person in a hundred will be diagnosed with 
schizophrenia in their lifetime; t%  same number will be diagnosed with manic 
depression. Yet, the dichotomy of ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ can also be 
misleading -  inasmuch as both appraisals merely describe behaviour, there is a 
continuum that extends from extreme and unusual behaviour to normality.^'*^ 
Moreover, since psychiatric diagnoses indicate nothing about the causes of the 
behaviours, prognosis does not automatically follow from diagnosis -  there are 
variables that obfuscate the relationship between causes, symptoms and treatment. 
Not only does this mean that certain treatments work for some but not for others, it 
also makes it difficult to undertake risk assessments.
Many people assume that a diagnosis of psychosis means that individuals must resign 
themselves to a life of illness and disability. In fact, the course of psychotic 
experience is very different for different people -  many people who have distressing 
psychotic experiences at some time in their lives never have them again, and less than 
a quarter remain permanently affected. Some people who continue to have psychotic 
experiences nonetheless manage to sustain a high quality of life. It is possible for 
people who experience enduring psychotic episodes to find lasting employment and 
enjoy enduring relationships. Many of the difficulties faced have more to do with 
stigmatisation, social isolation and poverty than with the psychotic experiences 
themselves.
The British Psychological Society, ‘Recent advances in understanding mental illness and psychotic 
experiences,’ June 2000  
Ibid, p. 16 
Ibid, P-Î6 
Ibid, p. 14
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Mental illness, therefore, ought not to be presented as an unmanageable madness, 
which requires punitive measures to safeguard the public. As the BPS points out, the 
threat to others from those diagnosed with mental illness is only marginally greater 
than those without diagnosis:
“A very few people with diagnoses of mental illness commit violent acts, including 
homicide. It is very slightly more common for people with such diagnoses to 
commit such violent crimes than it is for those without diagnoses. However, 95 
percent of homicides are not committed by psychiatric patients and most
(A:,psychiatric patients are not dangerous. Moreover, specific diagnoses such as 
schizophrenia do not predict dangerousness.”
The BPS continues:
“If you wanted to predict whether a person was going to be violent in the future, 
the most important factor to consider would be whether they had been violent in the 
past. Whether or not they had a diagnosis of mental illness would be less important 
than their alcohol or drug use, their age, their gender and their social circumstances 
and their relationship to the potential victim.”
Despite the tenuous link between mental illness and violence, there ought to exist 
legislation that allows for the compulsoiy short-term tr eatment of those with a mental 
illness who exhibit violent tendencies. Some specific psychotic experiences are linked 
to Irigher rates of violence, such as ‘command hallucinations’ (voices that instruct a 
person to harm others) and ‘delusions with hostile content’ (a fixed and rigid belief 
about the need to harm others).^ '^* Such factors should always be considered when 
making a risk assessment. More broadly, the threat of violence will be greatly 
enhanced where a person has been violent in the past or where a person is exhibiting 
abnormally aggressive tendencies or hostile behaviour. The latter is likely to be an 
emergency situation, in which the affected party is already ‘out of c o n t r o l W h e n
Ibid, p.49
The British Psychological Society, ‘Recent advances in understanding mental illness and psychotic 
experiences,’ June 2000, p.5I 
Ibid, p.49
D avison, G .C., N eale, J.M ., Abnormal Psychology, 7^ '' Edition, John W iley & Sons, 1998, p .605
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such conditions obtain, then compulsion is obviously justified, so long as rigorous 
safeguards are met.
Unfortunately, recent proposals by the British Government do not adequately protect 
individuals against unnecessary compulsion. Draconian mental health legislation is 
currently being primed, which would allow for significant restrictions of liberty. 
Under the Draft Mental Health Bill (2002), a person will automatically be subject to 
compulsory powers if two qualified medical practitioners judge that tire four 
conditions (listed above) are met.^^Crucially, however, the first and fourth criteria 
utilise definitions that are broad enough to allow for the wrongfiil use of compulsory 
powers. The first criterion defines a mental disorder very broadly as ‘any disability or 
disorder of mind or brain which results in an impairment or disturbance of mental 
functioning’. T h i s  definition makes no reference to specific diagnostic categories 
such as ‘psychosis’ or ‘manic depression’; and it is broad enough to include groups of 
people such as the learning disabled.^^^ The fourth criterion defines appropriate 
medical treatment as ‘treatment for mental disorder provided under the supervision of 
an approved clinician’; and for this purpose ‘treatment’ includes -  nursing, care, 
habilitation (including education, and training in work, social and independent living 
skills), and rehabilitation (which covers the same areas as habilitation).^^^
The ease with which the first and fourth criteria could be satisfied ensures that the 
proposed legislation would effectively allow individuals to be indefinitely detained on 
the basis of ‘risk’. Both lawyers and psychiatrists are extremely critical of this 
proposal, believing it to be a populist response to public fears and insecur i t i es .The 
legislation would place significant pressure on health professionals to make accurate 
risk assessments and would transform their role fiom being primar ily concerned with 
healthcare to an orientation of social control. Notwithstanding the blurring of 
professional boundar ies, there is also the problem of accurately identifying risk; it is 
widely accepted by mental health professionals that the prediction of dangerousness is
http://www.doh.gov.uk/mentalheatth/draftbill2002/index.htm |
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fallible, especially where there is no prior record of violence/^** As Gray et al. point 
out:
“The current research literature and the experience of our clinicians has very little to 
say about how we might reliably and validly evaluate risk in someone who has never 
previously committed a serious criminal offence.”^^*
Consider the risk that psychopaths pose to the public. Although there is strong 
evidence that a diagnosis of psycl^opathy can predict recidivism across all forensic 
populations, the diagnosis itself does not determine criminality - there are many 
people who meet the criteria for psychopathy but who never commit a serious 
crime.^ *^  ^ Thus, psychiatrists might be able to predict that previous offenders 
diagnosed with a psychopathic disorder will re-offend; but there is no known way to 
establish whether psychopaths who have not yet offended will ever offend. This raises 
a crucial moral dilemma: if  we agree with Rawls that justice is the first virtue of social 
institutions, then should we allow for the detention of individuals without a history of 
violence if  psychiatry can only imperfectly identify which of those individuals will 
become serious offenders? If, as Rawls claims, each person possesses inviolability 
founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override, can we 
legitimately imprison, say, five men on the basis that thr ee of them would otherwise 
commit a serious offence?^^^ There is good reason to think not. It is for this reason 
that the legislation falls short -  it ought to stipulate in advance that threat to others 
must be demonstrable or judged to be imminent; otherwise, it is possible that many 
people will be wrongly detained.
The proposed legislation also provides inadequate safeguards in relation to the 
appropriateness of treatment. The new criteria allow for extremely controversial
Davison, G.C., Neale, J.M., Abnormal Psychology, Edition, John Wiley & Sons, 1998, p.605 Statistical 
methods are often unhelpful as a means to detennine risk. For example, some ethnic groups indicate higher rates o f  
violent crime than others; does this then mean we can predict the risk an individual poses on the basis o f his 
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Gray, S. et al., CriminalJustice, Mental Health, and the Politics o f  Risk, Cavendish Publishing, 2002, p.8 
Ibid, p.7-8
Eastman, N., ‘The Ethics o f  Clinical Risk Assessment and Management’ in Criminal Justice, Mental Health, 
and the Politics o f  Risk, Gray, S. et al., (eds.) Cavendish Publishing, 2002, p. 56-7
Given the social pressures that will be placed on psychiatrists to avoid ‘false negatives’ (i.e. failure to identify 
and detain a dangerous psychopath), they will be motivated to err on the side o f  injustice and imprison harmless 
individuals. Ibid, p.6I
241
medication, therapies and surgical procedures to be administered on a compulsory 
basis. For instance, where an individual is deemed incapable of consenting to 
treatment, the proposed legislation allows for non-consensual surgical operations that 
will destroy the functioning of brain tissue. Other non-consensual treatments - such as 
antipsychotic drugs - are equally controversial. As Davison and Neale point out, “The 
side effects of most antipsychotic drugs are often aversive to the patient and 
sometimes harmful and irreversible in the long ran, and the drags do not truly address 
all of the patient’s psychosocial problems.”^^  ^ Such invasive and contentious 
treatments ought to require more songent safeguards, one of which should be active 
patient consent.
In light of these problems, many professional and charitable organisations argue that 
the Government’s proposals are fundamentally flawed, misconceived, and 
unworkable; they are likely to infringe on individuals’ human rights and undermine 
the more positive aspects of cunent mental health policy. More broadly, the 
proposed legislation ignores the principle of reciprocity (whereby individuals are 
properly consulted on their treatment plan, with appropriate obligations on their part), 
abolishes checks and balances (such as the powers of discharge by the Nearest 
Relative), and sweeps away the important principle that compulsion should only be 
used as a last resort.^^^ In short, the Government’s proposals move the legislation in 
the wrong direction. The criteria for compulsory treatment should therefore be 
amended to include the following safeguards, all of which are recognised in UN 
guidelines;^^^
® In relation to risk management, threat to others must be clearly demonstrated or 
judged to be imminent; even then, compulsory treatment ought to be undertaken as a 
last resort, and the measures ought to be the least restrictive available (so long as the 
safety of the patient and general public is protected). Independent advocates may be 
employed to make this principle effective and to ensure that persons are not detained 
for longer than is necessary.
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# There should be a duty for full information to be provided on any proposed treatment 
and for informed consent to be sought in every case. Where informed consent is not 
obtained, treatment must be the least invasive available. Special safeguards should 
apply to controversial treatments. Psychosurgeiy and other intrusive and irreversible 
treatments for mental illness should never be carried out on a patient who is an 
involuntaiy patient in a mental health facility.
® The treatment of every patient shall be directed towards preserving and enhancing 
their capacities to pursue a vision of the good. People with mental health problems 
should have the right to choose whatever lifestyle is best for them and have that 
choice respected, so long as till'conditions for compulsory treatment are not met.
Mental Illness, Suicide and Paternalism
“Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, 
than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.” -  J.S. Mill, ‘On Liberty’^ ™
As mentioned. Mill’s harm principle provides clear ground for coercive practice if it 
is necessary to protect the physical integrity of citizens; to this extent. Mill would 
accept that there are grounds to restrict the liberty of people who are a demonstrable 
tlireat to others. Yet, it is less clear what his opinion is of paternalism. On the one 
hand, he suggests that we cannot compel others to act in accordance with oui- vision of 
the good; we ought to leave people alone, to live as they see fit, for better or worse, so 
long as they do not hann other people. However, Mill concedes that people can 
sometimes act in ignorance of their true interests, like the man who strides across a 
damaged bridge, not knowing of its danger. In these circumstances, he writes, we can 
justifiably restrict the man horn proceeding, at least until we alert him of the danger.
This type of argument allows for limited paternalism with regard to our topic; we 
might say that suicide ought to be allowed only if it can be shown that it is undertaken 
out of an enduring desire or belief. What circumstances demonstrate such conviction? 
This is a difficult question to answer, but we might say that a person’s desire to 
commit suicide should be accepted if it is eonsistent with his overall plan of life and if 
it is persistent across time. For instance, people who have contracted a fatal illness
M ill, J.S., On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford U niversity Press, 1991
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have been known to commit suicide to avoid a protracted, degrading and painful 
death. In other words, there are rational grounds for taking one’s own life if it is 
consistent with one’s overall vision of the good. To this end, we might follow Saitre 
and assert that suicide is the final fieedom that dignifies mankind; for whatever else 
we have, we have the choice of whether or not to end our existence.
Yet, it is one thing to make a calculated decision to end existence, fully aware of our 
actions; it is altogether different to face this impasse encumbered by hysteria or 
emotional distress. People diagnose^ with mental illness are far more vulnerable to 
suicide of this type than other groups.^^^ Intervention might then be justified in order 
to save persons from mistaken but irrevocable acts of self-destruction; by tliis view, 
suicidal desires are passing afflictions or aberrations that should be fought. In other 
words, there are reasons to doubt that a person diagnosed with a mental illness who 
wishes to commit suicide is acting out of liis enduring beliefs: the self-destructive 
impulse may be born of a depression or confusion that will eventually pass.
A more difficult ethical dilemma arises when a person repeatedly attempts suicide, 
thus demonstrating a consistent desire to end his existence. Should we force that 
person to stay alive under all circumstances, irrespective of the cost to individual 
liberty? Are we entitled to place that person under restraint for an indefinite period of 
time? The noted psychiatrist Thomas Szasz argues that suicide prevention is only 
justified where there aie reasons to thinlc the decision is impulsive; otheiwise, 
preventive interventions may require us to encumber a person with powerfiil 
psychotropic medication, in which case there is little joy to be gained from life 
anyway.^^^ Consequently, Szasz recommends that we allow persistently suicidal 
patients the option of drafting a treatment plan or ‘psychiatric will’ (when in a 
balanced and reasonable state of mind) regarding appropriate intervention should they 
attempt to take their life again. It is true, of course, that if a non-intervention order 
was agreed to, the consciences of health professionals may be burdened with doubt 
and regret regarding the death of a person who could have been saved: how do we 
know that such a person would not have come to regret a suicide attempt? Still,
The British Psychological Society, ‘Recent advances in understanding mental illness and psychotic 
experiences,’ June 2000, p.51
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despite this haunting uncertainty, it would be wrong to force someone to stay alive if 
there were pervasive and unambiguous evidence that he wished to die. That is not to 
say the case for paternalism ought to be wholly dismissed: the ethic sketched here 
would apply only to the most serious cases, where persons repeatedly attempt suicide 
and where appropriate treatments were unsuccessful. To the extent that suicidal 
tendencies are seen as remediable, through medication and therapy, there are 
reasonable grounds to forcibly intervene to prevent self-destruction.
Again, it is important that risk is properly assessed and that compulsory powers are 
invoked for the right reasons. Mental health legislation is not designed to enable the 
state to coerce those whose behaviour is simply unconventional or offensive to our 
sensibilities. By its very nature, mental illness is characterised by unusual beliefs, 
bizarre perceptions and strange lifestyles. Behaviours might include swearing at 
people for no reason, defecating in clothes, tearing up money, and tallring to an 
imagined p e r s o n . I t  is therefore important that any decision to use compulsory 
powers is not grounded on an aversion to these rather odd behaviours; rather, the use 
of compulsion can only be justified paternalistically if there is firm evidence that a 
person is about to commit an act of serious self-harm. Professionals therefore ought to 
ask whether a person diagnosed with a mental illness is distressed by his or her 
experiences. If the person is not, and there is no serious risk to others, there is 
normally no need to i n te rvene . Indeed,  if a person with apparent mental health 
difficulties decides to live with the symptoms and forego treatment, then the 
authorities should respect this decision: “It is important for professionals to recognise 
that a decision not to take medication is not necessarily irrational or illness-related, 
and may be in the best interests of the p e r s o n . P e r s o n a l  freedom is as dear to 
people with mental ill health as it is to anyone else. Just because a given course of 
action does not accord with convention or reason does not mean that a person’s 
decision should be overruled. Freedom, as Berlin often reminds us, is not only for the 
rational.
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What is more, something infinitely precious may be lost with psychological 
intei-vention, namely, the vitality of an um*estrained human personality and the 
creativity that flows from it. In his article ‘From Hope and Fear* Set Free’, Berlin 
points out that certain artistic talents or streaks of genius belonging to those of 
unsound mind may be destr oyed or limited by acts of patemalism.^^^ Anecdotally, we 
can identify many great artists and thinkers who suffered from mental illness; ‘We of 
the craft are all crazy’ said Byron of his fellow poets.^^^ Van Gogh is the most 
celebrated artist whose work was touched by madness; he famously cut off his ear in a 
state of depression. Yet, if  Van G^gh had been adiriinistered psychotropic drugs to 
fight his manic depression, would the world have witnessed his artistic genius? In 
tmth, if  we inteiwene to counteract the effects of mental illness, we may well destroy 
or limit human creativity; and we may exorcise the soul of an irreducible human 
personality.
Still, forcible intervention is usually justified if someone is about to take imminent, 
drastic, damaging and irrevocable action regarding his or her own person; and if this 
comes only with a loss to art or progress, then such is the price of our humanity. Only, 
we must ensure that such intervention is truly necessary. The problem with the 
previously discussed legislative proposals from the British Government is that the 
criteria for compulsion are rather broad. Coercion should only be used as a last resort, 
a principle that ought to be ensluined in legislation. As the BPS argue;
“In the past, mental health services have often adopted a paternalistic approach, and 
in the context of limited resources extensive use has been made of the powers of 
coercion available under mental health legislation. This has led to a situation where 
many people have experienced mental health services as coercive and restrictive 
and has often been a barrier to the establishment o f the trusting, collaborative 
working relationships which are the cornerstones of an effective service.
The empirical link between creativity and mental illness is increasingly being affirmed by psychological 
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As such, a collaborative, voluntary relationship must be encouraged between mental 
health seiwices and clients. We should not rule out forcible intervention, especially if 
the client, in a different state of mind, indicates that he consents to such treatment. But 
mental health seiwices should look to collaborate rather than compel; they ought to 
provide support and opportunity, empowering people to forge a conception of the 
good.
Indeed, it is not necessarily the symptoms of mental illness themselves that undermine 
persons’ chances in life -  rather, success is inexorably linked with social environment. 
People living in deprived inner-city areas are much more likely to be given a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia than people living in more affluent submhan areas. This 
might be because poverty and social isolation trigger psychosis in vulnerable 
individuals; it might be because the development of psychotic experiences is 
disadvantageous for social functioning and employment opportunities, meaning those 
affected will drift into lower income brackets.^^^ Either way, social exclusion and 
poverty often combine to exacerbate the problems freed by the mentally ill. Yet, the 
identification of these social problems also points to the way forward. As the BPS 
recognise, certain measures, such as the opportunity for paid employment, are central 
to the maintenance of mental health;
“People who aie under-occupied are much more likely tlian others to experience an 
increase in the intensity or frequency of their psychotic experiences and work can 
bring about clinical improvement, particularly when paid. Indeed, there is evidence 
that getting back to work has a greater positive impact than any other single factor."
5 8 0
It is important, then, to extend meaningful employment opportunities to the mentally 
ill. Some people might require special programmes, but others are as able as any other 
similarly qualified citizen. Unfortunately, people with a diagnosed mental illness are 
subject to significant prejudice; people are less likely to be offered jobs if  they admit
The British Psychological Society, ‘Recent advances in understanding mental illness and psychotic 
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to having previously been patients in a psychiatric hospitalf^* It is important to 
overcome this prejudice and to insist on equal oppoitunities. The mentally ill ought 
not to be viewed as pseudo-citizens who should be institutionalised but as equal 
members of the community with rights to work and live in accordance with a vision 
of the good.
Physician Assisted Suicide
“Everyone has the right to kill himself. That’s his freedom. I have nothing against suicide as a way of
■ %vanishing.” - From Milan Kundera's ‘hnmortaiity’
Many great novels have portrayed suicide as a great freedom, a means by which we 
can exit from an existence that cannot be endured. Perhaps the greatest of these 
novels, Anna Karenina, makes this point most forcefully. When Anna throws herself 
in front of a train, we feel the tragedy, but we recognise that it was her liberty and her 
choice to end her life. Suicide, then, is the final freedom. Or at least, it is for most of 
us; some people, incapacitated by illness or disease,, wish to die but are unable to 
undertake the physical act. Such people are forbidden then final freedom.
In March of 1997, a group of eminent American scholars presented argmnent to the 
US Supreme Court in favour of a constitutional right that would allow physician- 
assisted suicide.^^^ This argument followed test cases in Washington State and New 
York in which it was ruled that the US Constitution forbids the government from 
flatly prohibiting doctors to help dying patients end their lives. In spite of these 
rulings and tlie sustained argument of the so-called Philosophers’ Brief, the Supreme 
Court later declared against physician-assisted suicide by a vote of nine-to-nil. 
Building upon the arguments of the Philosopher’s Brief, I will attempt to demonstrate 
the en'or of that decision. It is a basic freedom to be allowed to die in accordance with 
one’s overall plan of life.
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The Philosophers’ Brief sets out some technical legal argument for the right to 
physician-assisted suicide; yet its most persuasive sentiment is based on an appeal to 
the value of liberty:
“Certain decisions are momentous in their impact on the character of a person’s 
life -  decisions about religious faith, political and moral allegiance, marriage, 
procreation, and death, for example. Such deeply personal decisions pose 
controversial questions about how and why human life has value. In a free 
society, individuals must be allowed to make these decisions for themselves, out 
of their own faith, conscience, and convictions.”
The problem, of course, is that the conscious thoughts of the terminally ill ai'e often 
radically dislocated from their capabilities. In this circumstance, people require an 
external agent to attend to their wishes. They might ask for help in order to prolong 
their existence -  to be nourished and cared for -  but equally they may require 
assistance in ending their existence. The decision to end life may be inspired by 
manifold reasons, not all of which will derive from the motivation to escape from 
physical pain. Even if it were possible to eliminate pain from a dying patient -  and it 
is often not -  some who are dying are equally determined to avoid what they consider 
to be the indignity of ending life overpowered by drags that have all but eliminated 
conscious existence.
Though one might disagree with physician-assisted suicide for religious or 
philosophical reasons, one cannot reasonably forbid the opportunity to those who 
abide by an alternative perspective. It is entirely a decision for the individual, which 
should be made in accordance with one’s conscience, free from the coercive legal 
restraints that prohibit doctors from assisting with a patient’s suicide. This argument 
feeds into the political liberalism advocated by Rawls: the legality of physician- 
assisted suicide ought to be insulated from comprehensive ideas -  that suicide is a sin, 
for instance -  which characterise many religious v i e w s . T h e  decision to prohibit 
must be taken on grounds that any reasonable citizen could accept.
584 Ibid.
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There are several arguments against physician-assisted suicide that can be formulated 
in purely political terms. Perhaps the least persuasive of these invokes a democratic- 
majoritarian perspective, namely, that the legal protection of physician-assisted 
suicide would provide a right whose existence most people would disagree with (they 
would not merely be content not to exercise the right). In this instance, the argument 
for libeity is surely stronger. If we are free to determine oui* own good with regard to 
relationships, religion, and politics, then why not in relation to our own death? As the 
Philosophers’ Brief points out, people ought to be free to make the deeply personal 
decision about their death for themselves and must not be forced to end their life in a 
way that appals them, simply because the majority thinks it proper. Indeed, Ronald 
Dworkin, in an earlier article, contends that to forbid someone the right to die, simply 
to acquiesce the moral majority, is “a serious, unjustified, unnecessary form of 
tyranny.
Other objectors point to the moral difference between an act and omission. It is one 
thing to withhold treatment and allow a patient to die naturally; it something 
altogether different to administer lethal medication to a patient. Yet, this moral 
distinction does not hold up to scrutiny -  both acts and omissions can be morally 
culpable. For instance, a doctor is noimally wrong if he omits to resuscitate his 
patient, although he is right if his patient is terminally ill and has asked not to be 
revived. Equally, a doctor is wrong if he knowingly acts against a patient’s wishes not 
to receive a certain procedure on religious grounds, although he would be right to act 
in this way were his patient not to object. So the distinction between act and omission 
does not necessarily have moral import; the cmcial distinction is between assistance 
and non-assistance. This criterion gives strength to the argument that there is no moral 
difference between a doctor who terminates a treatment that keeps a person alive and 
a doctor who helps a person end his own life by providing him with lethal pills to be 
ingested as and when the patient decides.
The strongest aigument against physician-assisted suicide refers to the um-eliability of 
safeguards. Marjorie Hornik, a New York social worker, admits to significant
587 Dworkin, R., ‘D o  W e Have a Right to D ie? ’ Freedom’s Law, Oxford U niversity Press, 1996, p. 146
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discomfort about the prospect of legalised assisted suicide: “I see on a daily basis the 
pressures which exist to marginalize...[the elderly and chronically ill]. So many of 
our elderly are already vulnerable to feeling that they are or will soon become a 
‘burden’ to society or to their families. The legalising of assisted suicide will add yet 
another pressure on them to ‘bow out’ quietly and g r a c i o u s l y . S h e  also points to 
the increasingly distant relationship between doctors and patients, a result of the 
economic pressures on health services. Instead of doctors acting as guardian and 
family friend, the relationship becomes less intimate and more bureaucratic. As such, 
“If assisted suicide is legalised, we %ill see what is now considered as a desperate and 
extraordinary solution for the few become yet another possible outcome on the care 
map.”^^  ^ In short, Homik fears that assisted suicide could become an institutionalised 
norm in virtue of the increasing numbers of elderly patients competing for scarce 
medical resources.
Whether or not this latter fear is justified, Hornik is correct to point to the significant 
pressures placed on the elderly to ‘bow out graciously’; the power of relatives to 
influence the decisions of weak and vulnerable family members should not be 
underestimated. Yet, as the Brief points out, “even people who are dying have the 
right to heai’ and, if they wish, act on what others might wish to tell them.”^^  ^Indeed, 
we steer a course through life in part by listening to those around us; we are 
constantly subjected to the pressures and expectations of others regarding oui' 
conduct, yet this does not annul om’ choice. In some circumstances, we make our 
decisions knowing that others might not agree with us; at other times, we acquiesce to 
the desires of those we care about. Whatever might be said about the morality of such 
decisions, it is surely not up to the state to deteimine what and who influences oui’ 
deliberations.
Again though, critics argue that safeguards requiring doctors to obtain active patient 
consent may in practice leave scope for abuse. Given the fragile condition of the 
tenninally ill, patient consent will often be ambiguous, meaning assisted suicide could 
be carried out without the clear authority of the patient. Herbert Hendin argues that
Hornik, M., ‘The Philosophers’ Brief: An Exchange’, New York Review ofBoolcs, May, 1997 
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medical evidence demonstrates this to be the case. In the Netherlands, where 
physician-assisted suicide is legal, between 900 and 1000 patients’ lives ai’e ended 
each year without their explicit consent.^^* Hendin also complains that many Dutch 
physicians have merely facilitated the death of patients: they have often failed to 
provide an independent assessment of patients’ mental health and have frequently 
neglected to discuss palliative o p t i o n s . A n o t h e r  study has revealed clinical 
problems with the practice of physician assisted suicide, not least that physicians who 
intend to provide assistance with suicide are sometimes required to administer a lethal 
injection themselves because of 1% patient’s inability to take the medication, or 
because of problems with completion (a longer than expected time till death, failure to 
induce coma, or induction of coma followed by awakening o f the patient).^^^ Yet, 
while such clinical problems must obviously be addressed, there is evidence that the 
Dutch experience has been a partial success -  it has brought relief and dignity to many 
patients who otherwise lacked the ability to end their lives; it enabled many to escape 
from debilitating and relentless diseases.^^'^ Regarding the issue of patient consent, an 
independent report that followed the legalisation of physician-assisted suicide in the 
Netherlands found that “close monitormg of the [decision to end life] is possible,” and 
that there was no evidence of “less careful decision making” nor of a significant 
increase in the number of decisions to end life.^^^
Yet, even if Dutch practices are found to be lax, there is no reason that stricter 
regulations could not be introduced, which would requhe unambiguous consent to 
assisted suicide. As a whole, the state would have to provide robust protection against 
abuse of the legal right to assisted suicide. It would have to be content that a 
terminally ill patient who wishes to die is not making a judgement based upon an 
impulse or a passing depression. Any decision to grant assisted suicide must judge 
that the patient’s choice is informed, competent, uncoerced and stable. There must be
Hendin, H., ‘Euthanasia Consultants or Facilitators?’ M edicalJounial o f  Australia, 170 (1999), p.351-352 This 
was prior to the Dutch euthanasia legislation in 2001, which allows for doctors to end life without explicit patient 
consent.
Hendin, H., ‘Euthanasia Consultants or Facilitators?’ M edical Journal o f  Australia, 170 (1999), p.35E352  
Van der W at, G., et al. ‘Clinical Problems with the Performance o f  Euthanasia and Physician-assisted Suicide 
in the Netherlands’, The New England Journal o f  Medicine, 342 (February 2000), p.551-556
The most common disease that affected patients was cancer. Van der Wal., G., et al. ‘Euthanasia, Physician- 
assisted Suicide, and Other Medical Practices Involving the End o f  Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995’, The New 
England Journal o f  Medicine, 335 (November 1996), p. 1699-1705
Van der Wal., G., et al. ‘Euthanasia, Physician-assisted Suicide, and Other Medical Practices Involving the End 
o f  Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995’, The New England Journal o f  Medicine, 335 (November 1996), p. 1699- 
1705
252
a test, undertaken across time, to ensure that a person’s wishes reflect their enduring 
principles and beliefs. The state ought to have the right override the request for 
assisted suicide where these conditions do not obtain, in order to protect citizens from 
mistaken but irrevocable acts of self-destruction. Yet, for all that rigorous safeguards 
are essential to make the right to assisted suicide feasible, that is not to say the option 
should be prohibited under all circumstances. People ought to be free to die, if that is 
their wish.
Conclusion %
This chapter has considered the broad issue of personal freedom in circumstances that 
usually allow for comprehensive paternalism -  the education of children, the caie of 
those diagnosed with a mental illness, and the care of the terminally ill. In each of 
these cases, the paternalistic provision of social services is both necessary and 
humane. Young people, people who are subject to psychotic episodes, and those 
incapacitated by terminal illness cannot always be relied upon to make good decisions 
regarding tlieir own welfare - but then, who can? As such, I have presented an 
argument in favour of personal freedom. In education, while parents should have the 
liberty to educate their children in a way that is consistent with their broader value 
system, their influence should not be allowed to impair the future value of children’s 
freedom. With regard to mental illness, though there are circumstances in which 
short-term compulsion is in the interests of affected persons, that is not to say 
sweeping coercive powers ought to be available to the mental health services. Finally, 
with regard to those diagnosed with a terminal illness, I have affirmed the right to 
assisted-suicide. Whilst it is important that this right be supplemented with robust 
safeguards, there is no reason to think that this would not be bureaucratically 
manageable -  laborious and thorough checks are a small price to pay for the potential 
gain in personal freedom.
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Conclusion -  Freedom and the Pursuit of the Good
A liberal concept of freedom, roughly put, is the opportunity to act unconstrained by 
the deliberate interference of other people. This idea -  which Berlin described as 
negative liberty - does not allude to a hierarchy of inner selves (higher or lower; true 
or false). Human beings are what they are, and a liberal concept of freedom should not 
be loaded with assumptions about what is good, or rational, or prudent; it is agnostic 
regarding the desirability of human ends. Given the absence of constraints, one is free 
to sing or dance, just as one is free to maim or murder, hi short, a liberal conception of 
freedom is anti-perfectionist. This conception of liberty as licence seems to encourage 
clear thinking. It allows us to identify those instances in which we accept limitations 
on liberty for the sake of other social goods such as justice, equality, security or 
community. At other times, the restriction of one liberty secures another; by 
prohibiting censorship on political ideas, freedom of speech and conscience is 
protected. By this view, it would obfuscate matters if we were to use the concept of 
liberty in such a way that we counted a loss of freedom only when men were 
prevented from doing something they ought to be allowed to do.
A liberal concept of freedom is therefore concerned with the avenues that are open to 
a man, in*espective of his abilities or desires or strength of character or personal 
morality. Paradigmatic constraints on liberty include physical compulsion and 
restraint, as well as threat. In the context of the modern state, this means that law - 
inasmuch as it has a coercive component -  places specific limitations on freedom, 
even if the effect of some laws is to expand liberty in other directions. Even those 
laws that protect the private sphere, and otherwise provide for individual freedom, are 
restrictive of a specific freedom -  for instance, such laws deny me the opportunity to 
use my neighbour’s property without consent. G.A. Cohen understood this point well. 
Yet, Cohen was less persuasive in his aigument that laws protective of capitalist 
institutions restrict liberty to varying extents depending on one’s personal wealth or 
class position. In truth, the laws that protect capitalist exchange restrict the liberty of 
those under its jurisdiction equally. The poor are not interfered with any more than tire 
wealthy; they are not subject to additional or more intrusive laws; simply because they 
lack the resources of their fellows does not mean they are less free. Rather, they lack
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the resources that would allow them to take advantage of their liberties in pursuit of a 
conception of the good, hnportantly, however, the inability that comes with povei*ty 
matters as much as the unfreedom that comes with persecution. Consequently, a 
commitment to individual freedom requires a commitment to certain all-purpose 
means, upon which the value of liberty is dependent.
The second part of this thesis considered three broad questions. First, why should we 
privilege liberty over other values? Second, is freedom instrumentally, intrinsically or 
constitutively valuable? Third, wh@$ is the relationship between freedom and other 
social goods? The first question is concerned with justification; the second considers 
the ends at which freedom is directed; and the third investigates the mechanisms of 
support that are needed to make liberty valuable (and whether the state should assume 
responsibility for the provision of these goods).
Regarding the initial question of justification, the priority of liberty was judged to be 
uncertain if we begin from the premise of value pluralism. If no impersonal ranking of 
values is rationally possible, on what basis can we construct an argument in favour of 
the privileged status of liberty? If ultimate values are incommensui able, does freedom 
not become just one value among others? This relativist attack challenges the 
liberalism of both Raz and Berlin. However, the opposite strategy of entrenching the 
priority of liberty as a truth of reason is equally unsuccessful, and also more insidious. 
As we witnessed with Gewirth’s ‘principle of generic consistency’, once the supreme 
value of freedom is identified as a rational truth, any actions that do not accord with 
reason can be suppressed or restricted without being said to offend against liberty. As 
such, a better approach would take a Rawlsian form: let us acknowledge that the 
priority of liberty cannot have any claim on being a necessary truth, but let us do our 
best to demonstrate that its priority is in our best interests if  subject to a veil of 
ignorance.
We might put the issue of justification another way. Kant distinguishes between two 
types of freedom: Wille and Willkür, Whereas the former is a concept of moral 
autonomy (the freedom of the rational will to accord with the categorical imperative).
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the latter is an expression of subjectively determined endsf^^ Now as Berlin correctly 
points out, a vision of liberty that is based on rational autonomy is dangerous when 
employed as a political concept: it may lead to the restriction of WillkUr without being 
said to constrain freedom (for such restrictions are the rational demands of Wille). We 
find this error in Gewirth, when he claims that to force medical treatment upon a 
badly wounded religious man is not to infringe upon his liberty since his behaviour is 
manifestly irrational. Yet, we also find that Berlin’s critique of the rational will goes 
astray insofar as he implicates the use of this concept in Kanf s ar gument for the 
liberal state.^^^ hi truth, it is the concept of freedom as Willkiir that animates Kanf s 
political philosophy: individuals are under no political obligation to act in accordance 
with Wille; they are free within the bounds of the right to pursue whatever ends they 
wish, so long as these are consistent with the freedom of everyone else.^^^ What is 
more, any remaining doubts that a Kantian justification of liberalism is haunted by a 
menacing metaphysics is comprehensively dispelled by Rawls, inasmuch as he 
replaces Kanf s philosophical conception of the person with a political conception of 
citizens as free and equal. It is in this regard that we can think of Rawis as the best 
type of Kantian: he utilises an anti-perfectionist conception of freedom as Willkiir to 
derive rules o f justice, along with assumptions about the moral equality and rational 
agency of inviolable human beings.
In relation to the ends at which liberty is directed, Raz is unique in offering a strongly 
perfectionist ai'gument. He might not utilise the concept of Wille (rational freedom) 
but he does stipulate that Willkiir (personal freedom) ought to be directed at valuable 
ends. The state is therefore charged with providing valuable opportunities for its 
citizens; more specifically, it must foster the conditions in which citizens can act 
autonomously, not only because of current socio-economic realities, but also because 
autonomy is an intrinsic good. However, contrary to Raz, I suggest that the state ought 
to remain agnostic about what is good or valuable. The liberal state, within the 
boundai-ies of the right, ought to respect the revealed preferences of individuals, 
however eccentric, imprudent, unhelpful or morally ambiguous. As Berlin puts it: 
“Most modern liberals, at their most consistent, want a situation in which as many
Williams, H., K a n t’s Political Philosophy, Blackwell, 1983, p.69, HO 
Berlin, I., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 153, Footnote 1 
598 -Williams, H., Kant's Political Philosophy, Blackwell, 1983, p.69, 110
256
individuals as possible can realise as many of their ends as possible, without 
assessment of the value of these ends as such, save in so far as they may frustrate the 
purposes of others.”^^  ^ The work of Berlin is therefore characterised by anti­
perfectionism, even if he makes strong claims about the intrinsic value of liberty. This 
latter belief stems from his broader account of human nature and rests specifically in 
the value he suggests human beings find in making free choices. By contrast, Rawls 
tliinks of liberty as having an instrumental value: its worth derives from the 
opportunities that it generates; the liberties conferred upon us by the right merely 
allow us to pursue the good (it is th%good that is intrinsically valuable). This position 
is certainly less controversial than the belief that there is intrinsic value in being able 
to make free choice, irrespective of the ends at which freedom is directed. This notion 
might be criticised as being fetishist.
Regarding the relationship between liberty and the all-purpose means that make it 
valuable, Gewirth and Rawis are the most instructive. In Reason and Morality, 
Gewirth suggests that agents prize the generic goods required to pursue their 
purposes. These goods, according to Gewirth, are freedom and well-being. Freedom 
allows the agent to control his action by making unforced choices, such that his action 
is a means of pursuing what he considers good. Well-being, which is minimally 
composed of the basic goods that sustain life (food, clothing, shelter, and confidence 
in the possibility of attaining one’s goals), allows one to act pmposively towaids 
one’s ends. Without these goods, the agent would be able to act either not at all or 
only in certain very limited ways. Gewirth’s understanding of generic goods is 
comparable to Rawls’s conception of primary social goods. For Rawls, primaiy social 
goods refer to rights, liberties, and opportunities, the social bases of self-respect, and 
income and wealth. Such goods are viewed as all-purpose means to agents’ ends; they 
are instrumental to the puisuit of their purposes. As such, these goods are ‘things that 
eveiy rational man is presumed to want’. These goods normally have a use ‘whatever 
a person’s rational plan of life’. On this point, Gewirth and Rawls agree: there are 
certain generic goods that assist the individual in the pursuit of purposes; hence 
purposive agents pmdentially value such generic goods. To a greater extent than 
Berlin or Raz, Gewirth and Rawls discuss the linlc between liberty and the capacities
Berlin, 1., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford U niversity Press, 1969, p. 153, Footnote 1
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that allow for the pursuit of purposes. These capacities derive from the primary social 
goods identified above. That is to say, if liberty is to be valuable to individuals, they 
must have access to those social goods that allow for its exercise: freedom is valuable 
because it allows us to act upon our conception of the good; but unless we aie 
endowed with certain capacities, it becomes difficult to realise such a conception.
The extent to which primaiy goods should be provided by the state is a question of 
distributive justice. Rawls’ argument was explored in most detail here, primarily 
because his broader justification of^jbeity was held to be the most persuasive. That is 
not to say the other theorists do not touch upon the issue of distributive justice. Yet, 
often this only developed the emergent problems of their more general argument. For 
instance, according to Raz, the state ought to sponsor an array of valuable 
opportunities, thus enabling autonomous choice. Yet, how, in Raz’s pluralistic 
universe, are these valuable opportunities to be identified? How can we identify 
morally worthwhile ends fiom an array of incompatible and incommensurable 
values? There are no satisfactory responses to such questions. Or again, Gewirth’s 
distributive argument potentially conflicts with the rational truth of his ‘principle of 
generic consistency’. For instance, if it is a necessary truth that an egalitarian 
distribution of social goods is derived from Gewirth’s premises, why place this 
outcome in doubt by opening it up to the uncertainties of a democratic mandate?
Rawls’ distributive argument is the most persuasive of the four considered. His 
principles of justice are a rational response to the uncertainties of the original position. 
Moreover, and importantly for ray overall argument, his argument protects not only 
the right to basic liberties, but also the fair value of those liberties. This is a concern of 
utmost importance for Rawls. He explicitly calls for the fair value of the political 
liberties to be protected; and he argues that the difference principle sufficiently 
protects the value of other basic liberties, without damaging additional human 
concerns, such as economic efficiency. I wish to draw attention to the force of this 
ethic in Rawls’ work (that liberty must be made valuable for those who possess it by 
fairly distributing primary goods), for it is often overlooked.^^^ Yet, that is not to say 
Rawls’ argument is without difficulty. Most importantly, as far as distributive justice
Indeed, the only critic to really engage with it is Norman Daniels. See pages 122-4
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is concerned, he fails to properly distinguish between the effects of choice and chance. 
He rightly points out that many of our capacities, which are vital to oui* pursuit of the 
good, are a product of social and genetic factors over which we have no control and 
hence are undeseiwed (thus paving the way for an egalitarian distribution of primary 
social goods). However, as Dworkin points out, sometimes our successes and failures 
in life are attributable to the choices we make or the effort we apply. Unfortunately, 
Rawls’ difference principle is blind to this notion.
The final part of the thesis a ttem pt^ to partially accommodate the notion of desert in 
relation to the type of social policies that are consistent with the broader argument, 
namely, that a system of basic liberties ought to be complimented by an an*ay of 
social goods if individuals are to be empowered in their pursuit of a conception of the 
good. To some extent, my treatment of social policy was superficial, given limitations 
of space and time. Nonetheless, I suggested several ideas that could be said to 
empower individuals in the puisuit of their purposes. I began by asserting that the 
point of market society is to produce opportunities for wealth production and to allow 
individuals to act on their economic freedom. However, a laissez faire society 
produces significant casualties, and hence the capacity of many people to pursue a 
vision of the good is undermined. The task, then, is to generate conditions in which 
people have a good chance to puisue their own ends without undermining personal 
responsibility or transgressing against basic freedoms. I argued this could be achieved 
thi'ough a mixed economy that fostered economic independence, personal 
responsibility and the principle of reciprocity. Specific policies that might facilitate 
this included asset-based welfare, conditional unemployment benefit and universal 
basic health cai*e.
The issue of paternalism was discussed in the final chapter. Here the debate was still 
policy oriented, but the focus was on those ai*eas that have in the past disempowered 
individuals: the schooling of children; the treatment of the mentally ill; and the 
hospitalisation of the terminally ill. I touched upon the type of support that is 
necessary to empower individual choice, and I examined the reach of that choice. 
Often this produced controversial ideas: allowing people to take their own life, 
conceding some ground to religious schooling, and allowing people conunonly 
thought to be dangerous to live in the community. That is not to say I found no role
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for paternalism in society; the paternalistic provision of social services is both 
necessary and humane. Only, this should be kept to a minimum; notwithstanding 
serious threat to persons’ well-being, individuals should be encouraged to forge a life 
for themselves.
As a whole, my argument upholds that which Kant held to be true, namely, that: “No- 
one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of 
others, for each may seek happiness in whatever way he thinks fit, so long as he does 
not infringe upon the freedom o |. others to pursue a similar end which can be 
reconciled with the freedom of everyone else.”^^  ^ This is the classical liberal notion 
that self-regarding conduct should not be interfered with by moralisers, reactionaries, 
or cynics. Yet, Kant’s argument is incomplete, for the pursuit of our purposes requires 
more than rights to basic liberties; it also requires access to primary social goods. In 
other words, while each person may seek happiness in whatever way he thinks fit (so 
long as he does not infringe upon the rights of others) we aie nonetheless obliged to 
support the worth of each other’s freedom. We are responsible to each other for the 
conditions in which all can reasonably pui sue a determinate vision of the good.
Kant, I., ‘On the Relationship ofT heoo' to Practice in Political Right’, Kant's Political Writings, Reiss, H., 
(ed.), Nisbet, H.B., (trans.), Cambridge University Press, 1970, p.74
260
Bibliography
Ackerman, B., Alstott, A., The Stakeholder Society, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1999).
Arblaster, A,, The Rise and Decline o f Western Liberalism, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) 
Arrow, K., ‘Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Theory of Justice’ Journal 
o f Philosophy, 70 (1973), p.245-263.
Baghramian, M., Ingram. A, (eds.). Pluralism -  The Philosophy and Politics o f
’1'% :Diversity, (London: Routledge, 2000).
Barry, h.. Essays in Political Theory, Vol. II Liberty and Justice, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1991)
Beehler, R , ‘For One Concept of Liberty’, Journal o f Applied Philosophy, (1991), 
p.27-43.
Benn, ST., A Theory o f Freedom, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 
Benn, S.I., and Weinstein, W.L., ‘Being Free to act, and Being a Free Man’, Mind, 80 
(1971), p .194-211 
Berlin, I., Liberty, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)
Berlin, I., Freedom and Its Betrayal, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002) 
Berlin, I., The PoM>er o f Ideas, (London: Chatto & Windus, 2000)
Berlin, I., ‘Reply to Ronald H. McKinney,’ The Journal o f Value Inquiry, 26 (1992), 
p.557-560.
Berlin, I., The Crooked Timber o f Humanit)), (London: Fontana Press, 1991)
Berlin, I., ‘Reply to Kocis’, Political Studies, 31 (1981), p.388-393 
Berlin, I., Concepts and Categories, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980)
Berlin, I., Russian Thinkers, (London: Flogarth Press, 1978)
Berlin, I., Four Essays on Liberty, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969)
Berlin, L, Williams, B., ‘Pluralism and Liberalism: A Reply’, Political Studies, 42 
(1994), p.293-309
Beyleveld, D., The Dialectical Necessity o f Morality, (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1991)
Blokland, H., Freedom and Culture in Western Society, (London: Routledge, 1997) 
Brighouse, FT, Egalitarian Liberalism and Justice in Education, (London: University 
of London, 2002)
261
British Psychological Society, ‘Recent advances in understanding mental illness 
and psychotic experiences’, (June 2000)
Brittan, S., ‘Assets for AH’, Prospect, (August 2003), p.24-27 
Callan, E., ‘Political Liberalism and Political Education’, Review o f  Politics, (1996), 
p.5-33
Cohen, G.K., History, Labour and Freedom: Themes from Marx, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1988)
Cohen, G.A., Self-ownership, Freedom and Eqiialityf, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) "
Cranston, M., Freedom, (London: Longmans, 1967)
Crowder, G., ‘Pluralism and Liberalism’, Political Studies, (1994), p.293-309 
Crowder, G., Liberalism and Value Pluralism, (London: Continuum, 2002)
Daniels, N. (ed.), Reading Rawls, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989)
Daniels, N., Just Health Care, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 
Davison, G.C., Neale, ]M ., Abnormal Psychology, 7^ '^ Edition, (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1998)
Day, J.P., ‘Threats, Offers, Law, Opinion and Liberty’, American Philosophical 
gwufrrerfy, 14 (1977), p.252-272 
Day, J.P., Liberty and Justice, (London: Croom Helm, 1987)
Dostoevsky, F., The Brothers Karamazov, (London: Penguin, 1993)
Dostoevsky, F. Crime and Punishment, (London: Penguin, 1991)
Dworkin, R., Sovereign Virtue, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) 
Dworkin, R , Freedom's Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)
Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously, (London: Duckworth, 1977).
Dworkin, R., Lilia, M., Silvers, R., (eds.), The Legacy o f  Isaiah Berlin, (New York: 
New York Review of Books, 2001)
Fromm, E., The Fear o f  Freedom, (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1960) 
Galipeau, C.J., Isaiah Berlin’s Liberalism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994)
Galston, W.A., Liberal Pluralism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
Galston, W.A., ‘Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory’, American Political 
S'c/g/zcg Rewen/, 93 (1999), p.769-778 
Galston, W.A., ‘Moral Personality and Liberal Theory: John Rawls’s ‘Dewey 
Lectures” Political Theory, 10 (1982), p,492-519
262
Gelder, M.G., Lopez-Ibor, J.J., Andreasen, N., (eds.) New Oxford Textbook o f  
Psychiatry, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)
Gewirth, A., The Community o f Rights, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1996)
Gewirth, A., Reason and Morality, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978) 
Gewirth, A., ‘The Justification of Morality,’ Philosophical Studies, 53 (1988), 
p.245-262
Giddens, Sociology, 2nd Edition, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993)
Gilbert, N., Transformation o f the P/elf are State, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002)
Gray, J., ‘On Negative and Positive Liberty’, Political Studies, 28 (1980), p.507-526 
Gray, J., Straw Dogs, (London: Granta Books, 2002)
Gray, J., Two Faces o f Liberalism, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000)
Gray, J., Berlin, (London: Fontana Press, 1995)
Gray, J., Liberalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)
Gray, N., Laing, J., Noaks, L., (eds.), CriminalJustice, Mental Health, and. the 
Politics o f Risk, (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2002)
Gutman, A., Liberal Equality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980)
Hart, H.L.A., ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’ Philosophical Review, Ixiv (1955), 
p.175-191
Habermas, J., ‘Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John
Rawls’s Political Liberalism’, Journal o f Philosophy, (March 1995) p. 109-131 
Hampshire, S., Innocence and Experience, (London: Penguin Press, 1989)
Hampshire, Morality and Conflict, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983)
Hamp shir e-Mo nk. I., A History o f Modern Political Thought, (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992)
Flampson, N., The Enlightenment, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968)
Hayek, F.A. von, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol.2, (London: Routledge & Keegan 
Paul, 1973)
Hayek, F.A. Von, The Constitution o f Liberty, (London: Routledge, 1960)
Heidegger, M., The Essence o f Truth, (Continuum International Publishing, 2002) 
Flendin, H., ‘Euthanasia Consultants or Facilitators?’ Medical Journal o f Australia, 
170 (1999), p.351-352
263
Herzen, A., Selected Philosophical Works, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, 1956)
Hornik, M., ‘The Philosophers’ Brief: An Exchange’, New York Review o f Books,
44 (May 1997)
Israel, J.I., Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making o f Modernity 1650- 
1750, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)
Jahanbegloo, R,, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin, (London: Phoenix Press, 2000) 
Kant, I., Groundwoili fo r  the Metaphysics o f Morals, trans. Paton, (London: 
Hutchinson, 1948)
Kant, I., K an t’s Political Writings, Reiss, H., (ed.), Nisbet, H.B., (trans.), (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970)
Kekes, J., The Morality o f Pluralism, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) 
Knowles, D., Political Philosophy, (London: Routledge, 2001)
Kristjansson, K., Social Fi'eedom, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
Kukathas, C., {qO), John Rawls: Critical Assessments o f Leading Political
Philosophers, Volume II: Principles o f Justice-1, (London: Routledge, 2003) 
Kukathas, C., {q6), John Rawls: Critical Assessments o f Leading Political
Philosophers, Volume IV: Political Liberalism and The Law o f Peoples, 
(London: Routledge, 2003)
Kundera, M., Immortality, (London: Faber & Faber, 1992)
Kymlicka, W., Contemporary Political Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990)
Kymlicka, W., Midticidtural Citizenship, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 
Lessnoff, M., Political Philosophers o f the Twentieth Century, (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1999)
Levinson, M., The Demands o f Liberal Education, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002)
Lindley, W, Autonomy, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986)
Lomasky, L.E., ‘ Gewirth’s Generation of Rights,’ Philosophical Quarterly, 31(1981), 
p.248-252
Lukacs, G., Marxism and Human Liberation, (Dell Publishing Co., 1973)
Lukes, S., ‘In Conversation with Isaiah Berlin,’ Salmagundi, 4 (1998), p.52-134 
Lukes, S., Liberals and Cannibals, (London: Verso, 2003)
264
MacCallum, G. C., ‘Negative and Positive Freedom,’ Philosophical RevieMf, 76 
(1967), p.312-334 
MacIntyre, K., After Virtue, (London; Duckworth, 1981)
Mackenzie, I., ‘Berlin’s defence of value-pluralism: clarifications and criticisms’, 
Contemporary Politics, 5 (1999), p.325-337 
MacKinnon, C., ‘Sexuality, Pornography, and Method: ‘Pleasure under Patriarchy’ 
Ethics, 99 (1989), p.314-346 
MacKinnon, C., and Dworkin, A., In Harm’s Way: The Pornography Civil Rights 
Hearings, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997)
MacKinnon, C., Only Words, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993) 
Macpherson, C.B. Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1973)
Manning, D. J., Liberalism, (J. M. Dent & Sons, 1976)
Marples, R,, (ed.), The Aims o f Education, (London: Routledge, 1999)
Marx, K., Engels, F., The Communist Manifesto, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992)
McMahon, C., ‘ Gewirth’s Justification of Morality,’ Philosophical Studies, 50 (1986),
p.261-281
Mill, J.S., (9/7 Liberty and Other Essays, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) 
Miller, D., ‘Constraints on Freedom’, Ethics, 94 (1983), p.66-86 
Miller, D., ‘Reply to Oppenheim’, Ethics, 95 (1985), p.310-314 
Miller, D., Liberty, (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Moore, M. Foundations o f Liberalism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993)
Nagel, T., Other Minds: Critical Essays 1969-1994, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995)
Nagel, T., Mortal Questions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) 
Narveson, J., Dimock, S., Qds.) Liberalism: New Essays on Liberal Themes, 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000)
Nietzsche, F., On The Genealogy! o f Morals, Smith, D., (trans.), (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996)
Nissan, D., Le Grand, J., A Capital Idea: Start-up Grants fo r  Young People, (London: 
The Fabian Society, Feb 2000)
Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974)
Oakeshott, M., Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, (London: Methuen, 1962)
265
Oppenheim, F., ‘ ‘Constraints on Freedom’ as a Descriptive Concept’ Ethics, 95 
(1985), p.305-309
Oppenheim, F,, Political Concepts: A Reconstruction, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981) 
Parekh, B., ‘Superior People: The Narrowness of Liberalism from Rawls to Mill’, 
Times Literary Supplement, (25th February 1994)
Parijs, P. Van., ‘Why Surfers should be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional 
Basic Income’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, (1991), p. 101-131 
Parijs, P, Van., Real Freedom For All, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995)
Paul, E.F., Miller, F.D., Paul, J., and Ahrens, J., (eds.). Capitalism, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1989)
Paul, J., (ed.), Reading Nozick, (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield, 1981)
Pettit, P., Republicanism: A Theory o f  Freedom and. Government, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997)
Pinker, S., The Blank Slate, (London: Penguin Books, 2002)
Pojman, L., and Westmoreland, R., (eds.), Equality: Selected Readings, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997)
Randall, J., {ed.) Bloomsbury Anthology! o f  Quotations, (London: Bloomsbury, 2002) 
Rauch, J., Kindly Inquisitor, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993)
Rawls, J.,ri Theory o f Justice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972)
Rawls, J., Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2001)
Rawls, J., Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)
Rawls, J., John Rawls: Collected Papers, Freeman, S., (ed.), (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001)
Rawls, J., Thomson, J. Nozick, R , Dworkin, R., Scanlon, T.M., Nagel, T., ‘Assisted 
Suicide: The Philosophers’ Brief, New York Review o f Books, 44 (March
1997)
Raz, J., Ethics in the Public Domain, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994)
Raz, J., The Morality o f  Ft^eedom, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)
Regis, E., (ed.), Gevnrth’s Ethical Rationalism, (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1984)
Rosen M., Wolff, J., (eds.). Political Thought, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999)
266
Rorty, R,, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989)
Ryan, A. 'Freedom’, Philosophy, 40 (1965), p. 93-112 
Ryan, A., (ed.) The Idea o f Freedom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) 
Sandel, M., Liberalism and Its Critics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) 
Sandel, M., Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982)
Sartre, J.P. Being And Nothingness, Barnes, H E. (trans.) (London: Methuen & Co., 
1957)
Sartre, J.P. Existentialism and Humanism, Mairet, P. (trans.), (London:
Methuen & Co., 1948)
Schmidtz, D., and Goodin, R., Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility, 
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1998)
Seldon, A., 'Rethinking the Private School Problem’ Prospect, (June 2003, p. 18-22) 
Sen, A., Development as Freedom, (New York: Anchor Books, 2000)
Sen, A., Inequality^ Reexamined, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)
Simhony, A., 'On Forcing Individuals to be Free; T.H. Green’s Liberal Theoiy of 
Positive Freedom’, Political Studies, 1991, p.303-20 
Singer, P., (ed.) Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994)
Smith, A., An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations, 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981)
Smith, G.W., 'Slavery, Contentment, and Social Freedom’, Philosophical Quarterly, 
27 (1977), p.236-248 
Steiner, FI., 'Individual Liberty,’ Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society, 75 (1975), 
p.33-50
Steiner, H., An Essay on Rights, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994)
Strawson, P.F., Freedom and Resentment, (London; Methuen & Co., 1974)
Swift, A., ‘Rethinking the Private School Problem’ Prospect, (June 2003), p. 18-22 
Szasz, T., ‘The Case Against Suicide Prevention’, American Psychologist, 41 (1986),
p.806-812
Ten, C.L. Mill On Libert)!, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980)
Van der W al, G., et al. ‘Clinical Problems with the Performance of Euthanasia and 
Physician-assisted Suicide in the Netherlands’, The Ncm> England Journal of 
Medicine, 342 (Febmary 2000), p.551-556
267
Van der Wal,, G., et al, 'Euthanasia, Physician-assisted Suicide, and Other Medical 
Practices Involving the End of Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995’, The New 
England Journal o f Medicine, 335 (November 1996), p. 1699-1705 
Wade, D., ‘You don’t have to be mad to be creative but it helps’, Sunday Times 
Magazine, (November 2003), p.52-60 
Walzer, M., Spheres o f Justice, (Oxford: Robertson, 1983)
West, D., ‘Spinoza on Positive Freedom’ Political Studies, (1993), p,284-96 
Williams, B., Moral Luck, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)
Williams, FI., K ant’s Political Philosophy, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983)
Wollstonecraft, M., A Vindication o f the Rights o f Women, (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1975)
In terne t Sources:
The Department of Health, Draft Mental Health Bill 2002:
http://www.doll.nov.uk/mentalhealtlLdraftbill20Q2/index.htm (10.1.2004)
The Mental Health Foundation, Response to the Draft Mental Health Bill 2002: 
http://www.mentalhealth.orK.uk/html/content/re8ponse mbb eimwales 0902.pdf 
(10.1.2004)
The United Nations, UN Resolution 46/119 (1991), ‘Principles for the protection of Persons 
with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care’: 
http : II WWW, un. orK/documents/sa/res/46/a46rl 19. htm (10.1.2004)
rCLASGOW 
UNIVERSITY 
LIBRARY___
268
